Citizen Demand for Corruption: Evidence from Roadway Tolls in the D.R. Congo

This study examines the determinants of petty corruption in the DRC. In pilot data, 42 percent of motorcycle taxi drivers reported paying less than the official rate at tolls. To explain this high rate of non-compliance, we randomly offer motorcycle taxi drivers one of three incentives to obtain an official receipt at the toll, or a control condition . Relative to an official toll of 2000FC (US$2.20), the incentives are: a 1000FC-2500FC payment to the driver, a 2000FC donation to a local health NGO, or a 2000FC donation to the government, earmarked for health. The first treatment induces drivers to either pay the official amount or demand a lower bribe price. The latter two treatments compare the responsiveness of tax-payer behavior to differences in the perceived effectiveness of the recipient of tax payments. We will cross-randomize with an audit treatment to compare the effectiveness of citizen-side interventions with bureaucrat interventions.