

The Power of Dialogue: Forced Displacement and Social Integration amid an Islamist Insurgency in Mozambique

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Abstract

With global forced displacement at an unprecedented level, there is an increasing demand for low-cost interventions that can reduce tension between displaced persons and host communities. This study undertakes a novel field experiment designed to improve the social integration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into host communities under conditions of scarce resources and low state capacity. The experiment was conducted in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique's northernmost province, where an Islamist insurgency has resulted in over one million IDPs. Hosts and IDPs participated in joint community meetings in which they discussed topics related to their collective life. Analysis of survey data, list experiments and lab-in-the-field games shows the community meetings produced sustained positive effects on the relationship between hosts and IDPs. As a novel insight, this study finds that even brief but structured intergroup interactions can have a beneficial and enduring impact on social cohesion that persists for at least 2-3 months.

Keywords: Forced Displacement; Intergroup Contact; Field Experiment; Social Integration

JEL: C93, D74, D83, D91 J15, O15, Z12, Z13.

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1 Introduction

Mòro wa va'salani ohisa empá.

(A fire in the junkyard can burn the house.)

—Popular saying of the Makua people.

The integration of forcibly displaced individuals, such as refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs), is a pressing issue faced by low- and middle-income countries. The latest United Nations report on global trends in forced displacement reveals that the world has reached a new peak of 108.4 million forcibly displaced individuals, with 82 million (76%) of them being hosted in low- and middle-income countries (UNHCR 2023). The relocation of such a large number of individuals places a significant burden on hosting communities, with numerous empirical studies finding evidence of negative effects on local labor and housing markets (Depetris-Chauvin and Santos 2018, Jennifer Alix-Garcia and Saah 2012, Morales 2018, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2015, Tsuda 2022, Tumen 2016), food security (George and Adelaja 2022), and wealth (Alix-Garcia and Saah 2010). The shock generated by the arrival of these individuals can also lead to tension and even conflict between hosts and displaced persons (Albarosa and Elsner 2023, Jennings and Sanchez-Pages 2017, Putnam 2007, Rozo and Vargas 2021). All this evidence highlights the need for effective solutions to integrate forcibly displaced individuals and local hosts, as tension between these two groups can impede long-term socioeconomic development (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004, Knack and Keefer 1997, Sobel 2002, Zak and Knack 2001).

The first-order importance of reducing tension between local hosts and displaced persons has led both academics and policy makers to increasingly think of new policies to address this issue. One common approach is resource focused; it often consists in providing public goods (Asaad, Ginn, and Saleh 2023) or social and economic incentives to advance the socioeconomic self-sustainability of displaced persons and integrate them into the local labor market (Altindag and O'Connell 2023, Battisti, Giesing, and Laurensyeva 2019, Beltramo et al. 2023, Caria et al. 2020, MacPherson and Sterck 2021). Although they have proven to be effective, resource-focused interventions often require significant central planning and financial investment—which may not always be available to policy makers in low income countries. Another approach is community

based, aiming to empower local communities to promote socioeconomic integration with minimal central planning or financial resources. Despite its key importance, this approach has remained scarcely studied.

Using a community-based approach, I designed and conducted a field experiment testing a novel intervention to promote the social integration of IDPs into the local hosting community in the city of Pemba, the provincial capital of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique. Since October 2017, Cabo Delgado has been affected by an Islamist insurgency that has already led to more than one million IDPs—around 40% of the province’s total population—with 140,000 IDPs currently relocated to Pemba (a city of 200,000 people before the conflict). This sizable increase in Pemba’s population has generated significant social friction between local hosts and IDPs, threatening the efforts of local authorities and their international partners to maintain peaceful coexistence.¹

In my experiment, inspired by Allport’s contact hypothesis (Allport 1954) and building upon a recent and promising body of research measuring the beneficial impact of intergroup contact on marginalized groups (Lowe 2021, Mousa 2020, Rao 2019), I implemented a novel randomized intervention that assigned IDPs and local hosts (in Pemba) to joint community meetings. Lasting a half day and consisting of 8 to 10 participants, community meetings followed a predefined protocol based on the framework of a public dialogue (Herzig and Chasin 2006), which I tailored to the context of Pemba with the support of local community members. The community meetings had the main objective of reducing prejudice and promote social integration into the local hosting community.²

The community meetings offered an opportunity for locals and IDPs to discuss the current displacement situation in Pemba, their experiences with each other and the insurgency, and possible paths going forward. IDPs were also invited to voluntarily share their stories of escaping from insurgents. To evaluate the treatment effects of the intervention, I employed a variety of outcome measurements, including surveys, lab-in-the-field games and list experiments.

This study finds that community meetings, under the defined protocol, achieved their objective

¹Supporting evidence is provided in Section 2.2.

²This study also examined how community meetings impacted support for the insurgency, due to the concerns about the potential radicalization of locals and IDPs. This analysis complements the relevant work of (Armand et al. 2020) and (Vicente and Vilela 2022), also studying the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. The preliminary results are encouraging, showing a decrease in the support for insurgents, and they can be consulted in the working paper version of this study (<https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4609266>). A more in-depth analysis is currently being conducted.

of improving the social integration of local hosts and IDPs. Regarding social integration, the community meetings had positive and significant effects on social integration in both the short term (2-3 days after the intervention) and the medium term (2-3 months after the intervention). In the short term, locals who participated became more tolerant of IDPs' staying in their neighborhoods (11.5% increase). I observed this even though I detected no significant improvements in the locals' beliefs about IDPs or discrimination against IDPs.

In the medium term, the intervention softened locals' beliefs about IDPs—measured by their association of IDPs with insecurity and worse living conditions (9.2% decrease) and their self-reported trust (10.1% increase). Discrimination against IDPs, measured by a list experiment, decreased by 16.6%. An analysis of heterogeneous effects reveals that the community meetings produced differential effects depending on locals' baseline views of IDPs. The short-term improvement in tolerance toward IDPs was driven by locals with more negative baseline views, while the positive shift in beliefs about IDPs was driven by locals with more positive baseline views.

Regarding IDPs, treatment effects measured using survey data suggest that the community meetings generated short-term improvements in IDPs' sense of belonging in host neighborhoods and their trust in local hosts (20.6% and 15.1% increases, respectively); these effects' magnitude and precision persisted in the medium term. In addition, IDPs who participated in the community meetings reported being more involved in the civic life of host neighborhoods shortly after the intervention (8.1% improvement), although no significant treatment effect was detected in the medium term. The results from a list experiment suggest that IDPs' sense of being discriminated against by locals decreased by 15.1% in the short term. The community meetings also generated heterogeneous effects among IDPs, with the significant improvements in their social integration being driven by IDPs who felt more marginalized before the intervention.

This study makes several important contributions to the literature. It adds the case of an ongoing Islamist insurgency to the body of empirical research on the impact of intergroup interactions on social behavior in low- and middle-income countries. It builds on previous work on the effects of intergroup interactions in different settings, including schools ([Corno, La Ferrara, and Burns 2022](#), [Rao 2019](#)), educational and vocational training programs ([Maiti et al. 2022](#), [Scacco and Warren 2018](#)), ethnically and religiously segregated sporting competitions ([Lowe 2021](#), [Mousa 2020](#)), post conflict national reconciliation ([Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi 2016](#)), nation building ([Bazzi et al.](#)

2019) or lab-in-the-field experiments (Clochard, Hollard, and Sene 2023).³

Complementing all these works, which analyze longer interventions (ranging between several days and months), this study provides new evidence that even brief intergroup interactions can produce results that persist for at least 2-3 months. In intergroup-contact literature reviews, Paluck, Green, and Green (2019) and Paluck et al. (2021) indicate that the efficacy of short-term interactions remains underexplored. Most research has either focused on longer-term interventions (spanning weeks, months, or years) or only measured effects soon after the intervention (within the same day).

This study also contributes to the growing body of research on conflict in Cabo Delgado, a hard to reach and still understudied conflict-ridden region. It complements the ongoing work by Barros (2024), which examines the efficacy of intergroup contact as a counterinsurgency strategy. Additionally, it builds on recent studies that investigated the implications of resource wealth for political stability and conflict prevention during the onset of the insurgency (Armand et al. 2020) and assessed the effectiveness of civic education in countering Islamic radicalization (Vicente and Vilela 2022). By focusing on community-based interventions targeting IDPs and local hosts in Cabo Delgado, this study offers a complementary perspective on how to address the social challenges posed by forced displacement and conflict.

The policy implications of this study are substantial, as policy makers in numerous settings around the world lack the capacity to establish incentives, create labor-participation schemes, or implement resource-focused programs to integrate forcibly displaced individuals. This deficiency often erodes social capital and harms mental health (Chiovelli et al. 2021). This study proposes a new, community-based policy that can generate positive and enduring effects under conditions of resource scarcity or low state capacity. Consequently, it reduces the number of circumstances in which supporting forcibly displaced individuals is not feasible.

The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I explain the context of Cabo Delgado in Section 2. Next, in Section 3, I detail the intervention, including the field-experiment design, baseline

³Although Mousa (2020) studies a setting of internal displacement in Iraq, the work focuses solely on IDPs (Christians and Muslims). This differs substantially from the setting of Pemba, where both IDPs and local hosts coexist. In addition, Mousa (2020) only focuses on measuring intergroup interactions' effects on the minority group (Christians), without measuring the majority group (Muslims). In this study, I innovate by measuring the effects of intergroup contact on the majority group, which is the subpopulation more empowered to improve the social integration of displaced individuals.

statistics, balance tests, and the design of the community meetings. Section 4 provides an overview of the main qualitative evidence. The main empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2 Contextual Background

This paper studies Cabo Delgado, the northernmost province of Mozambique (Figure A1 displays the location of Mozambique within Africa and Cabo Delgado within Mozambique). Despite substantial liquefied natural gas reserves in the area (Idowu 2017), Cabo Delgado continues to be one of the poorest provinces in Mozambique, having a nominal GDP per capita of 243 US dollars—half of Mozambique’s national average (INE 2021).

In October 2017, the region was affected by a violent insurgency launched by the Islamist group locally known as Al-Shabaab, which is affiliated with the Islamic State. The insurgency is motivated by religious extremism, and it resulted from cleavages between conservative Salafi movements in Cabo Delgado and Islamic authorities closely connected to the Mozambican government. Repression of these Salafi movements gradually led to their militarization. Young men were sent abroad for military training—to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania—and radical clerics were brought to Cabo Delgado (Estelle and Darden 2021).⁴

At first, the insurgency was confined to the town of Mocimboa da Praia, but it has since spread to most of Cabo Delgado and the surrounding provinces of Niassa and Nampula. Al-Shabaab has primarily targeted rural villages and midsized urban centers (district capitals), destroying public infrastructure and abducting and killing thousands of civilians. The geographical distribution of the insurgents’ attacks, as recorded by ACLED and represented in Figure 1, shows the extent of the insurgency as of August 2022.

As of June 2022, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported approximately 946,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to the conflict in Cabo Delgado—equivalent to about 40% of the total population in the province in 2017 according to the Mozambique Census

⁴It is also argued that the tension between civil groups and the government were exacerbated by three main factors. First, the persistent income inequality and poverty. Second, the recent findings of substantial reserves of natural gas in Cabo Delgado have led to the appropriation of natural resources by interest groups. Finally, the neglect of coastal populations which instigated a speech of victimization and resentment (Fejjó 2020).





Figure 1: Number of attacks by insurgents in each district of Cabo Delgado (October 2017–August 2022). Source: ACLED Data.

(IOM 2022). Of these IDPs, approximately 140,000 resided in Pemba. This substantial inflow of IDPs has resulted in a 70% increase in the population of Pemba, which was 201,000 in 2017 according to the latest Mozambique Census (INE 2017).

2.1 Characterization of the IDPs in Pemba

To gain a deeper understanding of IDPs, I conducted an individual-level baseline survey. This survey was designed to be representative of the population and to provide a more comprehensive and granular view of the social situation in Pemba, as existing data on the subject (mostly reported by the International Organization for Migration) was largely aggregated or qualitative. I focused on measuring the journey of IDPs from their homelands to Pemba and the exposure of IDPs to the insurgency, as indicated by whether they personally knew someone abducted or killed by insurgents.

The distribution of surveyed IDPs according to the year in which they left their homelands is shown in Figure 2a. The increasing number of IDPs leaving their homelands until 2020 is consistent with the timing of the conflict. The first reported attack in Cabo Delgado took place in October 2017, and insurgents’ activities gradually increased in magnitude and frequency in the years after. A turning point occurred in 2020, when the insurgents advanced territorially in Cabo Delgado by capturing the midsized town of Mocimboa da Praia, which explains the sizable



(a) The distribution of IDPs by the year they left their homelands. (b) The distribution of IDPs by year of arrival in Pemba, and the average number of places through which IDPs relocated.


Figure 2: The IDPs' pattern of departure from homelands and arrival in Pemba (2017-2022).

increase in the number of surveyed IDPs reporting having left their homelands in 2020. The next year, 2021, saw reinforcement of government forces fighting the insurgency and support by an international military coalition, which decreased insurgents' activity. This strategic advancement is consistent with the decreased number of surveyed IDPs reporting having left their homelands in 2021 and 2022.⁵

Figure 2b shows the distribution of IDPs according to the year in which they arrived in Pemba. The pattern of arrivals is consistent with the data presented in Figure 2a. Surveyed IDPs were asked how many places they had stayed before moving to their current shelter (as of August 2022). IDPs stayed on average in 2.4 places before settling into their current place of shelter in Pemba (excluding IDPs who arrived in 2022). Although the baseline survey did not ask IDPs to separate shelters en route to Pemba from those within the city, this information is consistent with the reports issued by the International Organization for Migration: IDPs tend to stay in multiple places, namely transit camps, before settling.

The baseline survey included two instruments measuring the exposure of IDPs to the current conflict, following the survey modules developed by Bruck et al. (2010; 2013): one instrument captured (i) whether surveyed IDPs knew someone within or outside their household who was abducted by insurgents and (ii) their relationship with that person (displayed in Figure 3a); the other instrument captured whether someone left an IDP's household for a reason directly related

⁵Information regarding 2022 continues until August, when the baseline survey was conducted.



(a) Number of IDPs who know someone abducted by insurgents. (b) Number of IDPs with at least one household member that left due to a reason related with insurgents.

Figure 3: Exposure of IDPs to the insurgency.

to insurgents (displayed in Figure 3b).⁶

Starting with the evidence presented in Figure 3a, roughly half of the IDP sample (48.5%) reported knowing someone abducted by insurgents. Most of the reported abductees were relatives (33.6%), which reveals how close surveyed IDPs were to the conflict. Figure 3b corroborates this evidence by showing that 17.5% of surveyed IDPs reported that at least one household member was abducted by insurgents. This figure also shows that 5.4% of surveyed IDPs had at least one household member killed by insurgents—arguably one of the worst types of exposure to insurgents. Meanwhile, 5.4% of IDPs reported that at least one household member left to escape insurgents, highlighting the role of the insurgency in splitting households. Finally, 0.6% of IDPs (three individuals) reported that at least one household member left to voluntarily join insurgents, an occurrence that is likely to be underreported because of the sensitivity of the topic.

2.2 Barriers to Social Integration of Locals and IDPs

The massive increase in the population of Pemba has generated significant friction between IDPs and local hosts. Although empirical evidence on this issue is limited, there exist multiple anecdotal

⁶The measure of whether an IDP's household member was killed by insurgents was not asked directly, as suggested by Bruck et al. (2010; 2013).

accounts of such tension. This tension manifests in various forms, such as barriers to local business development or accessing public services; verbal, physical, or sexual violence; extortion; and forced labor.

During my fieldwork, locals and IDPs cited several reasons for this tension. One of the most salient issues concerned the economic vulnerability of both locals and IDPs. It was difficult for locals to morally accept that the support provided by humanitarian workers and government authorities was almost entirely directed toward IDPs while most of the locals also lived in extreme poverty. This evidence corroborates the similar finding in previous studies (Ansar, Faisal, and Khaled 2021, George and Adelaja 2022) that tension is accentuated where local hosts are poorer or have lower human capital, such as in Pemba (Verme and Schuettler 2021). Cultural differences between locals, who came mostly from urban settings, and IDPs, who came from less urbanized areas, were also listed as a significant source of friction. These cultural differences ranged from hygiene routines to social behavior.⁷

In the baseline survey, I asked multiple questions addressing the beliefs and attitudes of locals and IDPs toward each other. The answers are summarized in Figure 4. The survey results indicate a significant level of intolerance of locals toward IDPs, with 42% of the surveyed locals reporting that IDPs brought insecurity to their neighborhoods, 28% believing that IDPs should be relocated, 33% thinking that the presence of IDPs is negative to the host neighborhood, and 32% feeling that their living conditions had worsened with the arrival of IDPs (however, the majority of locals, 53%, reported that they trusted IDPs, almost as high as the proportion trusting other locals, 56%). These statistics corroborate my anecdotal evidence that locals did not support hosting IDPs in their neighborhoods.

In contrast, less than half of IDPs (44%) reported trusting locals, while a considerably higher proportion (62%) reported trusting other IDPs. This discrepancy, not observed in locals, suggests a problem of trust among IDPs, which is consistent with my anecdotal evidence of frequent discrimination against IDPs.

Finally, the survey results suggest that locals and IDPs held different beliefs about the extent to which the voices of both groups were heard in host neighborhoods (see Figure 5a). While a

⁷To a lesser extent, competition in business and for the provision of public goods and services (education and health care) were also listed as sources of friction between locals and IDPs, in line with existing research (Castells-Quintana, del Pilar Lopez-Urbe, and McDermott 2022).





Figure 4: The attitudes of locals and IDPs toward each other. $N_{locals} = 416$, $N_{IDPs} = 495$

similar percentage of respondents in both groups believed that the voice of IDPs was more heard than locals’ (7.8% vs. 6.8%), sizable disparities existed among the respondents who thought both groups were equally heard (62% and 47% for locals and IDPs respectively) and those who believed that locals were more heard than IDPs (30% of locals and 46% of IDPs).

Following a similar pattern, locals and IDPs also had contrasting beliefs on how neighborhood authorities—the layer of government most present in the daily life of locals and IDPs—treated both groups, as shown in Figure 5b. Both groups believed that neighborhood authorities treated locals better than IDPs (17.8% of locals and 14.3% of IDPs); however, they had differing views on how equally treated the two groups were: 68.9% of locals felt that both groups were treated equally by neighborhood authorities, while 13.3% believed that locals received better treatment; only 55.5% of IDPs believed that both groups were treated equally, and 30.2% felt that locals received better treatment. These different perceptions are consistent with IDPs’ considerably lower trust in locals.

In summary, the baseline data underscore significant challenges in socially integrating locals and IDPs. Locals exhibited reduced tolerance for IDPs in their neighborhoods and often held negative beliefs about them. Meanwhile, IDPs reported diminished trust in locals and perceptions of receiving inferior treatment by both locals and neighborhood authorities.



(a) *Voices of IDPs within host neighborhoods.* (b) *Treatment of locals and IDPs by neighborhood authorities.*

3 The Intervention

My intervention consisted in the convening of a single community meeting to a random sample of local hosts and IDPs. The community meetings took place between August and October 2022, and the program of meetings was developed in collaboration with local leaders from the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO). The intervention was endorsed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Mozambique, the Provincial Government of Cabo Delgado, and the Municipality of Pemba.

Each community meeting was moderated by a local leader affiliated with CISLAMO (all men) who was experienced in managing challenging conversations and resolving conflicts. These moderators were also highly respected and well known in Cabo Delgado, regardless of individuals’ religion, ethnicity, or status as a local or IDP. I used local community leaders (rather than psychologists or other professionals with Western training) as moderators for two main reasons. One was to incorporate a program design that would be easier to replicate and scale up, as Cabo Delgado (like many similar settings around the world) has a shortage of formally trained professionals, so the population has to rely on local community members. The other reason was to avoid an intervention that would impose Western values on study participants—which could be counterproductive (Verwimp, Justino, and Bruck 2019).

Each community meeting’s moderator was randomly assigned. The moderator received training on the meeting protocol, which followed the framework of a *public conversation* (Herzig and Chasin 2006), as detailed in Section 3.1. Throughout each meeting, the protocol was strictly enforced by the moderator. This framework was adapted to the context of Pemba by incorporating

the feedback of moderators, local community leaders, and the population. Participants in community meetings engaged in a dialogue, defined as *a conversation in which participants who have different beliefs and perspectives seek to develop mutual understanding* (Herzig and Chasin 2006). There are two principles embodied in this definition of dialogue. First, a dialogue (and therefore a community meeting) is not a debate, meaning that its fundamental purpose is for participants to seek mutual understanding, rather than prove that their beliefs are right. Second, the purpose of a dialogue is not to mediate or solve conflicts nor to promote personal growth—although it may incidentally serve these purposes.

The community meetings had the main objective of decreasing prejudice and improving the relationship between locals and IDPs, as suggested by the friction between the two groups measured in the baseline survey: intolerance of locals toward IDPs and lack of trust of IDPs in locals. Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis, according to which engagement between two groups can lead, under certain contact conditions, to a decrease in prejudice and improvement of intergroup relations, suggests that the objective would be achieved. These conditions, as applied to the design of the community meetings, were *equal status of both groups*, meaning there was no hierarchical relationship during intergroup contact; *cooperation*, meaning both groups engaged with each other in a noncompetitive environment; *common goals*, such that both locals and IDPs engaged in the meeting with the same objectives; and *support from authorities*, meaning that the meetings were regulated by an entity respected by both groups. Section 3.1 provides further details on how Allport's contact conditions were established in the meetings.

3.1 The Design of Community Meetings

Each community meeting followed the same protocol, detailed in Appendix H, and its cohort size ranged between 8 and 10 participants, with a targeted equal split between locals and IDPs. The meeting started with the moderator introducing himself and welcoming participants. The moderator also detailed his role in the meeting and provided other practical information. The moderator proceeded to explain the rules of communication: all participants (regardless of local or IDP status) would be treated equally, the goal of the meeting was to have an open and inclusive conversation, and all participants were expected to maintain a cooperative attitude (not interrupting

others, listening carefully, and trying to put themselves in others' position). This explanation was intended to create the social environment Allport (1954) suggests is conducive to intergroup contact.

Participants then started engaging in the meeting. They were initially invited to introduce themselves and share their expectations about the meeting. The meeting proceeded with a go-around format, which consisted in the moderator reading out loud different questions prespecified in the meeting protocol. After each question was read, participants took one minute and thought about what they would like to say. Then each participant spoke for three minutes. In the first go-around question, locals were asked how their lives changed with the arrival of IDPs in their neighborhood. IDPs were instead asked how their lives changed in that neighborhood relative to their homeland before the conflict started. The moderator continued by asking about the main difficulty in integrating IDPs in their neighborhood; he also asked IDPs for one positive aspect of their lives in the host neighborhood and asked locals for one positive thing IDPs brought to the host neighborhood. The moderator then asked IDPs to share their stories of fleeing their homeland and escaping from insurgents.

The last part of the meeting consisted in an open discussion. Specifically, the moderator encouraged all participants to freely exchange arguments, and he intervened only if a rule of engagement was broken. The moderator and participants were arranged in a circle (displayed in Figure 6). This arrangement ensured that all participants (and the moderator) occupied identical positions, creating a more conducive environment for discussion and engagement.

3.2 Sampling, Randomization, and Data Collection

Field activities commenced with random sampling of locals and IDPs, as delineated in the timeline in Figure A2. Research staff concentrated on one neighborhood at a time for logistic reasons (political constraints and the mobility of IDPs). Research activities in each neighborhood lasted for five days. The first phase of the project—consisting of sampling, baseline activities, community meetings, and post-meeting activities—took place between August and October 2022.

The sampling of IDPs used the Displacement Tracking Matrix, a database made available to me by the International Organization for Migration and the government of Pemba District. The Dis-



Figure 6: The setup of community meetings.

placement Tracking Matrix is derived from the roster of all IDPs who arrived in Pemba; the roster is compiled by neighborhood authorities and transferred to both the International Organization for Migration and the district government. This database catalogs the name, host neighborhood, and contact details of each primary IDP family member and dependents. Leveraging this data set, I selected a random sample of 48 to 60 IDPs from each neighborhood.

The sampling methodology for locals diverged from that for IDPs, primarily because there was no updated census containing comprehensive information on locals. To select local household heads for the intervention, I employed the random-walk technique.⁸

On the initial day of field activities, IDPs and locals, having been thoroughly briefed about the project, offered their informed consent to participate in the study. They were then randomly allocated ticket numbers detailing the time and venue of the research activities. This number functioned as a unique identifier, enabling the research team to associate each participant with a specific cohort, which could be designated to either a treatment or control group. All participants

⁸The region's political climate necessitated that local enumerators navigate neighborhoods with the assistance of local guides. These guides possessed the requisite political clearance, allowing them to seamlessly approach households and initiate interactions with residents. Throughout this exercise, it was imperative for the enumerators to ascertain that the chosen individuals were genuine locals rather than IDPs. To ensure authenticity, individuals were asked to present their national ID cards, which indicate their city of residency. In the occasional case in which locals lacked such identification, the local guide would vouch for the individual's residency status.

randomly placed in the same treatment cohort were selected to engage in the same community meeting and to engage in the surveys and lab-in-the-field games on the same schedule. Participants belonging to the same control cohort were only selected to engage in surveys and lab-in-the-field games following the same schedule. As noted, the size of both treatment and control cohorts ranged between 8 and 10 participants, with a targeted equal mix of locals and IDPs. Beyond the provided schedule and ticket number, participants remained unaware of their cohort or treatment assignment.

During the subsequent two days, participants completed a baseline survey. Those assigned to a treatment cohort moved to a secluded area to engage in the community meeting. Upon arrival, all participants, irrespective of their treatment status, were informed whether they would participate in a community meeting. They had merely been informed that a subset of participants would be randomly selected for such a gathering. Independently of their involvement in the meeting, every participant was compensated with a show-up fee of 100 Mozambique meticaís, equivalent to USD 1.57. Additionally, individuals participating in the community meeting were provided with a snack.

On the fourth and fifth days, participants reconvened for post-meeting activities: a post-meeting survey (mirroring the baseline survey), list experiments and lab-in-the-field games. The subsequent phase of this study consisted of follow-up activities, spanning November to December 2022 (between two and three months following the community meetings). These activities were identical to those in the post-meeting phase, and they measured the medium-term evolution of the effects observed during the post-meeting activities.⁹

3.3 Sample Balance and Attrition

This section analyzes the sample balance between control and treatment groups. The baseline sample included 415 locals from Pemba and 498 IDPs, totaling 913 individuals.¹⁰ Balance tests for

⁹The registered pre-analysis plan (Barros 2022) included a second follow-up round, which was not implemented based on advice from field staff and stakeholders in Pemba, due to changing conditions in the field. The first follow-up (November–December 2022) coincided with a wave of IDPs returning to their homelands. This mobility raised concerns about sample attrition and a significant reduction in the value of a second follow-up round of data collection.

¹⁰Table C1 compares the baseline characteristics of locals and IDPs. Although both groups are similar in most characteristics, they diverge in some dimensions. Lack of any type of schooling is more prevalent among IDPs than locals because most IDPs come from places (minor towns and rural villages) where schooling provision was inferior to what was available to locals in Pemba. IDPs also showed less access to information and less social capital relative

the main individual observable characteristics are presented in Table 1 which displays the statistics of treatment and control groups for the samples of locals and IDPs respectively. The table indicates that the sample of locals is generally balanced between the treatment and control groups, with only a very slight imbalance in tolerance towards IDPs (p-value = 0.091). Similarly, the sample of IDPs is well-matched across most variables, though there is a mild imbalance in elementary education levels (p-value = 0.06).

Table 1: Summary statistics of locals and IDPs by treatment assignment (baseline survey).

	Locals						IDPs					
	Sample Size		Means		Statistics		Sample Size		Means		Statistics	
	C	T	C	T	σ	p-val	C	T	C	T	σ	p-val
Age	204	209	37.971	37.325	1.598	.687	253	243	36.692	37.329	1.434	.657
Catholic	204	208	.181	.149	.045	.47	252	243	.147	.148	.035	.969
Muslim	204	208	.809	.841	.046	.482	252	243	.841	.831	.037	.787
Other religion	204	208	.01	.01	.01	.984	252	243	.012	.021	.014	.528
No educ.	205	210	.088	.076	.025	.639	252	243	.175	.123	.033	.125
Informal educ.	205	210	.039	.043	.018	.833	252	243	.04	.045	.018	.763
Elementary educ.	205	210	.62	.595	.049	.617	252	243	.532	.609	.041	.06
Secondary educ.	205	210	.234	.271	.046	.42	252	243	.242	.202	.038	.29
Higher educ.	205	210	.02	.014	.013	.678	252	243	.012	.021	.013	.492
Information index	205	210	3.328	3.317	.06	.845	254	244	2.951	2.991	.057	.481
Social capital index	204	210	1.723	1.714	.064	.892	254	243	1.444	1.447	.041	.949
Female	205	210	1.795	1.738	.039	.145	252	244	1.746	1.725	.039	.599
Macua ethnicity	205	210	.805	.833	.041	.49	252	243	.528	.457	.056	.203
Maconde ethnicity	205	210	.112	.086	.032	.411	252	243	.123	.115	.033	.813
Mwani ethnicity	205	210	.073	.071	.029	.952	252	243	.329	.387	.055	.295
Other ethnicity	205	210	.01	.01	.01	.981	252	243	.02	.041	.016	.171
Negative view of IDPs	205	210	.449	.462	.05	.794						
Tolerance towards IDPs	205	210	.717	.652	.038	.091						
Beliefs about IDPs	205	210	.603	.604	.023	.965						
Trust in IDPs	205	210	.509	.476	.032	.313						
Baseline marginalization							254	244	.433	.492	.051	.251
Particip. neigh. life							254	244	.468	.455	.018	.478
Trust in locals							253	243	.433	.428	.029	.849

C and T refer to individuals in control and treatment groups, respectively. Missing data affects total observations for some variables.

As for sample attrition, thoroughly addressed in Appendix E, 20 locals (4.8%) originally surveyed at baseline were absent from the post-meeting phase, escalating to 45 individuals (10.8%) in the follow-up phase. Among IDPs, there were 15 individuals absent from the post-meeting phase to locals. Finally, the Makua ethnic group was more prevalent among locals, while the Mwani ethnic group was more prevalent among IDPs. This is related to the fact that the areas most affected by the insurgency (coastal areas of Cabo Delgado, as displayed in Figure 1) are inhabited by the Mwani people, while the Makua constitute the majority group in the rest of the province.

(3.0%), increasing to 113 (22.7%) in the follow-up phase. An analysis described in Appendixes E.1 and E.2 finds slight evidence of differential and selective attrition among locals during both the post-meeting and follow-up phases and among IDPs only in the post-meeting phase. The consequences of sample attrition are further analyzed in Appendix sections E.3 and E.4. Section E.3 provides evidence, from inverse probability weighting, that despite this issue, the treatment effects discussed in Section 5 are robust. This indicates that the treatment effects are unlikely to have been significantly altered by sample attrition.

These findings are further supported by the estimation of Horowitz-Manski Bounds, which assume that all attrited observations take the most extreme values for each outcome variable (Horowitz and Manski 2000).¹¹

4 Qualitative Evidence from Community Meetings

The community meetings' protocol (outlined in Section 3.1 and Appendix H) incorporated two components: an initial structured segment, in which the moderator posed questions to the participants; and a subsequent open discussion. The latter part encouraged an organic exchange of ideas with minimal moderator intervention—which varied across meeting cohorts because of the unique characteristics of each participant group. To capture the substance of the open discussions, moderators were tasked with filling out one-page reports immediately following each meeting. These reports collected qualitative data about the key topics discussed while abstaining from referencing any personal identifiers. Although these reports did not cover all meeting feedback—other insights were communicated verbally and not included in the formal reports—they still offered a snapshot of the main themes discussed.

The reported discussion topics can be broadly divided into three categories: (i) IDPs' recounting their experiences with insurgents and fleeing from conflict, (ii) the relationship between locals and IDPs in the neighborhood, specifically regarding discrimination and unequal access to common

¹¹Horowitz-Manski bounds have the advantage of not requiring numerous assumptions about the data missing. They simply assume that all attrited observations take the most extreme values for each outcome variable. However, this approach also has a disadvantage. By making the unlikely and conservative assumption that all attrited individuals would have taken the most extreme outcome values (minimum and maximum), the estimated range for the true effect size can be broad and uninformative. This concern is corroborated by the wide estimated ranges presented in Table E11. Nevertheless, the estimated bounds indicate that the primary findings are generally accurate, particularly in the short term, where the data available is more compatible with the potential existence of selective attrition.

goods, and (iii) perceived inadequacies of support from the local government and the humanitarian sector. A visualization of these topics is provided in Figure A3.

The most recurrent topic, per the moderator reports, was the relationship between locals and IDPs, surfacing in 20 meetings across eight (of nine) neighborhoods. Inadequate support from governing bodies and international organizations was the second most discussed issue, brought up in 19 meetings across six neighborhoods. Tales of flight and experiences with insurgents were the third most frequent theme, appearing in eight meetings across five neighborhoods. Additional minor topics included economic issues, such as inflation and entrepreneurship, and IDPs' longing to return to their homeland.

In addition to the written reports, verbal feedback from moderators provided further qualitative evidence about how the community meetings unfolded. Though the formal reports only specifically mentioned eight meetings discussing the IDPs' experiences with insurgents and flight from conflict, moderators verbally reported that almost every meeting featured at least one IDP recounting their story (either during the more structured part of the meeting or in the open-discussion segment). Such narratives invariably stirred emotional reactions among the locals and fellow IDPs. It was also frequently reported that after IDPs expressed their desire to return to their homeland, locals became less concerned about issues related to competition over land.

Post-meeting participant feedback, albeit anecdotal, produced two key insights. First, locals expressed that participation in the meeting was a pivotal learning experience. Despite residing in the same neighborhood as IDPs, often for several years, locals acknowledged their ignorance regarding the hardships endured by the IDPs and their stories of fleeing from conflict. Second, for the IDPs, the community meeting served as a platform to voice their experiences and emotions. Many IDPs noted that the community meeting marked the first time they were given an opportunity to express their feelings and thoughts about the life in Pemba.

5 Empirical Results

Following the registered pre-analysis plan (Barros 2022), I anticipated that the engagement in community meetings could diminish social exclusion and discrimination; and enhance tolerance toward IDPs and trust (detailed in Section 3). The tools used to measure these outcomes are survey

questions capturing locals’ tolerance toward IDPs, IDPs’ sense of integration in their neighborhoods, and the preference among both groups for improved treatment of IDPs by local authorities. In addition, trust within and between groups was evaluated (refer to Appendix B.1 for details about the survey instruments used). To mitigate the impact of social desirability bias in survey responses, two list experiments were employed: one assessing discrimination by locals against IDPs, and the other focusing on IDPs’ perception of being discriminated against by locals (see Appendix B.2 for details). Additionally, public goods and trust games were administered (details in Appendix D.1), with the prediction that the meetings would induce their participants to increase their monetary contributions in both games, particularly their contributions to members of the other group.

To analyze the impact of the intervention, I assessed both short- and medium-term treatment effects. Short-term effects were evaluated using data from post-meeting activities within two to three days of the intervention, while medium-term effects were measured through follow-up activities two to three months later. To ensure consistency, I applied the same empirical strategy in both phases, limiting the sample to post-meeting or follow-up observations as necessary. Whenever outcomes were measured at baseline, an ANCOVA model was employed to estimate treatment effects, as detailed in Equation 1.

$$Y_{inc} = \alpha + \beta T_{nc} + \delta \mathbf{N}_n + \theta \mathbf{X}_{inc} + \rho \mathbf{M}_{nc} + \varepsilon_{inc} \quad (1)$$

Y_{inc} refers to the outcome Y of individual i , in neighborhood n , belonging to cohort c . T_{nc} is a binary variable taking value 1 if the individual participated in a community meeting, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest is β , which estimates the effect of participating in a community meeting (T_{nc}). \mathbf{N}_n represents a vector of neighborhood dummies, and \mathbf{X}_{inc} is a set of controls for individual demographic characteristics measured at baseline. For outcome variables measured also at baseline, I include a lagged dependent variable. \mathbf{M}_{nc} is a vector of controls for meetings’ characteristics (cohort size, percentage of IDPs/locals in the cohort). ε_{inc} is an individual-specific error term, which is clustered at the cohort level.¹²

Because of the large set of outcomes being estimated, I addressed issues of multiple-hypothesis testing by computing Romano-Wolf stepdown adjusted p-values (Romano and Wolf 2005a;b;

¹²Appendix G presents alternative specifications restricting the use of individual-level controls and employing the post-double least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (PDSLASSO).

2016), displayed inside the square brackets). The adjusted p-value displayed within each square bracket results from testing at the *phase level*—separately for post-meeting and follow-up results—the null hypothesis that the treatment effect for all outcomes is equal to zero.

5.1 Attitudes of Locals toward IDPs

Table 2 illustrates the positive impact of community meetings on local attitudes toward IDPs. The data in columns (1) and (2) suggest that the community meetings served as an effective catalyst in enhancing locals' tolerance toward IDPs residing in host neighborhoods a 2-3 days after. An index of survey questions is used as the outcome measure, aggregating the responses from two survey questions inquiring about local tolerance toward IDPs in host neighborhoods (the index ranges within the unit interval, with higher values corresponding to more tolerance toward IDPs).¹³

Column (1) displays the effect 2-3 days after the meeting: an 11.5% average increase in tolerance (significant at the 5% level), observed two to three days after the intervention. However, this improvement is not discernible in the follow-up assessment conducted two to three months later, as shown in column (2). This is evident in the near-zero estimated coefficient size in the follow-up and the p-value of 0.075 obtained when testing the equality of post-meeting and follow-up treatment effects. The absence of significant short-term effects on outcomes related to locals' beliefs, trust, and discrimination against IDPs, illustrated in columns (3), (5), and (7), indicates that, initially, community meetings solely enhanced locals' tolerance without influencing their level of empathy for IDPs.¹⁴

In the medium term, the evidence from Table 2 suggests, community meetings led to a positive shift in locals' empathy toward IDPs, noticeable across all assessed outcomes (positive beliefs, trust, and discrimination). The locals' positive beliefs about IDPs were evaluated using an index of survey questions designed to measure their associations of IDPs with worse living conditions and heightened insecurity in host neighborhoods as well as a generally negative perception of IDPs' presence. As indicated in column (4), the results demonstrate a 9.2% increase in such positive

¹³Appendix B.1 provides a detailed explanation of how the tolerance index was constructed.

¹⁴While most variables are well-balanced between treatment and control groups (Table 1), tolerance toward IDPs among locals shows a slight imbalance at baseline (p-value = 0.091). This imbalance is addressed by including the baseline value of tolerance as a lagged dependent variable in all regressions where this outcome is analyzed. Robustness checks also show that including baseline tolerance as a control in all other regressions does not meaningfully alter the findings.

beliefs among locals in the medium term (significant at the 5% level). Additionally, the level of locals’ trust in IDPs was assessed using a survey question that spanned a range from *no trust* to *significant trust* on a four-point scale within the unit interval. Consistent with the previous pattern, the level of trust in IDPs, represented in column (6), increased 10.1%, significant at the 10% level.¹⁵

Table 2: The effects of community meetings on the attitudes of locals toward the presence of IDPs in host neighborhoods.

	Tolerates IDPs staying in host neighborhood		Positive beliefs about IDPs in host neighborhood		Trust in IDPs		Discrimination against IDPs	
	Post-meeting	Follow-up	Post-meeting	Follow-up	Post-meeting	Follow-up	Post-meeting	Follow-up
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treated	0.075** (0.035) [0.079]	0.003 (0.034) [0.931]	0.013 (0.020) [0.802]	0.054** (0.025) [0.089]	0.005 (0.033) [0.941]	0.054* (0.030) [0.089]	0.147 (0.128) [0.525]	0.107 (0.126) [0.614]
Sensitive × Treated							-0.047 (0.195) [0.941]	-0.378** (0.182) [0.089]
Sensitive sentence							0.511*** (0.126) [0.010]	0.269** (0.130) [0.089]
Mean (control group)	0.651	0.827	0.600	0.587	0.531	0.537	2.298	2.277
P-value Post-meeting=follow-up	0.075		0.122		0.115		0.144	
R ²	0.373	0.321	0.346	0.310	0.383	0.380	0.456	0.491
N	367	332	367	332	367	332	354	330
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). The dependent variables in columns (1) to (6) are constructed using survey data. Columns (1) and (2) use as dependent variable an index measuring the tolerance of locals toward IDPs staying in host neighborhoods, ranging within the unit interval where a higher index value corresponds to greater tolerance toward IDPs. Columns (3) and (4) use as dependent variable an index of survey questions capturing the beliefs of locals about IDPs in hosting neighborhoods. This index ranges within the unit interval, where a higher value represents more positive beliefs. Columns (5) and (6) measure locals’ trust in IDPs, using as dependent variable a 4-point scale index within the unit interval, where a higher value corresponds to more trust. Columns (7) and (8) show the results of a list experiment measuring locals’ discrimination against IDPs, where the dependent variable takes integer numbers ranging from 0 to 5 capturing the number of sentences with which locals agree. *Sensitive* is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence in the list experiment. *P-value Post-meeting=follow-up* tests the null hypothesis that the treatment effects (columns (1) to (6)) or the interaction (columns (7) and (8)) are equal between post-meeting and follow-up phases. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

¹⁵Section D.2 examines the effects of community meetings on locals’ trust in diverse individuals, groups, and government authorities. It notes a significant short-term decrease in trust among locals toward fellow residents of Cabo Delgado, Mozambicans more broadly, and the armed forces. There were no discernible alterations in trust in other community members (such as relatives, neighbors, and community leaders) or toward the government. Apart from the improvement in locals’ trust in IDPs—also articulated in Table 2—no medium-term effects were observed. I interpret this as a result of IDPs’ narrating their escape stories, thereby potentially heightening the salience of distrust of other Mozambicans—given that the majority of insurgents are presumed to be Mozambicans, predominantly from Cabo Delgado—and underscoring the inefficacy of the armed forces in thwarting insurgent activities. The differences in the p-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing between Table 2 and Tables D3 and D4 also suggest that the intervention generated a targeted effect on trust towards members of the other group, but not towards trust in general.

To further supplement the analysis of survey outcomes, a list experiment was conducted to assess the level of discrimination by locals against IDPs. In this experiment, each local respondent was read four non-sensitive statements. Additionally, half of the sample was randomly selected to hear a sensitive statement: “I do not like IDPs who live in this neighborhood.” Respondents were then asked to quantify the number of statements with which they agreed. Importantly, enumerators remained uninformed about respondents’ answers to individual statements. A comprehensive description of the execution of the list experiment is provided in Appendix B.2.

Columns (7) and (8) present the results. The dependent variable is an integer value ranging from 0 to 5, representing the total number of statements the respondent agreed with. Using Equation 1, the effects were calculated by incorporating a binary variable (*Sensitive*) to indicate random exposure to the sensitive statement. The interaction between *Treated* and *Sensitive* is the variable of interest, which, contingent upon the random assignment to hear the sensitive statement, quantifies the influence of community meetings on the number of statements respondents concurred with. In the follow-up assessment (column (8)), attendees of community meetings displayed a 16.6% decrease in discrimination against IDPs, evidenced by the fewer statements with which the respondents exposed to the sensitive statement agreed. Examining the indices of beliefs about IDPs, trust, and the list experiment, the substantial p-values (>0.1) attained from testing the equality of post-meeting and follow-up coefficients do not provide sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the effects recorded in both phases are statistically identical.

The findings presented in Table 2 are inconclusive regarding whether the observed absence of significant effects on tolerance toward IDPs in the follow-up, shown in column (2), is due to the diminishing of post-meeting effects, the presence of social desirability effects or experimenter demand effects, spillovers onto the control group, or an underlying secular positive trend in tolerance. Given the time lapse between the community meetings and the follow-up, it is possible that time made locals’ recollections of their experiences gradually less salient, leading post-meeting treatment effects to depreciate. However, it is important to reconcile these results with how, in the medium term, locals can harbor more positive beliefs about IDPs, exhibit increased trust, and demonstrate reduced discrimination while not showing proportionally more tolerance toward IDPs residing in host neighborhoods (the reason for this result could be that locals, despite their friendlier beliefs and attitudes toward IDPs, still preferred IDPs to be hosted somewhere else). The possi-

bility that social desirability bias or experimenter demand effects primarily influenced the post-meeting improvement in tolerance toward IDPs also appears remote. If such were the case, other survey measures, such as beliefs about IDPs and trust, would likely have also manifested in sizable coefficients, a scenario not supported by the data in columns (3) and (5).

Concerning the potential presence of spillover effects or a secular positive trend in tolerance, the elevated average tolerance observed in control-group members between the post-meeting and follow-up phases indicates the possible presence of one or both phenomena. If these spillover effects were indeed prevalent in this study, the significant positive outcomes depicted in column (1) might represent an underestimation of the actual impact of the community meetings.

Regarding the robustness of the results detailed in Table 2, all significant findings withstand the rigors of multiple-hypothesis testing, evidenced by the small adjusted p-values (<0.1), following the Romano-Wolf procedure.¹⁶ Regarding the implications of sample attrition—detailed in Section 3.2—on the effects delineated in Table 2, to adjust for the potential bias due to individual attrition, I conducted further analysis: applying inverse probability weighting (IPW) to account for the likelihood of individual attrition. An exhaustive explanation of this technique and the corresponding results can be found in Appendix E.3. This supplementary analysis finds that the coefficients in Table 2 undergo only small changes in magnitude while maintaining their statistical significance.¹⁷

In conclusion, the data delineated in Table 2 suggest that community meetings systematically modified locals' perceptions of IDPs. Initially, these gatherings enhanced locals' tolerance toward IDPs residing in host neighborhoods, without altering the underlying empathy levels. Subsequently, between two and three months after the intervention, the meetings fostered more positive beliefs and trust among locals toward IDPs and diminished discrimination against them.

In addition to the results delineated in Table 2, a public goods game was administered to measure the impact of community meetings on real-life decision-making. In this game, individuals

¹⁶Section F studies whether the differences between post-meeting and follow-up estimates can be related to different samples. This section replicates the estimation of the post-meeting results presented in Tables 2 and 4 but restricting the sample used to include only follow-up observations. The estimated coefficients do not change significantly, suggesting that differences in the samples used in the post-meeting and follow-up are not driving the different treatment effects.

¹⁷Horowitz-Manski bounds were employed to assess the sensitivity of the treatment effects to sample attrition. Although these bounds are inherently imprecise, they offer a more comprehensive range within which the true effect might lie (Horowitz and Manski 2000). By considering extreme and unlikely scenarios—where all attrited observations in the treatment and control groups assume the best and worst possible outcomes—these bounds provide valuable insights into the potential variability of the results. A detailed discussion of this analysis is presented in Section E.4.

participated simultaneously in pairs. Both locals and IDPs were informed about whether their opponent was a local or an IDP, though specific identities remained undisclosed. The dependent variable in this context was the respondents' monetary contribution, which could range from 0 to 130 Mozambique meticaís (with 64 meticaís equivalent to USD 1). The interaction between treatment and playing against a participant from a different group (local or IDP) served as the variable of interest. As depicted in Table D1, the findings suggest that community meetings augmented locals' monetary contributions by 36% in the medium term, a shift observed irrespective of the counterparts' group affiliation. This outcome can be interpreted as indicative of heightened prosocial behavior among locals who attended community meetings, manifesting in equitable treatment of individuals from both groups.

5.1.1 The Role of Prior Beliefs in Shaping the Attitudes of Locals toward IDPs

This section explores the influence of prior beliefs on the impact of community meetings regarding locals' attitudes toward IDPs. The sample of locals was divided based on their baseline views about IDPs (either negative or positive). This baseline view was determined by averaging four survey questions that measured locals' beliefs and attitudes toward IDPs. The corresponding results are displayed in Table 3.

Post-meeting outcomes are displayed in Panel A, capturing short-term effects. Column (1) indicates that the increase in tolerance toward IDPs residing in host neighborhoods predominantly resulted from locals harboring more negative baseline views about IDPs, showcasing an average tolerance increase of 31%. Conversely, the community meetings seemed to render no substantial effect on locals with initially positive views about IDPs, as seen in column (2). The effects appear to diverge between locals with more negative and positive baseline views, supported by the p-value (0.034) obtained from testing the equality of coefficients in columns (1) and (2). Panel B shows that the decline in the positive effect on tolerance, discussed in Section 5.1, is principally attributable to locals with initially negative views about IDPs, with their coefficient decreasing from 0.172 to 0.002, whereas the coefficient for those with initially more positive views remains relatively stable, decreasing from 0.032 to 0.012.

Regarding the positive treatment effects on locals' beliefs and trust in IDPs, the medium-term effects delineated in Section 5.1 were driven by locals with initially more favorable views about

Table 3: Heterogeneous effects on locals, according to their initial negative or positive view about IDPs.

	Tolerates IDPs staying in host neighborhoods		Positive beliefs about IDPs in host neighborhoods		Trust in IDPs		Discrimination against IDPs	
	Baseline view of IDPs Negative (1)	Baseline view of IDPs Positive (2)	Baseline view of IDPs Negative (3)	Baseline view of IDPs Positive (4)	Baseline view of IDPs Negative (5)	Baseline view of IDPs Positive (6)	Baseline view of IDPs Negative (7)	Baseline view of IDPs Positive (8)
Panel A. Post-meeting effects								
Treated	0.172** (0.069)	0.032 (0.050)	-0.002 (0.046)	0.018 (0.036)	-0.054 (0.076)	0.043 (0.053)	0.088 (0.278)	-0.025 (0.188)
Treated × Sensitive sentence							0.101 (0.381)	-0.124 (0.292)
Mean (control group)	0.554	0.717	0.519	0.663	0.505	0.556	2.222	2.361
P-value negative=positive view	0.034		0.684		0.165		0.455	
R ²	0.607	0.516	0.533	0.464	0.517	0.520	0.646	0.599
N	160	201	160	201	160	201	155	193
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no
Panel B. Follow-up effects								
Treated	0.002 (0.070)	0.012 (0.052)	0.002 (0.049)	0.063* (0.035)	0.011 (0.047)	0.079** (0.040)	0.117 (0.239)	0.210 (0.167)
Treated × Sensitive sentence							-0.722** (0.314)	-0.399 (0.247)
Mean (control group)	0.816	0.833	0.544	0.619	0.520	0.556	2.279	2.289
P-value negative=positive view	0.872		0.184		0.117		0.239	
R ²	0.583	0.434	0.562	0.499	0.685	0.527	0.758	0.651
N	145	182	145	182	145	182	144	181
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are shown inside parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. Post-meeting (short-term) results are presented in Panel A, while follow-up (medium-term) results are presented in Panel B. Holding a *negative* (*positive*) view corresponds to locals with relatively more negative (*positive*) baseline views about IDPs. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is an index in the unit interval that averages the answer of locals to two survey questions measuring tolerance toward IDPs staying in host neighborhoods. A higher index value corresponds to greater tolerance toward IDPs. Columns (3) and (4) use as dependent variable an index ranging in the unit interval, where a higher value represents a better perception about IDPs in host neighborhoods. Columns (5) and (6) use as dependent variable a trust index ranging within the unit interval, where a higher index value represents greater trust in IDPs. Columns (7) and (8) show the results of a list experiment measuring locals' discrimination against IDPs, where the dependent variable is an integer number ranging from 1 to 5, capturing the number of sentences with which respondents agree. *Sensitive* is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence in the list experiment. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

IDPs. This is inferred from the evidence in Panel B, reflecting a 10.1% increase in locals' beliefs about IDPs (column (4)) and a 14.2% improvement in locals' trust in IDPs (column (6)). Nevertheless, even though the evidence presented suggests that the effects on beliefs and trust among locals with positive views are statistically significant, it is not possible to conclusively state that they differed from the effects observed in locals with more negative views, as indicated by the p-values of 0.184 and 0.117.

Furthermore, the data in columns (7) and (8) indicate that the reduction in discrimination

against IDPs was predominantly driven by locals with initially more negative views about IDPs, displaying an estimated reduction of 31.7%. Similarly to the effects noted in columns (3) to (6), there is no discernible evidence that the coefficients on discrimination significantly differed between locals with negative and positive initial views about IDPs.

A comprehensive interpretation of the results in Table 3 suggests that community meetings may have induced varied effects depending on locals' initial perceptions of IDPs. Those with relatively more unfavorable views at baseline increased their tolerance of and reduced their discrimination against IDPs. However, the meetings did not significantly enhance the degree of locals' affinity toward or trust in IDPs. Conversely, locals with initially more positive views and presumably a greater natural predisposition to adjust their prior beliefs demonstrated more positive beliefs and trust in IDPs. Despite these interpretations, and even though the coefficient magnitudes may substantially diverge between locals with more negative or positive initial views about IDPs, a definitive conclusion regarding the statistical difference in effects on beliefs, trust, and discrimination for both subgroups cannot be reached.

5.2 Social Integration of IDPs

Table 4 displays the effects of community meetings on IDPs' social integration within host neighborhoods. Columns (1) and (2) employ a survey question as the dependent variable, asking IDPs about their sense of integration into their host neighborhood after the intervention compared to before. The coefficients in these columns suggest that community meetings improved IDPs' sense of integration, with effects manifesting 2-3 days after and persisting in the medium term (with treatment effects of 20.6% and 19.2%, respectively, both significant at the 1% level). Correspondingly, a significant increase in IDPs' trust in locals occurs 2-3 days after the intervention and remains substantial in the medium term, with effect sizes of 15.1% and 15.5%, significant at the 5% level.¹⁸

Examining the effects on the integration of IDPs into host neighborhoods' civic life, reported in columns (3) and (4), the outcome measure is an index of survey questions measuring IDPs' perception of being heard and support by the host community. Column (3) reveals that community meetings induced an 8.1% increase in IDPs' perceived inclusion in civic life in the short-term,

¹⁸Section D.2 shows that community meetings improved IDPs' trust in locals but did not alter trust in any other individual or group.

Table 4: The effects of community meetings on the social integration of IDPs.

	Feels better integrated		Participation in neighborhood life		Trust in locals		Feels discriminated by locals	
	Post-meeting (1)	Follow-up (2)	Post-meeting (3)	Follow-up (4)	Post-meeting (5)	Follow-up (6)	Post-meeting (7)	Follow-up (8)
Treated	0.142*** (0.028) [0.010]	0.132*** (0.033) [0.010]	0.036** (0.015) [0.040]	0.013 (0.020) [0.832]	0.070** (0.035) [0.040]	0.076** (0.033) [0.297]	0.181 (0.120) [0.040]	0.004 (0.144) [1.000]
Sensitive × Treated							-0.344** (0.159) [0.040]	-0.057 (0.203) [0.891]
Sensitive sentence							0.496*** (0.108) [0.010]	0.424*** (0.135) [0.020]
Mean (control group)	0.689	0.686	0.447	0.501	0.463	0.490	2.271	2.335
Post-meeting=follow-up p-value	0.801		0.095		0.974		0.234	
R ²	0.487	0.443	0.336	0.440	0.351	0.388	0.411	0.458
N	401	332	437	332	435	332	419	329
Lagged Dependent Variable	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). Columns (1) and (2) use as dependent variable a question measuring the extent to which IDPs agree to be feeling better integrated since the onset of community meetings (the variable uses a 4-point scale within the unit interval). A higher index value corresponds to greater tolerance toward IDPs. The outcome variable in columns (3) and (4) is a survey index in the unit interval that measures whether IDPs feel more included in the neighborhood civic life, with a greater index value representing more inclusion. Columns (5) and (6) use as dependent variable a survey question measuring the trust of IDPs toward locals in a four point scale within the unit interval. Columns (7) and (8) show the results of a list experiment measuring IDPs' sense of being discriminated by locals, where the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 5 capturing the number of sentences with which IDPs agree. Sensitive sentence is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence in the list experiment. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

significant at the 5% level. However, this improvement was not sustained in the medium term as illustrated in column (4), with a decrease in the estimated coefficient magnitude and a rejection of the hypothesis of equality between short- and medium-term treatment effects (p-value=0.095). One plausible explanation is that community meetings amplified IDPs' sense of being heard, enhancing the salience of civic participation, which depreciated over time (in the absence of additional community meetings). Several potential reasons, including a secular upward trend in social inclusion or spillover effects, align with the control group mean's increase between the post-meeting and follow-up phases. Experimenter demand effects are less likely because of the absence of a parallel depreciation in the post-meeting effects of other outcomes.

Potential social desirability bias is addressed in columns (7) and (8) using a list experiment to gauge IDPs' perceptions of discrimination by locals. The sensitive statement for IDPs was "I

feel discriminated against by locals in this neighborhood.” Column (7) shows a 15.1% short-term decline in perceived discrimination by locals. However, the hypothesis that the post-meeting and follow-up effects are significantly different from each other fails to be rejected (p -value=0.234). It is therefore not conclusive whether the medium-term effects are not detected because of depreciation, reduced statistical power (as the sample size decreased), or spillover effects. One notable observation from the list-experiment results is that IDPs’ sentiment of decreased discrimination manifested more promptly than locals’ reduced discriminatory tendencies—locals only registered significant effects in the follow-up stage. This discrepancy suggests a behavioral change in locals soon after community meetings—thus resulting in a decreased perception among IDPs of being discriminated against—while their beliefs took more time to change.

The robustness of the results is emphasized by the adjusted p -values. All significant effects displayed in Table 4 withstand the scrutiny of multiple-hypothesis testing, maintaining significance with an adjusted p -value < 0.1 . Estimates from inverse probability weighting, addressing possible concerns of differential and selective sample attrition (outlined in Appendix E.3), corroborate the stability of the coefficients in both magnitude and statistical significance.

IDPs also participated in a public goods game identical to the one played by locals. The results show no evidence that community meetings influenced IDPs’ monetary contributions to other IDPs or locals, as outlined in Table D2.

5.2.1 The Role of Prior Beliefs in Shaping the Social Integration of IDPs

This section evaluates the degree to which the observed positive impacts of community meetings on IDPs’ attitudes and integration into hosting neighborhoods reflect shifts in IDPs’ prior beliefs. The analysis centers on IDPs’ initial perceptions regarding their self-assessed marginalization within host neighborhoods. In particular, it compares the perspectives of IDPs who felt less heard by the host-neighborhood community relative to locals, on one side, with those who felt equivalently or more heard, on the other. Given the hypothesis that community meetings primarily operated by modifying IDPs’ beliefs, I predicted that the effects delineated in Section 5.2 would predominantly result from IDPs with less favorable initial perceptions.

Post-meeting and follow-up outcomes are delineated in Panels A and B, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) depict the influence of community meetings on IDPs’ integration into host neighbor-

Table 5: Heterogeneous effects on IDPs, according to their baseline perception that IDPs were less heard than locals in hosting neighborhoods.

	Feels better integrated		Participation in neighborhood life		Trust in in locals		Feels discriminated by locals	
	Marginalized More (1)	Less (2)	Marginalized More (3)	Less (4)	Marginalized More (5)	Less (6)	Marginalized More (7)	Less (8)
Panel A. Post-meeting effects								
Treated	0.238*** (0.045)	0.112** (0.050)	0.058** (0.027)	0.036 (0.027)	0.190*** (0.058)	0.005 (0.047)	0.367** (0.184)	0.077 (0.213)
Treated × Sensitive sentence							-0.762*** (0.263)	-0.097 (0.326)
Mean (control group)	0.674	0.701	0.395	0.486	0.368	0.533	2.333	2.224
More=less marginalized p-value	0.009		0.437		0.000		0.035	
R ²	0.691	0.628	0.586	0.465	0.593	0.531	0.641	0.484
N	189	209	201	235	200	234	193	225
Lagged Dependent Variable	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no
Panel B. Follow-up effects								
Treated	0.094* (0.049)	0.123** (0.055)	-0.020 (0.038)	0.026 (0.028)	0.064 (0.060)	0.071 (0.052)	0.363 (0.297)	-0.175 (0.204)
Treated × Sensitive sentence							-0.645 (0.465)	0.250 (0.302)
Mean (control group)	0.681	0.693	0.488	0.509	0.478	0.500	2.391	2.310
More=less marginalized p-value	0.537		0.116		0.896		0.019	
R ²	0.735	0.625	0.652	0.622	0.723	0.566	0.718	0.712
N	149	180	149	180	149	180	148	178
Lagged Dependent Variable	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. Post-meeting (short-term) results are presented in Panel A, while follow-up (medium-term) results are presented in Panel B. *more* and *less marginalized* refer to IDPs with the baseline assessment of being less/more included in the host neighborhood decision making. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a survey question measuring whether IDPs self reported being better integrated after at post-meeting and follow-up. It uses a 4-point scale within the unit interval, in which a higher value corresponds to feeling better integrated in hosting neighborhoods. Columns (3) and (4) use as dependent variable an index ranging in the unit interval, where a higher value corresponds to IDPs participating more in the neighborhood life. Columns (5) and (6) use as dependent variable a trust index that ranges within the unit interval and where a higher value corresponds to more trust toward locals. Columns (7) and (8) show the results of a list experiment measuring the discrimination from locals felt by IDPs, where the dependent variable is an integer number ranging from 1 to 5, capturing the number of sentences with which respondents agree. Sensitive is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence in the list experiment. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

hoods. Column (1) unveils a 35.3% impact (significant at the 1% level) among IDPs who initially felt more marginalized, while the effect on IDPs who felt less marginalized was 15.9% (significant at the 5% level). The comparison of effects between these columns leads me to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal (p-value=0.009), thus underscoring the greater positive impact of community meetings on more marginalized IDPs. The follow-up reveals a reversal, with stronger effects materializing for less marginalized IDPs, though statistical evidence to differenti-

ate the effects is lacking (p-value=0.537).

Regarding post-meeting participation of IDPs in host neighborhoods' civic life (columns (3) and (4) in Panel A), the effects appear uniformly distributed among IDPs, irrespective of their initial level of marginalization—as supported by both similar treatment-effect sizes (9.9% and 8.4% for more and less marginalized IDPs, respectively, significant at the 5% level) and a non-rejected null hypothesis of identical coefficients (p-value=0.437). Panel B indicates that the absence of significant treatment effects in Section 5.2 does not indicate any concealed heterogeneity relative to the baseline marginalization of IDPs.

The post-meeting treatment effects on trust in locals, shown in columns (5) and (6) of Panel A, indicate that the positive outcomes noted in Section 5.2 predominantly originated from more marginalized IDPs, a conclusion drawn from a 51.6% increase in trust among this subgroup (significant at the 1% level), contrasted with a negligible, nonsignificant effect for their less marginalized counterparts (p-value=0). The medium-term findings in Panel B reveal no distinguishable effects between subgroups.

Columns (7) and (8) underscore the short-term impact of community meetings on the discrimination perceived by IDPs. On this dimension, the evidence from Panel A suggests that the primary beneficiaries of community meetings were IDPs who initially felt more marginalized, with a 32.7% decrease in perceived discrimination (significant at the 1% level), contrasting with the 15.1% effect outlined in Table 4 in Section 5.2. The hypothesis of identical discrimination effects between the more and less marginalized IDPs is rejected, suggesting that community meetings produced different effects among more and less marginalized IDPs (p-value=0.035).

In summary, the comprehensive evidence presented in this section corroborates that the positive effects of community meetings on IDPs, as detailed in Section 5.2, were substantially driven by the IDPs who initially felt more marginalized. This indicates the effectiveness of community meetings in altering beliefs, particularly among IDPs presenting the most potential for enhancement at baseline.

5.3 Formation of Social Networks

This section examines how participating in community meetings affected the social networks of both locals and IDPs. Drawing on the Contact Hypothesis (Allport 1954), I conceptualize social networks not merely as mechanisms driving observed outcomes but as outcomes themselves that dynamically interact with belief updating and social cohesion. The Contact Hypothesis suggests that direct intergroup interactions, such as in the community meetings, facilitate belief updating, which can strengthen social networks. These stronger networks may then contribute to improved social cohesion, creating a bidirectional and reinforcing relationship, which may mediate changes in intergroup attitudes and integration.

To explore these dynamics, I focus on participants' interactions within their study cohorts, as measured by survey data collected in the post-meeting and follow-up phases. All study participants were asked whether they contacted someone who belonged to their cohort. For the treatment group, this referred to interactions with fellow attendees of the community meeting, surveys and lab-in-the-field games. For the control group, it referred to interactions with participants from the same sessions of surveys and lab-in-the-field games.

Empirical results are presented in Table 6. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) represents the percentage of co-participants from the same meeting cohort with whom the respondent has had contact. The remaining columns offer insights into specific types of contacts: columns (3) and (4) concern connections that did not exist before the intervention, while columns (5) and (6) concern interactions with individuals already known prior to the intervention.

The results, specifically in Panel A (focusing on locals), provide strong evidence that community meetings significantly increase interactions among attendees from the same meeting cohort. These enhancements in social networks were evident 2-3 days following the intervention, and they persisted through the follow-up phase while also remaining robust to multiple-hypothesis testing (adjusted p-values < 0.1). The data reveal a significant short-term impact, reflected by a coefficient estimate of 0.208 (p-value < 0.001), which intensified to 0.397 in the medium term, suggesting a progressive increase in contact intensity (the hypothesis of that post-meeting and follow-up coefficients are equal is rejected, as p-value = 0.004).

The significant effects documented in columns (1) and (2) largely originated from interactions

Table 6: Intra-cohort networks generated by community meetings.

	Percent of within-cohort contacts					
	Anyone in cohort		Persons not known		Persons already known	
	Post-meeting (1)	Follow-up (2)	Post-meeting (3)	Follow-up (4)	Post-meeting (5)	Follow-up (6)
Panel A. Locals						
Treated	0.208*** (0.042) [0.010]	0.397*** (0.052) [0.010]	0.002 (0.023) [0.495]	0.040 (0.029) [0.842]	0.196*** (0.042) [0.010]	0.371*** (0.051) [0.010]
Mean (control group)	0.128	0.253	0.051	0.088	0.115	0.222
P-value post-meeting=follow-up	0.004		0.282		0.008	
R ²	0.458	0.396	0.304	0.280	0.451	0.389
N	364	331	367	332	365	331
Lagged Dependent Variable	No	No	No	No	No	No
Panel B. IDPs						
Treated	0.185*** (0.037) [0.010]	0.155*** (0.051) [0.168]	0.012 (0.009) [0.531]	-0.018 (0.028) [0.623]	0.162*** (0.038) [0.010]	0.149*** (0.050) [0.198]
Mean (control group)	0.083	0.279	0.004	0.076	0.083	0.250
P-value post-meeting=follow-up	0.473		0.231		0.874	
R ²	0.324	0.416	0.220	0.306	0.318	0.378
N	419	332	437	332	422	332
Lagged Dependent Variable	No	No	No	No	No	No

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3) and (5), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4) and (6). The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) captures the percentage of cohort members that kept in touch with the respondent. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) restricts the analysis using as dependent variable the percentage of within-cohort contacts with new persons (who the respondent had not met before participating in this study). Columns (5) and (6) use as dependent variable the percentage of within-cohort contacts with persons already known by the respondent before the community meeting. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

with individuals known before the meetings, as indicated by coefficient estimates of 0.196 and 0.371 for the short and medium term, respectively. In contrast, the meetings had minimal impact on forming new connections. It is crucial to clarify that *known individuals* primarily includes neighbors or persons recognizable by name or face, with a smaller fraction comprising family, friends, or other closer relations.

An identical pattern is observed for IDPs in Panel B. Community meetings significantly increased interactions within cohorts both 2-3 days after and in the medium term, with coefficient estimates of 0.185 and 0.155 (p-value<0.001). As with locals, community meetings primarily enhanced interactions with individuals already known before the intervention, with minimal impact

on creating new relationships. However, there are two key differences: the effect of community meetings on IDPs remained stable over time, as evidenced by the non significantly different coefficients (p-values of 0.473, 0.231 and 0.874); and the results in columns (2) and (6) are not robust to multiple-hypothesis testing, as demonstrated by high adjusted p-values (>0.1). One possibility is that the divergence in the impact of community meetings between locals and IDPs could be related to different social dynamics or levels of pre-existing cohesion within these groups. For locals, who may have more stable or established networks, the meetings appear to have reinforced existing ties more effectively. In contrast, IDPs, who might have more fragmented or less established networks, did not exhibit the same progressive strengthening of social ties over time.

The insights from Table 6 indicate that community meetings intensified interactions within the existing networks of their participants, although they did not enlarge these networks. The short-term increase in network intensity in the post-meeting phase may suggest a role in improving medium-term intergroup attitudes and perceptions, as discussed in previous sections. However, the available data do not conclusively establish a causal link, which should be a focus of future research.

6 Concluding Remarks

This paper highlighted the importance of intergroup contact as a mechanism for promoting social cohesion in conflict-ridden regions. It evaluated the role of community meetings in bringing together IDPs and local hosts in the midst of an Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.

The array of measurement tools used in this study consistently indicate that community meetings enhanced tolerance, beliefs, and attitudes of locals toward IDPs while also promoting a sense of better social integration among the latter. These positive effects are conceivably due to shifts in the beliefs of locals and IDPs and due to the formation of social networks. In a contribution to the intergroup-contact literature, which tends to emphasize the need for prolonged interventions, this study finds that even brief but well-tailored intergroup interactions can have a beneficial impact on social cohesion that persists for at least 2-3 months. The policy implication is substantial, with community meetings serving as an effective, low-cost strategy to integrate forcibly displaced individuals in areas of limited state capacity, where more resource intensive interventions may be

unfeasible.¹⁹

While this study focused on IDPs who share a national identity with their hosts, the principles underlying the community gathering intervention are potentially applicable to other contexts, including those involving refugees from different countries or cultures. Although the intervention may require adaptation to address specific cultural, linguistic, or ethnic differences in other settings, its core mechanism—fostering social cohesion through structured intergroup contact—remains universally relevant. Future research should investigate how such interventions can be effectively tailored to diverse displacement scenarios, particularly those involving refugees from multiple regions or cultural backgrounds, to evaluate their broader applicability and impact on social integration in these more complex environments.

This study also suffers from three main limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, the relationship between shifts in beliefs and the expansion of social networks has yet to be clearly understood. It is important to emphasize that social networks are not a mechanism per se but rather an outcome that interacts dynamically with other key outcomes such as belief updating and social cohesion. One possibility is that as participants' beliefs evolve, they become more open to forging connections outside their immediate circles, leading to stronger social networks. Conversely, an expansion in their networks and exposure to diverse viewpoints could catalyze belief shifts and reinforce social cohesion. This bidirectional relationship suggests that belief updating, social cohesion, and social networks continuously interact, each reinforcing the other, consistent with the predictions of Allport's contact hypothesis. Future research should ascertain whether community meetings fostered a symbiotic reinforcement between these evolving beliefs, social cohesion, and the development of social networks in the months following the intervention. Additionally, research should focus on isolating each of these interplaying channels to better measure causal links and understand how these factors influence each other over time.

Second, this study did not account for potential spillovers to the control group due to the political constraints in Pemba. If such spillovers existed, they would lead to an underestimation of the results reported. A possible mechanism here is that even groups not directly targeted by the study

¹⁹The contact hypothesis suggests that the insights presented in this study should hold across different settings, after adjusting the content of community meetings to the context. This is because the framework of community meetings, inspired by [Herzig and Chasin \(2006\)](#), is consonant with the prerequisite conditions proposed by [Allport \(1954\)](#) for successful intergroup contact.

could benefit from its effects, perhaps through informal interactions with direct beneficiaries or by observing changes in the broader community. Analyzing these spillovers is vital for assessing the intervention's cost-effectiveness. Observing the individuals within the pre-intervention social networks of study participants, or the individuals adjacent to control- and treatment-group members, could provide novel insights about the prevalence of spillover effects.

Third, this study found that community meetings positively influenced the attitudes of both locals and IDPs toward each other. This finding aligns with prior research in the intergroup contact literature (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) and supports the Contact Hypothesis (Allport 1954), which posits that intergroup contact can reduce prejudice and improve attitudes. However, this study did not find evidence that the community meetings produced changes in behavior that were statistically captured by the lab-in-the-field games. It is not possible to rule out that the discrepancy between attitudes and behavior could be attributed to participants not fully comprehending the lab-in-the-field games—an issue highlighted by Gneezy and Imas (2017), particularly relevant in low-literacy settings—or to external constraints on individual behavior, such as financial limitations (Rabin and Weizsäcker 2009). One alternative explanation originates from the ongoing debate in the intergroup contact literature (Paluck, Green, and Green 2019), which highlights the mixed outcomes of intergroup contact interventions in changing behavior. Future research should focus on understanding how these attitudinal changes translate into behavior, potentially utilizing a broader range of administrative data, such as income level, housing stability, social services engagement, labor market participation or crime statistics.

This study also concentrated on a one-time intergroup interaction, leaving the cumulative benefits of prolonged contact unexamined. It is plausible that repeated interactions compound the positive effects or, instead, are counterproductive. Subsequent encounters might reinforce prior shifts in beliefs or give rise to new dynamics as participants become more familiar. This remains a pertinent area for future exploration, especially since increased intergroup contact might not invariably yield positive results. A longitudinal study design tracking participants over multiple interactions could yield new important information.

Finally, future research on forced displacement should investigate the reintegration of forcibly displaced individuals returning to their regions of origin (return migrants). A potential mechanism at play is the multifaceted challenges return migrants face, such as sociocultural re-adaptation,

confronting trauma and stigma associated with displacement, or competition for scarce resources in return areas. These remarks offer different pathways for future research.

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A Figures



Figure A1: The location of Mozambique and Cabo Delgado.




Figure A2: Project timeline




Figure A3: Topics discussed in the community meetings, as reported by moderators. On average nine individuals participated in each meeting.

B Outcomes Measured

The intervention used a combination of different outcome variables to measure both the social integration of IDPs and religious extremism, which are detailed in this section. The social integration of IDPs used variables constructed from: survey questions, measuring the tolerance and beliefs of locals toward IDPs, sense of belonging and civic participation of IDPs, and trust between locals and IDPs; two list experiments, in which one measured locals’ discrimination against IDPs, and the other measured IDPs’ sense of being discriminated by locals; lab-in-the-field public goods and trust games.

The following sections detail each of the outcome variables constructed. Section B.1 focuses on the variables constructed from survey data. The list experiments measuring locals’ discrimination against IDPs and IDPs’ sense of being discriminated by locals are detailed in Section B.2. The public goods, trust and anti-social games are detailed in Section B.3.

B.1 Survey Outcomes

B.1.1 Survey Outcomes Concerning Locals

Tolerance toward IDPs staying in host neighborhoods (Index): this index ranges from 0 (indicating less tolerance) to 1 (indicating more tolerance). It is constructed by averaging the responses of two binary survey questions that measure whether locals think that IDPs should be moved away from host neighborhoods or sent back to their homelands.

Positive beliefs about IDPs (index): this index ranges from 0 (less positive beliefs) to 1 (more positive beliefs). It is constructed by averaging the responses to three survey questions that measure the extent to which locals appreciate IDPs. These questions capture whether locals agree that *IDPs brought insecurity to the this neighborhood, the arrival of IDPs made my life worse* and *the presence of IDPs in this neighborhood is not positive for this neighborhood*.

B.1.2 Survey Outcomes Concerning IDPs

Sentiment of being socially integrated in the neighborhood: This variable is a measure of IDPs' sense of belonging to their hosting neighborhood. It is based on a survey questions asked IDPs whether they had been feeling better socially integrated in the neighborhood over the past few days (short-term assessment) or few months (medium-term assessment). This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating a greater sense of belonging to the neighborhood.

Participation in the civic life of host neighborhoods (index): this index ranges from 0 (less participation) to 1 (more participation). It is based on three survey questions that capture the extent to which IDPs feel heard by the community in the host neighborhood; how IDPs think they were being treated by neighborhood authorities relatively to locals; and how IDPs think neighborhood authorities should treat IDPs relatively to locals.

B.1.3 Survey Outcomes Concerning Locals and IDPs

Trust toward locals and IDPs: to measure trust toward locals and IDPs, respondents were asked to what extent they trust individuals from these two groups in their neighborhood. The responses were provided on a 4-point scale within the unit interval, ranging from *no trust* to *trust a lot*. The resulting variable reflects the level of trust that respondents have toward locals and IDPs in the community.

B.2 List Experiments

During the post-meeting and follow-up phases of this project, I conducted a regular list-experiment with study participants. The enumerators read out loud 4 non-sensitive sentences to each participant, which were:

1. *I do not like the tax level in Mozambique;*
2. *I do not like when Pemba becomes too hot;*
3. *I do not like football;*
4. *I do not like the quality of the roads in Pemba.*

In addition, half of the participants were randomly assigned to hear a fifth sensitive sentence. For locals, the sensitive sentence was: *I do not like that IDPs are living in my neighborhood*, which aimed to measure locals' discrimination against IDPs that may be underreported due to social desirability bias. Meanwhile, half of the IDP sample was read the following sensitive sentence: *I feel discriminated by the local population of this neighborhood*. This sentence aimed to measure IDPs' real perception of how welcome they are in the hosting neighborhoods.

To conduct the list-experiment, the enumerator first gave the respondent 4 or 5 stones, depending on whether they were randomly assigned to hear the sensitive question. The stones were placed in the respondent's left hand, and the enumerator instructed the respondent to move one stone from

the left hand to the right hand each time they heard a sentence with which they agreed. The enumerator turned away from the respondent and read the sentences out loud. After all sentences were read, the enumerator turned back to the respondent and counted the number of stones in the right hand, which was taken as the estimate of the number of sentences the respondent agreed with. This count was used as the outcome variable to measure the effects of the list-experiment.

B.3 Lab-in-the-field Games

Common procedure for all games: Post-meeting and follow-up activities included three lab-in-the-field games: public goods, trust, and anti-social. Due to logistical constraints, individuals played lab-in-the-field games during the post-meeting activities with other players from the same cohort (of 8-10 individuals). During follow-up activities, individuals were totally randomized and assigned to groups of 7-10 other players of the same neighborhood. The field supervisor started by dispersing all players along the game site (in order to minimize communication or any type of coordination). Then, the research team explained all the details of the game to be played. This explanation was made in all local languages represented in the group taking the game. Next, each player was individually told whether she was playing against a local or IDP. Players then received an envelope and tokens, and they were asked to leave in the envelope the tokens corresponding to their monetary decision (which depended on the game played). At the end of each game, the field supervisor removed the tokens from the envelopes and introduced the corresponding monetary amounts in the project database.

Public goods game: this game was designed to assess cooperative behavior among individuals, particularly when interacting with individuals from different groups. During the game, each participant was given an envelope containing an endowment of 130 meticaï, equivalent to \$2 USD. They were informed that they would be playing the game simultaneously with another player. Participants had the option of keeping the entire endowment for themselves or contributing a portion of it to a common pot. The research team then increased the total contribution in the pot by 50% before dividing it equally among both players.

Trust game: the purpose of this game was to measure the trust of locals and IDPs in individuals of the other group. The game was played in pairs and sequentially. During the first turn of the game, each player received an envelope with 120 meticaïs (\$1.9 USD). Individuals were instructed that they could send, by leaving inside the envelope, whatever fraction of those 120 meticaïs (including 0 or 120) to the other player. Whatever amount sent would be tripled by the research team, with the remainder being a payoff of the first player. In the second turn, the other player receives the envelope with the tripled amount. Then, this player can keep whatever fraction of the money inside the envelope, and return the remainder to the first player. All this information is common knowledge of both players, and each player was informed whether she was playing with a local or IDP (in both stages of the game).

Anti-social game: This game aimed to assess individuals' tendencies toward anti-social behavior, as demonstrated by their willingness to sacrifice a portion of their endowment in order to generate an even larger loss in their opponent's endowment. The game was conducted in pairs, with each player receiving an initial endowment of 200 meticaïs (\$3.1 USD). Players had the option to keep their endowment or pay 20 meticaïs, which would result in their opponent losing 100 meticaïs. It was common knowledge that the opponent also had the same options, leading to a situation where both players could potentially sacrifice their endowments. In the event that neither player chose to sacrifice their endowment, both players would finish the game with 200 meticaïs (a unique Nash equilibrium). However, if both players elected to sacrifice their endowments, each player would end up with 80 meticaïs.

C Sample characteristics

C.1 Differences Between Locals and IDPs at Baseline

Table C1: Comparison of the main baseline characteristics of locals and IDPs.

	Sample size		Mean		dif.	σ	p-value
	Locals	IDPs	Locals	IDPs			
Age	413	496	37.644	37.004	.64	.973	.511
Female	415	496	0.766	0.736	.03	.029	.292
Religion							
Catholic	412	495	0.165	.147	.018	.024	.468
Muslim	412	495	0.825	.837	-.011	.025	.656
Other	412	495	0.009	.016	-.007	.007	.398
Education							
No educ.	415	495	0.082	.149	-.068	.022	.002
Informal educ.	415	495	0.041	.043	-.002	.013	.913
Elementary educ.	415	495	0.607	.57	.037	.033	.253
Secondary educ.	415	495	0.253	.222	.031	.029	.277
Higher educ.	415	495	0.017	.016	.001	.009	.933
Information and social capital							
Information index	415	498	3.323	2.97	.352	.04	0
Social capital index	414	497	1.719	1.445	.274	.034	0
Ethnicity							
Macua	415	495	0.820	.493	.327	.03	0
Maconde	415	495	0.099	.119	-.021	.021	.328
Mwani	415	495	0.072	.357	-.286	.026	0
Other ethnicity	415	495	0.009	.03	-.021	.009	.03

D Additional analyses

D.1 Lab-in-the-field Games

This section delineates the impact of community meetings on real-life behaviors, assessed through three lab-in-the-field games: public goods, trust, and anti-social. The impacts on decisions made by locals are presented in Table D1. The variables of interest are the treatment effect of community meetings, represented by the variable *Treated*, and the treatment effect explicitly oriented toward individuals from contrasting groups – locals or IDPs (*Different opponent* \times *Treated*).

Columns (1) and (2) display the outcomes of the public goods game, denoting post-meeting and follow-up effects, respectively. The dependent variable is the monetary contribution in Mozambique meticaïs made by locals (refer to Section B.3 for game implementation details), ranging between 0 and 130 meticaïs (approximately USD \$2). The immediate aftermath of the intervention saw negligible shifts in monetary contributions, with effect sizes approximating zero (column (1)). In the medium-term (column (2)), community meetings prompted a significant 36% upsurge in locals' contributions, with no consequential effects noted on allocations specifically to IDPs, indicating a generalized enhancement in pro-social behavior among locals.

Columns (3) to (6) illustrate the results of the trust game, where columns (3) and (4) represent post-meeting and follow-up effects on initial monetary donations, and columns (5) and (6) pertain to the retributed amounts.²⁰ Neither the immediate nor the follow-up phases manifested significant alterations in donations or retributions. Nonetheless, in the medium-term, substantial, albeit non-significant augmentations were observed in locals' donations and retributions to IDPs (39.5% and 78.1%). These findings suggest no significant alterations in trust or pro-social behavior; however, caution in interpreting these results is required due to the relatively smaller sample size, potentially leading to underpowered estimates.

Columns (7) and (8) display the anti-social game results, using a binary dependent variable to

²⁰Political constraints during the post-meeting phase invalidated some trust-game data, accounting for the fewer observations in the trust game compared to the public goods and anti-social games.

denote whether locals expended 20 meticaïs to destroy 100 meticaïs (from 200) belonging to their opponent. The results show that community meetings did not significantly change locals' decision to destroy the endowment of opponents.

Table D1: The effects of community meetings on the monetary contributions of locals in the public goods and trust games, and the decision to destroy opponents' payoffs in the anti-social game.

	Monetary contribution in public good game		Trust Game				Anti-social game (Destroys endowment)	
	Post-meeting (1)	Follow-up (2)	Post-meeting (3)	Follow-up (4)	Post-meeting (5)	Follow-up (6)	Post-meeting (7)	Follow-up (8)
Different Opponent × Treated	-1.352 (12.235)	4.155 (7.086)	-8.730 (12.315)	13.573 (10.288)	6.037 (21.422)	14.977 (13.142)	0.145 (0.141)	0.030 (0.180)
Treated	-1.028 (10.074)	13.967** (5.439)	-4.239 (10.746)	-7.941 (7.273)	-11.817 (14.963)	-1.815 (9.307)	0.109 (0.111)	0.133 (0.122)
Different Opponent	3.914 (9.187)	-9.994* (5.957)	7.606 (8.129)	-7.981 (5.692)	-9.116 (12.186)	-7.032 (7.175)	0.023 (0.104)	-0.113 (0.126)
Mean (control group)	36.462	38.796	25.893	34.189	20.824	19.167	0.364	0.381
R^2	0.395	0.543	0.491	0.419	0.506	0.372	0.425	0.377
N	228	228	173	227	205	223	227	229
Lagged Dep. Var.	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (4) are constructed using survey data. Columns (1) and (2) use as dependent variable a question measuring on a scale 1 to 4 the extent to which IDPs agree to be feeling better integrated since the past 2 days (post-meeting assessment) and 2 months (follow-up assessment). A higher index value corresponds to greater tolerance toward IDPs. The treatment effects on the preference for more political participation of IDPs are shown in columns (3) and (4). The dependent variable is an index taking values between -1 and 1, where a higher value represents a greater preference for more political participation of IDPs. Columns (5) and (6) show the results of a list experiment measuring IDPs' sense of being discriminated by locals, where the dependent variable ranges from 1 to 5 capturing the number of sentences with which individuals' agree. Sensitive sentence is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3) and (5), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4) and (6). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies.

Table D2 portrays the implications of the public goods, trust, and anti-social games on IDPs, maintaining an identical structure to the table displaying locals' results. The observed absence of significant treatment effects and generally smaller estimated coefficients, compared to locals, underscore no substantial monetary alterations among IDPs, potentially attributable to IDPs more precarious circumstances.

Overall these lab-in-the-field games are marked by a smaller sample size (relatively to other outcome measures), as games were not always implemented due to political and logistical constraints. The reduced number of the observations used may have reduced statistical power in the

Table D2: The effects of community meetings on the monetary contributions of IDPs in the public goods and trust games, and the decision to destroy opponents' payoffs in the anti-social game.

	Monetary contribution in public good game		Trust Game				Anti-social game (Destroys endowment)	
	Post-meeting (1)	Follow-up (2)	Donation Post-meeting (3)	Donation Follow-up (4)	Retribution Post-meeting (5)	Retribution Follow-up (6)	Post-meeting (7)	Follow-up (8)
Different Opponent × Treated	-12.823 (9.764)	-2.202 (9.845)	-3.238 (10.863)	0.597 (7.802)	13.913 (11.721)	-0.341 (10.103)	-0.136 (0.201)	0.073 (0.160)
Treated	11.846 (7.451)	-3.797 (6.814)	8.923 (12.484)	4.212 (5.478)	2.834 (11.490)	5.450 (7.468)	0.236 (0.150)	0.081 (0.115)
Different Opponent	13.288* (6.805)	0.482 (7.612)	-4.786 (7.018)	3.635 (5.972)	-10.812 (7.801)	6.457 (7.053)	0.018 (0.147)	0.022 (0.102)
Mean (control group)	39.325	45.426	23.628	32.797	17.358	32.103	0.417	0.397
R ²	0.429	0.271	0.451	0.307	0.410	0.335	0.552	0.368
N	253	267	209	268	243	274	189	269
Lagged Dep. Var.	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (4) are constructed using survey data. Columns (1) and (2) use as dependent variable a question measuring on a scale 1 to 4 the extent to which IDPs agree to be feeling better integrated since the past 2 days (post-meeting assessment) and 2 months (follow-up assessment). A higher index value corresponds to greater tolerance toward IDPs. The treatment effects on the preference for more political participation of IDPs are shown in columns (3) and (4). The dependent variable is an index taking values between -1 and 1, where a higher value represents a greater preference for more political participation of IDPs. Columns (5) and (6) show the results of a list experiment measuring IDPs' sense of being discriminated by locals, where the dependent variable ranges from 1 to 5 capturing the number of sentences with which individuals' agree. Sensitive sentence is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3) and (5), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4) and (6). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies.

estimates presented in this section, thus requiring a cautious interpretation of the results shown. Treatment effects may also not exist if the financial constraint of locals and IDPs is binding. More precisely, if individuals live close to the subsistence level, they have less margin to make higher monetary contributions (Gneezy and Imas 2017).

Previous studies conducted in Cabo Delgado, such as Vicente and Vilela (2022) and Armand et al. (2023), suggest that lab-in-the-field games can effectively capture behavioral changes in Cabo Delgado. These works provide insights into how specific interventions, such as civic education campaigns or informational treatments, influence actual behavior. However, direct comparisons with this study are challenging due to key differences in the timing, target populations, and contextual factors. Vicente and Vilela (2022) and Armand et al. (2023) primarily analyzed settings prior to the escalation of the insurgency and the major influx of IDPs to Pemba in 2020, while this study focuses on a population directly affected by ongoing conflict and displacement. Understanding the source of these differences (context, population characteristics, among others) should be addressed

in future research.

D.2 The Effects of Community Meetings on Trust

This section delineates the impacts of community meetings on trust directed toward various individuals and groups. Table D3 showcases the effects on locals, displaying post-meeting and follow-up impacts in Panels A and B, respectively. Column (1) shows the trust of locals toward IDPs, as previously outlined in Table 2. The post-meeting effects in Panel A suggest that community meetings did not yield any significant impact on the trust of locals toward other community members – either other locals, relatives, neighbors, or community leaders –, individuals of the same ethnic group, or government authorities. Nevertheless, a short-term significant decrease is observed in locals’ trust toward individuals outside their community or group, namely, the people of Cabo Delgado and Mozambicans in general, with the effects being 10.6% and 14.5%, respectively (significant at the 10% level). Additionally, a short-term decline of 11.7% is noted in locals trust toward the armed forces (significant at the 5% level).

Most insurgents in Cabo Delgado are purported to be Mozambicans, primarily from the districts affected by the insurgency. Given that IDPs shared their experiences of escaping insurgents during the community meetings, it’s plausible that locals may have begun associating the people of Cabo Delgado and Mozambicans at large with insurgents. This proffers a probable rationale behind the short-term decline in trust toward these groups. Furthermore, the narratives from IDPs highlighted the ineffectiveness of the Mozambican armed forces in counteracting insurgent activities, potentially driving the reduced trust in the armed forces in the short term.

In Panel B, aside from the improvement in locals’ trust specifically toward IDPs – as noted in column (1) and previously documented in Table 2 – no substantial effects were observed across the other trust measures. The disappearance of the short-term significant effects on trust toward the people of Cabo Delgado, Mozambicans, and the armed forces implies that these topics, although salient in the aftermath of community meetings, might have depreciated over time over time. Crucially, Table D3 accentuates that the community meetings mainly elevated locals’ trust levels directed toward IDPs.

Table D3: The effects of community meetings on the trust of locals.

	IDPs	Locals	Relatives	Neighbors	Same ethnicity	Trust in... People of Cabo Delgado	Mozambicans	Armed forces	Community leaders	Government
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A. Post-meeting										
Treated	0.005 (0.033) [0.917]	-0.053 (0.034) [0.322]	-0.016 (0.028) [0.837]	-0.051 (0.032) [0.322]	-0.045 (0.031) [0.365]	-0.056* (0.030) [0.226]	-0.063* (0.033) [0.213]	-0.074** (0.029) [0.053]	-0.037 (0.028) [0.372]	-0.010 (0.024) [0.837]
Mean (control group)	0.531	0.554	0.802	0.558	0.630	0.530	0.434	0.632	0.670	0.676
R ²	0.383	0.382	0.394	0.424	0.371	0.355	0.445	0.340	0.310	0.378
N	367	367	365	367	367	367	367	367	365	367
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Panel B. Follow-up										
Treated	0.054* (0.030) [0.305]	0.045 (0.034) [0.646]	0.004 (0.023) [1.000]	0.012 (0.039) [1.000]	0.002 (0.030) [1.000]	0.048 (0.029) [0.395]	0.004 (0.026) [1.000]	0.018 (0.030) [0.987]	-0.016 (0.027) [0.987]	-0.004 (0.026) [1.000]
Mean (control group)	0.537	0.532	0.868	0.612	0.589	0.459	0.367	0.665	0.694	0.690
R ²	0.380	0.341	0.383	0.417	0.396	0.528	0.594	0.346	0.333	0.388
N	332	332	330	330	332	332	332	332	331	332
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (2-3 days after the intervention) are shown in Panel A, while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in Panel B. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (9) are survey questions in a 4-point scale within the unit interval, where a higher value corresponds to more trust. The dependent variable in column (10) is an index of three survey questions measuring trust in the district, provincial and national governments. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

Table D4 displays the impact of community meetings on IDPs' trust. The results in column (2) are identical to those previously presented in Table 4. Besides the enhancement in IDPs' trust toward locals, no other significant effects were discerned, indicating that the community meetings primarily shifted the beliefs and attitudes of IDPs toward locals, leaving the perceptions regarding other individuals and groups unaltered.

Table D4: The effects of community meetings on the trust of IDPs.

	IDPs	Locals	Relatives	Neighbors	Same ethnicity	Trust in... People of Cabo Delgado	Mozambicans	Armed forces	Community leaders	Government
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A. Post-meeting										
Treated	-0.041 (0.032) [0.565]	0.070** (0.035) [0.183]	0.016 (0.025) [0.910]	0.037 (0.032) [0.588]	0.005 (0.030) [0.920]	0.014 (0.033) [0.920]	0.021 (0.032) [0.910]	0.047 (0.029) [0.375]	0.037 (0.028) [0.552]	0.008 (0.023) [0.920]
Mean (control group)	0.643	0.463	0.805	0.514	0.629	0.496	0.416	0.570	0.620	0.684
R ²	0.318	0.351	0.375	0.420	0.424	0.342	0.362	0.401	0.344	0.347
N	437	435	433	434	437	437	436	436	435	437
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Panel B. Follow-up										
Treated	0.020 (0.027) [0.950]	0.076** (0.033) [0.116]	-0.029 (0.028) [0.880]	-0.020 (0.033) [0.960]	0.001 (0.029) [1.000]	0.035 (0.031) [0.837]	-0.017 (0.030) [0.960]	0.024 (0.037) [0.960]	-0.003 (0.029) [1.000]	0.003 (0.026) [1.000]
Mean (control group)	0.659	0.490	0.893	0.635	0.626	0.422	0.322	0.552	0.682	0.683
R ²	0.351	0.388	0.407	0.390	0.357	0.459	0.572	0.413	0.274	0.364
N	332	332	330	329	332	332	331	331	329	332
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (2-3 days after the intervention) are shown in Panel A, while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in Panel B. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (9) are survey questions in a 4-point scale within the unit interval, where a higher value corresponds to more trust. The dependent variable in column (10) is an index of three survey questions measuring trust in the district, provincial and national governments. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

E Attrition

This section describes sample attrition in relation to participation in community meetings, identifying attritors and non-attritors across various phases of the study as presented in Table E1. Attrition manifested in a 4.8% loss of locals (20 individuals) and a 3.0% reduction in IDPs (15 individuals) between the baseline and post-meeting phases (separated by an interval of 2-3 days). The attrition rate escalated during the post-meeting to follow-up phases, witnessing an additional loss of 25 locals (6.3% of the post-meeting total) and a substantial decrease of 98 IDPs (20% of the post-meeting total). Considering the overall attrition from baseline to follow-up phases, the study experienced a decrease of 45 locals and 113 IDPs (respectively 10.8% and 22.7% of the baseline totals).

Table E1: Sample attrition across post-meeting and follow-up phases.

Baseline to Post-meeting			
	Non-attritors	Attritors	Total
Locals	395	20	415
IDPs	483	15	498
Post-meeting to Follow-up			
	Non-attritors	Attritors	Total
Locals	370	25	395
IDPs	385	98	483
Baseline to Follow-up			
	Non-attritors	Attritors	Total
Locals	370	45	415
IDPs	385	113	498

E.1 Differential Attrition

Table E2 addresses the potential occurrence of differential attrition, consisting of participation in community meetings influencing individuals’ decision to abstain from the post-meeting and/or follow-up phases of the study. This table conducts a regression analysis of a binary variable representing individual attrition status on the treatment variable (columns (1), (3), and (5)), while subsequent analyses incorporate individual demographic characteristics, neighborhood dummies, and controls for meeting characteristics (columns (2), (4), and (6)). Standard errors are clustered at the cohort level.

Results pertaining to local participants are presented in Panel A, revealing that locals who were present at the baseline and engaged in community meetings were significantly less likely to abstain from the post-meeting (columns (1) and (2)) or follow-up stages (columns (5) and (6)). A plausible interpretation of this effect is that treated locals generally found community meeting participation beneficial, resulting in a perceived increase in individual benefit from being part of the study following the intervention. This interpretation aligns with the intervention’s positive impact on various dimensions such as tolerance, discrimination, and trust. The inclusion of additional control variables (columns (2), (4), and (6)) doesn’t significantly alter the coefficients, suggesting that local participants’ decisions to abstain were not predominantly based on observable charac-

teristics. These estimates are based on a small number of local attritors: 20 individuals from the baseline to post-meeting phases, and 45 from the baseline to follow-up phases.

Regarding attrition among IDPs, the findings are depicted in Panel B. From the baseline to post-meeting phases (columns (1) and (2)), there is a 2.9 percentage point increase in attrition probability among IDPs who attended community meetings. However, this effect achieves significance only at the 10% level. This outcome is influenced by 15 missing IDPs, and it can be conjectured that these individuals represent IDPs who found the community meeting participation less agreeable, due to factors such as interacting with locals or sharing personal narratives. There is no statistical evidence to support differential attrition based on treatment status from baseline to follow-up.

Table E2: Differential attrition among locals and IDPs.

	Baseline to post-meeting		Post-meeting to follow-up		Baseline to follow-up	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Locals						
Treated	-0.069*** (0.021)	-0.062*** (0.018)	-0.011 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.075** (0.031)	-0.072** (0.029)
Mean (control group)	0.083	0.074	0.069	0.074	0.146	0.142
N	415	386	395	370	415	386
Number of attritors	20	16	25	24	45	40
Individual controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Panel B. IDPs						
Treated	0.029* (0.016)	0.027* (0.014)	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.027 (0.036)	0.005 (0.036)	-0.007 (0.037)
Mean (control group)	0.016	0.013	0.212	0.213	0.224	0.223
N	498	453	483	441	498	453
Number of attritors	15	12	98	89	113	101
Individual controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level. The dependent variables are binary, taking value 1 if the study participant was an attritor and 0 otherwise. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include neighborhood dummies, controls for individuals and cohort characteristics.

E.2 Selective Attrition

An alternative possibility is that attrition may be selected by observable factors correlated with treatment status. To assess the potential for selective attrition within the sample of local residents and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), I executed a Wald test contrasting the unrestricted regression, which calculates Equation 2 (where the dependent variable signifies a binary measurement of attrition and the notation is identical to Equation 1), and the restricted regression where $\gamma = 0$.

$$Attrition_{inc} = \alpha + \beta T_{nc} + \delta \mathbf{N}_n + \theta \mathbf{X}_{inc} + \rho \mathbf{M}_{nc} + \gamma T_{nc} [\mathbf{N}_n + \theta \mathbf{X}_{inc} + \rho \mathbf{M}_{nc}] + \varepsilon_{inc} \quad (2)$$

Table E3 displays the p-values computed from the Wald tests. These results infer that treatment assignment significantly affected the likelihood of attrition among locals possessing specific observable characteristics in the post-meeting phase (p-value=0.003, based on 20 missing locals), albeit less significantly in the subsequent follow-up phase (p-value=0.08, based on 45 missing locals). Regarding the IDPs, it appears the differential attrition observed in the post-meeting phase (recorded in Table E2) is significantly correlated with individuals possessing specific observable characteristics (p-value=0.03, based on 15 missing IDPs). Conversely, the Wald test's p-value during the follow-up phase did not yield statistical support for selective attrition among IDPs (p-value=0.142, based on 113 missing IDPs).

Table E3: Selective attrition: wald test p-values for the null hypothesis that restricted and unrestricted models are not statistically significantly different.

	Wald Test P-value	
	Baseline to post-meeting	Baseline to follow-up
Locals	0.003***	0.08*
IDPs	0.03**	0.142

Null hypothesis: $T_{nc}[\mathbf{N}_n + \mathbf{X}_{inc} + \mathbf{M}_{nc}] = 0$

Following the interpretation of the Wald test results displayed in Table E3, the balance of individual observable characteristics conditioned on attrition and categorized by treatment status is

presented in Tables E4, E5, E6, E7, E8 and E9. The attrition of locals from baseline to post-meeting (Table E4) and to follow-up (Table E5) reveals a balance of almost all observables at any common significance level. One notable exception is the imbalance of tolerance towards IDPs of post-meeting non-attrited locals (Table E4). The table shows that the tolerance index of non-attrited locals in the control and treatment groups was 0.721 and 0.65 respectively (p-value=0.075). This imbalance can potentially bias downwards the treatment effects presented in Table 2, thus turning the positive and statistically significant effects found in this table into underestimates of the true effect.

Table E4: Locals: baseline to post-meeting attrition – characteristics of attritors vs. non-attritors

	Attritors							Non-attritors						
	Sample Size		Means				p-value	Sample Size		Means				p-value
	C	T	C	T	dif	σ		C	T	C	T	dif	σ	
Age	17	3	39.412	31	-8.412	8.493	.334	187	206	37.84	37.417	-.422	1.632	.796
Catholic	17	3	.353	0	-.353	.107	.004	187	205	.166	.151	-.015	.046	.754
Muslim	17	3	.647	1	.353	.107	.004	187	205	.824	.839	.015	.048	.747
Other religion	17	3	0	0	0	0	.	187	205	.011	.01	-.001	.01	.926
No educ.	17	3	.059	0	-.059	.057	.314	188	207	.09	.077	-.013	.026	.61
Informal educ.	17	3	0	0	0	0	.	188	207	.043	.043	.001	.019	.962
Elementary educ.	17	3	.647	.667	.02	.307	.950	188	207	.617	.594	-.023	.05	.646
Secondary educ.	17	3	.235	.333	.098	.306	.752	188	207	.234	.271	.036	.046	.43
Higher educ.	17	3	.059	0	-.059	.061	.345	188	207	.016	.014	-.001	.012	.905
Information index	17	3	3.101	2.619	-.482	.337	.169	188	207	3.349	3.327	-.022	.06	.714
Social capital index	16	3	1.297	1.167	-.13	.18	.479	188	207	1.759	1.722	-.037	.065	.567
Female	17	3	1.765	2	.235	.104	.036	188	207	1.798	1.734	-.064	.04	.113
Macua ethnicity	17	3	.647	1	.353	.107	.004	188	207	.819	.831	.012	.042	.778
Maconde ethnicity	17	3	.235	0	-.235	.095	.023	188	207	.101	.087	-.014	.033	.665
Mwani ethnicity	17	3	.059	0	-.059	.061	.345	188	207	.074	.072	-.002	.03	.946
Other ethnicity	17	3	.059	0	-.059	.061	.345	188	207	.005	.01	.004	.009	.616
Negative view of IDPs	17	3	.412	.667	.255	.313	.426	188	207	.452	.459	.007	.052	.895
Tolerance towards IDPs	17	3	.676	.833	.157	.164	.351	188	207	.721	.65	-.071	.04	.075
Beliefs about IDPs	17	3	.608	.63	.022	.077	.779	188	207	.602	.603	.001	.023	.962
Trust in IDPs	17	3	.51	.444	-.065	.21	.759	188	207	.509	.477	-.032	.033	.325

C and T refer to individuals in control and treatment groups, respectively. The total number of observations of IDPs does not add to 498 for all variables due to missing observations.

When examining the attrition of IDPs from baseline to post-meeting (Table E7), the samples of attritors and non-attritors are reasonably balanced, aside from two exceptions pertaining to schooling. The first one consists of a higher prevalence of attritors with secondary schooling in the treatment group than in the control group (p-value 0.041, N=15). The second pertains to non-attritors in the treatment group demonstrating elevated rates of elementary schooling compared to the control group. In analyzing attrition of IDPs from baseline to follow-up (Table E8), the only imbalances observed are a lower prevalence of the Makua ethnicity among attritors in the treatment

Table E5: Locals: baseline to follow-up attrition – characteristics of attriters vs. non-attriters

	Attriters								Non-attriters							
	Sample Size		Means					Sample Size		Means						
	C	T	C	T	dif	σ	p-value	C	T	C	T	dif	σ	p-value		
Age	30	15	36.233	38.467	2.233	4.987	.656	174	194	38.27	37.237	-1.033	1.663	.535		
Catholic	30	15	.2	.333	.133	.147	.369	174	193	.178	.135	-.043	.048	.363		
Muslim	30	15	.8	.667	-.133	.147	.369	174	193	.810	.855	.045	.049	.368		
Other religion	30	15	0	0	0	0	.	174	193	.011	.01	-.001	.011	.917		
No educ.	30	15	.033	.133	.1	.097	.306	175	195	.097	.072	-.025	.027	.347		
Informal educ.	30	15	.067	.067	0	.076	1	175	195	.034	.041	.007	.019	.721		
Elementary educ.	30	15	.567	.6	.033	.148	.823	175	195	.629	.595	-.034	.051	.512		
Secondary educ.	30	15	.3	.2	-.1	.142	.485	175	195	.223	.277	.054	.046	.244		
Higher educ.	30	15	.033	0	-.033	.034	.331	175	195	.017	.015	-.002	.013	.894		
Information index	30	15	3.119	2.933	-.186	.154	.235	175	195	3.364	3.346	-.018	.062	.772		
Social capital index	29	15	1.371	1.233	-.137	.105	.199	175	195	1.781	1.751	-.03	.07	.666		
Female	30	15	1.833	1.667	-.167	.133	.217	175	195	1.789	1.744	-.045	.042	.281		
Macua ethnicity	30	15	.700	.8	.1	.134	.458	175	195	.823	.836	.013	.043	.759		
Maconde ethnicity	30	15	.167	.133	-.033	.112	.767	175	195	.103	.082	-.021	.033	.532		
Mwani ethnicity	30	15	.1	.067	-.033	.087	.702	175	195	.069	.072	.003	.029	.912		
Other ethnicity	30	15	.033	0	-.033	.034	.331	175	195	.006	.01	.005	.009	.623		
Negative view of IDPs	30	15	.433	.467	.033	.155	.831	175	195	.451	.462	.01	.053	.847		
Tolerance towards IDPs	30	15	.75	.633	-.117	.105	.272	175	195	.711	.654	-.058	.04	.146		
Beliefs about IDPs	30	15	.567	.63	.063	.076	.413	175	195	.609	.602	-.007	.024	.761		
Trust in IDPs	30	15	.411	.333	-.078	.097	.429	175	195	.526	.487	-.039	.032	.235		

C and T refer to individuals in control and treatment groups, respectively. The total number of observations of IDPs does not add to 498 for all variables due to missing observations.

Table E6: Locals: post-meeting to follow-up attrition – characteristics of attriters vs. non-attriters

	Attriters								Non-attriters							
	Sample Size		Means					Sample Size		Means						
	C	T	C	T	dif	σ	p-value	C	T	C	T	dif	σ	p-value		
Age	13	12	32.077	40.333	8.256	5.887	.174	174	194	38.27	37.237	-1.033	1.663	.535		
Catholic	13	12	0	.417	.417	.149	.01	174	193	.178	.135	-.043	.048	.363		
Muslim	13	12	1	.583	-.417	.149	.01	174	193	.810	.855	.045	.049	.368		
Other religion	13	12	0	0	0	0	.	174	193	.011	.01	-.001	.011	.917		
No educ.	13	12	0	.167	.167	.112	.151	175	195	.097	.072	-.025	.027	.347		
Informal educ.	13	12	.154	.083	-.071	.127	.584	175	195	.034	.041	.007	.019	.721		
Elementary educ.	13	12	.462	.583	.122	.199	.547	175	195	.629	.595	-.034	.051	.512		
Secondary educ.	13	12	.385	.167	-.218	.185	.251	175	195	.223	.277	.054	.046	.244		
Higher educ.	13	12	0	0	0	0	.	175	195	.017	.015	-.002	.013	.894		
Information index	13	12	3.143	3.012	-.131	.219	.556	175	195	3.364	3.346	-.018	.062	.772		
Social capital index	13	12	1.462	1.25	-.212	.143	.152	175	195	1.781	1.751	-.03	.07	.666		
Female	13	12	1.923	1.583	-.34	.168	.054	175	195	1.789	1.744	-.045	.042	.281		
Macua ethnicity	13	12	.769	.75	-.019	.18	.916	175	195	.823	.836	.013	.043	.759		
Maconde ethnicity	13	12	.077	.167	.09	.136	.517	175	195	.103	.082	-.021	.033	.532		
Mwani ethnicity	13	12	.154	.083	-.071	.135	.605	175	195	.069	.072	.003	.029	.912		
Other ethnicity	13	12	0	0	0	0	.	175	195	.006	.01	.005	.009	.623		
Negative view of IDPs	13	12	.462	.417	-.045	.199	.824	175	195	.451	.462	.01	.053	.847		
Outcomes measured at baseline																
Tolerance towards IDPs	13	12	.846	.583	-.263	.133	.06	175	195	.711	.654	-.058	.04	.146		
Beliefs about IDPs	13	12	.513	.63	.117	.104	.271	175	195	.609	.602	-.007	.024	.761		
Trust in IDPs	13	12	.282	.306	.024	.126	.854	175	195	.526	.487	-.039	.032	.235		
Outcomes measured in the post-meeting phase																
Tolerance towards IDPs	13	12	.692	.625	-.067	.137	.627	175	195	.651	.708	.056	.038	.136		
Beliefs about IDPs	13	12	.585	.685	.1	.086	.26	175	195	.608	.618	.01	.022	.64		
Trust in IDPs	13	12	.385	.444	.06	.125	.637	175	195	.543	.557	.014	.035	.685		
Discriminates IDPs	13	12	2.538	2	-.538	.555	.341	175	195	2.263	2.349	.086	.092	.35		

C and T refer to individuals in control and treatment groups, respectively. The total number of observations of IDPs does not add to 498 for all variables due to missing observations.

group and a higher prevalence of non-attritors with elementary education in the treatment group.

Table E7: IDPs: baseline to post-meeting attrition – characteristics of attritors vs. non-attritors

	Attritors							Non-attritors						
	Sample Size		Means					Sample Size		Means				
	C	T	C	T	dif	σ	p-value	C	T	C	T	dif	σ	p-value
Age	4	11	30	38	8	5.386	.16	249	232	36.799	37.297	.498	1.474	.735
Catholic	4	11	0	.091	.091	.094	.351	248	232	.149	.151	.002	.035	.962
Muslim	4	11	1	.909	-.091	.094	.351	248	232	.839	.828	-.011	.037	.766
Other religion	4	11	0	0	0	0	.	248	232	.012	.022	.009	.014	.505
No educ.	4	11	0	.091	.091	.094	.351	248	232	.177	.125	-.052	.034	.129
Informal educ.	4	11	0	.182	.182	.113	.131	248	232	.04	.039	-.002	.017	.93
Elementary educ.	4	11	.25	.455	.205	.275	.47	248	232	.536	.616	.08	.042	.057
Secondary educ.	4	11	.75	.182	-.568	.266	.051	248	232	.234	.203	-.031	.039	.422
Higher educ.	4	11	0	.091	.091	.094	.351	248	232	.012	.017	.005	.012	.68
Information index	4	11	2.607	3.013	.406	.376	.299	250	233	2.957	2.99	.034	.058	.565
Social capital index	4	11	1.188	1.318	.131	.217	.556	250	232	1.448	1.453	.005	.04	.909
Female	4	11	1.75	1.727	-.023	.277	.936	248	233	1.746	1.725	-.021	.039	.593
Macua ethnicity	4	11	.75	.273	-.477	.277	.107	248	232	.524	.466	-.059	.057	.307
Maconde ethnicity	4	11	0	0	0	0	.	248	232	.125	.121	-.004	.034	.899
Mwani ethnicity	4	11	.25	.636	.386	.273	.178	248	232	.331	.375	.044	.056	.428
Other ethnicity	4	11	0	.091	.091	.084	.3	248	232	.02	.039	.019	.016	.237
Particip. neigh. life	4	11	.586	.494	-.091	.116	.443	250	233	.466	.453	-.013	.018	.475
Trust in locals	4	11	.25	.394	.144	.119	.248	249	232	.436	.43	-.007	.03	.819

C and T refer to individuals in control and treatment groups, respectively. The total number of observations of IDPs does not add to 498 for all variables due to missing observations.

E.3 Correction of Treatment Effects Using Inverse Probability Weighting

Following the evidence suggesting the existence of differential and selective attrition, I proceeded by analyzing the robustness of the primary results introduced in Section 5 by implementing inverse probability of attrition weights (IPW). The IPW estimates for locals and IDPs are enumerated in Table E10. Comparison of the primary and IPW results for locals (Panel A) reveals that estimated coefficient magnitudes and their statistical significance remain largely unaltered. Notably, the coefficients estimating the treatment effects on tolerance toward IDPs and beliefs about IDPs (presented in Table 2) exhibited both increased magnitude and statistical significance. Trust in IDPs also enhanced during the follow-up stages. All other estimated coefficients preserved their statistical insignificance, and their variation in magnitude was minimal.

Table E8: IDPs: baseline to follow-up attrition – characteristics of attritors vs. non-attritors

	Attritors							Non-attritors						
	Sample Size		Means					Sample Size		Means				
	C	T	C	T	dif	σ	p-value	C	T	C	T	dif	σ	p-value
Age	56	56	37.839	35.875	-1.964	2.816	.487	197	187	36.365	37.765	1.399	1.636	.393
Catholic	56	56	.107	.179	.071	.071	.318	196	187	.158	.139	-.019	.038	.615
Muslim	56	56	.839	.786	-.054	.088	.544	196	187	.842	.845	.003	.039	.938
Other religion	56	56	.054	.036	-.018	.046	.700	196	187	0	.016	.016	.009	.078
No educ.	55	56	.2	.125	-.075	.072	.302	197	187	.168	.123	-.045	.035	.207
Informal educ.	55	56	.036	.071	.035	.04	.388	197	187	.041	.037	-.003	.02	.874
Elementary educ.	55	56	.4	.464	.064	.095	.498	197	187	.569	.652	.084	.046	.068
Secondary educ.	55	56	.309	.268	-.041	.087	.637	197	187	.223	.182	-.042	.043	.336
Higher educ.	55	56	.055	.071	.017	.051	.741	197	187	0	.005	.005	.005	.316
Information index	57	56	2.682	2.816	.135	.11	.225	197	188	3.029	3.043	.014	.062	.818
Social capital index	57	55	1.294	1.3	.006	.078	.937	197	188	1.487	1.489	.002	.045	.964
Female	57	56	1.702	1.732	.03	.083	.715	195	188	1.759	1.723	-.036	.044	.416
Macua ethnicity	56	56	.571	.339	-.232	.088	.01	196	187	.515	.492	-.023	.062	.709
Maconde ethnicity	56	56	.107	.161	.054	.066	.422	196	187	.128	.102	-.026	.037	.484
Mwani ethnicity	56	56	.304	.411	.107	.085	.208	196	187	.337	.38	.043	.061	.482
Other ethnicity	56	56	.018	.089	.071	.048	.143	196	187	.02	.027	.006	.015	.674
Particip. neigh. life	57	56	.442	.494	.052	.035	.139	197	188	.475	.443	-.032	.02	.12
Trust in locals	56	55	.405	.394	-.011	.057	.85	197	188	.442	.438	-.004	.035	.916

C and T refer to individuals in control and treatment groups, respectively. The total number of observations of IDPs does not add to 498 for all variables due to missing observations.

The IPW estimates for IDPs in the post-meeting phase (Panel B), reveal the robustness of the main results in IDPs feeling better integrated and trusting locals more—with the IPW coefficients remain statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, and their magnitudes display slight variation. This result is observed despite Tables E2 and E3 suggest potential differential and selective attrition in the post-meeting phase. Regarding the IPW estimates for IDPs in the follow-up phase, the empirical evidence provided in Tables E2 and E3 did not demonstrate support for differential or selective attrition of IDPs. Consequently, the assumptions applied by inverse probability weighting may inadvertently skew otherwise unbiased estimates of treatment effects for IDPs. Nonetheless, IPW estimates for IDPs in the follow-up phase are also reported, showing a decrease in the statistical significance of trust in locals.

In conclusion, evidence described in this section (Tables E2 and E3) suggests there existed differential and selective attrition among locals, notwithstanding the low number of attrited individuals—

Table E9: IDPs: post-meeting to follow-up attrition – characteristics of attritors vs. non-attritors

	Attritors							Non-attritors								
	Sample Size		Means			dif	σ	p-value	Sample Size		Means			dif	σ	p-value
	C	T	C	T	C				T	C	T					
Age	52	45	38.442	35.356	-3.087	3.037	.312	197	187	36.365	37.765	1.399	1.636	.393		
Catholic	52	45	.115	.2	.085	.077	.272	196	187	.158	.139	-.019	.038	.615		
Muslim	52	45	.827	.756	-.071	.096	.46	196	187	.842	.845	.003	.039	.938		
Other religion	52	45	.058	.044	-.013	.052	.799	196	187	0	.016	.016	.009	.078		
No educ.	51	45	.216	.133	-.082	.082	.316	197	187	.168	.123	-.045	.035	.207		
Informal educ.	51	45	.039	.044	.005	.039	.894	197	187	.041	.037	-.003	.02	.874		
Elementary educ.	51	45	.412	.467	.055	.106	.604	197	187	.569	.652	.084	.046	.068		
Secondary educ.	51	45	.275	.289	.014	.091	.875	197	187	.223	.182	-.042	.043	.336		
Higher educ.	51	45	.059	.067	.008	.058	.893	197	187	0	.005	.005	.005	.316		
Information index	53	45	2.687	2.768	.081	.115	.484	197	188	3.029	3.043	.014	.062	.818		
Social capital index	53	44	1.302	1.295	-.006	.088	.942	197	188	1.487	1.489	.002	.045	.964		
Female	53	45	1.698	1.733	.035	.085	.68	195	188	1.759	1.723	-.036	.044	.416		
Macua ethnicity	52	45	.558	.356	-.202	.1	.046	196	187	.515	.492	-.023	.062	.709		
Maconde ethnicity	52	45	.115	.2	.085	.077	.272	196	187	.128	.102	-.026	.037	.484		
Mwani ethnicity	52	45	.308	.356	.048	.094	.613	196	187	.337	.38	.043	.061	.482		
Other ethnicity	52	45	.019	.089	.07	.055	.212	196	187	.02	.027	.006	.015	.674		
Particip. neigh. life	53	45	.431	.494	.063	.034	.067	197	188	.475	.443	-.032	.02	.12		
Trust in locals	52	44	.417	.394	-.023	.061	.712	197	188	.442	.438	-.004	.035	.916		

C and T refer to individuals in control and treatment groups, respectively. The total number of observations of IDPs does not add to 498 for all variables due to missing observations.

20 (4.8%) and 45 (11%) in the post-meeting and follow-up stages, respectively. Employing IPW estimates to compensate for these factors, the treatment effects demonstrate robustness by retaining statistical significance and minimal fluctuations in the magnitudes of estimated coefficients. With respect to IDPs, evidence supports the existence of differential and selective attrition during the post-meeting phase, driven by a modest quantity of 15 individuals (3% of all IDPs sampled). No evidence was found for differential or selective attrition of IDPs during the follow-up phase. These findings corroborate qualitative evidence collected by field staff indicating that absences among IDPs were predominantly due to migration or illness, factors orthogonal to treatment assignment.

Table E10: Inverse Probability Weighting estimates.

Outcome Variable	Sample size			IPW Estimates		
	Total (1)	Control (2)	Treatment (3)	Coef. (4)	Std. Err. (5)	P-value (6)
Panel A. Locals						
Tolerance toward IDPs (PM)	367	175	192	.086	.036	.019
Tolerance toward IDPs (F-UP)	332	159	173	.019	.031	.538
Beliefs about IDPs (PM)	367	175	192	.028	.016	.091
Beliefs about IDPs (F-UP)	332	159	173	.046	.022	.042
Trust in IDPs (PM)	367	175	192	.022	.03	.464
Trust in IDPs (F-UP)	332	159	173	.089	.045	.052
Panel B. IDPs						
Feels better integrated (PM)	362	173	189	.167	.029	0
Feels better integrated (F-UP)	298	154	144	.133	.029	0
Particip. neigh. life (PM)	437	228	209	.027	.016	.083
Particip. neigh. life (F-UP)	332	172	160	.016	.021	.438
Trust in locals (PM)	435	227	208	.067	.031	.03
Trust in locals (F-UP)	332	172	160	.055	.033	.091

OLS estimates. A different model is estimated in each row, which varies in the outcome measure being used. PM and F-UP refer to post-meeting and follow-up estimates, respectively. The specifications and samples used are identical to those present in the main results tables.

E.4 Attrition: Sensitivity Analysis using Horowitz-Manski Bounds

The attrition rates observed in both the post-meeting and follow-up phases make it relevant to examine how attrition might have influenced this study’s results. In this section, I analyze the sensitivity of the findings under extreme assumptions about the characteristics of the attrited observations, using Horowitz-Manski bounds.

Horowitz-Manski bounds are a statistical tool used to assess the robustness of treatment effects in the presence of attrition (Horowitz and Manski 2000). These bounds provide the range within which the true treatment effect lies by considering extreme scenarios—assuming that all missing data could either support the strongest possible positive or negative outcomes. The core intuition behind Horowitz-Manski bounds is to evaluate how much the attrition could alter the estimated effects, offering a worst- and best-case scenario analysis. Using the variable tolerance towards IDPs as an example, a worse case scenario would correspond to all attrited locals in the control and treatment groups taking the highest and lowest tolerance values, respectively (vice-versa for the best case scenario).

Horowitz-Manski bounds also involve some limitations. First, these bounds can be overly conservative, often resulting in wide intervals that make it difficult to draw precise conclusions. This is due to the extreme assumptions they rely on, which may not accurately reflect the actual distribution of missing data. Consequently, while Horowitz-Manski bounds are useful for identifying the potential extent of bias, they can also overestimate the uncertainty and lead to broader bounds than what might be realistically expected. Therefore, interpreting these bounds requires caution, as they do not provide precise estimates but rather a range of possibilities.

The estimates of Horowitz-Manski Bounds are presented in Table E11. Columns (2) and (3) display the lower and upper limits of the Horowitz-Manski bounds, representing the range within which the true treatment effect could lie under worst-case scenarios of attrition. Column (3) indicates the sample size used to compute the bounds, while Column (4) shows the proportion of individuals who attrited from the study. The 95% confidence interval for each limit is presented in square brackets, reflecting the uncertainty in these estimates due to sample variability.

In Panel A, which examines the results for locals, the post-meeting phase shows that the Horowitz-Manski bounds for tolerance towards IDPs range from 0.027 to 0.123, suggesting that even under the worst-case scenario of attrition, the intervention likely had a positive effect. The relatively low attrition rate (4.2%) implies that attrition has a limited impact on the robustness of these results. The bounds for beliefs about IDPs range from 0.013 to 0.058, showing a positive effect, though slightly weaker than for tolerance, indicating that the intervention positively impacted locals' beliefs about IDPs even when accounting for attrition. Trust in IDPs shows bounds ranging from 0.015 to 0.055, indicating improved trust post-intervention, robust against potential attrition bias. However, in the follow-up phase, the bounds for tolerance towards IDPs are wider, ranging from -0.060 to 0.152, suggesting a possible positive or negative effect, particularly if the attrited participants had extremely negative outcomes. Similar patterns are observed for beliefs about IDPs and trust in IDPs, where the larger proportion of attrition (11%) at this stage increases the uncertainty around the treatment effects, underscoring the importance of considering these bounds in interpreting long-term outcomes.

Panel B focuses on IDPs. In the post-meeting phase, the bounds for feeling better integrated range from 0.078 to 0.127, indicating a consistently positive effect of the intervention on IDPs' sense of integration, even when considering the worst-case attrition bias. The bounds for partic-

Table E11: Computation of Horowitz-Manski bounds.

Variable	Lower limit (1)	Upper limit (2)	N (3)	Prop. attrited (4)
Panel A. Locals				
	Post-meeting			
Tolerance towards IDPs	0.027 [-0.044 0.098]	0.123 [0.050 0.196]	383	0.042
Beliefs about IDPs	0.013 [-0.059 0.086]	0.058 [0.014 0.102]	383	0.042
Trust in IDPs	0.015 [0.056 0.086]	0.055 [-0.018 0.127]	383	0.042
	Follow-up			
Tolerance towards IDPs	-0.060 [-0.125 0.0053]	0.152 [0.071 0.233]	373	0.110
Beliefs about IDPs	-0.059 [-0.117 -0.001]	0.154 [0.101 0.207]	373	0.110
Trust in IDPs	-0.055 [-0.114 0.004]	0.160 [0.097 0.223]	373	0.110
Panel B. IDPs				
	Post-meeting			
Feels better integrated	0.078 [0.025 , 0.130]	0.127 [0.079 , 0.174]	412	0.027
Participation in neigh. Life	0.010 [-0.022 , 0.041]	0.058 [0.028 , 0.088]	448	0.025
Trust in locals	0.035 [0.021 , 0.092]	0.083 [0.024 , 0.142]	446	0.025
	Follow-up			
Feels better integrated	-0.113 [-0.176 , -0.050]	0.334 [0.282 , 0.387]	432	0.23
Participation in neigh. Life	-0.225 [-0.270 , -0.181]	0.230 [0.185 , 0.273]	432	0.23
Trust in locals	-0.166 [-0.221 , -0.112]	0.282 [0.229 , 0.336]	431	0.23

OLS estimates of the lower and upper limits of Horowitz-Manski Bounds are presented in Columns (1) and (2) respectively. Column (3) provides the sample size used in the estimation, where the proportion of attrited observations in the sample used is displayed in Column (4). The 95% confidence intervals for the lower and upper bounds are presented inside the square brackets. Panel A displays the bounds for locals in the post-meeting and follow-up phases. Analogous results for IDPs are presented in Panel B.

icipation in neighborhood life and trust in locals range from 0.010 to 0.058 and 0.035 to 0.083, respectively, also showing positive effects, suggesting that the intervention successfully fostered participation and trust among IDPs. However, in the follow-up phase, the bounds for feeling better integrated are significantly wider, from -0.113 to 0.334, reflecting the high attrition rate (23%) and the potential for a substantial negative or positive effect. This indicates that while there is strong evidence of a positive impact, the results must be interpreted with caution due to the increased

uncertainty. The wide bounds for participation in neighborhood life and trust in locals (-0.225 to 0.230 and -0.166 to 0.282, respectively) highlight the substantial uncertainty in the long-term effects, particularly due to the high attrition rate. These results suggest that while the intervention may have had a positive effect, the potential for negative outcomes cannot be dismissed.

The estimated Horowitz-Manski bounds suggest that the intervention had a positive effect, even under the worst-case attrition scenarios. However, the follow-up results, especially for the IDP population, reveal a higher level of uncertainty due to increased attrition rates. It is crucial to understand that the extreme assumptions underlying these bounds render the worst- and best-case scenarios unlikely in the context of the study sample. Specifically, the bounds assume that all participants who dropped out in the control and treatment groups had the most extreme possible outcomes. However, as shown in Tables [E4](#), [E5](#), [E6](#), [E7](#), [E8](#), and [E9](#), the baseline outcomes of attrited locals and IDPs in both groups were not extreme, suggesting that those who dropped out did not consistently hold extreme baseline beliefs. Notably, Tables [E6](#) and [E9](#) demonstrate that locals and IDPs who attrited between the post-meeting and follow-up phases, after the community meetings, did not consistently exhibit extreme post-meeting outcomes. This is significant because these individuals had already been influenced by the intervention before dropping out.

F Robustness: Post-meeting effects using follow-up sample

This section examines whether the differences in post-meeting and follow-up results could be attributed to sample variations. To investigate this, Table F12 replicates the post-meeting effect estimates from Tables 2 and 4, but the analysis is restricted to the observations included in the follow-up estimates.

Table F12: Treatment effects in the post-meeting phase when the sample is restricted to observations included in the follow-up.

	Unrestricted Sample (1)	Follow-up observations only (2)	P-value (3)	Follow-up sample size (4)
Panel A. Locals				
Tolerance towards IDPs	0.075 (0.035)	0.092 (0.039)	0.833	332
Beliefs about IDPs	0.013 (0.020)	0.010 (0.020)	0.976	332
Trust in IDPs	0.005 (0.033)	-0.012 (0.036)	0.882	332
Discrimination against IDPs	-0.047 (0.195)	-0.010 (0.199)	0.931	323
Panel B. IDPs				
Feels better integrated	0.142 (0.028)	0.151 (0.034)	0.868	301
Particip. Neigh. Life	0.036 (0.017)	0.035 (0.020)	0.984	332
Trust in locals	0.070 (0.035)	0.058 (0.039)	0.841	331
Discrimination against IDPs	-0.344 (0.159)	-0.273 (0.171)	0.833	315

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Column (1) displays the post-meeting treatment effects as presented in Table 1. Column (2) estimates post-meeting treatment effects restricting the sample used to only include observations used in the follow-up estimates. Column (3) shows the p-values for null hypothesis that the coefficients in Columns (1) and (2) are equal. Column (4) provides the sample used to compute the post-meeting treatment effects with the restricted follow-up sample. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level

The table presents the treatment effects during the post-meeting phase, comparing the results from the unrestricted sample (identical to Tables 2 and 4) with those obtained when the sample is restricted to only include observations present in the follow-up. The analysis is conducted separately for locals (Panel A) and IDPs (Panel B).

In Panel A (Locals), the treatment effect on tolerance towards IDPs in the unrestricted sample is

0.075, while in the restricted sample, it is slightly higher at 0.092. The p-value of 0.833 suggests no statistically significant difference between these estimates. For beliefs about IDPs, the treatment effect is very similar between the unrestricted (0.013) and restricted samples (0.010), with a p-value of 0.976, indicating no significant difference. The trust in IDPs shows minimal effect in both samples, with a slight change from 0.005 in the unrestricted sample to -0.012 in the restricted sample, and a p-value of 0.882 suggests no significant difference. For discrimination against IDPs, the estimates show a larger difference, from -0.047 in the unrestricted sample to -0.010 in the restricted sample, but the p-value of 0.931 indicates this difference is not statistically significant.

In Panel B (IDPs), the treatment effect on feeling better integrated is positive in both samples, with a slight increase from 0.142 in the unrestricted sample to 0.151 in the restricted sample. The p-value of 0.868 shows no significant difference. Participation in neighborhood life shows almost identical estimates between the unrestricted (0.036) and restricted samples (0.035), with a p-value of 0.984, indicating no significant difference. Trust in locals is positive in both samples, slightly decreasing from 0.070 in the unrestricted sample to 0.058 in the restricted sample, with a p-value of 0.841 suggesting no significant difference. Discrimination against IDPs shows a negative treatment effect in both samples, with a decrease from -0.344 in the unrestricted sample to -0.273 in the restricted sample, but the p-value of 0.833 indicates this difference is not statistically significant.

Column (1) presents the results from the unrestricted sample, identical to those already reported in the main tables of the paper. Column (2) provides the estimates from the restricted model, which includes only individuals who were present at the follow-up. Column (3) displays the p-values from tests of the null hypothesis that the estimates in Columns (1) and (2) are statistically indistinguishable. Column (4) shows the sample size used in the follow-up to compute the restricted model estimates. The outcomes for locals and IDPs are presented separately in Panels A and B, respectively.

Overall, restricting the sample to include only observations present at the follow-up does not significantly alter the estimated effects or their interpretation. In other words, changes in the sample between the two rounds do not appear to be driving the differences in the results. The p-values in Column (3) consistently indicate no significant difference between the estimates from the unrestricted and restricted samples, further reinforcing the robustness of the treatment effects despite sample attrition.

G Robustness: change in individual-level controls

Outcome Variable	Restricted individual controls				PDSLASSO			
	N	Coef.	Std. Err.	P-value	N	Coef.	Std. Err.	P-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Post meeting								
Tolerance towards IDPs (PM)	367	.084	.034	.013	367	.077	.032	.016
Beliefs about IDPs (PM)	367	.029	.02	.151	367	.02	.017	.241
Trust in IDPs (PM)	367	.003	.032	.92	367	.015	.03	.612
Discrimination against IDPs (PM)	354	-.1	.179	.579	354	.031	.169	.852
Panel B. Follow-up								
Tolerance towards IDPs (F-UP)	332	.02	.031	.521	332	.024	.031	.442
Beliefs about IDPs (F-UP)	332	.055	.024	.022	332	.05	.022	.024
Trust in IDPs (F-UP)	332	.052	.028	.07	332	.066	.027	.014
Discrimination against IDPs (F-UP)	330	-.433	.175	.014	330	-.427	.166	.01

OLS estimates. A different model is estimated in each row, which varies in the outcome measure being used. PM and F-UP refer to post-meeting and follow-up estimates, respectively. The *restricted individual controls* specification removes all individual-level controls except for enumerator fixed effects. The individual-level controls used in the *PDSLASSO* specification correspond to the post-double least absolute shrinkage and selection operator procedure.

Table G1: Robustness of results (locals)

Outcome Variable	Restricted individual controls				PDSLASSO			
	N	Coef.	Std. Err.	P-value	N	Coef.	Std. Err.	P-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A. Post meeting								
Feels better integrated (PM)	401	.154	.026	0	401	.166	.026	0
Particip. neigh. life (PM)	437	.027	.017	.115	437	.026	.015	.081
Trust in locals (PM)	435	.065	.032	.043	435	.065	.032	.042
Discrimination from locals (PM)	419	-.241	.14	.086	419	-.303	.134	.024
Panel B. Follow-up								
Feels better integrated (F-UP)	332	.137	.026	0	332	.141	.026	0
Particip. neigh. life (F-UP)	332	.002	.018	.892	332	.003	.016	.873
Trust in locals (F-UP)	332	.057	.029	.048	332	.048	.027	.073
Discrimination from locals (F-UP)	329	.019	.182	.915	329	.013	.174	.942

OLS estimates. A different model is estimated in each row, which varies in the outcome measure being used. PM and F-UP refer to post-meeting and follow-up estimates, respectively. The *restricted individual controls* specification removes all individual-level controls except for enumerator fixed effects. The individual-level controls used in the *PDSLASSO* specification correspond to the post-double least absolute shrinkage and selection operator procedure.

Table G2: Robustness of results (IDPs)

H Protocol of Community Meetings

Community meetings protocol
in the next page

Community Meetings Guide

[Translated from the original version in Portuguese]

Version: July 30, 2022

MEETING DEVELOPMENT

[Chronological order]

-

1. Moderator's opening message [duration: 5 minutes]

- a) MODERATOR: Start by welcoming participants. Let them know that the meeting is intended to give participants the opportunity to develop an **open and constructive dialogue between all those involved, in order to improve coexistence in the neighborhood where they live.**

- b) MODERATOR: detail the role played by you, the duration of the meeting (3 hours), and other practical information (for example, that the light meal may be provided later, at a time to be defined by the moderator or by all participants). The objective is that the moderator can manage, from the beginning of the meeting, participants' expectations.

2. Definition of the rules of coexistence [duration: 5 minutes]

- a) MODERATOR: inform the participants about the rules of coexistence and participation that must be followed by all people during the meeting (for example, only speak after putting your arm in the air, do not interrupt the speaker, follow the moderator's instructions).

- b) MODERATOR: It is **very important** that you inform that in this meeting all participants:
 - i) Will be **treated equally**
 - ii) You want all participants **to share the same common goal of having an open and inclusive conversation** about their life in the neighborhood.



- iii) It will be critical that **all participants cooperate throughout the meeting** (not interrupting others, listening carefully and understandingly, and trying to put yourself in the other's position).
- c) MODERATOR: take advantage of this moment to define in which languages people will communicate during the meeting, taking into account the profile of all participants (natural and displaced), and the extreme importance that all participants understand what is said during the meeting . MODERATOR, it is your responsibility to translate the participants' interventions, if necessary.

3. Introductions and Expectations [duration: 18 minutes]

- a) MODERATOR: Use this moment to give participants the opportunity to introduce themselves, talk a little about themselves and say what they think will happen during the meeting. Suggest that participants say their names, age, where they are from, what their main occupation has been throughout their lives, etc.
- b) MODERATOR: Let each participant speak for approximately 2 minutes. You can start with the person on your left or right and so on. If someone isn't ready to speak when it's their turn, jump to the next person. At the end of the round, re-voice the person who skipped their turn to speak.

4. Question 1 [duration: 26 minutes]

- a) The purpose of this question is to invite participants to link their perspectives on the relationship between displaced people and natives with their own life experiences.
- b) MODERATOR: ask a different question to displaced people and another to natives:
 - i) **DISPLACED: Compared to the life you had in the village of origin, how has your life changed here in Pemba?**
 - ii) **NATURAL: how has your life changed with the arrival of the displaced here in the neighbourhood?**



c) MODERATOR: After reading the questions, **give participants about 1 minute** to think and reflect on what they think. Then start the participation round and allow approximately 3 minutes for each person to speak.

d) MODERATOR: If the participant still does not trust the rest of the group to share their experiences and perspectives, please try to build their trust by building a welcoming environment for all participants.

5. Question 2 [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question seeks to address what, for the participants, is the main obstacle to the good integration of the displaced in the neighbourhood.

b) MODERATOR: ask:

i) **Is the main difficulty in integrating displaced people in this neighborhood?**

c) MODERATOR: Let the participants think for 1 minute. Then start the participation round by choosing someone to be the first to speak. Allow 2 to 3 minutes for each participant to speak. Let participants introduce their own themes.

d) MODERATOR: if no one wants to speak first, suggest some topics (e.g. differences in customs, hygiene standards, differences in the way of speaking and communicating, etc.)

6. Question 3 [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question is intended for participants to reflect on positive things they have received from the other group.

b) MODERATOR: ask the displaced people and people from the neighborhood the following questions:

i) **To the displaced people: can you tell me one positive thing about your life in this neighborhood, in relation to the life you had in your villages of origin?**

ii) **To natural persons: Can you tell me one positive thing that the displaced have brought to this neighbourhood?**



- c) MODERATOR: Give each person about 2 minutes to speak. Insist if no one says anything. There are always positive things that can be said.

6. **Question 4** [duration: 20 minutes]

- a) This question will be addressed to participants who are displaced.
- b) **MODERATOR:** ask the displaced:
 - i) **Can you share a little of your story with us? In other words, what made you leave your home village and come to Pemba and how was that trip? What did you see and experience, can you share a little with us?**
- c) MODERATOR: Give a maximum of 4 minutes to each displaced person to speak. let all the displaced speak first. Then, let the participants from the neighborhood ask the displaced people questions.
- d) MODERATOR: It is very important that you ensure that the privacy and well-being of IDPs is respected, because these topics are sensitive and difficult for IDPs to talk about.

7. **Question 5** [duration: 26 minutes]

- a) MODERATOR: This will be a question defined by **YOU**, based on what you heard during the meeting. Try to identify the most relevant idea to be addressed, with the purpose of promoting the integration of the displaced and the natural. This question may differ from meeting to meeting and from neighborhood to neighborhood. **Moderator: It is up to your own judgment to decide which is the best question to ask at this time.**

8. **Open conversation** [duration: 30 minutes]

- a) At this stage, participants have already shared their experiences and perspectives, guided by the MODERATOR. The confidence of the various meeting participants, both in the MODERATOR and in the other participants, should also have improved.



- b) Now, it's time to open the dialog to a more natural and less structured format. Introduce some question or topic that prompts dialogue, and then let the conversation flow freely. **Intervene only when absolutely necessary.**
- c) Some suggestions on how to start the dialogue. MODERATOR: Start by asking all participants:
 - i) **So far, have you heard anything that made you think in a new and different way? What was this thing? OR**
 - ii) **Is there anything you'd like to add to something that's already been talked about? OR**
 - iii) **Did you hear something different from your opinion that disturbed you in some way?**

9. Last Words [duration: 10 minutes]

- a) MODERATOR: invite participants are invited to say something they have not yet had a chance to say, but would like to share before the end of the meeting.
- b) MODERATOR: **STRONGLY encourage** people to exchange phone contacts with each other so that they build personal relationships from this meeting.
- c) MODERATOR: Say a few words that sum up the meeting and say goodbye to the participants.

END OF MEETING