# Polarization and Exposure to Counter-Attitudinal Media in a Nondemocracy*

Ahmet Akbiyik[†], Jeremy Bowles[‡], Horacio Larreguy[§] & Shelley Liu[¶]

Current draft: November 2, 2023

**Abstract**

Political polarization is an increasing global concern. Although recent research suggests that media has the potential to mitigate polarization through persuasion, it is unclear whether polarized individuals are willing to consume, and be receptive to information from, diverse news sources. This might especially be the case in nondemocracies where many citizens lack familiarity with credible media sources from across the political spectrum, and some are particularly distrustful of government media. We implement a field experiment in Turkey inducing citizens' exposure to politically non-aligned online media sources over seven months. Exposure to cross-partisan media outlets increased participants' consumption of their assigned outlets across the board, but the effects on political attitudes varied based on treatment. Although there was a backlash in the short term, assignment to pro-government media sources led to positive appraisals and voting intentions towards the ruling party in the long term. In contrast, assignment to anti-government media sources positively affected attitudes but not vote intention towards the opposition both in the short and long term. Finally, affective polarization did decrease in the short term, but not in the long term.

*With thanks to the funding NGO and to Istanbul Economics Research for their cooperation. IRB review granted by Harvard (IRB20-1665) and UC Berkeley (2020-09-13655). Larreguy gratefully acknowledges funding from the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche under the Investissement d'Avenir program ANR-17-EURE-0010. The authors have no competing interests with respect to this manuscript.

[†]Ph.D. Candidate, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University. ahmetakbiyik@g.harvard.edu.

[‡]Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and School of Public Policy, University College London. jeremy.bowles@ucl.ac.uk.

[§]Associate Professor, Economics and Political Science, ITAM. horacio.larreguy@itam.mx.

[¶]Assistant Professor, Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University. shelley.liu@duke.edu.

# 1 Introduction

Ideological polarization and affective polarization, i.e., distrusting individuals and media sources that hold opposing political views (Iyengar et al., 2019) have become a growing concern around the world due to their detrimental economic, social, and political effects. Research has shown that polarization is associated with worse policy outcomes (Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva, 2020; Allcott et al., 2021; Milosh et al., 2021). Polarization weakens electoral accountability (Baysan, 2022; Enriquez et al., 2023), and has also been linked with democratic backsliding (Svolik, 2019) and increased support for populists (Prior, 2013; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022). At the extreme, polarization may increase the likelihood of political violence (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014).

Existing research suggests that media may have the potential to mitigate polarization through persuasion if polarized individuals consume media across the ideological spectrum (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010; De Benedictis-Kessner et al., 2019). However, it is unclear whether this is likely to be effective due to polarized individuals' tendency to distrust sources that hold opposing views when media outlets display partisan bias (Cheng and Hsiaw, 2022; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006; Guess et al., 2021; Peterson and Kagalwala, 2021). Distrust may lead polarized individuals to discount news from discordant sources or even strengthen preexisting beliefs due to cognitive biases (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Bail et al., 2018; Cheng and Hsiaw, 2022; Gentzkow, Wong and Zhang, 2021; Jahani et al., 2022; Enriquez et al., 2023). Thus, whether the consumption of discordant new sources can reduce individuals' political polarization with respect to political beliefs and affective polarization is also unclear.

The bulk of field experimental research on the impact of increasing media consumption across ideological lines has been conducted in democratic contexts within the Global North (Bail et al., 2018; Levy, 2021; Broockman and Kalla, 2022). Moreover, these studies have primarily focused on relatively short-term effects. We therefore still lack a comprehensive understanding of how people receive and process information from discordant media in nondemocracies and over longer periods of time. In illiberal regimes, political polarization and media usage are particularly relevant because the state uses media to shape citizens' beliefs about the regime (Chen and Yang, 2019; Guriev and Treisman, 2019). Because the state maintains a stranglehold over media, engagement with cross-partisan media in nondemocratic contexts encounters additional challenges. Specifically, beyond political polarization, moderate opposition news is less readily available, and opposition

voters' are more distrustful of government media. It is therefore essential to comprehend how expanding exposure to diverse information sources influences people's consumption behaviors, their trust in various media, and ultimately, how it alters their political attitudes in nondemocratic contexts. It is also crucial to investigate whether the effects are dependent on the ideological distance between individuals and the information sources, and the duration of exposure.

We partnered with a major international NGO to evaluate the impact of exposure to counter-attitudinal media in Turkey.[1] Due to democratic erosion and heightened political polarization under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), citizens' access to opposition media, particularly moderate outlets, has been increasingly limited for the past two decades. This is mainly due to the government's expansion of control over mainstream news outlets (Arat, 2019), and the marginalization of independent journalism (Keyman, 2014; Çarkoğlu, Baruh and Yıldırım, 2014). Political polarization has further reduced citizens' exposure to news sources across the ideological spectrum (Svolik, 2019). Our study was designed to investigate the effects of exposure to online media outlets that promote ideologically different views on citizens' political beliefs and attitudes.

In our experimental study, we recruited 3,851 participants through social media and randomly assigned them either to a control group, or to one of four news media outlets with differing political views: strongly anti-government, weakly anti-government, weakly pro-government, and strongly pro-government. Treatment was assigned as a joint function of the participant's baseline affinity for the ruling party and the media outlet's political leaning. Participants were only assigned to a news outlet that did not match their baseline political beliefs. Our research design allows us to estimate the impact of exposure to counter-attitudinal *cross-partisan* news outlets, i.e., assigning anti-government participants to pro-government outlets and pro-government participants to anti-government outlets. We are also able to identify the effects of exposure to *moderating* versus *polarizing* news outlets that align with participant's baseline partisanship, i.e., assigning strongly pro-government participants to weakly pro-government outlets and weakly pro-government participants to pro-government outlets, respectively.

We delivered the treatment over seven months in three ways. First, we directed participants to follow their assigned news outlet on Facebook and/or Twitter, and verified this through screenshots. This increased the

[1] The overall project is part of the NGO's programming, which its donors seek not to be publicized. Therefore, we cannot indicate the name of the NGO.

probability of participants receiving news from their assigned and similar media outlets through social media algorithms (Allcott et al., 2020; Levy, 2021; Guess et al., 2023; Nyhan et al., 2023). Second, once a week, we selected and delivered top headlines from the participants' assigned outlet via push notifications from a cell phone application created for this project. This encouraged participants to at least read the headlines and click on them to access the full article. Third, we incentivized news consumption from their assigned news outlet through optional monthly quizzes. These quizzes covered information from four news articles selected from the set of headlines delivered to participants in the previous month, and participants were rewarded financially for correct responses (Chen and Yang, 2019). We evaluated changes in news media consumption and political beliefs and attitudes, as well as intermediary outcomes relating to increased knowledge and trust in particular media sources, using midline and endline surveys. We additionally collected behavioral measures drawn from the cellphone application and participants' public social media activity.

Our main analysis focuses on exposure to *cross-partisan* news outlets, where we present treatment effect estimates defined at the media outlet level. Because each media outlet represents differing degrees of partisanship, our results separately identify the effects of exposing pro-government participants to either weakly, or strongly, anti-government media outlets; and of exposing anti-government participants to either weakly, or strongly, pro-government media outlets.

We present the following primary findings. First, treated participants were more likely to see, click, and read news from media outlets with a similar political leaning to their assigned online media source relative to participants assigned to control. Moreover, several months after the conclusion of the study, participants continued to be more likely to follow assigned media outlets on social media. Second, although participants assigned to pro-government outlets reported more negative attitudes towards the ruling party within three months of the intervention, this backlash was reversed by the end of the intervention. In the long-term, those participants exhibit more positive attitudes toward, and an increased intention to vote for, the AKP. We find similar shifts in affinity with the opposition when participants were assigned to anti-government outlets in the medium- and long-term, but such shifts did not translate to an increased willingness to vote for the opposition. Rather, participants assigned to anti-government news outlets appear to be unsure who to vote for. Third, despite shifts in consumption and attitudes, we find only short-lived changes in affective polarization. While midline results for all treatment arms suggest that participants were more open to individuals across the

political aisle, this effect dissipated by endline.

We analyze intermediary outcomes through which the treatment may have shifted political attitudes beyond the direct effect of exposure to more information. First, we find that assignment to pro-government outlets improved participants' perceptions of the ruling party's policy performance across a range of contentious policy issues. In turn, assignment to anti-government outlets led participants to view these policy issues as more *important* but did not affect their views on how the ruling party performed. Second, we find that treated participants were more likely to trust media outlets with a similar political leaning to their assigned online media source. Breaking down the determinants of trust further, we find that (1) increased trust in anti-government news outlets was primarily driven by participants' greater knowledge about these media outlets, which were relatively unknown at baseline (Peterson and Kagalwala, 2021); and (2) increased trust in pro-government media outlets was primarily driven by these outlets covering a broader diversity of news topics and perspectives than anticipated by participants (Peterson and Kagalwala, 2021; Broockman and Kalla, 2022)

We then turn to secondary effects. First, we find that assignment to pro-government outlets positively affected participants' appraisal of Turkish democracy, but there was no negative effect of assignment to anti-government outlets. We also find that participants who were assigned to the strongly anti-government outlet were more likely to perceive an echo chamber in Turkey, while participants assigned to the strongly pro-government outlet were *less* likely. Addressing concerns of self-reported data, we also observe treatment effects on behavior on social media. Weakly anti-government outlet assignment reduced the proportion of participants' pro-government tweets only during the study, while weakly pro-government assignment increased this proportion, both during and after the study.

Second, while our main effects examine treatment assignment to *cross-partisan* news outlets, we turn to examine *co-partisan* treatment effects when participants were assigned to moderating or polarizing media outlets. We find that only participants assigned to polarizing outlets were more likely to increase consumption of outlets with a similar political leaning and exhibited greater degrees of political polarization at endline. Finally, we estimate treatment effects for all participant-news outlet pairs, including both *cross-partisan* and *co-partisan* treatment assignments, and find that shifts in political attitudes were primarily concentrated among participants who were moderately partisans at baseline.

Our study contributes to several strands of literature. First, it speaks to interventions designed to target political polarization. Field experimental interventions in the Global North exhibit mixed findings depending on the treatment mode of delivery. A one-month deactivation from Facebook (Allcott et al., 2020) or assignment to follow counter-attitudinal media outlets on Facebook (Levy, 2021) reduced affective polarization but had no effect on voting intentions during non-election periods. In contrast, reducing (increasing) exposure of Facebook users to content from like-minded (cross-cutting) sources did not reduce political polarization during election periods (Guess et al., 2023; Nyhan et al., 2023). Moreover, getting regular Fox News viewers to watch CNN for one month moderated their political attitudes by exposing them to different topics and information, but did not shift affective polarization (Broockman and Kalla, 2022). Further, some studies also found backlash effects: for example, exposure to opposing views for one month through a Twitter bot increased political polarization (Bail et al., 2018). Our findings demonstrate that, in a nondemocratic context, individuals can be encouraged to consume cross-partisan media. Moreover, while that consumption led in some instances to a backlash and thus an increase in ideological polarization in the short run, it led to a reduction in ideological polarization in the long run. However, the effects on affective polarization reduction are short-lived.

Second, it contributes to the literature on media and persuasion. Evidence from developed (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010; DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Fujiwara, Muller and Schwarz, 2022) and developing democracies (Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Larreguy, Marshall and Snyder Jr, 2018) support the persuasive power traditional and social media and point to media's potential for reducing polarization. However, consuming like-minded news sources, which is encouraged by social media algorithms (Allcott et al., 2020; Levy, 2021; Guess et al., 2023; Nyhan et al., 2023), can also reinforce consumers' degree of partisanship (Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017), thereby contributing to political polarization. Moreover, exposure to counter-attitudinal views can also backfire due to biased processing, fueling political polarization (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Adena et al., 2015; Bail et al., 2018; Gentzkow, Wong and Zhang, 2021). Similarly, information campaigns and protest by opposition can further polarize the electorate (Baysan, 2022; Enikolopov et al., 2022; Caprettini et al., 2023; Enriquez et al., 2023). In contrast with the concerns that exposure to *cross-partisan* media can further polarize citizens in authoritarian contexts, our findings point to possibilities for mitigating ideological, albeit not affective, polarization.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the changes in the media landscape, democratic erosion, and political polarization in Turkey in the past two decades. In Section 3, we describe our experimental design, treatment delivery, and estimation. In Section 4 to 6, we respectively present our results on our main, intermediate, and additional outcomes. In Section 7, we conclude.

# 2 Background

## 2.1 Democratic erosion and political polarization in Turkey

While a history of military coups had marred Turkey's political development, the AKP's rise to power in 2002 marked the beginning of high hopes for democratic consolidation. The AKP—led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan—was a newcomer in the Turkish political scene that promised to reconcile religion with democracy. Since its initial election into power, the AKP has won every subsequent parliamentary election and has consolidated its power.

The AKP underwent several changes as the ruling party. At the outset, the party was elected by its religious base. Between 2002 to 2007, it transformed into a catch-all party that implemented popular reforms such as boosting economic growth and taking steps towards securing membership within the European Union (Carkoglu, 2009). Its initial goal of liberalizing Turkish politics was short-lived, as President Erdogan's rule took an authoritarian turn (Kirişçi and Sloat, 2019). At the elite level, moderate elements of the AKP were purged as Erdogan consolidated power with the support of more conservative loyalists.

Even as the political space further narrowed under the AKP, voting patterns suggest that the level of political polarization also increased. For instance, in recent years, referenda in 2007, 2010, and 2017, as well as other referendum-like elections, have consistently resulted in nearly equal splits among voters. In the last three Presidential elections in 2014, 2018, and 2023, AKP received 51.79%, 52.49%, and 52.18% of the votes, respectively. The high participation rates of these votes—above 85% in the last two Presidential elections—point towards an increasingly politically mobilized and polarized electorate.

Affective polarization is also widespread. A survey fielded between 2015 and 2017 found that, across different dimensions of affective polarization—social distance, moral superiority, and political intolerance—respondents demonstrated an unwillingness to socially interact with those across the political aisle (Erdogan,

2018). 74% of respondents expressed unwillingness to do business with one of the supporters of political parties they disapprove of, while 68% of respondents did not want their children to play with children of other political parties' supporters. We find similarly polarized attitudes in our survey: Within our sample, pro-(anti-) government participants are more (less) likely to trust and consume pro-government media outlets, while being less (more) likely to trust and consume anti-government media outlets (see Section 3).




Figure 1: Polarization across time (source: V-Dem)

Both political and affective polarization have further contributed to the erosion of democracy as voters have prioritized partisan interests over democratic principles (Svolik, 2019). In Figure 1, we plot measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project of political polarization and social polarization from 2000 to 2022.[2] We note that both measures of polarization, and in particular polarization, rose rapidly across the AKP's tenure in government.

## 2.2 Media landscape

Turkey's democratic erosion is closely related to the reduction in access to independent news sources. Particularly in recent years, the AKP has significantly increased restrictions on freedoms of expression. Journalists who speak out against AKP face having their credibility undermined by the AKP, and are harassed, subject physical violence, and detained under allegations of terrorist propaganda (Arsan, 2013; Corke et al., 2014). Since October 2022, a new law has enabled the government to imprison citizens or journalists for posting on social media what it terms 'disinformation' (Reuters, 2022). Press organisations in Turkey have

[2]These are unstandardized measures of the variables `v2cacamps` and `v2smpolsoc` (Coppedge et al., 2021).

described the law as potentially "the heaviest censorship and self-censorship mechanisms in the history of the Republic" (Bianet, 2022).

Beyond overt censorship, one of the AKP's major strategies for managing the flow of political information in Turkey was to replace secular media owners with members of the newly emerging pro-AKP elite (Arat, 2019; Reporters Without Borders, 2023). This strategy is perhaps best exemplified by the case of *Sabah*, a major news outlet that has become closely aligned with the government. Originally established in 1985, *Sabah* has grown to become a significant presence in both print and online media. In 2013, the ownership of the media group was transferred to the Turkuvaz Media Group, which is owned by the Kalyon Group—a conglomerate with close ties to AKP elites. These media shifts have contributed to both the expansion of news outlets with a pro-government stance and polarization within domestic Turkish media. Not only have new highly partisan news outlets emerged, but some media organizations that were once considered to have a moderate pro-government stance have also adopted increasingly hardline positions due to changes in ownership.




Figure 2: Media diversity (Source: V-Dem)

The AKP's control over media is evidenced across the years. First, in Figure 2, we present V-Dem measures of the consumption of domestic online media, the homogeneity of main online outlets, and the perspective diversity of online media over time.[3] We notice that domestic media consumption has increased over time, while the diversity of media outlets has decreased.

Second, we show that Turkish media landscape has become more supportive of the government and

[3]These are standardized measures (since the original scale of each variable differs) of the variables `v2smonex`, `v2smmefra` and `v2smonper` (Coppedge et al., 2021).

polarized. We use data from our respondents' baseline survey regarding which online newspapers they most frequently consumed. Fixing the consumption for a given outlet in 2022, we determine how each media outlet's ideological stance has changed over the last two decades by retrospectively tracking the acquisition and founding dates of major online newspapers in Turkey between 2002 and 2022. In Figure 3, we then evaluate the extent to which respondents consumed media outlets with a particular ideological stance, as defined by their ownership,[4] in five-year intervals between 2002 and 2022. The result of this coding exercise illustrates how participants' information diets may have *shifted* between 2002—when the AKP first came into power—and the subsequent two decades of its rule.[5]

Figure 3 shows that our respondents mostly consumed either weakly pro-government media outlets or ideologically extreme outlets in 2022. However, reflecting the Turkish media landscape ownership, there was very limited consumption of weakly anti-government outlets. This situation contrasts drastically with that of 2002, when the bulk of predicted consumption was of weakly anti-government outlets, followed by weakly pro-government media outlets, with very limited predicted consumption of ideologically extreme outlets.

## 3 Experimental design and estimation

We conducted a field experiment over the course of 14 months to study the effects of exposure to different types of media. Participants, recruited on a rolling basis, were encouraged to consume media from one of four online news outlets for seven months each. These outlets varied in the direction and intensity of their political leaning, as we describe below.[6] We measure changes in political attitudes and behaviors using surveys administered at midline (four months into the study) and endline (seven months into the study) combined with behavioral data drawn from the cellphone app developed for the project and participants' public social media accounts.

[4] We detail coding procedures in Appendix A.

[5] While this approach may not capture precise patterns of ideological media consumption, as individuals are likely to modify their consumption in response to changes in media outlets' ideological orientation, it is a valuable exercise for analyzing the evolution of the Turkish media landscape following the rise to power of the AKP, since retrospective media consumption data is unavailable.

[6] The full set of treatments also included two fact-checkers. We focus this paper on the four news outlets because the content of these treatments is much more comparable.




(a) 2022




(b) 2017




(c) 2012




(d) 2007




(e) 2002

Figure 3: Predicted frequent readership of online media by ideological stance—as defined by their ownership—from 2002 to 2022

### 3.1 Experimental design

We recruited 5.890 participants into an online media study on a weekly rolling basis from February to August 2021 using Facebook ads targeted at individuals living in Turkey between 18-55 years old. To participate in the study, interested individuals were instructed to download a cellphone app designed for the study (see Appendix B.2) and were screened for eligibility before completing a baseline phone survey.[7] After excluding 1,185 participants who completed the baseline but never saw the assignment, our overall baseline sample comprises 4,720 participants, out of which 3,851 were assigned to control or one of the four news outlets and are thus the focus of this paper.[8] Participants were, on average, 60% male, 28.6 years old, and 87% possessed at least secondary education. Due to the rolling nature of baseline enumeration, we grouped baseline participants surveyed in the same week into a given "batch" and assigned participants within each batch into *control* or a given *treatment* outlet as a joint function of (1) the participant's affinity towards the ruling party; (2) the treatment outlet's political leaning.

#### Participants' affinity towards the ruling party

We stratify this random assignment according to participants' baseline affinity towards the ruling AKP—whether they are strongly anti-government (23% of sample), weakly anti-government (30%), weakly pro-government (36%), or strongly pro-government (11%). Table A4, documenting how participants' characteristics vary across these strata, validates the measure. With regard to baseline attitudes and behaviors, strongly pro- (anti-) government participants (1) are $0.16\sigma$ ($0.31\sigma$) more (less) likely to consume pro-government media outlets relative to mean levels, while being $0.16\sigma$ ($0.18\sigma$) less (more) likely to consume anti-government media outlets; (2) are $0.49\sigma$ ($0.52\sigma$) more (less) likely to trust pro-government media outlets, while being $0.05\sigma$ ($0.36\sigma$) less (more) likely to trust anti-government media outlets; (3) report perceptions of AKP performance which are 0.72 (0.80) $\sigma$ higher (lower); (4) consider contentious policy issues to be 0.18 (0.29) $\sigma$ less (more) important; and (5) think that Turkey is 0.79 (0.79) $\sigma$ more (less) democratic. Considering participants' social media behavior prior to the study, strongly pro-government participants post a greater

[7] Citizens were eligible to participate in the study if they were at least 18 years old and actively used either Facebook or Twitter. Approximately 20% of participants instead completed the baseline survey using the app since they were not available the first three times they were contacted by phone and chose that option.

[8] 869 participants who were assigned to fact-checkers are the focus of another paper.

proportion of posts on Twitter (46%) classified as being pro-government than other participants (discussed below).

**Variation in political leaning among treatment outlets**

We similarly divide our four treatment media outlets according to their political leaning, based on whether an outlet was owned by a company that has close connections with the government and the expert assessment of the funding NGO. Among the two independent outlets, we define *Gazete Duvar* as strongly anti-government and *Medyascope* as weakly anti-government. Among the pro-government news outlets, we define *Hürriyet* as weakly pro-government and *Sabah* as strongly pro-government. Appendix B.1 provides more details about each of these outlets.

The assignment of outlets to their political leaning is reinforced by our baseline survey data. Table A5 summarizes participants' baseline beliefs about, and knowledge of, of these outlets. Each stratum considers *Sabah* to be more biased in favor of the government than *Hürriyet*, and considers *Hürriyet* to be more pro-government than either of the independent media outlets (panel A). Between the independent media outlets, perceptions of their relative political leanings are less clear primarily because their much smaller size and reach (panel D) means that many fewer participants are aware of them at baseline (panel B). Consistent with the point that independent media outlets are much less well known, participants' trust in them is relatively stable across strata, compared to a steep gradient among the pro-government outlets (panel C).

Outlets' varied political leanings are further validated by classifying the content of their news stories, which we detail further in Appendix D.1. We first collected a sample of articles from each of the four media outlets ($n = 1,116$). Three Turkish university student coders were then asked to code the anti-government sentiment of both the actual text or plain text stripped of identifying information of these news articles based on either the topic's choice or its portrayal. Second, using these binary labels, we train a Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) natural language processing model to classify *all* articles produced by the four media outlets during the treatment period ($n = 206,252$) as containing anti-government sentiment or not. This classification exercise indicates that *Gazete Duvar* produced a substantially higher share of anti-government stories (79%) than *Medyascope* (49%), *Hürriyet* (15%) or *Sabah* (1%).

### 3.2 Treatment assignment

Our study is designed primarily to capture the effects of exposure to media outlets that are *counter-attitudinal*, i.e., cross-partisan outlets that do not align with participants' baseline partisanship. Combining the stratification of participants according to their affinity towards the ruling party with variation across our treatment media outlets in terms of their political leaning, we then randomly assigned participants to treatment outlets. Table 1 documents the treatment assignment process (columns) according to participants' affinity stratum (rows).

Table 1: Treatment assignment

| | | Anti-govt | | Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Strongly | Weakly | Weakly | Strongly |
| *Treatment name* | Control | Gazete Duvar | Medya-scope | Hürriyet | Sabah |
| Strongly Anti-govt | ✓ | - | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Weakly Anti-govt | ✓ | ✓ | - | ✓ | ✓ |
| Weakly Pro-govt | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | - | ✓ |
| Strongly Pro-govt | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | - |

Table presents the treatment assignment stratified by participants' baseline AKP affinity stratum (rows). Participants of a particular baseline affinity can be assigned to an outlet if the cell is represented by a checkmark (✓). Checkmarks in a circle represent the sample used for analysis, where gray indicates Control; red indicates *same-side* treatment; blue indicates *cross-partisan* treatment.

Given our interest in cross-partisan exposure relative to participants' baseline partisan beliefs (i.e., the blue checkmarks in Table 1), we did not assign participants to a condition of 'perfectly aligned' media sources. For example, strongly pro-government participants were never assigned to the strongly pro-government media source. A relatively small share of the sample (17%), however, was assigned to a treatment outlet which aligned with their baseline partisanship but represented either a *moderating* or *polarizing* treatment assignment (i.e., the red checkmarks in Table 1). As discussed in detail below, we focus on our main results on the cross-partisan treatment assignments and present these co-partisan treatment assignments in the secondary results.

Within each batch and affinity stratum of participants, we block randomize using a set of individual-level covariates, including their attitudes towards the government, their consumption of different media sources, and

their trust in different media sources.[9] Among the cross-partisan treatment assignments, because treatment assignment probabilities varied by stratum (see Table A2), 21% of the sample are assigned to *Gazete Duvar*, 10% to *Medyascope*, 10% to *Hürriyet* and 23% to *Sabah* and the remaining 36% to Control. Figure 4 shows the resulting sample numbers for each treatment arm.

### 3.3 Treatment delivery

We then administered treatment in three ways. Once randomized, participants were asked to follow their assigned outlet on Facebook and/or Twitter and to upload a screenshot to the study's cell phone application validating this. Participants were expected to thereafter organically see posts from their assigned outlet, and potentially posts from other similar media sources (Allcott et al., 2020; Levy, 2021; Guess et al., 2023; Nyhan et al., 2023). Second, once a week, we compiled three politically-relevant headlines from each of the media outlets and delivered these headlines via notifications pushed through the app with links to the full news stories for more information (see Appendix B.3). Third, to mitigate attrition concerns and incentivize the consumption of news from the assigned media outlet, we implemented optional monthly quizzes—incentivized for correctness—that tested participants' information recall of the previous months' headlines (Chen and Yang, 2019). Treated participants received nine questions pertaining to their assigned media outlets, while participants in the control group received a similar number of generic, unrelated, questions to minimize heterogeneity in study engagement.

Table A6 summarizes study participation by cross-partisan treatment assignment using endline survey data (panels A and C), screenshot data provided at baseline (panel B), quiz participation data (panel D), and app-recorded engagement with the weekly news headline blasts (panel E). Across each treatment arm, participants' engagement with their assigned outlet was relatively high. Participants reported following their assigned news outlets on social media, and this was validated with screenshots. Notably, screenshot data closely matched self-reported data (both 77% on average), increasing confidence in participants' truthfulness. Participants also reported consuming stories from their assigned media across a variety of platforms on social media (69% on average). Finally, we record high levels of quiz participation—with participants completing 68% of quizzes through the study—and also reasonably high levels of app engagement with the weekly news

[9] Generally, these blocks are defined with size $n = 18$, except in rare cases where particularly small batches of baseline data necessitated smaller block sizes.




Figure 4: Overview of study

Assignment to media outlets is stratified by baseline AKP affinity (see Figure 1). Assignment generates variation in whether participants are assigned to *cross-partisan* or *co-partisan* treatments, where the former are the main focus of the results. Participants were additionally incentivized to consume particular content through optional monthly quizzes, relating either to the treatment information (Outlet news quizzes) or pop culture (Placebo quizzes). Colored cells inside *Midline survey* and *Endline survey* indicate sample sizes for Control, Cross-partisan treatment, and Co-partisan treatment.

headline blasts, with an average of 55% of participants clicking through to a story on at least one of the news blasts sent to them.

We administered a midline survey four months after participants' enrollment into the study and an endline survey seven months after enrollment. The midline survey, largely containing the same questions as those asked at baseline, was administered through the study's app. The endline survey was administered through phone-based surveys whenever possible.[10] Within the endline, we included a portion of the baseline questions and added new sets of questions relating to potential mechanisms activated by the treatment.[11]

### 3.4 Estimation

We define treatment based on the direction and intensity of the partisanship of the assigned media outlet. In our pre-analysis plan, we did not distinguish between treatment assignments *within* and *across* the political aisle. As a result, for example, participants assigned to the strongly anti-government media outlet would conflate (1) weakly anti-government participants, for whom this would represent a *polarizing* treatment reinforcing their pre-existing partisanship, with (2) pro-government participants, for whom this would represent a *cross-partisan* moderating treatment potentially challenging their pre-existing partisanship. Because these treatments, in principle, might have quite different effects, we therefore estimate *cross-partisan* and *co-partisan* treatment effects separately and primarily focus on the large majority (83%) of the sample assigned to the counter-attitudinal cross-partisan treatments throughout the results.

We focus on both the midline and endline surveys as our primary data source for outcomes. In accordance with our pre-analysis plan, within both surveys, we created inverse covariance weighted (ICW) indices of pre-defined similar outcomes to reduce the risks of multiple testing that are standardized relative to the control group. Our baseline estimating Equation (1) captures the reduced form effect of participants being assigned to a given treatment condition at baseline:

$$Y_{i,b} = \tau \mathbf{T}_{i,b} + \beta Y_{i,b}^{pre} + \mathbf{X}_{i,b}^{pre} + \kappa_b + \mu_e + \epsilon_{i,b}, \quad (1)$$

[10] In 28% of cases, due to the difficulties of reaching respondents by phone, we instead administered the endline survey using the cellphone app.

[11] These new questions were motivated by fourteen focus group discussions conducted among participants prior to endline enumeration. We discuss the sets of questions asked in the outcome surveys as we introduce the results.

where $Y_{i,b}$ is individual $i$ outcomes from block $b$ regressed onto $\mathbf{T}_{i,b}$, the vector of treatment conditions. The OLS estimate of $\tau$ identifies the reduced form causal effect of assignment to a given treatment on outcomes. To improve precision, we control for $Y_{i,b}^{pre}$, which captures pre-treatment baseline values of the outcome of the corresponding variable, or family of variables (when available), and for a vector of predetermined covariates defined at baseline, $\mathbf{X}_{i,b}^{pre}$, which we select using LASSO. We add enumerator and fixed effects, $\mu_e$, for endline observations, and block fixed effects, $\kappa_b$. Finally, because the probability of assignment to specific treatments varies by block, we use inverse propensity weighting (IPW) to weight observations by the inverse of the probability of their assignment to a given treatment (Gibbons, Serrato and Urbancic, 2019). We use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for inference, reflecting the individual-level randomization.

Our counter-attitudinal treatment assignments, intuitively, entail that only anti-government participants are assigned to pro-government outlets while only pro-government participants are assigned to anti-government outlets. As a result, we can interpret differences between treatment coefficients in the $\tau$ vector among treatments with *shared* partisanship (e.g. weakly pro-government and strongly pro-government treatments) as reflecting their relative causal impact, since e.g., any anti-government participant could have been assigned to either treatment. However, differences between the coefficients among treatments with *contrasting* partisanship (e.g. pro-government and anti-government treatments) also imply differences in the samples assigned to each one since no single participant could have been assigned both to either a pro-government or an anti-government treatment. We therefore provide formal tests for the equality of coefficients only among treatments that share the same partisanship and interpret differences *across* the partisanship of treatments as also speaking to the relative ease of persuading anti-government, versus pro-government, participants.

Central to internal validity, we find no evidence of differential attrition between baseline and midline or endline survey enumeration (see Table A39).[12] Among the 3,171 baseline participants assigned either to control or a cross-partisan treatment, both midline and endline response rates are around 70%. Similarly, in Table A38, we find that baseline covariates are relatively well balanced among the endline sample, with participants appearing similar both in terms of demographic characteristics and their baseline attitudes and behaviors.[13]

[12] We note in Table A6, descriptively, that engagement is relatively lower among those assigned to pro-government outlets—however, for the sample composition reasons discussed above, this does not imply that engagement is *imbalanced* relative to the control group, which is unobserved by design for each of the variables in that Table A6.

[13] Testing for the significance of the joint hypothesis that the treatment vector $\tau$ is different from zero, only 1 variable is imbalanced

# 4 Main Findings

We now turn to our main findings. First, we assess effects on participants' exposure to, and consumption of, pro-government and anti-government media outlets. Second, we consider effects on participants' political attitudes and related attitudinal changes. Across each set of outcomes, we present treatment effects based on endline survey data (panel A in each table) and midline survey data (panel B) where available. We typically emphasize endline results in the discussion since they capture longer-term effects and tend to match those at midline. When they differ, however, we discuss the difference. Per outcome, we present two sets of estimates. In the odd columns, we present results including block and enumerator fixed effects, and controlling for baseline values of the dependent variable (when available). Even columns additionally include LASSO-selected baseline controls, and thus are the focus of our finding discussions.

## 4.1 Treatment exposure on social media

**Following treatment outlet.** We find that treatment assignment did induce participants to follow media outlets with a similar political leaning to the media outlet to which they were assigned, consistent with the descriptive statistics reported above. Columns 1-4 of Table 2 present estimated effects on participants' following of anti-government and pro-government outlets in our study, respectively. Participants assigned to anti-government outlets were more likely to follow such outlets at endline by $0.72\sigma$–$0.74\sigma$ compared to those in control. Participants assigned to pro-government outlets were also more likely to follow such outlets by $0.36\sigma$–$0.44\sigma$. We find no significant substitution effects on following pro- or anti-government media for treated participants. Treatment effects are similar in magnitude between midline (panel B) and endline (panel A) and do not vary between treatment outlets sharing the same partisanship, as reflected by the p-values of the corresponding test at the bottom of each panel.

**Seeing cross-partisan content on social media.** We next examine whether participants saw these media outlets' posts when using social media. In columns 5-8 of Table 2, we assess treatment effects on exposure to anti-government outlets and pro-government outlets, respectively. Assignment to anti-government outlets increased participants' social media exposure to these outlets by $0.67\sigma$, while pro-government outlet

at the 10% level. Any existing imbalances are adjusted for in our specifications including LASSO-selected controls.

Table 2: Effects on compliance and exposure to media outlets

| | ICW: Following outlets (anti) | | ICW: Following outlets (pro) | | ICW: Outlet exposure (anti) | | ICW: Outlet exposure (pro) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.72*** | 0.72*** | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.64*** | 0.67*** | -0.08 | -0.04 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.75*** | 0.74*** | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.67*** | 0.67*** | 0.02 | 0.06 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.45*** | 0.45*** | -0.12 | -0.13 | 0.40*** | 0.38*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.35*** | 0.36*** | -0.01 | -0.04 | 0.19** | 0.21*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.66 | 0.80 | 0.89 | 0.73 | 0.71 | 0.93 | 0.19 | 0.19 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.58 | 0.33 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.26 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| $R^2$ | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.09 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.31 | 0.09 | 0.17 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.80*** | 0.80*** | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.77*** | 0.76*** | 0.07 | 0.06 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.86*** | 0.84*** | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0.67*** | 0.66*** | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.37*** | 0.35*** | -0.03 | -0.05 | 0.33*** | 0.29*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.36*** | 0.36*** | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.34*** | 0.32*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.54 | 0.62 | 0.94 | 0.86 | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.42 | 0.51 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.48 | 0.46 | 0.90 | 0.87 | 0.47 | 0.54 | 0.82 | 0.73 |
| $R^2$ | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.24 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.35 | 0.28 | 0.31 |
| Observations | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 |

All DVs are ICW indices. Columns 1-4: Index of how many anti/pro-government treatment outlets respondent follows. Columns 5-8: Index of (i) how frequently respondent reports seeing anti/pro-government treatment outlets on social media in prior three months; (ii) how many anti/pro-government media outlets they report seeing regularly on their news feeds on social media. See Tables A9-A13 for disaggregated estimates. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

assignments yielded smaller but significant effects ($0.21\sigma$–$0.38\sigma$). Differences in effects on exposure were significantly larger for weakly pro-government than for strongly pro-government outlet assignments at endline ($p = 0.02$), while being statistically indistinguishable for the anti-government outlets. Once again, there is no evidence of a substitution effect for exposure, on the aggregate.

In Tables A11 and A13, we expand the treatment exposure index to show results for its individual sub-components. When considering disaggregated outcomes, we do find modest evidence of a substitution effect: participants assigned to weakly pro-government media became slightly *less* likely to see anti-government outlets' content often on social media, while those assigned to strongly anti-government media reported seeing pro-government outlets' news less often compared to control.

## 4.2 Consuming cross-partisan news outlets

**Consuming cross-partisan content on social media.** Treatment not only increased participants' exposure to cross-partisan news content on social media, but it also increased their consumption. In the surveys, we asked participants whether they regularly clicked on various specific news sources when they saw their news posts on social media. Table 3 presents these results, which indicate stable changes in behavior between midline and endline. Treating participants with anti-government media outlets led to $0.45\sigma$ increases in clicking on these outlets on social media (column 2). The weakly pro-government outlet assignment also increased self-reported clicks of pro-government news stories by $0.34\sigma$, while the strongly pro-government outlet assignment increased clicks by $0.17\sigma$ (column 4), with the latter significantly smaller than the former ($p = 0.04$).

Across the two outcomes, we again find some evidence of substitution effects, with modest reductions in the consumption of anti-government outlets among those assigned to pro-government outlets, and the converse for those assigned to the weakly anti-government outlet. These substitution effects are only statistically significant—with magnitudes of $0.14\sigma$ and $0.17\sigma$, respectively—for assignments to weakly pro-government and strongly anti-government outlets.

**Media consumption.** Beyond social media clicks, we also asked participants in the endline surveys which news they read often, and which they sought out often. We combine these measures into an index that

Table 3: Effects on consumption of media outlets

| | ICW: Outlet consumption (anti) | | ICW: Outlet consumption (pro) | | ICW: Media consumption (anti) | | ICW: Media consumption (pro) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.44*** | 0.45*** | -0.21** | -0.17** | 0.40*** | 0.38*** | -0.28*** | -0.24*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.44*** | 0.45*** | -0.10 | -0.08 | 0.43*** | 0.38*** | -0.21*** | -0.19** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.15 | -0.14* | 0.33*** | 0.34*** | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.12* | 0.11 |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.05 | -0.04 | 0.16** | 0.17** | -0.07 | -0.09 | 0.14** | 0.14** |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.21 | 0.33 | 0.77 | 0.98 | 0.31 | 0.53 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.21 | 0.20 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.30 | 0.16 | 0.80 | 0.55 |
| $R^2$ | 0.18 | 0.27 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.30 | 0.19 | 0.24 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.47*** | 0.49*** | -0.17** | -0.16** | 0.49*** | 0.48*** | -0.16** | -0.16** |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.37*** | 0.37*** | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.26*** | 0.23*** | -0.03 | -0.03 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.09 | -0.10 | 0.27*** | 0.27*** | -0.05 | -0.07 | 0.22*** | 0.22*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.06 | -0.07 | 0.19*** | 0.17** | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.25*** | 0.24*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| Control SD | 1.01 | 1.01 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.25 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.67 | 0.74 | 0.34 | 0.22 | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.73 | 0.78 |
| $R^2$ | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.26 | 0.27 |
| Observations | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All DVs are ICW indices. Columns 1-4: Index of how many anti/pro-government media outlets respondents regularly click on when they see news on social media. Columns 5-8: Index of (i) how many anti/pro-government outlets respondents report frequently reading on social media; (ii) respondents preferring anti/pro-government media outlets when they seek out news information. See Tables A15-A20 for disaggregated estimates. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

measures media consumption by type of media outlet more broadly in columns 5-8 of Table 3 , and present sub-component results in Tables A17 and A19. In column 6, we find that assignment to an anti-government outlet increased overall consumption of anti-government media by $0.38\sigma$, while in columns 8 we find that assignment to a pro-government outlet only modestly increased consumption by $0.11\sigma$-$0.14\sigma$ at endline. The magnitudes of the results at midline are comparable for those assigned to anti-government outlets, but are around double the size for those assigned to pro-government outlets.

Finally, considering substitution effects, we find no evidence of substitution with respect to the consumption of anti-government media. We do, however, find evidence that assignment to anti-government outlets significantly *reduced* participants' consumption of pro-government media sources at endline ($0.19\sigma$– $0.24\sigma$). Taken together, the relative increase in the consumption of media outlets with a similar political leaning to the media outlet to which they were assigned is then similar across participants assigned to anti- and pro-government media outlets.

**Longer-run take-up.** To validate and extend the self-reported survey data, we collected Twitter data on the subset of study participants who provided their public Twitter accounts ($n = 521$) in the endline survey. Several months after the conclusion of the study, we classified whether they were still following pro-government or anti-government treatment outlets, and non-treatment media outlets and politicians with different political leanings. Among this smaller sample, well after the study concluded, column 2 of Table 4 shows that participants assigned to anti-government treatment outlets were between 15pp and 29pp more likely to be following an anti-government treatment outlet. In turn, column 4 indicates that participants assigned to pro-government outlets were between 20pp and 30pp more likely to be following an pro-government treatment outlet. These magnitudes are quite sizeable since, as Table A6 indicates, 51% of participants self-reported following their assigned media outlet on Twitter, and we validated that 36% actually did so. This suggests that around half of the participants who followed their assigned media outlet via Twitter continued to do so for months after incentives ended. However, we find no evidence that treated participants were more or less likely to follow other *non-treatment* media outlets on Twitter or politicians with different political leanings.

Taken together, the evidence points to substantively large treatment effects on participants' exposure

Table 4: Social media accounts: Following Twitter accounts

| | TW follow Treatment: Anti | | TW follow Treatment: Pro | | TW follow Media: Anti | | TW follow Media: Pro | | TW follow Politician: Anti | | TW follow Politician: Pro | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.130 | 0.144** | 0.067 | 0.045 | -0.006 | -0.080 | -0.016 | 0.042 | -0.008 | 0.030 | -0.078 | -0.002 |
| | (0.079) | (0.065) | (0.072) | (0.072) | (0.115) | (0.106) | (0.103) | (0.092) | (0.101) | (0.091) | (0.111) | (0.106) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.282*** | 0.295*** | 0.105 | 0.079 | 0.025 | -0.044 | 0.066 | 0.102 | -0.033 | 0.001 | -0.178 | -0.101 |
| | (0.092) | (0.080) | (0.081) | (0.088) | (0.130) | (0.123) | (0.118) | (0.113) | (0.110) | (0.101) | (0.118) | (0.119) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.015 | -0.011 | 0.258*** | 0.281*** | 0.051 | 0.052 | 0.110 | 0.065 | -0.087 | -0.062 | -0.036 | -0.017 |
| | (0.052) | (0.050) | (0.077) | (0.078) | (0.098) | (0.104) | (0.093) | (0.084) | (0.099) | (0.088) | (0.092) | (0.086) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.058 | 0.064 | 0.187*** | 0.184*** | -0.043 | -0.015 | 0.083 | 0.033 | 0.017 | 0.053 | 0.052 | 0.037 |
| | (0.042) | (0.041) | (0.065) | (0.059) | (0.092) | (0.087) | (0.081) | (0.074) | (0.089) | (0.084) | (0.082) | (0.074) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.33 | 0.33 |
| Control SD | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0.47 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.56 | 0.60 | 0.80 | 0.73 | 0.43 | 0.56 | 0.80 | 0.74 | 0.38 | 0.40 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.42 | 0.22 | 0.34 | 0.49 | 0.75 | 0.68 | 0.25 | 0.16 | 0.30 | 0.49 |
| $R^2$ | 0.46 | 0.54 | 0.43 | 0.47 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.35 | 0.46 | 0.35 | 0.42 |
| Observations | 521 | 520 | 521 | 520 | 521 | 520 | 521 | 520 | 521 | 520 | 521 | 520 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

to, and consumption of, cross-partisan media outlets, which persisted throughout the study. Importantly, we see somewhat larger effects on these outcomes for participants assigned to anti-government outlets than those assigned to pro-government outlets. Further, we find consistent evidence of treatment inducing substitutions in media consumption, particularly among those participants assigned to (much less well known) anti-government outlets.

## 4.3 Changes in political attitudes

We next examine how these shifts in media consumption induced by treatment affected participants' political attitudes and voting intentions. These results are summarized in Table 5, which uses unstandardized outcomes.

**Views towards the ruling party.** Considering participants' self-reported affinity towards the AKP in columns 1-2 of Table 5, we find relatively symmetric effects at endline: those assigned to anti-government outlets report lower affinity for the AKP, while those assignment to pro-government outlets report higher affinity. While treatment effects for the 'extreme' treatments are slightly larger and statistically significant, they are statistically indistinguishable from the more moderate outlets.[14] At midline, however, we find some

[14]Treatment effects for anti-government outlets lose conventional statistical significance when including LASSO-selected baseline controls.

Table 5: Effects on party preferences

| | AKP affinity | | Party vote: AKP | | Opposition affinity | | Party vote: Opposition | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.20** | -0.14 | -0.03 | -0.02 | 0.21** | 0.15 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.15 | -0.11 | -0.10*** | -0.10*** | 0.24** | 0.20* | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.15 | 0.15* | 0.07*** | 0.07** | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.04 |
| | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.22** | 0.19** | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.06 | -0.05 |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Control mean | 2.54 | 2.54 | 0.33 | 0.33 | 2.62 | 2.62 | 0.44 | 0.44 |
| Control SD | 1.39 | 1.39 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 1.38 | 1.38 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.62 | 0.83 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.81 | 0.55 | 0.27 | 0.13 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.46 | 0.61 | 0.10 | 0.19 | 0.61 | 0.62 | 0.88 | 0.77 |
| $R^2$ | 0.33 | 0.43 | 0.36 | 0.40 | 0.25 | 0.38 | 0.29 | 0.35 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.25*** | -0.22*** | -0.05 | -0.05* | 0.21** | 0.22** | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.15* | -0.11 | -0.08** | -0.07* | 0.19* | 0.20** | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.04) | (0.03) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.39*** | -0.37*** | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.20** | -0.19** | 0.04 | 0.03 | -0.12 | -0.10 | -0.04 | -0.04 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 2.85 | 2.85 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 2.87 | 2.87 | 0.45 | 0.45 |
| Control SD | 1.34 | 1.34 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 1.23 | 1.23 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.30 | 0.18 | 0.52 | 0.68 | 0.77 | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.70 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.90 | 0.62 | 0.09 | 0.17 | 0.45 | 0.42 |
| $R^2$ | 0.48 | 0.55 | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.36 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.50 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

DVs: Columns 1-2: Affinity towards AKP (scale 1-5); 3-4: Respondent intends to vote for AKP if election were to be held tomorrow; 5-6: Affinity towards opposition parties (scale 1-5); 7-8: Respondent intends to vote for an opposition party if an election were to be held tomorrow. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

evidence of a shorter-term backlash effect: those assigned to pro-government outlets report significantly *lower* affinity for the ruling party.

Columns 3-4 consider outcomes relating to whether respondents would vote for the AKP if an election were held the day after the survey. Across both midline and endline surveys, we observe no differences in AKP voting intentions for those assigned to 'extreme' treatments, i.e. strongly anti-government or strongly pro-government outlets. Assignment to the more moderate outlets shifts attitudes more: at endline, participants assigned to the weakly anti-government media outlet report being 10pp less likely to vote for AKP, and participants assigned to the weakly pro-government outlet report being 7pp more likely to vote for AKP.

**Views towards the opposition.** Columns 5-8 of Table 5 consider an analogous set of outcomes with respect to opposition parties. In columns 5-6, we find that only those assigned to one of the anti-government outlets positively update their affinity for opposition parties, both at midline and endline. In turn, we find no updating among those assigned to one of the pro-government outlets. Contrasting the results on AKP vote in columns 3 and 4, in columns 7-8, we find no evidence of treatment effects on participants' intended voting for the opposition at either midline or endline.

**Turnout decisions.** In Table A21, we parse these contrasting results: increased affinity for the AKP translates into participants' increased intention to vote for the ruling party, while increased affinity for opposition parties has no analogous effect. We consider indicators reflecting turnout decisions as helping to reconcile this, including whether participants indicate an intention to vote for any party, or if they would not vote, or if they are unsure of their preferred party. While the effects are noisy, we find some evidence that opposition parties fail to benefit because those participants assigned to anti-government outlets become more *uncertain* about their voting intentions (columns 5-6) while the ruling party benefits because those participants assigned to pro-government outlets become less likely to abstain from voting (columns 3-4).

Taken together, the evidence suggests that the effect of treatment on participants' attitudes and vote intention towards the AKP and opposition parties vary depending on the outlets' ideology and how extreme it is. Consistent with participants' assignment to anti-government outlets increasing the consumption of

those outlets more so than those assigned to pro-government outlets, the treatment effect on attitudes towards the parties is stronger for the former. Participants assigned to anti-government outlets both increased their affinity for opposition parties, and reduced their affinity for AKP. On the other hand, those assigned to pro-government outlets only increased their affinity for AKP at endline, after exhibiting short-term backlash at midline (Bail et al., 2018; Enriquez et al., 2023). Treatment effect sizes are similar across these measures. However, the greater change in attitudes for participants assigned to anti-government outlets translated into a weaker change in vote intention than for participants assigned to pro-government outlets—suggesting that the preferences of participants who were incumbent supporters at baseline are stronger.

Moreover, while strongly and weakly partisan outlets seem to be equally persuasive, only assignment to weakly partisan outlets led to changes in vote intentions for AKP. Later we show that this is driven by a very different set of compliers depending on how extreme the ideology of the assigned media outlets is.

We next consider two political corollaries of changes in participants' attitudes towards the ruling party. First, assignment to cross-partisan media outlets might have shaped beliefs over incumbent's performance on contentious *policy* issues and the relative importance of those issues. Second, outlet assignment might have shaped not only ideological polarization, but also *affective polarization*.

**AKP policy performance and issue importance.** Changes in attitudes toward AKP can potentially be explained by (1) changes in perceptions of AKP's performance on contentious policy issues, and/or (2) the importance of these policy issues to participants. We first assess treatment effects on changes in participants' perceptions of performance. In the surveys, we asked participants to rate the AKP's performance on a series of contentious policy issues facing the country: corruption, environmental protection, EU membership, femicides, journalist imprisonment, inflation, Kurdish issues, and Syrian refugees. We combine these to create an index reflecting AKP's overall policy performance, shown in columns 1-2 of Table 6. Participants assigned to pro-government outlets reported more positive perceptions of AKP policy performance ($0.12\sigma$–$0.14\sigma$) compared to control at both midline and endline. For participants assigned to anti-government outlets, effects slightly shift between the medium and long term. At midline, the strongly anti-government media assignment elicited $0.12\sigma$ more negative views about AKP policy performance, whereas the weakly anti-government media assignment did not. At endline, neither anti-government outlet produced a discernable effect on AKP performance.

Then, in columns 3-4 we assess whether treatment induced changes in the *importance* participants placed on this same set of policy issues. Estimates in column 4 suggest that assignment to one of the anti-government outlets increased participants' perceived importance of these issues by midline by $0.15\sigma$-$0.17\sigma$. The effect, albeit with weaker statistical significance, remained at endline. On the other hand, there are no effects on participants assigned to pro-government outlets at both midline and endline.

Altogether, these results suggest that pro-government outlets' content may be interpreted by readers as reporting on the positive aspects of the ruling party, while anti-government outlets' content may be interpreted as primarily highlighting ongoing contentious issues in the country—without overtly endorsing a political opposition. Differences in reporting may explain the symmetric results on AKP affinity across treatment arms but asymmetric effects on voting intention.

**Affective polarization.** Last, we examine how the assignment to *cross-partisan media* affected measures of participants' affective polarization, which we define based on their attitudes towards members of their partisan in-group and their partisan out-group (comprising their willingness to have neighbors of either group, having them as friends, or trusting them). Columns 5-8 in Table 6 show that affective polarization is reduced across the board for all treatment arms at midline, with respondents notably more positive towards their partisan out-group and effect sizes by $0.15\sigma$-$0.23\sigma$. However, all these effects dissipate at endline. Achieving a lasting reduction in affective polarization may require significant shifts in social interactions with individuals holding opposing views, which requires more than exposure to cross-partisan news outlets.

# 5 Intermediary outcomes

Notwithstanding such temporal nuances, these estimates provide consistent evidence that assignment to cross-partisan news outlets induced anti-government participants assigned to pro-government media outlets to update overall positively about the AKP; while those pro-government participants assigned to anti-government outlets updated negatively about the AKP and positively about the opposition. Such broadly symmetric updating is not *ex-ante* obvious, particularly given the context—with pro-government outlets enjoying far more reach even absent our intervention—and substantive differences between the treatment outlets—with very few anti-government outlets even known to our sample at baseline.

Table 6: Effects on policy performance and affective polarization

| | ICW: AKP performance | | ICW: Issue importance | | ICW: Affinity towards in-partisans | | ICW: Affinity towards out-partisans | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.10 | 0.08 | -0.03 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.08 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.08 | -0.06 | 0.16* | 0.15* | -0.12 | -0.09 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.14** | 0.14** | -0.05 | -0.05 | 0.09 | 0.10 | -0.08 | -0.13 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.10* | 0.12** | -0.03 | -0.05 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.03 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.22 | 0.30 | 0.53 | 0.40 | 0.29 | 0.26 | 0.78 | 0.29 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.47 | 0.73 | 0.81 | 0.94 | 0.31 | 0.39 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| $R^2$ | 0.35 | 0.41 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.02 | 0.09 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.10 | -0.12* | 0.16** | 0.15** | -0.04 | -0.04 | 0.19** | 0.15* |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.17** | 0.17** | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.21** | 0.19** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.11 | 0.13* | 0.04 | 0.05 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.23*** | 0.23*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.11** | 0.12** | -0.05 | -0.04 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.23*** | 0.22*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.22 | 0.16 | 0.97 | 0.77 | 0.97 | 0.67 | 0.78 | 0.63 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.93 | 0.94 | 0.21 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.22 | 0.98 | 0.89 |
| $R^2$ | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.32 | 0.38 | 0.29 | 0.42 | 0.27 | 0.32 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 |

All DVs are ICW indices. DVs: Columns 1-2: Perceived AKP policy performance relating to (i) inflation; (ii) Kurdish issues; (iii) press freedom; (iv) femicides; (v) corruption; (vi) Syrian refugees; (vii) EU membership; (viii) environmental protection. Columns 3-4: Perceived importance of same set of contentious policy areas. Columns 5-6: Affinity towards respondent's partisan in-group, in terms of (i) willingness to befriend; (ii) willingness to have as neighbors; (iii) trust in them. Columns 6-7: Affinity towards respondent's partisan out-group, using the same variables defined for out-group. See Tables A22-A25 for disaggregated outcomes. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

We discuss two potential complementary channels inducing these changes in political attitudes as conveyed via the treatments. First, information: by reading new outlets as part of the treatment, participants' knowledge of news stories potentially broadened and thus the incorporation of novel information may have shifted their political beliefs. Second, trust: sustained exposure to their assigned outlet might have induced participants to place more trust in the stories they read, leading to a greater persuasive effect of cross-partisan media consumption over time.

**Information.** There are two potential logics through which citizens' exposure to new media sources might change their political beliefs within an authoritarian context. On the one hand, following a simple Bayesian logic, exposure to anti-government media outlets might lead to more updating than exposure to pro-government outlets. In authoritarian contexts, there is inequality in exposure to anti- and pro-government outlets. As reflected in Figure 3, people in Turkey are underexposed to anti-government (especially moderate) media outlets and are overexposed to state-approved media. Therefore, when people—in particular, pro-government supporters—are prompted to consume anti-government media, they become exposed to new issues and framing of ongoing events that were previously relatively unknown (Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2011).

On the other hand, we may see no effect or the opposite effect owing to (1) inequalities in the information space, and (2) motivated reasoning. People may be more comfortable accepting information that falls closer on the ideological spectrum to the information that they are exposed to regularly (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Cheng and Hsiaw, 2022; Gentzkow, Wong and Zhang, 2021). This explains why people may find it difficult to disentangle themselves from dominant state narratives that pervade, even if they are aware of biases in the media landscape (Chen and Yang, 2019; Bai et al., 2015). When pro-government rhetoric pervades, pro-government media may be ultimately more persuasive.

Treatment assignment increased the information that participants consume, conditional on treatment take-up, as the results on media exposure and consumption confirm. Moreover, while there is evidence of a backlash on attitudes toward AKP for participants assigned to pro-government outlets in the short run, the evidence indicating a persuasive role of media in the long run supports the Bayesian logic. Such learning effects are likely to have been larger for the pro-government participants assigned to (generally far smaller and with limited reach) anti-government outlets. To assess this implication, in columns 1-4 of Table 7, we

assess treatment effects on how much participants knew about different media outlets at endline. Results in column 2 show that participants assigned to either anti-government outlets become 0.16$\sigma$-0.22$\sigma$ less likely to be unaware of anti-government outlets at endline, but that this effect takes time with no significant differences observed at midline. By contrast, in columns 3-4, we observe no significant difference across treatment groups in terms of whether participants are informed about different pro-government media outlets.

Table 7: Effects on knowledge about, and trust in, media sources

| | ICW: DNK outlet (anti) | | ICW: DNK outlet (pro) | | ICW: Media trust (anti) | | ICW: Media trust (pro) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.13** | -0.16*** | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.21*** | 0.18** | -0.05 | -0.05 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.21*** | -0.22*** | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.27*** | 0.25*** | -0.08 | -0.07 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.23*** | 0.20*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.06 | -0.06 | 0.13* | 0.11* |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Control mean | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 0.42 | 0.35 | 0.68 | 0.78 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.40 | 0.32 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.15 | 0.18 |
| $R^2$ | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.23 | 0.30 | 0.22 | 0.29 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.45*** | 0.44*** | 0.25*** | 0.23*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.14 | 0.18* | 0.48*** | 0.47*** | 0.18** | 0.15* |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.05 | -0.05 | 0.13 | 0.15* | 0.23*** | 0.25*** |
| | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.11 | -0.10 | 0.13* | 0.12* |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.02 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.64 | 0.81 | 0.44 | 0.47 | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.37 | 0.25 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.97 | 0.96 | 0.80 | 0.74 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.21 | 0.11 |
| $R^2$ | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.32 | 0.36 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All DVs are ICW indices. DVs: Columns 1-4: Participant does not know either leaning of, or how much they trust, anti/pro-government treatment outlets. Columns 5-8: Participant's level of trust in anti/pro-government outlets. See Tables A26-A27 for disaggregated estimates. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

**Trust.** We next assess treatment effects on trust in media outlets. In principle, given initial uncertainties over what sources of information to trust, repeated exposure to a given news source can both shape political beliefs about the state of the world and affect trust in that outlet (Pennycook, Cannon and Rand, 2018; Peterson and Kagalwala, 2021; Gentzkow, Wong and Zhang, 2021). In columns 5-6 of Table 7, we present results for trust in anti-government and pro-government media outlets. Participants assigned to anti-government media sources report 0.18-0.25$\sigma$ greater trust of anti-government media at endline, while participants assigned to pro-government media outlets report 0.11-0.20$\sigma$ greater trust of pro-government media.

Two differences between midline and endline are noteworthy. First, for participants assigned to anti-government media outlets, the effect sizes at midline (0.44$\sigma$-0.47$\sigma$) are double that of effect sizes at endline (0.18$\sigma$-0.25$\sigma$). On the other hand, we see similar effects on trust for the pro-government outlets at midline and endline. Second, at midline, we find that some treatment arms may have elicited greater trust across all partisan media. Specifically, participants assigned to weakly pro-government media also reported greater trust in weakly anti-government outlets at midline (0.14$\sigma$), while participants assigned to anti-government outlets similarly reported significantly greater trust in pro-government media outlets (0.15-0.23$\sigma$). These effects dissipate at endline, such that greater trust is only seen for counter-attitudinal news.

In addition, in the endline survey only, we examine participants' trust in either traditional media (print or TV)—which is dominated by pro-government media groups—or online media (social media, fact-checkers, and digital sources), which is likely less constrained. We find some evidence that those participants assigned to the strongly anti-government outlet report reduced trust in traditional media by 0.16$\sigma$ (Table A28) while those assigned to the weakly anti-government outlet report increased trust in online media by 0.25$\sigma$ (Table A29). In addition, we discuss additional results relating to changes in media trust in Appendix E.1, where we find some evidence that participants assigned to pro-government sources updated strongly positively (relative to their low priors) about the breadth of news coverage offered by such outlets and how much news they had consumed that they might otherwise have missed.

# 6 Additional Results

We now turn to secondary outcomes. First, we examine whether the intervention led participants to reflect more on politics and media in Turkey more broadly. Second, our main effects rely on cross-partisan treatment

assignments. We thus turn to examine the effects of co-partisan treatment assignment—i.e. exposing (pro-) anti-government participants to (pro-) anti-government news outlets. Lastly, we estimate the treatment effects of all possible participant-assigned media outlet pairs to understand how treatment effects vary depending on the baseline ideological distance between participants and outlets.

### 6.1 Views towards politics and media in Turkey

**Views on democracy.** We ask participants about their support for various policies as indicators of their views on democracy. These questions include: whether Turkish should be the only language used; whether parties are dangerous; whether the president should not be bound by law; whether military force should be used to maintain law and order, and whether democracy is the best form of government. We create a democracy index, with results presented in columns 1-2 of Table 8. We find that only participants assigned to weakly anti-government news were more likely to exhibit pro-democracy views at midline, and this is driven by changed opinions about the use of military force and democracy as the best form of government (Table A32). At endline, however, treatment effects have dissipated: reading counter-partisan news neither made participants more or less democratic, regardless of whether their treatment assignment was anti- or pro-government in slant.

While participants did not become more or less democratic in their overall political views, results in columns 3-4 of Table 8 indicate that some perceptions of Turkish democracy did shift. Notably, however, shifts were asymmetric between anti- and pro-government outlet assignments. For participants assigned to the anti-government news outlets, there were no treatment effects on whether participants were satisfied with democracy in Turkey both at midline and at endline. For participants assigned to the pro-government outlets, however, we did find positive treatment effects at midline ($0.12\sigma$-$0.17\sigma$), suggesting that these participants had updated positively in the short run about Turkish democracy. Treatment effects for the strongly pro-government outlet persisted in the endline ($0.15\sigma$), but not for the weakly pro-government outlet.

Finally, we find null effects at endline on an index that captures participants' views about democratic institutions in Turkey, including military abuse, freedom of speech (both media and people), and whether parties are dangerous (Table A33). Likewise, we find limited effects on political engagement (Table A34).

Table 8: Effects on democratic attitudes

| | ICW: Democracy support | | ICW: Democracy satisfaction | | ICW: Perceived echo chamber | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.22*** | 0.19** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.10 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.11 | -0.09 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.08 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.16*** | 0.15*** | -0.15** | -0.15** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.82 | 0.67 | 0.94 | 0.69 | 0.05 | 0.22 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| $R^2$ | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.06 | 0.09 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.07 | -0.07 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.20*** | 0.17** | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.13* | 0.12* | -0.07 | -0.06 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.19*** | 0.17*** | 0.07 | 0.08 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.21 | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.26 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.87 | 0.73 | 0.36 | 0.40 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| $R^2$ | 0.33 | 0.36 | 0.46 | 0.51 | 0.25 | 0.27 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All DVs are ICW indices. DVs: Columns 1-2: Support for democratic principles, in terms of (i) believes democracy is the best form of government; (ii) disagreeing that only Turkish should be taught; (iii) disagreeing that political parties are dangerous; (iv) disagreeing that the President should not be bound by laws; (v) disagreeing with the use of the military to settle civil issues. Columns 3-4: Perceived satisfaction with democracy in Turkey. Columns 5-6: Perceived extent of online media as an echo chamber, in terms of (i) whether social media typically exposes you to the same views; (ii) how hard it is to discuss different views on social media; (iii) how similar others' views on social media are. See Tables A32-A36 for disaggregated estimates. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

**Echo chambers and political polarization.** As political polarization in Turkey has increased substantially in recent years, we investigate treatments' effects on participants' perception of echo chambers in the media and within society, which are thought to be important drivers of political polarization. In the endline survey, we ask participants questions that measure homophily (i.e. how different their views are from their friends), whether they think different views can be discussed, and whether social media exposes them to the same opinions. We combine these variables into an index and present results in columns 5-6 of Table 8. Participants who were assigned to the strongly anti-government outlet were significantly more likely to perceive an echo chamber in Turkey ($0.19\sigma$). On the other hand, participants assigned to the strongly pro-government outlet were significantly *less* likely to perceive an echo chamber in Turkey ($0.15\sigma$).

Examining the index's sub-components in Table A35, we find that the participants assigned to strongly anti-government media were less likely to say that different views could be discussed and more likely to report that they felt that social media promoted echo chambers. For participants assigned to strongly pro-government media, their reduced perceptions of an echo chamber are driven primarily by their views that there is greater variation in opinions within their social group and also that different views could be discussed more. These asymmetric effects could be explained by the fact that, in a media market dominated by pro-media outlets, it is easier for participants to discuss pro-government, rather than anti-government, news within their social networks.

**Behavioral data on Twitter posting.** We supplement these self-reported results by classifying the Twitter posts made by the subset of study participants who were willing to share their publicly viewable Twitter accounts. As detailed in Appendix D.2, we build a labeled set of pro-government tweets by scraping the accounts of a set of AKP government officials. Then, using a Turkish BERT natural language processing model, we classify participants' own tweets (or retweets or quotes) as containing pro-government sentiment. Of the tweets made by study participants, 30% are classified as containing pro-government content. We assess treatment effects on the log of the number of tweets, either in total or those classified as pro-government, made during the treatment period or in the months following the study, as well as the *share* of posts made which were pro-government, in Table A37.

Assignment to any treatment induced substantively large, but broadly statistically insignificant, reductions in Twitter posting during the treatment period, with the largest effects observed for those assigned to the

weakly pro-government outlet. Considering instead treatment effects on the *share* of Tweets classified as pro-government, however, we find that assignment to anti-government outlets induced 66-97% reductions during the treatment period; while assignment only to the weakly pro-government outlet increased this share by 27%. We find only limited evidence of persistence in these posting behavioral effects after the end of the treatment period. These effects suggest that particularly more moderate treatments did shift the relative slant of participants' public posting, while modestly inducing them to refrain from publicly posting as much.

### 6.2 Co-partisan treatment assignment

While our main results derive from estimating the effects of assigning participants to cross-partisan media, we turn to examining how treatment may have affected participants who were assigned to media outlets that largely accord with their baseline partisanship. Due to setup of our study, we can examine how co-partisan media outlet assignment affected participants' outcomes based on whether the participant was *moderated* or *polarized*. Specifically, a strongly (pro-) anti-government participant would have been moderated if they were assigned to a weakly (pro-) anti-government outlet; a weakly (pro-) anti-government participant would have been polarized if they were assigned to a strongly (pro-) anti-government outlet. This sub-sample of participants is represented in Table A3, where moderated participants are shaded in blue and polarized participants are shaded in red. We present all regression tables in Appendix F.6.2, but note that this definition of treatment assignment implies worse balance in terms of both predetermined covariates and rates of attrition (see Appendix F.6.1).

**Take-up, Exposure, and Consumption.** Results in A41 indicate that participants assigned to a co-partisan media outlet significantly complied with their assignment, which resulted in greater social media exposure to news from co-partisan outlets. However, Table A42 shows that only assignment to *polarized* media outlets is more likely to increase social media and overall media consumption compared to assignment to *moderated* outlets. In terms of magnitudes, columns 5-6 of show that assignment to a polarized anti-government outlet on social media increases the consumption of such outlet type by $0.32\sigma$, and columns 5-6 show an analogous increase of $0.28\sigma$ for participants assigned to a polarized pro-government outlets. In contrast, media consumption does not change for participants assigned to more moderated co-partisan media outlets.

**Political beliefs.** With respect to political attitudes, Table A43 shows that participants assigned to the polarized pro-government outlet are more likely to perceive the AKP more positively by $0.26a\sigma$ (columns 1-2) and to report they would vote for AKP by 10pp (columns 3-4) at endline. This is likely because they both rate the AKP's performance on contentious *policy* issues more highly by $0.20a\sigma$ (columns 1-2 of Table A44), and also rate these issues as less important by $0.29\sigma$ (columns 3-4). In turn, we find that participants assigned to the moderated anti-government outlet are $0.32\sigma$ more likely to perceive the opposition more positively (columns 5-6 of Table A43), to report they would vote for the opposition by 13pp (columns 7-8), and to rate the AKP's performance $0.2\sigma$ more poorly (columns 1-2 of Table A44) at endline.

**Intermediary outcomes.** In terms of channels inducing these changes in political attitudes, similar to the main results, there is a significant increase of $0.17\sigma$ in knowledge of the anti-government outlets, which are relatively unknown media outlets, for participants assigned to moderated anti-government outlets (columns 1-2 of Table A45). Moreover, participants assigned to polarized anti-government outlets were $0.18\sigma$ less likely to recall anti-government outlets. In turn, there is no change in knowledge about pro-government for participants assigned any type of outlet (columns 3-4).

Turning to changes in trust, results in columns 5-6 of Table A45 indicate that participants assigned to anti-government media, both moderated or polarized, were $0.28\sigma$–$0.43\sigma$ more likely to trust anti-government media. In turn, columns 7-8 show that assignment to the polarized pro-government outlet increased trust in pro-government outlets by $0.22\sigma$, and reduced trust in anti-government outlets by $0.29\sigma$, suggesting that pro-government rhetoric did persuade participants to become even less trusting of out-party ideas.

### 6.3 Who was most likely to change their media consumption and shift in attitudes?

As our final set of analyses, we turn to estimate treatment effects on the full range of participant-assigned media outlet pairs, including effects on both cross-partisan and co-partisan treatment assignments. Effects are represented as heat maps, which show in greater detail how different beliefs at baseline—and their treatment assignment's partisanship—jointly produce changes in various outcomes. We focus on treatment take-up, media exposure and consumption and political outcomes, where treatment effects shifted between midline and endline survey enumeration, and the mechanisms that explain shifts in political attitudes.

**Take-up, and Media Exposure and Consumption.** In Figures A4 and A5, we respectively present heat maps for whether participants follow media certain types of media outlets and see their news on social media for anti-government media outlets (left panels) and pro-government outlets (right panels). Assignment to media outlets leads to increased following of, and news exposure from, such outlet type for all participant types, both in the short and long run. However, take up and exposure was stronger for more moderate participants and outlets, suggesting the importance of ideological proximity between participants and outlets for take up and subsequent algorithmic exposure.

Figure A6 and A7 respectively present heat maps for social media consumption and overall consumption of anti-government media outlets (left panels) and pro-government outlets (right panels). We find that assignment to anti-government media outlets leads to increased consumption for all participant types, both in the short and long run. Moreover, we notice some evidence of substitution in the overall consumption of pro-government media for pro-government participants, which is particularly significant in the long run. In turn, assignment to pro-government media outlets leads to increased consumption of pro-government outlets in the medium run. However, the effects only last for moderate participants, pointing to the importance of ideological proximity for durable effects of pro-government consumption.

**Political beliefs.** In Figure A8, we present heat maps for views towards the ruling party (left panels) and opposition parties (right panels). We first consider attitudes towards the ruling party. In the short term (bottom panels), we find a backlash effect for participants who were strongly anti-government at baseline, and were then assigned to pro-government sources. We find no similar backlash effect for participants who were strongly pro-government at baseline. In addition, we find that weakly anti- and pro-government participants were both persuaded by anti-government media in the short run.

These results, however, do not persist in the long run (top panels): while the backlash effect for strongly anti-government participants subsided, participants assigned to anti-government media outlets were no longer swayed. Rather, we found that the two pro-government outlets were more persuasive in the long run. There are significant treatment effects for participants who were already moderate in their views. In particular, we find effects when they were pushed only one "step" away from their baseline partisanship towards the pro-government side of politics—meaning weakly anti-government participants who were assigned to weakly pro-government outlets, and weakly pro-government participants who were assigned to strongly

pro-government outlets.

Considering instead respondents' views towards the opposition, we find more muted treatment effects. We find some evidence at midline that, among weakly anti- and pro-government participants assigned to strongly anti-government outlets, there is an increase in affinity with the opposition. At endline, this effect weakens, while we see an increase in affinity with the opposition among strongly anti- and pro-government participants assigned to the weakly anti-government outlets.

When examining participants' beliefs about AKP performance, we find similar shifts to those for overall attitudes towards the ruling party in results between midline and endline (Figure A9). At midline, we note in particular that anti-government media did lead strongly pro-government participants to rate AKP performance more poorly. This effect, however, dissipates at endline. Moreover, much like results for views about the AKP perceptions, we find that the two pro-government outlets were more persuasive in the long run among participants who were already moderate in their views. With respect to issue importance (Figure A9), we only observe that weakly pro-government participants assigned to anti-government news increased the perceived importance of various contentious policy issues. At endline, however, the effect weakens for assignment to the strongly anti-government outlet, and there is a decrease in weakly pro-government participants' perceived importance of these contentious policy issues when assigned to the strongly pro-government outlet.

**Affective polarization.** In Figure A10, we present the results on affective polarization at midline and endline. At midline, we see that treatment assignment did lead to improvements in affinity towards out-partisans, and this result is largely driven by cross-partisan treatment assignments. However, these positive results are short-lived: at endline, all gains towards reducing affective polarization are erased. Instead, we find that weakly pro-government participants who were *polarized*—i.e. assigned to strongly pro-government outlets—exhibited a reduction in affinity towards out-partisans.

**Intermediary outcomes.** In Figure A12, we present results for trust in the different types of media outlet. At midline, strongly anti-government outlets were rated as trustworthy among pro-government participants assigned to these outlets. The magnitudes of these effects are substantively large, suggesting that the initial introduction to the anti-government media in the study—which were relatively unknown in Turkey—led to a short-term increase in trust. By the endline survey, some of these increases in trust in anti-government

outlets did persist, but primarily among participants who were more moderate in their initial stances. In addition, weakly pro-government participants assigned to the strongly pro-government outlet also reported substantially lower trust in anti-government media outlets at endline.

Treatment assignment elicited greater responses with respect to trusting the pro-government media by midline. Among pro-government participants assigned to anti-government outlets, there is generally a backlash effect wherein they reported trusting pro-government media outlets more than the control group. At the same time, moderately partisan participants assigned to pro-government outlets exhibited greater trust in these outlets. At endline, results remain stable only primarily for weakly anti- and pro-government participants assigned to pro-government sources, who reported sustained increases in trust towards these outlets.

# 7 Conclusion

This paper reports the outcomes of a seven month-long randomized control trial conducted in Turkey to explore whether exposure to cross-partisan media content online can mitigate polarization. Our study generated the following findings. First, treated participants in the study were willing to consume media from cross-partisan outlets upon being incentivized to do so. Second, however, consumption of cross-partisan news led to mixed effects on political attitudes by the midline and endline surveys. Specifically, after exhibiting a worsening in perceptions of the AKP in the short-term, perceptions of the AKP and its performance and AKP vote intention did increase in the long-term for participants assigned to the pro-government outlet. Perceptions of the opposition improved in the short and long-term for those assigned to anti-government outlets, but vote intentions for the opposition was more difficult to shift. Third, reading news from across the political aisle led only to short-term shifts in affective polarization, which subsequently dissipated by endline.

Further examination of potential mechanisms for these findings suggest that participants' attitudes shifted primarily due to increased knowledge and trust in their media outlets. However, the nature of these shifts varied depending on whether the participants were assigned to pro- or anti-government outlets. Specifically, anti-government outlet assignment exposed participants to previously unfamiliar independent media sources. This is consistent with existing research on how people update their priors under inequality of exposure (Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Larreguy, Marshall and Snyder Jr, 2018). In contrast, pro-

government outlet assignment increased trust by convincing participants that these outlets offered more comprehensive coverage.

In sum, our findings point to the significance of diversifying news consumption as one potential strategy for mitigating political polarization, while also underscoring the obstacles that anti-government media outlets might encounter in a setting where pro-government media dominates. In addition, our results identify three points for future consideration. First, among our secondary results is the finding that strongly pro-government media elicited positive changes in participants' views about democracy in Turkey and reduced perceptions of an echo chamber, which highlight the power of pro-government rhetoric. Second, we find that treatment assignments more consistently elicited shifts among participants who were moderately partisan at baseline, suggesting that particularly polarized individuals may be more difficult to sway. Finally, our findings align with prior research on the challenges of creating sustained changes in social attitudes. In future research, we intend to investigate the enduring impact of the effects outlined in this paper, specifically by examining whether they persist six months after the completion of the study.

# References


Adena, Maja, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2015. "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130(4):1885–1939.

Alesina, Alberto, Armando Miano and Stefanie Stantcheva. 2020. "The Polarization of Reality." *AEA Papers and Proceedings* 110:324–228.

Allcott, Hunt, Levi Boxell, Jacob Conway, Matthew Gentzkow, Michael Thaler and David Yang. 2021. "Polarization and public health: Partisan differences in social distancing during the coronavirus pandemic." *Journal of Public Economics* 191:104254.

Allcott, Hunt, Luca Braghieri, Sarah Eichmeyer and Matthew Gentzkow. 2020. "The Welfare Effects of Social Media." *American Economic Review* 110(3):629–76.

Arat, Yesim. 2019. "Beyond the Democratic Paradox: The Decline of Democracy in Turkey." *SSRN Electronic Journal* .
**URL:** *https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3832747*

Arsan, Esra. 2013. "Killing Me Softly with His Words: Censorship and Self-Censorship from the Perspective of Turkish Journalists." *Turkish Studies* 14(3):447–462.

Bai, Jie, Mikhail Golosov, Nancy Qian and Yan Kai. 2015. "Understanding the influence of government controlled media: Evidence from air pollution in china." *Unpublished* 2475.

Bail, Christopher A., Lisa P. Argyle, Taylor W. Brown, John P. Bumpus, Haohan Chen, M. B. Fallin Hunzaker, Jaemin Lee, Marcus Mann, Friedolin Merhout and Alexander Volfovsky. 2018. "Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 115(37):9216–9221.

Baysan, Ceren. 2022. "Persistent Polarizing Effects of Persuasion: Experimental Evidence from Turkey." 112(11):3528–46.

Bianet. 2022. "Journalism organizations call for withdrawal of Press Law amendment." *Available at* `https://bianet.org/haber/journalism-organizations-call-for-withdrawal-of-press-law-amendment-26250` .

Broockman, David and Joshua Kalla. 2022. "The impacts of selective partisan media exposure: A field experiment with Fox News viewers.".
**URL:** *osf.io/jrw26*

Caprettini, Bruno, Marcel Caesmann, Hans-Joachim Voth and David Yanagizawa-Drot. 2023. "Going Viral: Protests and Polarization in 1932 Hamburg." *Working Paper* .

Carkoglu, Ali. 2009. *The rising tide of conservatism in Turkey*. Springer.

Chen, Yuyu and David Y Yang. 2019. "The impact of media censorship: 1984 or brave new world?" *American Economic Review* 109(6):2294–2332.

Cheng, Ing-Haw and Alice Hsiaw. 2022. "Distrust in Experts and the Origins of Disagreement." *Journal of Economic Theory* 200.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Joshua Krusell, Anna L uhrmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Ei tan Tzelgov, Yi ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson and Daniel Ziblatt. 2021. "V-Dem Country-Year/Country-Date Dataset v11.".
**URL:** *https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-11/*

Corke, Susan, Andrew Finkel, David J Kramer, Carla Anne Robbins and Nate Schenkkan. 2014. *Democracy in crisis: Corruption, media, and power in Turkey*. Freedom House Washington, DC.

De Benedictis-Kessner, Justin, Matthew A. Baum, Adam J. Berinsky and Teppei Yamamoto. 2019. "Persuading the Enemy: Estimating the Persuasive Effects of Partisan Media with the Preference-Incorporating Choice and Assignment Design." *American Political Science Review* 113(4):902–916.

DellaVigna, Stefano and Ethan Kaplan. 2007. "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting." 122(3):1187–1234.

DellaVigna, Stefano and Matthew Gentzkow. 2010. "Persuasion: Empirical Evidence." *Annual Review of Economics* 2:643–669.

Devlin, Jacob, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee and Kristina Toutanova. 2019. BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding. In *Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and Short Papers)*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Association for Computational Linguistics pp. 4171–4186.
**URL:** *https://aclanthology.org/N19-1423*

Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2011. "Media and political persuasion: Evidence from Russia." *American Economic Review* 101(7):3253–85.

Enikolopov, Ruben, Michael Rochlitz, Koen J. L. Schoors and Nikita Zakharov. 2022. "The Effect of Independent Online Media in an Autocracy." *Working Paper* .

Enriquez, Jose Ramon, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall and Alberto Simpset. 2023. "Accountability Under Polarization.".

Erdogan, Emre. 2018. Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey: Social Distance, Perceived Moral Superiority, and Political Intolerance. Technical report The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Fujiwara, Thomas, Karsten Muller and Carlo Schwarz. 2022. "The Effect of Social Media on Elections: Evidence from the United States." *Working Paper* .

Gentzkow, Matthew and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2006. "Media bias and reputation." *Journal of Political Economy* 114(2):280–316.

Gentzkow, Matthew, Michael B. Wong and Allen T. Zhang. 2021. "Ideological Bias and Trust in Information Sources." *Working Paper* .

Gibbons, Charles E, Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato and Michael B Urbancic. 2019. "Broken or Fixed Effects?" *Journal of Econometric Methods* 8(1).

Guess, Andrew M., Neil Malhotra, Jennifer Pan, Pablo Barberá, Hunt Allcott, Taylor Brown, Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Drew Dimmery, Deen Freelon, Matthew Gentzkow, Sandra González-Bailón, Edward Kennedy, Young Mie Kim, David Lazer, Devra Moehler, Brendan Nyhan, Carlos Velasco Rivera, Jaime Settle, Daniel Robert Thomas, Emily Thorson, Rebekah Tromble, Arjun Wilkins, Magdalena Wojcieszak, Beixian Xiong, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Annie Franco, Winter Mason, Natalie Jomini Stroud and Joshua A. Tucker. 2023. "How do social media feed algorithms affect attitudes and behavior in an election campaign?" *Science* 381(6656):398–404.

Guess, Andrew M, Pablo Barberá, Simon Munzert and JungHwan Yang. 2021. "The consequences of online partisan media." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118(14):e2013464118.

Guriev, Sergei and Daniel Treisman. 2019. "Informational autocrats." *Journal of economic perspectives* 33(4):100–127.

Guriev, Sergei and Elias Papaioannou. 2022. "The Political Economy of Populism." *Journal of Economic Literature* .

Iyengar, Shanto, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil Malhotra and Sean J Westwood. 2019. "The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22(1):129–146.

Jahani, Eaman, Natalie Gallagher, Friedolin Merhout, Nicolo Cavalli, Douglas Guilbeault, Yan Leng and Christopher A Bail. 2022. "An Online experiment during the 2020 US–Iran crisis shows that exposure to common enemies can increase political polarization." *Scientific Reports* 12(1):19304.

Keyman, E Fuat. 2014. "The AK Party: Dominant party, new Turkey and polarization." *Insight Turkey* 16(2):19.

Kirişçi, Kemal and Amanda Sloat. 2019. "The rise and fall of liberal democracy in Turkey: Implications for the West." *Foreign Policy at Brookings, https://brookings. edu* .

Larreguy, Horacio A, John Marshall and James M Snyder Jr. 2018. "Leveling the playing field: How campaign advertising can help non-dominant parties." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 16(6):1812–1849.

Levy, Ro'ee. 2021. "Social Media, News Consumption, and Polarization: Evidence from a Field Experiment." *American Economic Review* 111(3):831–870.

Martin, Gregory J. and Ali Yurukoglu. 2017. "Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization." *American Economic Review* 107(9):2565–2599.

Milosh, Maria, Marcus Painter, Konstantin Sonin, David Van Dijcke and Austin L. Wright. 2021. "Unmasking partisanship: Polarization undermines public response to collective risk." *Journal of Public Economic* 204:104538.

Mullainathan, Sendhil and Andrei Shleifer. 2005. "The Market for News." *American Economic Review* 95(4):1031–1053.

Nyhan, Brendan, Jaime Settle, Emily Thorson, Magdalena Wojcieszak, Pablo Barberá, Annie Y. Chen, Hunt Allcott, Taylor Brown, Adriana Crespo-Tenorio, Drew Dimmery, Deen Freelon, Matthew Gentzkow, Sandra González-Bailón, Andrew M. Guess, Edward Kennedy, Young Mie Kim, David Lazer, Neil Malhotra, Devra Moehler, Jennifer Pan, Daniel Robert Thomas, Rebekah Tromble, Carlos Velasco Rivera, Arjun Wilkins, Beixian Xiong, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Annie Franco, Winter Mason, Natalie Jomini Stroud and Joshua A. Tucker. 2023. "Like-minded sources on Facebook are prevalent but not polarizing." *Nature* 620(7972):137–144.

Pennycook, Gordon, Tyrone D Cannon and David G Rand. 2018. "Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news." *Journal of experimental psychology: general* 147(12):1865.

Peterson, Erik and Ali Kagalwala. 2021. "When Unfamiliarity Breeds Contempt: How Partisan Selective Exposure Sustains Oppositional Media Hostility." *American Political Science Review* 115(2):585–598.
**URL:** *https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/when-unfamiliarity-breeds-contempt-how-partisan-selective-exposure-sustains-oppositional-media-hostility/96712C1D7B1DEBDC39DC3AA6FC4A9F50*

Prior, Markus. 2013. "Media and political polarization." *Annual Review of Political Science* 16:101–127.

Reporters Without Borders. 2023. "Turkey Media Ownership Monitor." `https://turkey.mom-rsf.org/en/`.

Reuters. 2022. "Turkey's parliament adopts media law jailing those spreading 'disinformation'." *Available at* `https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/law-that-would-jail-those-spreading-disinformation-progresses-turkey-2022-10-13/` .

Schweter, Stefan. 2020. "BERTurk - BERT models for Turkish.".
**URL:** *https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3770924*

Svolik, Milan W. 2019. "Polarization versus democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 30(3):20–32.

Taber, Charles S. and Milton Lodge. 2006. "Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs." *American journal of political science* 50(3):755–769.

Yanagizawa-Drott, David. 2014. "Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129(4):1947–1994.

Çarkoğlu, Ali, Lemi Baruh and Kerem Yıldırım. 2014. "Press-Party Parallelism and Polarization of News Media during an Election Campaign: The Case of the 2011 Turkish Elections." *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 19(3):295–317.
**URL:** *https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161214528994*

# A Media ownership over time

We categorize media outlets as strongly anti-government, weakly anti-government, weakly pro-government, or strongly pro-government over time. For any given year, if a media outlet is owned by a company that has close connections with the government, we consider it to be a pro-government media outlet. We determined connections with the government in the media sector using data from these three sources: Euronews[15], the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) Research Center[16], andArat (2019), which monitor shifts in media ownership, specifically focusing on acquisitions by business people with close ties to the government.

Table A1 reflects our coding of partisanship of the main media outlets over time. Media outlets owned by Demiroren Holding Company were coded as weakly pro-government, as they were recently acquired, while those owned by Albayrak Holding and Kalyon Holding Companies were classified as strongly pro-government due to their longer tenure of ownership. Similarly, anti-government media outlets exhibited a similar pattern, with longer-standing outlets that have not changed ownership being categorized as strongly anti-government, while more recently established outlets were classified as weakly anti-government. For further details, (Reporters Without Borders, 2023) offers an in-depth examination of the current state of media ownership in Turkey.

[15] https://tr.euronews.com/2019/05/03/medya-sahipligi-turkiye-de-medyayi-kim-kontrol-ediyor-

[16] https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FactCheckers-and-FactChecking-in-Turkey-H.-Akın-Ünver.pdf

Table A1: Media ownership overtime

| Outlet | Founded date | Previous owner | Acquisition date | Current owner | Treatment outlet | Affiliation in 2002 | Affiliation in 2007 | Affiliation in 2012 | Affiliation in 2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cumhuriyet | 5/7/1924 | NA | NA | NA | no | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt |
| Milliyet | 2/11/1926 | Doğan Yayın (Weakly Anti Govt) | 4/21/2011 | Demiroren (Weakly Pro Govt) | not | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Pro Govt | Weakly Pro Govt |
| Hürriyet | 5/1/1948 | Doğan Yayın (Weakly Anti Govt) | 3/21/2018 | Demiroren (Weakly Pro Govt) | yes | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt |
| Sabah | 4/22/1985 | Ciner (Weakly Pro Govt) | 12/5/2007 | Turkuvaz (Strongly Pro Govt) | yes | Weakly Pro Govt | Strongly Pro Govt | Strongly Pro Govt | Strongly Pro Govt |
| FOXTV | 4/22/1993 | NA | NA | NA | no | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt |
| Yeni Akit | 9/12/1993 | NA | NA | NA | no | Strongly Pro Govt | Strongly Pro Govt | Strongly Pro Govt | Strongly Pro Govt |
| Posta | 1/23/1995 | Doğan Yayın (Weakly Anti Govt) | 3/21/2018 | Demiroren (Weakly Pro Govt) | no | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt |
| Yeni Şafak | 1/23/1995 | NA | NA | Albayrak (Strongly Pro Govt) | no | Strongly Pro Govt | Strongly Pro Govt | Strongly Pro Govt | Strongly Pro Govt |
| CNNTürk | 10/11/1999 | Doğan Yayın (Weakly Anti Govt) | 3/21/2018 | Demiroren (Weakly Pro Govt) | no | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt |
| Habertürk | 9/3/2001 | Ufuk Güldemir | 11/16/2007 | Ciner (Weakly Pro Govt) | not | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Pro Govt | Weakly Pro Govt | Weakly Pro Govt |
| Birgün | 4/14/2004 | NA | NA | NA | no | NA | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt |
| HalkTV | 1/10/2005 | NA | NA | NA | no | NA | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt |
| Sözcü | 6/27/2007 | NA | NA | NA | no | NA | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt |
| T24 | 9/1/2009 | NA | NA | NA | no | NA | NA | Strongly Anti Govt | Strongly Anti Govt |
| Dogruluk Payi | 6/20/2014 | NA | NA | Internationally funded | yes | NA | NA | NA | Weakly Anti Govt |
| Sputnik | 11/10/2014 | NA | NA | Internationally funded | no | NA | NA | NA | Weakly Pro Govt |
| Medyascope | 8/1/2015 | NA | NA | NA | yes | NA | NA | NA | Weakly Anti Govt |
| Gunun Yalanlari | 10/6/2015 | NA | NA | government-funded | yes | NA | NA | NA | Weakly Pro Govt |
| Gazete Duvar | 8/8/2016 | NA | NA | NA | yes | NA | NA | NA | Strongly Anti Govt |

# B Study materials

## B.1 Overview of the media outlets

We summarize here basic information about the four treatment outlets assigned through the study. The following information reflects the status of each outlet prior to the beginning of the study.

1. Strongly anti-government media outlet: https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/
   (a) Online-based
   (b) Short news/articles almost every day on politics, etc.
   (c) Funding Scheme: Non-government-related firms.
   (d) Twitter: 665K Followers (https://twitter.com/gazeteduvar)
   (e) Facebook: 286K Followers (https://www.facebook.com/gazeteduvar)
2. Weakly anti-government media outlet: https://medyascope.tv/
   (a) Youtube-based: It has some written paragraphs before and after the video, but its main focus is video. It invites experts to discuss issues in Turkey on Youtube.
   (b) Funding Scheme: Patreon (https://www.patreon.com): A crowdfunding system.
   (c) Twitter: 251k followers (https://twitter.com/Medyascopetv)
   (d) Facebook: 62k followers (https://www.facebook.com/medyascopetv)
3. Weakly pro-government media outlet: https://www.hurriyet.com.tr
   (a) Newspaper-based
   (b) Funding Scheme
   (c) Government-related firms (Demiroren Group)
   (d) Twitter: 4.2M Followers (https://twitter.com/Hurriyet)
   (e) Facebook page: 3M followers (https://www.facebook.com/hurriyet)
4. Strongly pro-government media outlet: https://www.sabah.com.tr
   (a) Newspaper-based.
   (b) Funding-scheme: Government-related firms Turkuaz Media (http://www.turkuvazyayin.com.tr/ in Turkish).
   (c) Twitter: 2.1M (https://twitter.com/Sabah)
   (d) Facebook: 3.5M https://www.facebook.com/Sabah

## B.2 Phone Application




(a) Log-in page.




(b) Sign-up page that asks for name, gender, location, education, and employment status, among other variables.


Figure A1: Phone application's profile page, where the users can see and update all their information.


Figure A2: Phone application's main page. Users can see the unclaimed rewards they have earned up to then for answering surveys and quizzes. They can also access the weekly top headlines of the assigned online newspaper. Now it reads"There is no survey you can take right now."


Figure A3: Phone application's reward page, where the users can see the unclaimed rewards they have earned up to then for answering surveys and quizzes and claim them through a direct deposit to their bank account or in the form of gift cards.

## B.3 Sample article and quiz



The first two pages of the following link (translated by Google Translate to keep the structure constant):
https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/babacan-asida-bile-araci-sokmanin-pesinde-oldularsa-yatacak-yerleri-yok-haber-1527131

POLICY

### Babacan: Even with vaccination, if they are after inserting the vehicle, they have no place to sleep

**DEVA Party leader Ali Babacan said that the government should respond to the allegations that intermediaries were involved in the Sinovac vaccine and said, "If it is true, they have no place to sleep."**

Wednesday, June 30, 2021 Time: 14:57


Subscribe to Google News

**WALL -** DEVA Party Chairman Ali Babacan spoke at the 1st Ordinary Akyazı District Congress of his party in Sakarya. Babacan, who started his speech by emphasizing democracy, also had the vaccination process on his agenda. Babacan said that booster vaccines should be started in August and used the following statements:

**WE ARE THE PARTY OF THOSE WHO AGREED FOR THE FUTURE OF OUR COUNTRY:** We will always defend a common country, a common society, a common life, with respect to each other, together with our differences. We are strong together. We will first live in our own party to walk the path in unity and solidarity, respecting each other in differences; then we will make it live all over Turkey. Our friends, who supported different political preferences and adopted different ideologies in the past, gathered under the roof of DEVA today. It's not always easy for us to agree on the past. This applies to all societies. We are the party of those who come to an agreement for the future of our country. We are the party of those who have the same Turkey vision, who are united around the same Turkey dream and goal.

**WE WILL LEARN LESSONS FROM THE PAINS OF THE PAST, WE WILL BUILD THE FUTURE:** There have been many sufferings in this land in the past. Nice tears were shed. Undoubtedly, we will definitely learn lessons from the pain and tears that have been shed in this land. However, the primary duty of politicians is to build the future of the country. We will listen to each other, we will act carefully

in our relations. A democratic stance means respect for differing opinions. It is an effort to understand the other. Being a democrat also means respect, tolerance, enduring, altruism.

**THEY HAVE NO PLACE TO LIE IF THEY'RE PURSUANT TO INSIDE THE VEHICLE EVEN IN THE VACCINE: The** BionTech vaccine has only just begun to arrive. Why didn't you get it for 6 months? There are rumors, rumors: "He had a tool in the Chinese vaccine, he walked fast for him. This company, on the other hand, did not make this agreement because they did not accept the vehicle, said 'I would work directly with the state' and could not bring the vehicle." We lost lives for months. The government needs to explain. If it is wrong, they should say 'No such thing happened'. True, they have no place to sleep. We understand that you can get a partner there in every field, a vehicle there, but this is life.'

**STRENGTHENING VACCINES MUST BE FROM RNA VACCINES:** August is a very critical date in the fight against the pandemic. Our citizens over 65 years of age at risk and our healthcare workers should definitely receive a 3rd dose booster (reinforcement vaccine). These booster vaccines must also be RNA vaccines. For example, we are proud of the vaccines produced by two scientists of our own people in Germany. Why should these booster vaccines be started in August at the latest? Because after the second dose of vaccine, it will be 6 months. The effectiveness of the vaccine will decrease. Reinforcement vaccination should definitely be started in August, especially for our citizens and health workers at risk."

**THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT RESPECT TO THE NATION THAT** HE **SEEING THE RIGHTS TO HIM:** Mr. Erdogan said in a television program he attended, '3. I also overdosed,' he said. Moreover, most of our people could not reach the first dose at that time. The president of the country should not withhold from this nation what he sees as his right. Serving this nation means first of all providing vaccines. That's the number one issue.

**VACCINATION MUST BE CONSIDERED AT ENTRY TO CLOSED AREAS: None of** us would like to see an increase in the spread of the epidemic in this period. We would like to demonstrate that the necessity of vaccination should be considered as an additional precaution when entering closed spaces. There is no complacency in this business. We must be able to move freely, freely. In the meantime, we must make sure that the necessary precautions are taken. So as a society, we should feel safe.

**DECISION TO LIFT THE QUARANTINE ON ENTRY FROM RUSSIA: While** we move freely, it is necessary to pay attention to some international arrivals and departures. There is a variant of this virus called delta. The origin of this variant is India. One of the countries where this variant spreads the most is Russia. The government has liberalized entries from Russia and lifted the quarantine. Every day another circular is issued. They manage the business not by taking it seriously, not based on science, but by making snap decisions. They turned it into child's play. While we are on the way to control the epidemic, we consider the decision that prioritizes tourism revenues as a decision taken within the framework of complacency.

**IT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO EXPECT MEASURES FROM ARTS AND MANAGE THE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT PRECAUTION: They** acted hastily on issues related to economy and tourism. Before the pandemic, they depleted the country's resources. In the economy, one must be cautious. When things are good, the economy is growing fast, and you have income, you save for bad days. This is how the state is run. In fact, there is the concept of 'abusive trader' in our legislation on trade. A citizen who opens a grocery store and greengrocer is expected to be a manager. Expect the tradesman, the small business, to be cautious, but rule the whole state without hesitation. Is such a thing acceptable? (NEWS CENTER)

**labels** cure party Ali Babacan biontech sinovac

# Gazete Duvar Quiz Week 21-24

News used for the quiz:

- https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/babacan-asida-bile-araci-sokmanin-pesinde-oldularsa-yatacak-yerleri-yok-haber-1527131
- https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/pervin-buldan-akp-kadinlarin-basina-gelmis-en-buyuk-felakettir-haber-1527737
- https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/iktidar-destekcisi-medyaya-akan-kamu-kaynagi-3-adaletsizlikten-cok-daha-buyuk-bir-sorun-var-haber-1528410
  https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/ankarada-suruc-katliami-anmasina-polis-engeli-haber-1529175

Week21_Q1: In Gazete Duvar's recent article, what did DEVA party leader Ali Babacan say about the coronavirus?

- Babacan accused the government of corruption related to the coronavirus vaccine.
- Babacan accused the government of refusing to provide booster vaccine shots.
- Babacan said that the government should continue to lock down the country.
- Babacan said that Turkey should be reopened fully.
- Do not know

[If Week21_Q1 incorrect]: Babacan accused the government of corruption related to the coronavirus vaccine. Please, read: https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/babacan-asida-bile-araci-sokmanin-pesinde-oldularsa-yatacak-yerleri-yok-haber-1527131 since we will ask you additional questions about this news.

Week21_Q2: What did Babacan say about the booster vaccine shots?

- Babacan said that they are not necessary
- Babacan said that they must happen in August
- Babacan said that the booster vaccine shots come from RNA vaccines
- Both (2) and (3)
- Do not know

Babacan said that the booster vaccine shots must happen in August, and they must come from RNA vaccines. Please, read https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/babacan-asida-bile-araci-sokmanin-pesinde-oldularsa-yatacak-yerleri-yok-haber-1527131 because we will ask you an additional question about Gazete Duvar's coverage of this news at the end of this quiz.

Week22_Q1: In a recent Gazete Duvar article, what is the biggest disaster that has ever happened to women, according to HDP Co-Chair Pervin Buldan?

- AKP
- The military coup in 1980
- Violence against women
- Gender pay gap
- Do not now.

[If Week22_Q1 incorrect]: According to HDP Co-Chair Pervin Buldan, AKP is the biggest disaster that has ever happened to women. Please, read: https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/pervin-buldan-akp-kadinlarin-basina-gelmis-en-buyuk-felakettir-haber-1527737 since we will ask you additional questions about this news.

Week22_Q2: What gives HDP hope, according to HDP Co-Chair Pervin Buldan?

- LGBT groups' struggle rising from all over the country.
- The Kurdish struggle rising from all over the country.
- Worker's struggle rising from all over the country.
- Women's struggle rising from all over the country.
- Do not know.

Women's struggle rising from all over the country give HDP hope. Please, read https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/pervin-buldan-akp-kadinlarin-basina-gelmis-en-buyuk-felakettir-haber-1527737 because we will ask you an additional question about Gazete Duvar's coverage of this news at the end of this quiz.

Week23_Q1: According to Gazete Duvar, what is one major problem with advertisements in Turkish media?

- Too many advertisements contribute to reckless consumerism among Turkish citizens
- Public resources are being spent on advertisements in pro-government media
- Political parties should not be allowed to spend money on advertisements
- There is age-inappropriate advertisements in children's media
- Do not know

[If Week23_Q1 incorrect]: In a Gazete Duvar article, the former director of the TMSF claimed that public resources are being spent on advertisements in pro-government media. Please, read: https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/iktidar-destekcisi-medyaya-akan-kamu-kaynagi-3-adaletsizlikten-cok-daha-buyuk-bir-sorun-var-haber-1528410 since we will ask you additional questions about this news.

Week23_Q2: Did the Gazete Duvar article comment on how much public resources are being spent on such advertisements?

- No, the article did not discuss the advertisements in detail
- No, the article only discussed the number of advertising pages purchased using public resources, but not the costs
- Yes, the article claimed that advertisement costs to the public are inflated at 30X the price
- Yes, the article claimed that advertisement costs in Turkish media are simply too high across the board
- Do not know

The Gazete Duvar article claimed that advertisement costs are sold to the public at 30X the actual price. Please, read https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/iktidar-destekcisi-medyaya-akan-kamu-kaynagi-3-adaletsizlikten-cok-daha-buyuk-bir-sorun-var-haber-1528410 because we will ask you an additional question about Gazete Duvar's coverage of this news at the end of this quiz.

Week24_Q1: Did the Gazete Duvar article comment on the commemoration of the Suruç Massacre in Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul?

- No, the article did not discuss the Suruc Massacre in detail
- No, the article only discussed the Suruc Massacre, but not the commemoration
- Yes, the article discussed that there were police barriers during the commemoration of the Suruç Massacre.
- Yes, the article discussed that there were thousands of people during the commemoration of the Suruç Massacre.
- Do not know

[If Week24_Q1 incorrect]: The article discussed that there were police barriers during the commemoration of the Suruç Massacre. Please, read: https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/ankarada-suruc-katliami-anmasina-polis-engeli-haber-1529175 since we will ask you additional questions about this news.

Week24_Q2: According to the Gazete Duvar article, what did the police do to the protestors?

- The police kicked and battered the protesters
- The police detained some protestors
- The police kicked and battered the protesters and detained many protestors

- There was no information about the police's actions against the protestors
- Do not know

The police kicked and battered the protesters and detained many protestors. Please, read https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/ankarada-suruc-katliami-anmasina-polis-engeli-haber-1529175 because we will ask you an additional question about Gazete Duvar's coverage of this news at the end of this quiz.

Quiz21_24_overall: To conclude, according to what you have read in Gazete Duvar, and in particular in these news we have reviewed today, do you think the coverage of Gazete Duvar *this past month* was politically biased?

- No, it simply covered the facts evenly and reported them objectively.
- Yes, it showed facts that benefited the opposition, but it reported them objectively.
- Yes, it showed facts that benefited the opposition and was biased toward the opposition in its reporting.
- Yes, it showed facts that benefited the government's side, but it reported them objectively.
- Yes, it showed facts that benefited the government and was biased toward the government in its reporting.
- Do not know.

# C Experimental design

## C.1 Treatment assignment probabilities

Table A2: Treatment assignment probabilities by affinity strata

| | | Anti-govt | | Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Strongly | Weakly | Weakly | Strongly |
| *Treatment name* | Control | Gazete Duvar | Medya-scope | Hürriyet | Sabah |
| Strongly Anti-govt | 0.32 | | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.39 |
| Weakly Anti-govt | 0.29 | 0.18 | | 0.18 | 0.35 |
| Weakly Pro-govt | 0.29 | 0.35 | 0.18 | | 0.18 |
| Strongly Pro-govt | 0.32 | 0.39 | 0.14 | 0.14 | |

Table presents the treatment assignment probabilities stratified by participants' baseline AKP affinity stratum (rows). Participants are more likely to be assigned to outlets far from their pre-treatment affinity towards the ruling party. Probabilities within strata vary due to initial inclusion of *fact-checker* treatments (coded as weakly pro/anti-government) but subsequently excluded from the study for comparability reasons (see discussion in main body of manuscript).

## C.2 Incentives

Participants were provided small financial incentives to complete each step of the study:

- **Recruitment and baseline:** participants received **40 Turkish Lira (TL)**—equivalent to $5.43 USD—for completing the baseline survey and providing proof of following their assigned media outlet (if assigned to treatment). Participants who completed the baseline but ultimately decided not to follow the assigned media outlet were paid 15 Turkish Lira (TL)—equivalent to $2.04 USD.
- **Quizzes:** Participants who choose to complete the optional quizzes received **10TL** per completed quiz. Participants who answered more than half of the quiz questions correctly receive **20TL** as an additional incentive.
- **Midline:** We administered an app-based midline to all participants 4 months after their assignment to treatment. Respondents received **30 TL** for completing the midline survey.
- **Endline:** Participants received **60TL** for completing the endline survey, which was administered as a phone survey. We increased the amount from midline to endline due to the relatively longer survey instrument.

In total, participants could therefore receive up to **220TL** ($29.87 USD) for completing all aspects of the study. Financial incentives were decided with significant input from the implementing partner based on their past experiences conducting surveys in Turkey. Participants received payments upon completion of each step, which they could then redeem through the phone app designed to administer the study. Redemption options include a variety of gift cards or for a cash transfer.

## C.3 Timeline of the study

Recruitment and randomization into the study was conducted on a weekly rolling basis, beginning around February 2021 and ending in September 2021. For each participant that agreed to take part in the study and was eligible to do so, the timeline has proceeded as follows:

- $t$: Took baseline survey through phone survey ($\sim$80%) or app ($\sim$20%).
- $t$+1 week: All participants surveyed in a given one-week window ("batch") are randomly assigned to either pure control or a media outlet. To validate treatment uptake among participants assigned to treatment, the participant was asked to upload a screenshot indicating that they were following the assigned media outlet's Facebook or Twitter.
- $t+1, 2, ...$ weeks: Assigned media outlet's top headlines were delivered to treated participant through the app's push notifications. **Recurs once per week.**
- $t+1, 2, ...6$ months: Quizzes delivered to all participants. **Recurs once per month.**
- $t+4$ months: Midline administered to all participants through the app.
- $t+7$ months: Endline administered through phone surveys.

## C.4 Coding missing data

While missing outcome data across variables was limited, where data was missing, we assigned the participant the mean value of that covariate within their block. With regard to "do not know" responses to specific survey questions, responses were be coded as "negatives"—ie. not doing the action noted in the question.[17] Where "don't know" related to a Likert-type scale, the response was be coded as the median/neutral option.[18]

[17] E.g. when asked about consuming news from a particular media source, "don't know" would be coded as "never", while for the importance of an issue "don't know" would be coded as "not at all important."

[18] E.g. as "neither agree nor disagree."

### C.5 Same-side treatment

Table A3: Treatment assignment

| | | Anti-govt | | Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Strongly | Weakly | Weakly | Strongly |
| *Treatment name* | Control | Gazete Duvar | Medya-scope | Hürriyet | Sabah |
| Strongly Anti-govt | ✓ | - | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Weakly Anti-govt | ✓ | ✓ | - | ✓ | ✓ |
| Weakly Pro-govt | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | - | ✓ |
| Strongly Pro-govt | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | - |

Table presents the treatment assignment stratified by participants' baseline AKP affinity (rows). Participants of a particular baseline affinity can be assigned to an outlet if the cell is represented by a checkmark (✓). Checkmarks in a circle represent the sample used for analysis, where gray indicates Control; red indicates *Polarized* treatment; blue indicates *Moderated* treatment.

## D Social media data

### D.1 Political slant analysis of treatment outlets using BERT Model

We collected a sample of 1,116 news articles from treatment media outlets for manual coding by research assistants, who labeled them as pro-government or anti-government. We then used this labeled dataset to train a deep learning-based Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithm to classify a larger dataset of news articles. The larger dataset was obtained by scraping news articles from media outlets' tweets, resulting in a collection of 206,252 news articles.

To classify the news articles in the larger dataset, we utilized the BERTurk model(Schweter, 2020), which was trained on the manually labeled news articles from the treatment media outlets. This allowed the model to accurately classify the news articles scraped from media outlet tweets based on their political slant.

Once we determined the political slant of each news article, we assigned political slant scores, using a value of 1 to indicate pro-government partisanship and 0 to indicate anti-government partisanship. This allowed us to measure the political leanings of each news article and draw conclusions about the political slant of the media outlets.

### D.2 Partisanship analysis of Tweets using BERT model

We collected tweets from Turkish parliament and government members since their election and manually labeled them as pro-government or anti-government based on the parliamentarian's political party. Of the 587 individuals in the sample, 566 have a Twitter account, resulting in a dataset of 1,065,070 tweets posted from August 2021 to August 2022. Additionally, we gathered 331,820 tweets from study participants between January 2019 and October 2022 for labeling among those study participants with publicly viewable Twitter timelines.

To train our deep learning-based Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms to label the political slant of the tweets from study participants, we randomly selected 4,000 tweets from the parliament and government

members dataset. To classify the tweets of survey study participants, we utilized a BERT model called BERTurk (Schweter, 2020), which is a pre-trained transformer model based on Google's BERT architecture (Devlin et al., 2019). The BERT model was trained on the labeled tweets from politicians, allowing it to accurately classify the tweets of study participants.

Once we determined the political slant of each tweet, we assigned partisan scores, using a value of 1 to indicate *pro-government* partisanship and 0 to indicate *anti-government* partisanship. This allowed us to measure the political leanings of each tweet and draw conclusions about the attitudes and behaviors of the participants on social media during, and after, the treatment period. Out of the 331,820 tweets by study participants analyzed, 99,939 were assigned as pro-government.

# E Additional results

## E.1 What explains shifts in trust?

We explore two determinants of trust: the media outlet's slant, and the media outlet's breadth of news coverage.

**Media outlet's slant in coverage.** We combine responses on (1) media outlets' partisanship and (2) the media outlets' reporting bias to examine how treated participants perceive slant in coverage at midline and at endline. Midline results indicate that all treated participants rated the anti-government news outlets as being more biased, although for different reasons: while participants assigned to very anti-government outlets now perceived these anti-government outlets to have a more anti-government stance, all other participants primarily perceived these anti-government outlets to have a more anti-government reporting bias. In contrast, midline results for pro-government outlets' perceived slant shifted very little: only participants assigned to anti-government outlets shifted in their perceptions of pro-government outlets, which they rated as *less* biased.

In the short term overall, given the cross-partisan treatment assignment, evidence points to participants perhaps updating their beliefs about *in-party* outlets: anti-government participants (assigned to pro-government outlets) identified greater media bias among anti-government outlets, and pro-government participants (assigned to an anti-government outlet) found pro-government media to be less biased.

By the endline survey, however, different patterns emerge: only participants assigned to very pro- (anti-) government media reflected treatment effects on perceptions of media bias. Again, participants primarily update on in-party rather than out-party media to which they were assigned. Specifically, we find that participants assigned to very pro-government outlets reported lesser bias among anti-government outlets, while participants assigned to very anti-government outlets reported greater bias among pro-government outlets. Both results are driven by respondents' updated perceptions of the outlets' reporting bias rather than of the outlets' partisanship overall.

**Media outlet's breadth of news coverage.** Finally, it may be the case that participants trust the treatment outlets more because they find that they learn additional information that they would have missed otherwise. Results demonstrate that the *breadth* of news coverage plays an important role in building up trust for pro-government media in particular. At midline, participants assigned to very anti-government news were less likely to agree that they would learn more information from pro-government news sources while participants assigned to pro- and very pro-government outlets were more likely to agree that the breadth of pro-government new sources were wider. By endline, neither very anti- nor anti-government treatment assignments produced an effect on perceptions that pro-government news sources reported on a wider set of news; however, participants assigned to pro- and very pro-government outlets did exhibit a large effect on perceptions of breadth.

# F Additional Tables

Table A4: Correlates of affinity strata with indexes of political behavior and attitudes at baseline

| | Anti-govt | | Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Strongly | Weakly | Weakly | Strongly |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| **A. Demographic** | | | | |
| Education: Primary | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Education: High school | 0.93 | 0.91 | 0.88 | 0.78 |
| Education: University | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.43 | 0.38 |
| Age | 30.51 | 28.22 | 28.81 | 30.52 |
| Male | 0.66 | 0.58 | 0.50 | 0.44 |
| Lives in major city | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.43 | 0.45 |
| **B. Baseline ICW index outcomes** | | | | |
| AKP perceptions | -0.78 | -0.28 | 0.40 | 1.28 |
| Opposition party perceptions | 0.40 | -0.13 | -0.17 | -0.03 |
| AKP performance | -0.80 | -0.28 | 0.50 | 0.72 |
| Issue importance | 0.29 | 0.03 | -0.10 | -0.18 |
| Nationalism | -0.25 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.34 |
| Turkey democracy views | -0.79 | -0.19 | 0.42 | 0.79 |
| Trad media consumption | -0.12 | 0.01 | 0.18 | 0.28 |
| Social media consumption | 0.01 | -0.06 | -0.03 | -0.01 |
| Perceived echo chamber | 0.12 | -0.03 | -0.01 | 0.04 |
| Political efficacy | 0.08 | -0.17 | 0.06 | 0.52 |
| Political engagement | 0.21 | -0.20 | -0.06 | 0.38 |
| Media trust (anti) | 0.36 | 0.02 | -0.05 | -0.05 |
| Media trust (pro) | -0.52 | -0.08 | 0.39 | 0.49 |
| DNK outlet (anti) | -0.08 | 0.09 | -0.07 | -0.08 |
| DNK outlet (pro) | -0.11 | 0.03 | -0.08 | -0.10 |
| Media consumption (anti) | 0.18 | 0.00 | -0.21 | -0.16 |
| Media consumption (pro) | -0.31 | -0.14 | 0.24 | 0.16 |
| **C. Social media behavior** | | | | |
| Log Twitter posts | 2.34 | 1.55 | 1.46 | 2.30 |
| Share of pro-government Twitter posts | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.34 | 0.46 |

Table A5: Participants' beliefs about treatment media outlets

| | Anti-govt | | Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Strongly | Weakly | Weakly | Strongly |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| **A. Perceived pro-government leaning** (*1-5*) | | | | |
| Political leaning: Gazete Duvar | 2.58 | 2.85 | 2.86 | 2.70 |
| Political leaning: Medyascope | 2.74 | 2.88 | 2.83 | 2.76 |
| Political leaning: Hurriyet | 3.67 | 3.19 | 3.01 | 2.93 |
| Political leaning: Sabah | 3.98 | 3.53 | 3.25 | 3.09 |
| **B. Does not know outlet** (*0-1*) | | | | |
| DNK: Gazete Duvar | 0.38 | 0.46 | 0.38 | 0.36 |
| DNK: Medyascope | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0.42 | 0.43 |
| DNK: Hurriyet | 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.11 |
| DNK: Sabah | 0.11 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.11 |
| **C. Trust in outlets** (*1-5*) | | | | |
| Trust outlet: Gazete Duvar | 2.74 | 2.68 | 2.63 | 2.76 |
| Trust outlet: Medyascope | 2.84 | 2.67 | 2.67 | 2.77 |
| Trust outlet: Hurriyet | 2.37 | 2.86 | 3.39 | 3.40 |
| Trust outlet: Sabah | 2.02 | 2.57 | 3.35 | 3.51 |
| **D. Consumption of outlets** (*0-1*) | | | | |
| Read often: Gazete Duvar | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| Read often: Medyascope | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Read often: Hurriyet | 0.16 | 0.11 | 0.28 | 0.20 |
| Read often: Sabah | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0.25 |

Table presents descriptive statistics about treatment outlets according to participants' baseline affinity stratum.

Table A6: Study participation by treatment assignment

| | Anti-govt | | Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Strongly | Weakly | Weakly | Strongly |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| **A. Self reported following outlet** | | | | |
| Did you follow assigned outlet | 0.82 | 0.80 | 0.74 | 0.73 |
| Followed: Facebook | 0.64 | 0.63 | 0.51 | 0.48 |
| Followed: Twitter | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.50 |
| **B. Validated following outlet** | | | | |
| Validated follow at baseline | 0.82 | 0.79 | 0.72 | 0.73 |
| Confirmed follow: Facebook | 0.52 | 0.57 | 0.35 | 0.44 |
| Confirmed follow: Twitter | 0.37 | 0.30 | 0.46 | 0.39 |
| **C. News story consumption** | | | | |
| Have been reading news from assigned outlet | 0.75 | 0.79 | 0.64 | 0.58 |
| How consumed: News links | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.16 | 0.20 |
| How consumed: FB | 0.30 | 0.27 | 0.23 | 0.20 |
| How consumed: Twitter | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.10 |
| How consumed: Quiz | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| How consumed: Website | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.05 |
| **D. Quiz participation** | | | | |
| Share of quizzes taken | 0.71 | 0.76 | 0.67 | 0.62 |
| Average quiz payment | 13.57 | 14.37 | 13.96 | 14.25 |
| Share of quizzes receiving high incentives | 0.45 | 0.48 | 0.52 | 0.51 |
| **E. App engagement** | | | | |
| Number of clicked blasts | 7.03 | 5.58 | 5.36 | 4.87 |
| Share of blasts clicked | 0.21 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.14 |
| Any clicked blasts | 0.57 | 0.54 | 0.53 | 0.53 |

Table presents descriptive statistics about endline participants' engagement with their assigned outlet according to which outlet they were assigned to (columns).

Table A7: Survey response attrition

| | Took midline | | Took endline | | Took midline and endline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Very Anti Government | -0.029 | -0.031 | -0.002 | -0.004 | -0.024 | -0.022 |
| | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.031) | (0.030) |
| Anti Government | -0.003 | 0.000 | -0.003 | -0.001 | 0.022 | 0.029 |
| | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.033) | (0.032) | (0.036) | (0.035) |
| Pro Government | -0.036 | -0.036 | -0.004 | -0.010 | -0.037 | -0.040 |
| | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.034) | (0.034) |
| Very Pro Government | -0.038 | -0.038 | -0.007 | -0.010 | -0.036 | -0.036 |
| | (0.028) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.61 | 0.61 |
| Control SD | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.49 | 0.49 |
| $p$(VAG=AG) | 0.40 | 0.30 | 0.98 | 0.94 | 0.17 | 0.12 |
| $p$(VPG=PG) | 0.93 | 0.95 | 0.91 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.89 |
| $R^2$ | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.18 | 0.20 |
| Observations | 3171 | 3171 | 3171 | 3171 | 3171 | 3171 |

*Notes*: Specifications estimated using OLS including block fixed effects in the baseline survey sample. Even-indexed columns add LASSO-selected controls. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A8: Covariate balance

| Variable | $p(\tau = 0)$ | Strongly Anti Govt | Weakly Anti Govt | Weakly Pro Govt | Strongly Pro Govt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education: High school | [0.77] | -0.02 [0.46] | 0.00 [0.87] | 0.01 [0.68] | -0.01 [0.55] |
| Education: University | [0.38] | -0.05 [0.21] | -0.05 [0.24] | 0.06 [0.17] | 0.00 [0.91] |
| Male | [0.38] | -0.02 [0.68] | -0.07 [0.11] | -0.05 [0.28] | -0.03 [0.42] |
| Age | [0.29] | -1.14 [0.09]* | -0.21 [0.78] | 0.19 [0.84] | 0.94 [0.23] |
| Lives in major city | [0.38] | 0.04 [0.27] | 0.06 [0.20] | -0.01 [0.78] | 0.04 [0.23] |
| AKP perceptions | [0.18] | 0.02 [0.77] | 0.09 [0.09]* | -0.08 [0.26] | -0.09 [0.10] |
| Opposition party perceptions | [0.09] | 0.03 [0.52] | 0.12 [0.01]** | -0.09 [0.37] | -0.10 [0.23] |
| AKP performance | [0.48] | -0.06 [0.28] | -0.04 [0.49] | 0.08 [0.14] | 0.04 [0.43] |
| Issue importance | [0.88] | 0.00 [0.99] | -0.03 [0.69] | 0.05 [0.55] | 0.07 [0.32] |
| Nationalism | [0.80] | 0.06 [0.35] | 0.02 [0.85] | -0.04 [0.64] | 0.03 [0.69] |
| Turkey democracy views | [0.56] | 0.00 [0.94] | -0.10 [0.19] | 0.01 [0.92] | -0.03 [0.53] |
| Trad media consumption | [0.20] | 0.14 [0.05]** | 0.16 [0.05]** | 0.07 [0.40] | 0.05 [0.44] |
| Social media consumption | [0.13] | 0.14 [0.01]*** | 0.06 [0.39] | -0.01 [0.93] | -0.01 [0.82] |
| Perceived echo chamber | [0.61] | 0.04 [0.58] | 0.10 [0.27] | 0.03 [0.70] | 0.08 [0.23] |
| Political efficacy | [0.41] | -0.03 [0.68] | -0.01 [0.87] | 0.05 [0.54] | 0.13 [0.05]* |
| Political engagement | [0.31] | -0.06 [0.31] | 0.04 [0.52] | -0.12 [0.20] | -0.08 [0.24] |
| Media trust (anti) | [0.40] | 0.07 [0.34] | -0.07 [0.42] | 0.07 [0.37] | 0.07 [0.31] |
| Media trust (pro) | [0.18] | -0.09 [0.17] | -0.12 [0.08]* | 0.11 [0.11] | 0.04 [0.51] |
| DNK outlet (anti) | [0.53] | -0.05 [0.42] | -0.01 [0.86] | 0.11 [0.16] | 0.08 [0.22] |
| DNK outlet (pro) | [0.17] | 0.06 [0.33] | 0.16 [0.04]** | 0.03 [0.70] | 0.10 [0.17] |
| Media consumption (anti) | [0.91] | 0.04 [0.44] | 0.03 [0.61] | 0.03 [0.74] | 0.04 [0.54] |
| Media consumption (pro) | [0.22] | -0.12 [0.04]** | -0.10 [0.14] | -0.05 [0.50] | -0.07 [0.25] |

*Notes*: Specifications estimated using OLS including block fixed effects in the endline survey sample. $p(\tau = 0)$ provides the $p$-value from an F-test of the null hypothesis that the mean of a given variable is the same across treatment groups. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

## F.1 Main Effects

### F.1.1 Compliance and exposure

Table A9: Effects on following anti-government media outlets

| | ICW: Following outlets (anti) | | Do you follow: Anti-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.72*** | 0.72*** | 0.66*** | 0.67*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.75*** | 0.73*** | 0.70*** | 0.69*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.56 | 0.56 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.93 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.66 | 0.88 | 0.61 | 0.80 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.58 | 0.35 | 0.53 | 0.33 |
| $R^2$ | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.17 | 0.26 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.80*** | 0.80*** | 0.72*** | 0.72*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.86*** | 0.84*** | 0.77*** | 0.76*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.06 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.52 | 0.52 |
| Control SD | 1.01 | 1.01 | 0.91 | 0.91 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.54 | 0.62 | 0.54 | 0.58 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.47 | 0.46 |
| $R^2$ | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.31 |
| Observations | 2218 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A10: Effects on following pro-government media outlets

| | ICW: Following outlets (pro) | | Do you follow: Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.06 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.45*** | 0.45*** | 0.47*** | 0.46*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.35*** | 0.35*** | 0.36*** | 0.37*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.92 | 0.92 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.04 | 1.04 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.89 | 0.59 | 0.93 | 0.63 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.16 |
| $R^2$ | 0.09 | 0.17 | 0.09 | 0.17 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.02 | 0.00 | -0.02 | 0.00 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.02 | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.00 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.37*** | 0.35*** | 0.38*** | 0.36*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.36*** | 0.36*** | 0.37*** | 0.37*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.90 | 0.90 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 1.03 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.94 | 0.86 | 0.96 | 0.93 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.90 | 0.87 | 0.89 | 0.98 |
| $R^2$ | 0.24 | 0.27 | 0.24 | 0.26 |
| Observations | 2218 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A11: Endline: Outlet exposure (anti)

| | ICW: Outlet exposure (anti) | | Seeing outlet often: Anti-govt | | See on SM often: Anti-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.644*** | 0.675*** | 1.659*** | 1.683*** | 0.354*** | 0.370*** |
| | (0.074) | (0.072) | (0.241) | (0.226) | (0.051) | (0.051) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.671*** | 0.670*** | 1.835*** | 1.831*** | 0.342*** | 0.346*** |
| | (0.085) | (0.081) | (0.267) | (0.257) | (0.056) | (0.055) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.119 | -0.123 | -0.026 | -0.046 | -0.147** | -0.136** |
| | (0.096) | (0.085) | (0.268) | (0.254) | (0.071) | (0.063) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.011 | -0.039 | -0.047 | -0.093 | -0.012 | 0.006 |
| | (0.084) | (0.075) | (0.235) | (0.223) | (0.063) | (0.057) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 6.29 | 6.29 | 0.37 | 0.37 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.91 | 2.92 | 0.76 | 0.76 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.71 | 0.94 | 0.45 | 0.51 | 0.82 | 0.64 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.21 | 0.27 | 0.93 | 0.84 | 0.04 | 0.02 |
| $R^2$ | 0.37 | 0.50 | 0.35 | 0.43 | 0.39 | 0.48 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A12: Midline: Outlet exposure (anti)

| | ICW: Outlet exposure (anti) | | Exposure: Anti-govt | | See on SM often: Anti-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.773*** | 0.762*** | 1.942*** | 1.827*** | 0.351*** | 0.366*** |
| | (0.067) | (0.068) | (0.234) | (0.227) | (0.043) | (0.044) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.665*** | 0.656*** | 1.998*** | 1.906*** | 0.227*** | 0.234*** |
| | (0.077) | (0.076) | (0.279) | (0.270) | (0.050) | (0.052) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.035 | -0.049 | 0.396 | 0.395 | -0.142** | -0.139** |
| | (0.084) | (0.083) | (0.280) | (0.269) | (0.061) | (0.062) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.026 | 0.001 | 0.127 | 0.114 | -0.020 | -0.019 |
| | (0.075) | (0.073) | (0.229) | (0.216) | (0.058) | (0.058) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | -0.01 | 0.00 | 6.93 | 6.94 | 0.33 | 0.33 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 3.16 | 3.16 | 0.73 | 0.73 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.83 | 0.75 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.47 | 0.54 | 0.32 | 0.29 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| $R^2$ | 0.31 | 0.35 | 0.29 | 0.36 | 0.27 | 0.29 |
| Observations | 2218 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A13: Endline: Outlet exposure (pro)

| | ICW: Outlet exposure (pro) | | Seeing outlet often: Pro-govt | | See on SM often: Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.078 | -0.041 | 0.167 | 0.244 | -0.231*** | -0.217** |
| | (0.074) | (0.072) | (0.170) | (0.164) | (0.089) | (0.088) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.022 | 0.050 | 0.290 | 0.363* | -0.109 | -0.096 |
| | (0.091) | (0.089) | (0.197) | (0.194) | (0.106) | (0.105) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.398*** | 0.382*** | 0.660*** | 0.663*** | 0.377*** | 0.360*** |
| | (0.088) | (0.084) | (0.190) | (0.183) | (0.101) | (0.100) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.192** | 0.204*** | 0.557*** | 0.596*** | 0.062 | 0.044 |
| | (0.076) | (0.073) | (0.168) | (0.163) | (0.087) | (0.085) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.44 | 5.44 | 1.09 | 1.09 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.21 | 2.21 | 1.18 | 1.18 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.14 | 0.15 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.55 | 0.68 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| $R^2$ | 0.30 | 0.38 | 0.32 | 0.38 | 0.33 | 0.37 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A14: Midline: Outlet exposure (pro)

| | ICW: Outlet exposure (pro) | | Exposure: Pro-govt | | See on SM often: Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.071 | 0.062 | 0.731*** | 0.690*** | -0.144* | -0.148* |
| | (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.226) | (0.220) | (0.080) | (0.079) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.011 | 0.014 | 0.401 | 0.389 | -0.122 | -0.114 |
| | (0.080) | (0.079) | (0.278) | (0.271) | (0.094) | (0.093) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.325*** | 0.293*** | 0.660** | 0.702*** | 0.287*** | 0.267*** |
| | (0.082) | (0.082) | (0.267) | (0.261) | (0.091) | (0.091) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.343*** | 0.319*** | 0.794*** | 0.820*** | 0.262*** | 0.237*** |
| | (0.068) | (0.069) | (0.223) | (0.219) | (0.078) | (0.078) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | -0.01 | 0.00 | 7.77 | 7.78 | 0.97 | 0.98 |
| Control SD | 1.01 | 1.00 | 3.06 | 3.05 | 1.12 | 1.12 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.42 | 0.51 | 0.21 | 0.24 | 0.79 | 0.68 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.82 | 0.73 | 0.60 | 0.64 | 0.78 | 0.74 |
| $R^2$ | 0.28 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 0.27 | 0.28 |
| Observations | 2218 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

### F.1.2 Media consumption

Table A15: Effects on reading anti-government news stories

| | ICW: Outlet consumption (anti) | | Click often: anti-govt source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.44*** | 0.45*** | 0.37*** | 0.38*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.44*** | 0.44*** | 0.37*** | 0.38*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.15 | -0.14* | -0.13* | -0.13* |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.05 | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.04 |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.44 | 0.44 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.84 | 0.84 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.99 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 0.99 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.21 | 0.20 | 0.23 | 0.19 |
| $R^2$ | 0.18 | 0.27 | 0.18 | 0.27 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.47*** | 0.49*** | 0.37*** | 0.39*** |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.37*** | 0.37*** | 0.30*** | 0.30*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.09 | -0.10 | -0.08 | -0.08 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.06 | -0.07 | -0.05 | -0.05 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.41 | 0.40 |
| Control SD | 1.01 | 1.01 | 0.80 | 0.80 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.25 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 0.15 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.67 | 0.73 | 0.68 | 0.74 |
| $R^2$ | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.29 |
| Observations | 2218 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A16: Effects on reading pro-government news stories

| | ICW: Outlet consumption (pro) | | Click often: pro-govt source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.21** | -0.17** | -0.24** | -0.20** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.10 | -0.08 | -0.12 | -0.10 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.33*** | 0.34*** | 0.39*** | 0.39*** |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.16** | 0.17** | 0.18** | 0.20** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.16 | 1.16 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.17 | 1.17 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.21 | 0.32 | 0.22 | 0.32 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| $R^2$ | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.19 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.17** | -0.16** | -0.21** | -0.19** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.02 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.27*** | 0.27*** | 0.31*** | 0.31*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.19*** | 0.17** | 0.22*** | 0.20** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | -0.01 | -0.01 | 1.08 | 1.08 |
| Control SD | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.15 | 1.15 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.12 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.34 | 0.22 | 0.32 | 0.22 |
| $R^2$ | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.27 |
| Observations | 2218 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A17: Endline: Media consumption (anti)

| | ICW: Media consumption (anti) | | Read often: anti-govt source | | Seek out Anti info | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.403*** | 0.381*** | 0.389*** | 0.394*** | 0.120* | 0.100 |
| | (0.070) | (0.067) | (0.053) | (0.051) | (0.067) | (0.066) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.425*** | 0.383*** | 0.343*** | 0.327*** | 0.191** | 0.178** |
| | (0.082) | (0.079) | (0.060) | (0.056) | (0.080) | (0.079) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.007 | 0.015 | 0.009 | 0.010 | -0.003 | 0.030 |
| | (0.087) | (0.079) | (0.074) | (0.063) | (0.070) | (0.070) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.074 | -0.089 | 0.018 | 0.010 | -0.124* | -0.112* |
| | (0.075) | (0.070) | (0.062) | (0.056) | (0.063) | (0.063) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 3.03 | 3.03 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.87 | 0.87 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.77 | 0.98 | 0.41 | 0.21 | 0.35 | 0.29 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.30 | 0.16 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 0.05 | 0.02 |
| $R^2$ | 0.40 | 0.48 | 0.41 | 0.50 | 0.35 | 0.38 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A18: Midline: Media consumption (anti)

| | ICW: Media consumption (anti) | | Read often: anti-govt source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.489*** | 0.504*** | 0.359*** | 0.354*** |
| | (0.060) | (0.062) | (0.044) | (0.045) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.263*** | 0.258*** | 0.193*** | 0.169*** |
| | (0.064) | (0.067) | (0.047) | (0.048) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.049 | -0.073 | -0.036 | -0.052 |
| | (0.100) | (0.097) | (0.074) | (0.071) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.024 | 0.013 | 0.018 | 0.006 |
| | (0.084) | (0.083) | (0.062) | (0.061) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.33 | 0.33 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.73 | 0.73 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.45 | 0.35 | 0.45 | 0.39 |
| $R^2$ | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.26 | 0.29 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A19: Endline: Media consumption (pro)

| | ICW: Media consumption (pro) | | Read often: pro-govt source | | Seek out Pro info | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.285*** | -0.256*** | -0.380*** | -0.339*** | -0.120* | -0.100 |
| | (0.073) | (0.072) | (0.100) | (0.100) | (0.067) | (0.066) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.213*** | -0.194** | -0.145 | -0.130 | -0.191** | -0.181** |
| | (0.080) | (0.080) | (0.110) | (0.107) | (0.080) | (0.079) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.119* | 0.097 | 0.214** | 0.191** | 0.003 | -0.028 |
| | (0.072) | (0.071) | (0.095) | (0.091) | (0.070) | (0.070) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.136** | 0.139** | 0.089 | 0.090 | 0.124* | 0.113* |
| | (0.065) | (0.064) | (0.085) | (0.083) | (0.063) | (0.063) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.16 | 1.16 | 2.97 | 2.97 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.28 | 1.28 | 0.87 | 0.87 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.31 | 0.37 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.35 | 0.27 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.80 | 0.52 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 0.05 | 0.02 |
| $R^2$ | 0.38 | 0.43 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.38 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A20: Midline: Media consumption (pro)

| | ICW: Media consumption (pro) | | Read often: pro-govt source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.160** | -0.158** | -0.194** | -0.191** |
| | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.092) | (0.092) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.031 | -0.028 | -0.037 | -0.033 |
| | (0.085) | (0.085) | (0.103) | (0.103) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.222*** | 0.220*** | 0.269*** | 0.267*** |
| | (0.075) | (0.076) | (0.091) | (0.092) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.247*** | 0.241*** | 0.300*** | 0.293*** |
| | (0.068) | (0.068) | (0.083) | (0.083) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | -0.01 | -0.01 | 1.05 | 1.06 |
| Control SD | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.20 | 1.20 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.73 | 0.78 | 0.73 | 0.77 |
| $R^2$ | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.26 | 0.27 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

### F.1.3 Voting intentions

Table A21: Effects on turnout intentions

| | Vote: Any party | | Vote: Would not | | Vote: DNK | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.04 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.07* | -0.07* | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.01 | 0.02 | -0.05* | -0.04 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Control mean | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| Control SD | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.30 | 0.30 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.60 | 0.62 | 0.44 | 0.42 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.55 | 0.44 |
| $R^2$ | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.05 | 0.07 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.06* | -0.06* | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.02 | 0.03 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| Control SD | 0.43 | 0.42 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 0.30 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.35 | 0.38 | 0.43 | 0.51 | 0.15 | 0.12 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.45 | 0.33 | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0.97 | 0.81 |
| $R^2$ | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.24 | 0.28 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

### F.1.4 Policy performance and affective polarization

Table A22: Effects on perceptions of AKP policy performance

| | ICW: AKP performance | | Perf: Corruption | | Perf: Env. protection | | Perf: EU membership | | Perf: Femicides | | Perf: Journ. imprisonment | | Perf: Inflation | | Perf |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15 |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.06 | -0.04 | -0.13 | -0.10 | -0.05 | -0.02 | 0.12 | 0.10 | -0.04 | 0.00 | -0.09 | -0.06 | -0.0 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.1 |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.08 | -0.06 | -0.15 | -0.15 | -0.25** | -0.22* | -0.09 | -0.06 | -0.02 | -0.04 | -0.20* | -0.15 | -0.13 | -0.11 | -0.0 |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.1 |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.14** | 0.14** | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.22 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.1 |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.10* | 0.12** | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.15* | 0.16** | 0.16** | 0.11 | 0.13* | 0.13 | 0.18** | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.0 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.0 |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.06 | 2.06 | 2.59 | 2.60 | 2.39 | 2.39 | 2.05 | 2.05 | 2.25 | 2.26 | 2.02 | 2.02 | 2.6 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.27 | 1.27 | 1.41 | 1.41 | 1.27 | 1.27 | 1.28 | 1.28 | 1.33 | 1.33 | 1.24 | 1.25 | 1.3 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.37 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.68 | 0.65 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.69 | 0.60 | 0.7 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.47 | 0.71 | 1.00 | 0.73 | 0.96 | 0.79 | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.78 | 0.50 | 0.36 | 0.27 | 0.38 | 0.27 | 0.1 |
| $R^2$ | 0.35 | 0.41 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.22 | 0.32 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.22 | 0.27 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.2 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 226 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.10 | -0.12* | -0.13 | -0.15 | -0.18* | -0.19* | -0.14 | -0.14 | -0.03 | -0.06 | -0.13 | -0.14 | 0.04 | 0.06 | -0.28 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.0 |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.04 | 0.03 | -0.06 | -0.06 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.06 | 0.05 | -0.07 | -0.09 | 0.20* | 0.23** | -0.1 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.1 |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.11 | 0.13* | 0.16* | 0.15 | 0.18* | 0.20** | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.19** | 0.20** | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.18** | 0.20** | 0.0 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.1 |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.11** | 0.12** | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.21** | 0.23*** | 0.21*** | 0.21*** | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.15 |
| | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.0 |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × |
| Control mean | -0.01 | 0.00 | 2.05 | 2.05 | 2.31 | 2.31 | 2.28 | 2.29 | 1.99 | 2.00 | 2.27 | 2.27 | 1.92 | 1.92 | 2.5 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.29 | 1.29 | 1.39 | 1.39 | 1.30 | 1.30 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.35 | 1.35 | 1.21 | 1.21 | 1.4 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.22 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.16 | 0.40 | 0.28 | 0.62 | 0.58 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.1 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.93 | 0.94 | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.74 | 0.77 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.66 | 1.00 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.5 |
| $R^2$ | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.39 | 0.45 | 0.38 | 0.46 | 0.39 | 0.45 | 0.38 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0.41 | 0.46 | 0.4 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 221 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-sel
columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in pare
0.01.

Table A23: Effects on perceptions of policy importance

| | ICW: Issue importance | | Imp: Corruption | | Imp: Environmental protection | | Imp: EU membership | | Imp: Femicides | | Imp: Journalist imprisonment | | Imp: Inflation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.01 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.03 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.09 | -0.11 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.16* | 0.15* | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.24** | 0.21* | 0.11* | 0.12* | 0.11 | 0.13 | -0.14* | -0.18** |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.05 | -0.05 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | -0.02 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.16* | -0.16* | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.03 | -0.05 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.21*** | -0.24*** | 0.00 | -0.01 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 4.55 | 4.55 | 4.45 | 4.46 | 3.29 | 3.29 | 4.70 | 4.70 | 3.74 | 3.74 | 4.63 | 4.63 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.86 | 0.85 | 1.28 | 1.28 | 0.73 | 0.73 | 1.22 | 1.22 | 0.81 | 0.81 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.53 | 0.35 | 0.45 | 0.63 | 0.99 | 0.69 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.75 | 0.43 | 0.24 | 0.11 | 0.47 | 0.38 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.81 | 0.93 | 0.76 | 0.98 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.29 | 0.13 | 0.56 | 0.59 | 0.50 | 0.36 | 0.73 | 0.51 |
| $R^2$ | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.22 | 0.30 | 0.09 | 0.13 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.16** | 0.15** | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.27*** | 0.26*** | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.30*** | 0.27*** | 0.07 | 0.09 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.17** | 0.17** | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.02 | 0.28** | 0.28** | -0.08 | -0.06 | 0.32*** | 0.29*** | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.04 | 0.04 | -0.03 | -0.01 | -0.08 | -0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | -0.04 | -0.02 | 0.05 | 0.03 | -0.04 | -0.01 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.05 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.00 | -0.09 | -0.07 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.15* | -0.13* | -0.03 | 0.00 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 4.49 | 4.49 | 4.42 | 4.42 | 3.30 | 3.29 | 4.54 | 4.54 | 3.75 | 3.75 | 4.51 | 4.50 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.97 | 0.97 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.43 | 1.43 | 0.92 | 0.92 | 1.35 | 1.34 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.97 | 0.77 | 0.67 | 0.70 | 0.67 | 0.90 | 0.93 | 0.84 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.90 | 0.87 | 0.66 | 0.51 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.21 | 0.29 | 0.75 | 0.95 | 0.19 | 0.46 | 0.17 | 0.26 | 0.63 | 0.77 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.95 | 0.88 |
| $R^2$ | 0.32 | 0.38 | 0.30 | 0.35 | 0.25 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.29 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.44 | 0.29 | 0.37 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected
$p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *

Table A24: Effects on attitudes towards partisan in-group

| | ICW: Affinity towards in-partisans | | Inparty: Friendship | | Inparty: Neighbors | | Inparty: Trust people | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.03 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.01 | -0.10 | -0.11 | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.12 | -0.09 | -0.07 | -0.05 | -0.16* | -0.16* | -0.07 | -0.04 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.16* | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.06 |
| | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.06 | -0.07 | -0.01 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.87 | 3.87 | 3.98 | 3.99 | 3.63 | 3.63 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.02 | 1.02 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.04 | 1.04 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.29 | 0.26 | 0.54 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.22 | 0.23 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.31 | 0.39 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 0.28 | 0.38 |
| $R^2$ | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.17 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.02 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.04 | 0.00 | -0.04 | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0.05 | -0.08 | -0.04 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.02 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.12 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.78 | 3.78 | 3.85 | 3.85 | 3.48 | 3.48 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.05 | 1.05 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.97 | 0.53 | 0.92 | 0.74 | 0.46 | 0.24 | 0.54 | 0.84 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.31 | 0.28 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.80 | 0.92 | 0.24 | 0.13 |
| $R^2$ | 0.29 | 0.41 | 0.28 | 0.34 | 0.27 | 0.36 | 0.28 | 0.38 |
| Observations | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A25: Effects on attitudes towards partisan out-group

| | ICW: Affinity towards out-partisans | | Outparty: Friendship | | Outparty: Neighbors | | Outparty: Trust people | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.03 | -0.08 | 0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.05 | -0.07 | -0.10 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.04 | -0.07 | -0.09 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.08 | -0.13 | -0.20* | -0.24** | -0.02 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.11 |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.08 | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.06 | 0.18* | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.03 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 2.64 | 2.64 | 2.61 | 2.62 | 2.17 | 2.17 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.28 | 1.28 | 1.23 | 1.23 | 1.10 | 1.10 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.78 | 0.35 | 1.00 | 0.59 | 0.55 | 0.70 | 0.32 | 0.15 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.20 | 0.12 |
| $R^2$ | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.10 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.19** | 0.15* | 0.17* | 0.14 | 0.16* | 0.12 | 0.23** | 0.19** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.21** | 0.19** | 0.21** | 0.21** | 0.17* | 0.14 | 0.26** | 0.23** |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.23*** | 0.22*** | 0.20** | 0.18* | 0.24** | 0.22** | 0.24** | 0.24*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.23*** | 0.21*** | 0.26*** | 0.24*** | 0.26*** | 0.25*** | 0.20** | 0.17** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.58 | 2.59 | 2.64 | 2.65 | 2.24 | 2.24 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.19 | 1.19 | 1.15 | 1.15 | 1.15 | 1.15 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.78 | 0.63 | 0.67 | 0.43 | 0.88 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.69 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.98 | 0.88 | 0.52 | 0.54 | 0.82 | 0.75 | 0.61 | 0.43 |
| $R^2$ | 0.27 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.34 |
| Observations | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 | 2218 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

## F.2 Mechanisms

### F.2.1 Knowledge about, and trust in, media

Table A26: Effects on knowledge about media outlets

| | ICW: DNK outlet (anti) | | DNK: Anti-govt | | ICW: DNK outlet (pro) | | DNK: Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.13** | -0.16*** | -0.10** | -0.12*** | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.21*** | -0.22*** | -0.15*** | -0.16*** | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Control mean | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| Control SD | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.36 | 0.36 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.16 | 0.29 | 0.16 | 0.27 | 0.89 | 0.83 | 0.89 | 0.98 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.41 |
| $R^2$ | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.19 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0.17* | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.01 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 1.01 | 1.02 | 0.33 | 0.33 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.64 | 0.70 | 0.64 | 0.80 | 0.44 | 0.48 | 0.44 | 0.44 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.97 | 0.94 | 0.97 | 0.94 | 0.80 | 0.69 | 0.80 | 0.77 |
| $R^2$ | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.23 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A27: Effects on trust in media outlets

| | ICW: Media trust (anti) | | Trust outlet: Anti-govt | | ICW: Media trust (pro) | | Trust outlet: Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.21*** | 0.18** | 0.21*** | 0.19** | -0.05 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.27*** | 0.25*** | 0.27*** | 0.25*** | -0.08 | -0.07 | -0.08 | -0.07 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.23*** | 0.20*** | 0.24*** | 0.21*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | 0.13* | 0.11 | 0.13* | 0.12* |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.02 | 1.02 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 1.03 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.42 | 0.35 | 0.42 | 0.36 | 0.68 | 0.77 | 0.68 | 0.78 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.18 |
| $R^2$ | 0.23 | 0.30 | 0.23 | 0.30 | 0.22 | 0.29 | 0.22 | 0.29 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.45*** | 0.45*** | 0.47*** | 0.46*** | 0.25*** | 0.23*** | 0.25*** | 0.23*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.48*** | 0.48*** | 0.50*** | 0.49*** | 0.18** | 0.15* | 0.18** | 0.16* |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.13 | 0.14* | 0.13 | 0.15* | 0.23*** | 0.25*** | 0.23*** | 0.25*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.11 | -0.10 | -0.11 | -0.10 | 0.13* | 0.12* | 0.13* | 0.13* |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.14 | -0.14 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.25 | -0.25 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.01 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.37 | 0.25 | 0.37 | 0.31 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.21 | 0.11 | 0.21 | 0.13 |
| $R^2$ | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.32 | 0.36 | 0.32 | 0.37 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A28: Endline: Trust index (traditional media)

| | ICW: Trust index (traditional media) | | Trust news sources: Print | | Trust news sources: TV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.160** | -0.158** | -0.097 | -0.098 | -0.226*** | -0.218*** |
| | (0.072) | (0.067) | (0.082) | (0.079) | (0.083) | (0.077) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.042 | -0.018 | -0.006 | 0.007 | -0.081 | -0.058 |
| | (0.079) | (0.076) | (0.087) | (0.086) | (0.093) | (0.088) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.067 | -0.001 | 0.118 | 0.056 | 0.012 | -0.049 |
| | (0.086) | (0.077) | (0.093) | (0.087) | (0.099) | (0.091) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.095 | 0.064 | 0.171** | 0.131* | 0.014 | -0.011 |
| | (0.073) | (0.067) | (0.080) | (0.077) | (0.085) | (0.079) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.96 | 2.96 | 3.04 | 3.04 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.08 | 1.08 | 1.15 | 1.16 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.13 | 0.05 | 0.28 | 0.20 | 0.11 | 0.06 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.73 | 0.37 | 0.55 | 0.38 | 0.99 | 0.66 |
| $R^2$ | 0.35 | 0.47 | 0.33 | 0.41 | 0.33 | 0.44 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A29: Endline: Trust index (online media)

| | ICW: Trust index (online media) | | Trust news sources: Digital | | Trust news sources: Fact checking | | Trust news sources: Social media | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.025 | -0.011 | -0.089 | -0.090 | -0.093 | -0.085 | 0.106 | 0.090 |
| | (0.079) | (0.078) | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.075) | (0.088) | (0.088) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.209** | 0.247*** | 0.077 | 0.091 | 0.070 | 0.092 | 0.292*** | 0.301*** |
| | (0.087) | (0.087) | (0.084) | (0.084) | (0.082) | (0.082) | (0.096) | (0.094) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.056 | 0.068 | 0.121 | 0.096 | 0.073 | 0.068 | -0.054 | -0.030 |
| | (0.089) | (0.087) | (0.085) | (0.083) | (0.086) | (0.083) | (0.087) | (0.087) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.070 | 0.050 | 0.041 | 0.005 | -0.027 | -0.048 | 0.128 | 0.121 |
| | (0.077) | (0.075) | (0.074) | (0.072) | (0.073) | (0.071) | (0.078) | (0.077) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.00 | 0.01 | 3.10 | 3.10 | 3.29 | 3.29 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.94 | 0.94 | 1.05 | 1.05 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.87 | 0.83 | 0.30 | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.08 |
| $R^2$ | 0.27 | 0.33 | 0.30 | 0.37 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 0.26 | 0.31 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

## F.3 Bias perceptions

Table A30: Effects on perceived bias of anti/pro-government sources

| | ICW: Media bias (anti) | | Political leaning: Anti | | Reporting bias: Anti | | ICW: Media bias (pro) | | Political leaning: Pro | | Reporting bias: Pro | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.08 | -0.09 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.07 | -0.07 | 0.14* | 0.13* | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.14* | 0.14* |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.06 | -0.11 | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.13 | -0.16* | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.09 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.03 | 0.05 | -0.10 | -0.10 | -0.05 | -0.01 | -0.10 | -0.10 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.16** | -0.14* | 0.05 | 0.05 | -0.28*** | -0.24*** | -0.06 | -0.04 | 0.00 | 0.02 | -0.07 | -0.06 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 2.28 | 2.29 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 1.79 | 1.79 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.93 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.97 | 0.96 | 0.95 | 0.95 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.87 | 0.80 | 0.39 | 0.45 | 0.49 | 0.30 | 0.92 | 0.63 | 0.74 | 0.84 | 0.66 | 0.56 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.64 | 0.54 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.64 | 0.44 | 0.48 | 0.66 | 0.77 | 0.64 |
| $R^2$ | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.19 | 0.25 | 0.04 | 0.09 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.13* | 0.14** | 0.14* | 0.15** | 0.07 | 0.07 | -0.06 | -0.05 | -0.07 | -0.06 | -0.01 | -0.02 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.09 | -0.17* | -0.17** | -0.20** | -0.21** | -0.06 | -0.06 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.14* | 0.11 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.18** | 0.15* | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.19** | 0.16** | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.24*** | 0.22*** | -0.02 | -0.01 | -0.07 | -0.02 | 0.04 | 0.02 |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.28 | -0.28 | 3.36 | 3.36 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 2.75 | 2.75 |
| Control SD | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.20 | 1.20 | 0.95 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.02 | 1.02 | 0.92 | 0.93 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.63 | 0.72 | 0.32 | 0.36 | 0.81 | 0.80 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.51 | 0.62 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.74 | 0.86 | 0.49 | 0.39 | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.34 | 0.56 | 0.67 | 0.91 |
| $R^2$ | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.33 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.37 | 0.42 | 0.36 | 0.42 | 0.26 | 0.31 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

## F.4 Extra information from reading other outlets

Table A31: Effects on perceived additional information from reading pro-govt sources

| | ICW: Extra info (pro-govt) | | Extra info: Pro after anti | | Extra info: Pro-govt | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.11 | -0.03 | 0.00 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.01 | 0.03 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.25** | 0.22** | -0.01 | -0.04 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.25*** | 0.24*** | 0.26*** | 0.23** | 0.20** | 0.16* |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.63 | 2.63 | 3.02 | 3.02 |
| Control SD | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.24 | 1.24 | 1.24 | 1.23 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.54 | 0.47 | 0.27 | 0.21 | 0.49 | 0.69 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.93 | 0.93 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| $R^2$ | 0.11 | 0.16 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.15 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.18*** | -0.18*** | -0.13 | -0.08 | -0.19** | -0.18** |
| | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.10 | -0.10 | 0.04 | 0.06 | -0.21** | -0.19** |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.16* | 0.19** | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.26** | 0.23** |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.10) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.26*** | 0.24*** | 0.44*** | 0.41*** | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | -0.02 | -0.02 | 2.50 | 2.50 | 3.15 | 3.15 |
| Control SD | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.23 | 1.23 | 1.22 | 1.22 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.24 | 0.26 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.90 | 0.85 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.18 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| $R^2$ | 0.31 | 0.37 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.30 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

## F.5 Secondary effects

### F.5.1 Views towards politics and media in Turkey

Table A32: Effects on attitudes towards democracy

| | ICW: Democracy support | | Democracy best form of govt | | Disagree: Only Turkish language | | Disagree: Parties dangerous | | Disagree: President not law bound | | Disag mil |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.04 | 0.04 | -0.08 | -0.06 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.13 | 0.08 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.03 | 0.01 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.07 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.11 | -0.09 | -0.14 | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.14 | -0.08 | -0.03 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.01 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.05 | -0.03 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 | -0.05 | -0.03 | 0.10 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.69 | 3.70 | -3.25 | -3.25 | -3.65 | -3.65 | -2.72 | -2.72 | -3.41 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.25 | 1.24 | 1.30 | 1.30 | 1.30 | 1.30 | 1.46 | 1.46 | 1.24 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.82 | 0.71 | 0.60 | 0.73 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.57 | 0.54 | 0.84 | 0.78 | 0.93 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.38 | 0.54 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.22 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.28 | 0.38 |
| $R^2$ | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.22 | 0.11 | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.21 | 0.20 | 0.22 | 0.14 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.00 | -0.03 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.07 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.20*** | 0.17** | 0.16* | 0.18** | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.22* |
| | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.02 | 0.04 | -0.11 | -0.09 | 0.24* | 0.18 | 0.25** | 0.27** | -0.09 | -0.10 | 0.09 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.07 | -0.04 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.07 | -0.04 | -0.05 | 0.04 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.62 | 3.62 | -3.10 | -3.11 | -3.55 | -3.54 | -2.65 | -2.64 | -3.28 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.29 | 1.30 | 1.47 | 1.48 | 1.43 | 1.43 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.41 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.81 | 0.95 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 0.99 | 0.90 | 0.15 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.87 | 0.73 | 0.71 | 0.63 | 0.35 | 0.45 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.64 |
| $R^2$ | 0.33 | 0.36 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.27 | 0.32 | 0.31 | 0.36 | 0.29 | 0.35 | 0.28 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All DVs are ICW indices. DVs: Columns 1-2: Support for democratic principles, in terms of (i) believes democracy is the best form of government; (ii) that only Turkish should be taught; (iii) disagreeing that political parties are dangerous; (iv) disagreeing that the President should not be bound disagreeing with the use of the military to settle civil issues. Columns 3-4: Perceived satisfaction with democracy in Turkey. Columns 5-6: Perceiv online media as an echo chamber, in terms of (i) whether social media typically exposes you to the same views; (ii) how hard it is to discuss dif on social media; (iii) how similar others' views on social media are. See Tables A32-A36 for disaggregated estimates. 2 All specifications esti Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LAS baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisansh coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A33: Endline: Turkish institutions views

| | ICW: Turkish institutions views | | Views: Gov abuses military force (rev.) | | Views: No freedom of speech media (rev.) | | Views: Parties danger (rev.) | | Views: No freedom of speech people (rev.) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.068 | -0.042 | -0.109 | -0.075 | 0.169* | 0.176* | -0.255*** | -0.213** | -0.036 | -0.034 |
| | (0.081) | (0.081) | (0.099) | (0.097) | (0.102) | (0.102) | (0.098) | (0.095) | (0.101) | (0.100) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.021 | 0.028 | -0.123 | -0.104 | 0.271** | 0.268** | -0.152 | -0.133 | 0.072 | 0.060 |
| | (0.094) | (0.093) | (0.112) | (0.112) | (0.121) | (0.120) | (0.109) | (0.103) | (0.115) | (0.115) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.106 | -0.098 | 0.029 | 0.025 | -0.218* | -0.210* | 0.068 | 0.098 | -0.259** | -0.255** |
| | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.112) | (0.109) | (0.119) | (0.117) | (0.107) | (0.104) | (0.119) | (0.118) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.114 | -0.112 | 0.020 | 0.016 | -0.221** | -0.218** | 0.001 | 0.018 | -0.188* | -0.178* |
| | (0.080) | (0.080) | (0.098) | (0.096) | (0.104) | (0.103) | (0.091) | (0.090) | (0.105) | (0.106) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | -2.56 | -2.55 | -3.07 | -3.07 | -2.73 | -2.73 | -3.19 | -3.19 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.26 | 1.26 | 1.29 | 1.29 | 1.21 | 1.21 | 1.28 | 1.28 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.31 | 0.43 | 0.89 | 0.78 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.31 | 0.41 | 0.30 | 0.37 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.92 | 0.87 | 0.93 | 0.92 | 0.98 | 0.94 | 0.50 | 0.42 | 0.53 | 0.49 |
| $R^2$ | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 0.34 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.30 | 0.37 | 0.26 | 0.27 |
| Observations | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A34: Effects on political engagement

| | ICW: Political engagement | | Interest in politics | | Vote: Any party | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.09 | -0.04 | -0.04 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.07 | -0.06 | 0.07 | 0.05 | -0.07* | -0.07* |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.05 | -0.02 | -0.12 | -0.12 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.11 | -0.11 | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.04 | -0.03 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 3.30 | 3.30 | 0.80 | 0.80 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 0.40 | 0.40 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.72 | 0.64 | 0.33 | 0.32 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.41 | 0.26 | 0.73 | 0.91 | 0.11 | 0.08 |
| $R^2$ | 0.19 | 0.26 | 0.20 | 0.27 | 0.11 | 0.15 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.08 | -0.11* | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.03 | -0.03 |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.11 | -0.13* | -0.03 | -0.01 | -0.06* | -0.06* |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 |
| | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.32 | 3.32 | 0.76 | 0.76 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.08 | 1.08 | 0.43 | 0.42 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.70 | 0.76 | 0.74 | 0.34 | 0.35 | 0.37 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.25 | 0.16 | 0.30 | 0.22 | 0.45 | 0.32 |
| $R^2$ | 0.39 | 0.46 | 0.38 | 0.46 | 0.30 | 0.35 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A35: Endline: Perceived echo chamber

| | ICW: Perceived echo chamber | | Homophily: How different views (rev.) | | Polarization: Different views can discuss (rev.) | | SM exposes you to same opinions | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.222*** | 0.201** | 0.051 | 0.055 | 0.198** | 0.148* | 0.124* | 0.116* |
| | (0.083) | (0.083) | (0.080) | (0.079) | (0.085) | (0.082) | (0.071) | (0.070) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.061 | 0.078 | -0.029 | -0.013 | 0.098 | 0.080 | 0.029 | 0.048 |
| | (0.095) | (0.094) | (0.092) | (0.090) | (0.093) | (0.089) | (0.076) | (0.075) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.100 | 0.079 | 0.121 | 0.127* | -0.005 | -0.011 | 0.043 | 0.066 |
| | (0.089) | (0.087) | (0.077) | (0.076) | (0.085) | (0.087) | (0.075) | (0.074) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.155** | -0.151** | -0.130* | -0.096 | -0.099 | -0.095 | -0.052 | -0.033 |
| | (0.076) | (0.076) | (0.069) | (0.069) | (0.078) | (0.078) | (0.067) | (0.067) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.00 | -0.01 | -2.83 | -2.84 | -3.00 | -3.00 | 3.20 | 3.19 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 0.92 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 0.82 | 0.82 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.35 | 0.42 | 0.23 | 0.40 | 0.16 | 0.32 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.26 | 0.31 | 0.20 | 0.18 |
| $R^2$ | 0.28 | 0.31 | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.32 | 0.28 | 0.30 |
| Observations | 2263 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2269 | 2263 | 2263 | 2263 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A36: Midline: Perceived echo chamber

| | ICW: Perceived echo chamber | | SM exposes you to same opinions | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.067 | -0.065 | -0.059 | -0.057 |
| | (0.078) | (0.077) | (0.068) | (0.068) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.029 | 0.039 | 0.025 | 0.034 |
| | (0.090) | (0.089) | (0.079) | (0.078) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | -0.071 | -0.045 | -0.062 | -0.039 |
| | (0.083) | (0.081) | (0.073) | (0.071) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.069 | 0.084 | 0.060 | 0.074 |
| | (0.073) | (0.072) | (0.064) | (0.063) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.12 | 3.12 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.87 | 0.87 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.22 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.11 |
| $R^2$ | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.27 |
| Observations | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 | 2212 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A37: Effects on Twitter post sentiment

| | Share of pro-govt Twitter posts | | Log Twitter posts | | Log pro-govt Twitter posts | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| **A. After treatment** | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | 0.05 | -0.01 | -0.18 | -0.30 | -0.01 | -0.10 |
| | (0.32) | (0.23) | (0.95) | (0.69) | (0.77) | (0.55) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | 0.24 | 0.17 | -0.70 | -0.64 | -0.29 | -0.23 |
| | (0.52) | (0.43) | (1.32) | (1.16) | (1.09) | (0.99) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.06 | 0.06 | -0.48 | -0.90 | -0.15 | -0.38 |
| | (0.19) | (0.18) | (1.06) | (1.09) | (0.93) | (1.06) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.30 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.16 |
| | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.66) | (0.76) | (0.57) | (0.68) |
| Control mean | 0.29 | 0.27 | 2.73 | 2.73 | 1.79 | 1.79 |
| Control SD | 0.22 | 0.19 | 2.03 | 2.03 | 1.71 | 1.71 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.61 | 0.72 | 0.71 | 0.87 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.87 | 0.75 | 0.45 | 0.20 | 0.71 | 0.50 |
| $R^2$ | -0.08 | -0.56 | 0.36 | 0.24 | 0.35 | 0.17 |
| Observations | 191 | 190 | 305 | 304 | 305 | 304 |
| **B. During treatment** | | | | | | |
| Strongly Anti Govt | -0.13 | -0.22 | -0.55 | -0.36 | -0.22 | -0.01 |
| | (0.20) | (0.30) | (0.67) | (0.51) | (0.57) | (0.44) |
| Weakly Anti Govt | -0.29** | -0.32* | -0.58 | -0.54 | -0.50 | -0.37 |
| | (0.14) | (0.17) | (0.86) | (0.70) | (0.72) | (0.62) |
| Weakly Pro Govt | 0.13 | 0.09 | -1.17* | -1.18* | -0.22 | -0.27 |
| | (0.11) | (0.16) | (0.65) | (0.65) | (0.54) | (0.55) |
| Strongly Pro Govt | -0.08 | -0.14 | -0.35 | -0.52 | -0.08 | -0.20 |
| | (0.14) | (0.11) | (0.59) | (0.55) | (0.45) | (0.44) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.31 | 0.33 | 2.79 | 2.79 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Control SD | 0.22 | 0.21 | 2.11 | 2.11 | 1.76 | 1.76 |
| $p$(SAG=WAG) | 0.32 | 0.75 | 0.96 | 0.79 | 0.67 | 0.50 |
| $p$(SPG=WPG) | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.26 | 0.28 | 0.81 | 0.89 |
| $R^2$ | 0.92 | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.88 | 0.89 | 0.87 |
| Observations | 201 | 200 | 305 | 304 | 305 | 304 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

## F.6 Same-side treatment assignment

### F.6.1 Design validity

Table A38: Covariate balance (T8.3 samp1 wgt1 block1)

| Variable | $p(\tau = 0)$ | Anti Moderated | Pro Moderated | Anti Polarized | Pro Polarized |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education: High school | [0.63] | -0.01 [0.76] | 0.07 [0.31] | 0.04 [0.26] | -0.01 [0.71] |
| Education: University | [0.14] | -0.14 [0.06]* | -0.07 [0.42] | 0.03 [0.67] | -0.08 [0.11] |
| Male | [0.57] | -0.05 [0.43] | 0.08 [0.37] | -0.07 [0.22] | -0.02 [0.75] |
| Age | [0.74] | -0.42 [0.76] | 0.98 [0.58] | -1.01 [0.35] | -0.81 [0.39] |
| Lives in major city | [0.95] | 0.02 [0.81] | 0.06 [0.52] | 0.02 [0.79] | 0.02 [0.66] |
| AKP perceptions | [0.86] | 0.02 [0.61] | -0.05 [0.54] | 0.05 [0.44] | -0.02 [0.80] |
| Opposition party perceptions | [0.46] | -0.08 [0.62] | 0.17 [0.09]* | -0.02 [0.84] | 0.04 [0.52] |
| AKP performance | [0.41] | -0.01 [0.90] | -0.30 [0.05]* | 0.03 [0.63] | -0.01 [0.89] |
| Issue importance | [0.37] | -0.03 [0.83] | 0.32 [0.07]* | -0.05 [0.68] | -0.08 [0.41] |
| Nationalism | [0.41] | -0.19 [0.20] | -0.10 [0.64] | 0.13 [0.22] | -0.08 [0.42] |
| Turkey democracy views | [0.15] | -0.16 [0.07]* | -0.33 [0.06]* | 0.00 [0.99] | 0.01 [0.94] |
| Issue importance | [0.37] | -0.03 [0.83] | 0.32 [0.07]* | -0.05 [0.68] | -0.08 [0.41] |
| Trad media consumption | [0.03] | -0.08 [0.55] | 0.41 [0.01]*** | 0.09 [0.37] | 0.13 [0.16] |
| Social media consumption | [0.71] | 0.06 [0.58] | 0.00 [0.98] | 0.04 [0.70] | 0.09 [0.20] |
| Perceived echo chamber | [0.85] | -0.09 [0.53] | 0.06 [0.76] | -0.09 [0.39] | 0.04 [0.70] |
| Political efficacy | [0.12] | -0.15 [0.31] | -0.13 [0.54] | 0.24 [0.02]** | -0.06 [0.49] |
| Political engagement | [0.63] | -0.15 [0.33] | -0.09 [0.48] | -0.08 [0.54] | -0.08 [0.38] |
| Media trust (anti) | [0.87] | -0.10 [0.48] | -0.10 [0.68] | -0.03 [0.74] | -0.07 [0.49] |
| Media trust (pro) | [0.67] | 0.04 [0.74] | 0.12 [0.57] | -0.06 [0.50] | -0.10 [0.23] |
| DNK outlet (anti) | [0.70] | 0.18 [0.17] | 0.04 [0.81] | -0.05 [0.66] | 0.02 [0.80] |
| DNK outlet (pro) | [0.56] | -0.08 [0.43] | -0.14 [0.41] | -0.02 [0.87] | 0.12 [0.20] |
| Media consumption (anti) | [0.07] | -0.11 [0.44] | 0.21 [0.14] | 0.04 [0.68] | 0.16 [0.02]** |
| Media consumption (pro) | [0.24] | -0.05 [0.68] | -0.10 [0.58] | -0.09 [0.33] | -0.16 [0.04]** |

*Notes*: Specifications estimated using OLS including block fixed effects in the endline survey sample. $p(\tau = 0)$ provides the $p$-value from an F-test of the null hypothesis that the mean of a given variable is the same across treatment groups. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A39: Survey response attrition

| | Took midline | | Took endline | | Took midline and endline | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Anti Moderated | -0.027 | -0.039 | -0.106** | -0.115** | -0.054 | -0.063 |
| | (0.047) | (0.046) | (0.047) | (0.046) | (0.050) | (0.049) |
| Pro Moderated | 0.103 | 0.094 | -0.050 | -0.061 | 0.041 | 0.030 |
| | (0.068) | (0.070) | (0.068) | (0.070) | (0.072) | (0.074) |
| Anti Polarized | 0.041 | 0.036 | -0.004 | 0.001 | 0.034 | 0.040 |
| | (0.043) | (0.041) | (0.041) | (0.040) | (0.045) | (0.044) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.016 | 0.025 | 0.021 | 0.038 | 0.008 | 0.024 |
| | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.038) | (0.037) | (0.041) | (0.040) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.61 | 0.61 |
| Control SD | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.49 | 0.49 |
| $R^2$ | 0.30 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 0.30 | 0.33 |
| Observations | 1797 | 1797 | 1797 | 1797 | 1797 | 1797 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A40: Linkage to social media accounts

| | Linked to Twitter profile | | Twitter: Any friends | | Linked to Facebook profile | | Facebook: Any friends | | Linked to Twitter and Facebook profile | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Anti Moderated | 0.091 | 0.084 | 0.137** | 0.120** | 0.024 | 0.011 | 0.057 | 0.059 | 0.050 | 0.044 |
| | (0.072) | (0.071) | (0.062) | (0.060) | (0.066) | (0.064) | (0.045) | (0.046) | (0.058) | (0.057) |
| Pro Moderated | 0.038 | 0.007 | 0.005 | -0.013 | -0.022 | -0.066 | 0.052 | 0.051 | 0.034 | 0.022 |
| | (0.069) | (0.072) | (0.065) | (0.072) | (0.092) | (0.094) | (0.061) | (0.061) | (0.059) | (0.062) |
| Anti Polarized | -0.031 | -0.030 | -0.012 | -0.025 | -0.012 | 0.013 | -0.035 | -0.036 | -0.031 | -0.025 |
| | (0.052) | (0.051) | (0.049) | (0.048) | (0.052) | (0.051) | (0.039) | (0.039) | (0.045) | (0.046) |
| Pro Polarized | -0.056 | -0.061 | -0.057 | -0.054 | -0.107** | -0.095* | 0.019 | 0.019 | -0.061 | -0.061 |
| | (0.047) | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.044) | (0.051) | (0.049) | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.040) | (0.040) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | × | × | ✓ |
| Control Mean | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| Control SD | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.36 | 0.36 |
| $R^2$ | 0.45 | 0.48 | 0.43 | 0.47 | 0.41 | 0.44 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.43 |
| Observations | 1272 | 1269 | 1272 | 1269 | 1272 | 1269 | 1272 | 1269 | 1272 | 1269 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(SAG=WAG) and $p$(SPG=WPG) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of shared-partisanship treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

### F.6.2 Results

Table A41: Effects on compliance and exposure to media outlets

| | ICW: Following outlets (anti) | | ICW: Following outlets (pro) | | ICW: Outlet exposure (anti) | | ICW: Outlet exposure (pro) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | 0.77*** | 0.74*** | 0.27** | 0.26** | 0.33* | 0.34** | 0.01 | -0.04 |
| | (0.16) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.17) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Pro Moderated | -0.17 | -0.22 | 0.54*** | 0.46*** | -0.04 | -0.01 | 0.33 | 0.28 |
| | (0.24) | (0.23) | (0.18) | (0.17) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.22) | (0.20) |
| Anti Polarized | 0.81*** | 0.80*** | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.52*** | 0.58*** | -0.03 | -0.10 |
| | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.13) | (0.12) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.32*** | 0.32*** | -0.07 | -0.12 | 0.36*** | 0.38*** |
| | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.20 | 0.32 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.18 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| $R^2$ | 0.16 | 0.25 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 0.20 | 0.32 | 0.12 | 0.19 |
| Observations | 1272 | 1269 | 1272 | 1269 | 1272 | 1269 | 1272 | 1269 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | 0.79*** | 0.79*** | 0.33*** | 0.32*** | 0.53*** | 0.52*** | -0.09 | -0.14 |
| | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| Pro Moderated | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.37* | 0.45** | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0.32* |
| | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.21) | (0.19) | (0.20) | (0.19) |
| Anti Polarized | 0.97*** | 0.97*** | 0.31*** | 0.29** | 0.70*** | 0.68*** | 0.17 | 0.11 |
| | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.21** | 0.18* | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.29*** | 0.33*** |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.00 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.89 | 0.57 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.04 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.52 | 0.46 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.41 | 0.12 |
| $R^2$ | 0.45 | 0.47 | 0.41 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.48 | 0.42 | 0.47 |
| Observations | 1292 | 1289 | 1292 | 1289 | 1292 | 1289 | 1292 | 1289 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) restricted to 'same-side' treatment assignments, including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(AM=PM) and $p$(AP=PP) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of Moderated and Polarized treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A42: Effects on consumption of media outlets

| | ICW: Outlet consumption (anti) | | ICW: Outlet consumption (pro) | | ICW: Media consumption (anti) | | ICW: Media consumption (pro) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | 0.02 | 0.06 | -0.10 | -0.12 | 0.18 | 0.22 | -0.14 | -0.20 |
| | (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.16) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| Pro Moderated | 0.00 | -0.07 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.11 |
| | (0.22) | (0.21) | (0.22) | (0.22) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.19) |
| Anti Polarized | 0.46*** | 0.49*** | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.26** | 0.32*** | -0.07 | -0.12 |
| | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.25* | 0.28** | -0.16 | -0.18* | 0.27** | 0.28*** |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.10) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.93 | 0.62 | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.55 | 0.34 | 0.28 | 0.16 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.21 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| $R^2$ | 0.23 | 0.31 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.31 | 0.40 | 0.27 | 0.33 |
| Observations | 1272 | 1269 | 1272 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.16 | 0.15 |
| | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.18) | (0.13) | (0.13) |
| Pro Moderated | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.20* | 0.19 | 0.28 | 0.29 |
| | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.21) | (0.20) |
| Anti Polarized | 0.53*** | 0.52*** | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.46*** | 0.46*** | 0.07 | 0.08 |
| | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.23** | 0.23** | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | × |
| Control mean | 0.01 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| Control SD | 1.01 | 1.01 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.68 | 0.68 | 0.79 | 0.68 | 0.71 | 0.72 | 0.63 | 0.58 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.91 | 0.92 |
| $R^2$ | 0.44 | 0.46 | 0.42 | 0.46 | 0.42 | 0.44 | 0.38 | 0.38 |
| Observations | 1292 | 1289 | 1292 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) restricted to 'same-side' treatment assignments, including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(AM=PM) and $p$(AP=PP) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of Moderated and Polarized treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A43: Effects on party preferences

| | AKP affinity | | Party vote: AKP | | Opposition affinity | | Party vote: Opposition | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | -0.10 | -0.18 | -0.02 | -0.02 | 0.24 | 0.32** | 0.14** | 0.13** |
| | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Pro Moderated | 0.10 | 0.22 | 0.02 | 0.04 | -0.09 | -0.18 | -0.06 | -0.07 |
| | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Anti Polarized | 0.06 | -0.01 | -0.03 | -0.04 | 0.12 | 0.21* | -0.02 | 0.00 |
| | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.06) | (0.05) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.27** | 0.26** | 0.10* | 0.10* | -0.19 | -0.19 | -0.06 | -0.04 |
| | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Control mean | 2.54 | 2.54 | 0.33 | 0.33 | 2.62 | 2.62 | 0.44 | 0.44 |
| Control SD | 1.39 | 1.39 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 1.38 | 1.38 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.41 | 0.09 | 0.54 | 0.44 | 0.16 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.23 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.10 | 0.02 | 0.60 | 0.58 |
| $R^2$ | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.43 | 0.32 | 0.43 | 0.34 | 0.40 |
| Observations | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | -0.44*** | -0.44*** | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.05) | (0.06) |
| Pro Moderated | -0.09 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 | -0.03 |
| | (0.22) | (0.20) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.29) | (0.26) | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Anti Polarized | -0.32** | -0.29** | -0.03 | -0.04 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
| | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.13 | 0.18* | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 2.85 | 2.85 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 2.87 | 2.87 | 0.45 | 0.45 |
| Control SD | 1.34 | 1.34 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 1.23 | 1.23 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.18 | 0.03 | 0.69 | 0.63 | 0.98 | 0.79 | 0.71 | 0.49 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.52 | 0.34 | 0.95 | 0.98 | 0.22 | 0.24 |
| $R^2$ | 0.61 | 0.67 | 0.59 | 0.63 | 0.49 | 0.59 | 0.58 | 0.61 |
| Observations | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) restricted to 'same-side' treatment assignments, including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(AM=PM) and $p$(AP=PP) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of Moderated and Polarized treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A44: Effects on policy performance and affective polarization

| | ICW: AKP performance | | ICW: Issue importance | | ICW: Affinity towards in-partisans | | ICW: Affinity towards out-partisans | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | -0.19* | -0.20* | -0.04 | -0.03 | 0.38** | 0.35** | 0.10 | 0.04 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.14) |
| Pro Moderated | -0.17 | -0.19 | 0.05 | 0.05 | -0.06 | -0.19 | -0.22 | -0.28 |
| | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.21) | (0.22) |
| Anti Polarized | 0.02 | -0.04 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.07 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.22** | 0.20* | -0.27** | -0.29** | 0.22* | 0.20* | -0.24* | -0.21 |
| | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.94 | 0.98 | 0.73 | 0.74 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.21 | 0.19 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.14 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.53 | 0.31 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| $R^2$ | 0.37 | 0.41 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.13 | 0.27 | 0.06 | 0.14 |
| Observations | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1272 | 1269 | 1272 | 1269 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.26* | 0.14 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Pro Moderated | -0.16 | -0.12 | -0.02 | 0.06 | -0.22 | -0.25* | -0.08 | -0.02 |
| | (0.17) | (0.17) | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.26) | (0.24) |
| Anti Polarized | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.05 | -0.08 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.09 | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.16 | 0.17* | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.21 | 0.39 | 0.66 | 0.97 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.26 | 0.56 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.17 | 0.09 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.64 | 0.48 | 0.98 | 0.91 |
| $R^2$ | 0.58 | 0.62 | 0.44 | 0.51 | 0.44 | 0.51 | 0.37 | 0.45 |
| Observations | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1292 | 1289 | 1292 | 1289 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) restricted to 'same-side' treatment assignments, including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(AM=PM) and $p$(AP=PP) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of Moderated and Polarized treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A45: Effects on knowledge about, and trust in, media sources

| | ICW: DNK outlet (anti) | | ICW: DNK outlet (pro) | | ICW: Media trust (anti) | | ICW: Media trust (pro) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | -0.18* | -0.17* | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.43*** | 0.43*** | 0.12 | 0.15 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Pro Moderated | 0.28 | 0.28 | -0.10 | -0.09 | -0.14 | -0.22 | 0.01 | 0.05 |
| | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.23) | (0.23) | (0.18) | (0.19) |
| Anti Polarized | -0.18** | -0.16* | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.22** | 0.28*** | 0.18 | 0.15 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.12) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.10) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.14 | 0.18* | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.28** | -0.29** | 0.21** | 0.22** |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) |
| Control mean | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 0.99 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.69 | 0.78 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.60 | 0.66 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.77 | 0.82 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.80 | 0.63 |
| $R^2$ | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.30 |
| Observations | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | -0.17 | -0.14 | 0.03 | 0.05 | -0.01 | 0.02 | -0.21 | -0.19 |
| | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.16) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.12) |
| Pro Moderated | 0.06 | 0.09 | -0.30 | -0.31 | 0.07 | 0.02 | 0.44** | 0.46** |
| | (0.23) | (0.22) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.20) | (0.19) | (0.20) |
| Anti Polarized | -0.05 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 0.01 | 0.23** | 0.27*** | 0.09 | 0.07 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.13) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.20** | 0.17* | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.01 | -0.01 | 0.31*** | 0.29*** |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | × | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.02 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.40 | 0.41 | 0.22 | 0.17 | 0.75 | 0.99 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.55 | 0.68 | 0.14 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.11 |
| $R^2$ | 0.32 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.50 |
| Observations | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) restricted to 'same-side' treatment assignments, including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(AM=PM) and $p$(AP=PP) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of Moderated and Polarized treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table A46: Effects on democratic attitudes

| | ICW: Democracy support | | ICW: Democracy satisfaction | | ICW: Perceived echo chamber | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| **A. Endline** | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.15) | (0.14) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.15) | (0.15) |
| Pro Moderated | -0.27 | -0.33* | -0.11 | -0.02 | 0.09 | 0.12 |
| | (0.18) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.25) | (0.26) |
| Anti Polarized | -0.07 | -0.05 | 0.04 | 0.00 | -0.08 | -0.09 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.12) |
| Pro Polarized | -0.25** | -0.29*** | 0.27** | 0.25** | 0.08 | 0.10 |
| | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.19 | 0.12 | 0.58 | 1.00 | 0.75 | 0.68 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.21 | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.29 | 0.23 |
| $R^2$ | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.36 | 0.38 | 0.11 | 0.12 |
| Observations | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 | 1269 |
| **B. Midline** | | | | | | |
| Anti Moderated | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.06 |
| | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.14) | (0.13) |
| Pro Moderated | 0.14 | -0.01 | 0.11 | 0.16 | -0.14 | -0.16 |
| | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.21) | (0.21) |
| Anti Polarized | -0.14 | -0.12 | -0.02 | -0.08 | -0.01 | 0.01 |
| | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.11) |
| Pro Polarized | 0.01 | -0.02 | 0.25*** | 0.26*** | 0.15 | 0.14 |
| | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) |
| Controls | × | ✓ | × | ✓ | × | ✓ |
| Control mean | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Control SD | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| $p$(AM=PM) | 0.91 | 0.59 | 0.88 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.37 |
| $p$(AP=PP) | 0.30 | 0.50 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.28 | 0.35 |
| $R^2$ | 0.43 | 0.48 | 0.59 | 0.64 | 0.39 | 0.40 |
| Observations | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 | 1289 |

All specifications estimated using Equation (1) restricted to 'same-side' treatment assignments, including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls (even-indexed columns). $p$(AM=PM) and $p$(AP=PP) provide $p$-value associated with $F$-test of equality of Moderated and Polarized treatment coefficients. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

## F.7 Who was most likely to shift media consumption and political attitudes?




Figure A4: Effects on following anti/pro-government outlets

Treatment vector is defined as the interaction of respondent's baseline AKP affinity and their outlet treatment assignment. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. Size of label indicates coefficient magnitude; color indicates statistical significance.




Figure A5: Effects on exposure to anti/pro-government outlets

Treatment vector is defined as the interaction of respondent's baseline AKP affinity and their outlet treatment assignment. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. Size of label indicates coefficient magnitude; color indicates statistical significance.




Figure A6: Effects on outlet consumption

Treatment vector is defined as the interaction of respondent's baseline AKP affinity and their outlet treatment assignment. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. Size of label indicates coefficient magnitude; color indicates statistical significance.




Figure A7: Effects on media consumption

Treatment vector is defined as the interaction of respondent's baseline AKP affinity and their outlet treatment assignment. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. Size of label indicates coefficient magnitude; color indicates statistical significance.




Figure A8: Effects on party preferences

Treatment vector is defined as the interaction of respondent's baseline AKP affinity and their outlet treatment assignment. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. Size of label indicates coefficient magnitude; color indicates statistical significance.




Figure A9: Effects on policy performance

Treatment vector is defined as the interaction of respondent's baseline AKP affinity and their outlet treatment assignment. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. Size of label indicates coefficient magnitude; color indicates statistical significance.




Figure A10: Effects on affective polarization

Treatment vector is defined as the interaction of respondent's baseline AKP affinity and their outlet treatment assignment. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. Size of label indicates coefficient magnitude; color indicates statistical significance.




Figure A11: Effects on knowledge about media sources

Treatment vector is defined as the interaction of respondent's baseline AKP affinity and their outlet treatment assignment. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. Size of label indicates coefficient magnitude; color indicates statistical significance.




Figure A12: Effects on trust in media sources

Treatment vector is defined as the interaction of respondent's baseline AKP affinity and their outlet treatment assignment. All specifications estimated using Equation (1) including block fixed effects, enumerator fixed effects, controls for baseline values of dependent variable (when available), and LASSO-selected baseline controls. Size of label indicates coefficient magnitude; color indicates statistical significance.