

# PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

## HOW INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND CHIEFS SHAPE LAND

### FORMALIZATION IN URBAN AFRICA

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Word Count: 11,959

#### **Abstract**

Formalization always takes place against a backdrop of social institutions. Yet, whether social institutions are an asset or a constraint for formalization remains unclear. We argue that, when offered the opportunity to formalize their land, citizens weigh the benefits of informal insurance against the social extraction costs imposed by social institutions. We study a randomized land titling program in a large Congolese city that caused a large increase in the demand for and acquisition of land titles. Demand for formalization was more pronounced among citizens who participated more in social institutions and had closer links to city chiefs. In turn, the program crowded out participation in social institutions and worsened citizens' perceptions of chiefs. In peripheral areas with stronger customary authorities, the program was completely ineffective. These results challenge the view that social institutions are an effective substitute for formal land property rights in urban areas.

# 1 Introduction

Well-defined property rights are considered a cornerstone of economic development and political order (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Barzel, 2002; Boone, 2014; De Soto, 2000; North and Thomas, 1973). Insecure property rights make individuals fear expropriation, depressing incentives to invest (Demsetz, 1967; Field, 2005). Given the theoretical appeal of strengthening property rights, land titling programs have proliferated across the developing world.<sup>1</sup> However, despite these efforts, land formalization remains persistently low (Easterly, 2007), and formal titling does not appear to increase tenure security or agricultural productivity (Fenske, 2011; Jacoby and Minten, 2007; Lawry et al., 2017). This is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa, where 90 percent of the land is not formally registered.<sup>2</sup> To explain these low rates of land formalization, some have proposed a demand-side explanation: communal land rights—and, more generally, social institutions—may provide a substitute for formal land rights (Bromley, 2009; Deininger and Feder, 2001; Lawry et al., 2017; Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997).<sup>3</sup> According to this argument, citizens do not demand formal land property rights because they can do without them.

Formalization efforts—including land formalization—are implemented against the backdrop of pre-existent social institutions, which may critically affect their success (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2019; Boone, 2014; Migdal, 1988; O'Donnell, 2006; Wang, 2022). Of particular interest is the question of whether formal and informal institutions are complements or substitutes

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<sup>1</sup>In 2005 the World Bank supervised a portfolio of more than \$1 billion worth of land administration projects (Galiani and Schargrotsky, 2011).

<sup>2</sup>*The Economist*, Sep 12, 2020.

<sup>3</sup>For example, Lawry et al. (2017, p.16) find that the relationship between property rights and agricultural productivity is weaker in sub-Saharan Africa and argue that this “may be based on the fact that most farms in sub-Saharan Africa are held under customary tenure arrangements that provide tenure security.”

(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Henn, 2022; Van der Windt et al., 2019). Formal property rights to land—a signature of citizens’ incorporation into the state (Barzel, 2002)—are a case in point.

However, studying the relationship between social institutions and formal titling presents substantial empirical challenges since land titling is endogenous to economic development (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 1999), social norms (Platteau, 1996), and political considerations (Albertus, 2015, 2021; Boone, 2014, 2018; Hassan and Klaus, 2023). While there is some evidence in favor of substitution globally (Le Rossignol, Montero and Lowes, 2022) and in African countries (Honig, 2022),<sup>4</sup> arguments about the relationship between formal and informal institutions entail empirical implications about *both* the decision to adopt formal titles when social institutions are available and about the effects of formalization on social institutions. This is a key reason why evidence supporting competing theoretical accounts, typically coming from studies looking at either the adoption or effects of formal institutions (but not at both in the same context), remains partial and mixed.

A second reason is theoretical. The decision to adopt formal property rights involves a cost-benefit calculation, where citizens weigh the costs and benefits of different institutional arrangements. The substitution argument assumes that the benefits of social institutions outweigh their cost (Harris and Honig, 2023; Honig, 2022). However, social institutions not only confer benefits; they are also costly arrangements that extract resources from citizens and create ties of dependence (Lust and Rakner, 2018; Platteau, 2012). Acknowledging the costly nature of social institutions, we propose that the trade-off faced by citizens will be resolved differently in urban areas. Specifically, while much of the empirical evidence for the substitution argument comes from rural areas, where customary institutions are stronger (Honig, 2022), the cost of customary arrangements will likely outweigh their benefits in cities, where land values are higher and the

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<sup>4</sup>Le Rossignol, Montero and Lowes (2022) document a negative cross-country correlation between the success of titling programs and communal land rights. Drawing on data on Zambia and Malawi, Honig (2022) presents evidence that citizens embedded in customary institutions are less likely to demand land titles.

benefits of membership in social institutions are lower.

In this article, we present a systematic analysis of the relationship between land titling and social institutions in a representative urban setting in a large developing country. To this end, we designed and implemented a randomized land titling program in the city of Kananga, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where only 16 percent of citizens have formal title to their land. The program was implemented in collaboration with the cadastral and land titling offices of the Provincial Government of Kasai Central. To our knowledge, this is the first successful land titling RCT in an urban setting. Households eligible for a land title that expressed interest in the program were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The treatment group was invited to participate in a program that lowered both the monetary and transaction costs of acquiring a land title. Where citizens routinely pay \$1,000 or more for a title in Kananga, the titling program capped household outlays to the official price of \$100. Moreover, government officials and program staff visited participants at their homes, reducing the transaction costs of obtaining a land title and avoiding the need for frequent trips to government offices. The control group had the option to obtain a land title as per the status quo.

The program significantly boosted demand for land titles. It caused a 44 percentage-point increase in the probability that households initiated the formalization process, and a 13.7 percentage-point increase in the actual receipt of a formal land title. The slippage between initiation and receipt of a title reflects a combination of poor coordination across government offices and deeper institutional factors creating weak incentives for bureaucrats. In the control group, only a few citizens attempted to get a title, and almost none were successful during the study period. The large increase in take-up reflects citizens' high valuation of titles, and that citizens are priced out of formality due to high prices and the costs of accessing the state ([Fredriksson, 2014](#); [Rizzo, 2022](#)).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>This is a relevant finding given that a recent meta-analysis of coordinated interventions across six countries shows that a reduction in up-front transaction costs is often insufficient to generate a positive effect on formalization

This empirical setting provides a unique vantage point to study the relationship between social institutions and formal land titling. Because we can observe both program take-up and the effects of land titling, we can adjudicate between competing theoretical arguments. We first address the question of which citizens are more likely to demand and acquire a formal land title. The substitution argument predicts that citizens who participate more in *horizontal* social institutions—such as churches and mutual aid societies—will have a lower demand for land titles. Our results are inconsistent with this idea. Instead, we find that citizens who participate more in social institutions display a higher demand for land titles, but are not necessarily more likely to obtain them. We also study the effect of *vertical* institutions—urban chiefs, who are an important actor across sub-Saharan Africa. We find that citizens who are more connected to chiefs are more likely to demand a land title—but not to obtain one—and that the actual acquisition of titles is stifled by chiefs’ political connections, consistent with the notion that informal protection is a political tool (Janvry et al., 2014; Larreguy, Marshall and Trucco, 2018) and suggesting that citizens’ and chiefs’ preferences over titling are misaligned. Finally, we leverage geographic variation within the city and document that titling was nearly zero in customary areas, suggesting that in such areas titling follows a substitution logic, as documented by recent work on rural Africa (Honig, 2022). These findings bolster the view that preferences for titling critically depend on social institutions and exhibit considerable variation across space (Boone et al., 2021). We then examine the reduced-form effects of the land titling program. Our findings reveal that the program crowded out citizens’ participation in horizontal social institutions and deteriorated their evaluation of city chiefs, thus challenging the idea that informal and formal institutions are complements.

Taken together, the results on heterogeneous take-up and crowding-out reveal a distinctive logic of land formalization in urban areas—different from substitution or complementary. The fact that citizens facing a higher cost of these informal arrangements are more likely to demand

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(De la O et al., 2023).

formal property rights and more likely to exit them suggests, instead, that social institutions are, at best, *imperfect substitutes* for formal land property rights. All told, by showing that land formalization shapes and is shaped by social and political relationships, our results affirm a deeply political conception of land property rights in sub-Saharan Africa (Bates, 1987; Boone, 2014).

This article contributes to three strands of literature. First, we contribute to the body of work on the interaction between formal and informal institutions (Brenner, 1976; Cheema, Khwaja and Qadir, 2006; Gottlieb, LeBas and Magat, 2021; Henn, 2022; Van der Windt et al., 2019; Weigel, 2020). In the domain of land titling, previous studies have shown that informal institutions might function as substitutes for formal land property rights (Honig, 2022; Harris and Honig, 2023). We go above and beyond these studies on several fronts. First, unlike observational studies that rely on the endogenous adoption of land rights, we observe both program take-up and the effects of land titling, allowing us to adjudicate between competing theories about how informal institutions affect land formalization. Second, while existent studies tend to focus either on vertical or horizontal institutions (Honig, 2022), we study both types of institutions in the context of the same experimental intervention. Finally, we observe both the initiation and completion of the titling process at the individual level, which enables us to separate the factors that foster or hinder the demand for and the acquisition of titles.

Second, this article speaks to the literature on the role of local elites in governance in low-capacity states. Scholars have recently explored the importance of such elites in governance (Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014; Baldwin, 2016; Baldwin and Raffler, 2019), law and conflict resolution (Acemoglu et al., 2019), and land administration (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Boone, 2014; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Honig, 2017, 2022). In the context of land politics, scholars have proposed that chiefs, as representatives of customary institutions, have a vested interest in maintaining their power within those institutions and would therefore oppose titling (Honig, 2022). By contrast, our findings suggest that prevalent arguments about chiefs and

titling may not travel to urban contexts, where chiefs face different incentives contingent on their political alignment.

Finally, this paper adds to the literature on the effects of land titling programs (Besley, 1995; Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2007; Djankov et al., 2020; Field, 2005, 2007; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Goldstein et al., 2018; Hornbeck, 2010). Previous land titling field experiments have focused on rural areas (Goldstein et al., 2018), while the best evidence on urban titling comes from non-experimental research in slum and squatter communities in Peru and Argentina (Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2007; Field, 2005, 2007; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010). We present—to our knowledge—the first causal estimates of the social effects of land titling. Specifically, we provide field-experimental evidence from a city-wide land titling program and show that it crowded out participation in informal institutions, suggesting that formal property rights have the potential to alter social relationships (Bates, 1987). Recent results from survey experiments suggest that titling may dampen the cooperation benefits of social institutions (Harris and Honig, 2023). We see our findings as complementary, with two differences. First, we study the relationship between titling and social institutions in the context of a titling campaign. Second, we qualify the idea that the cooperation benefits of social institutions are such that citizens would refrain from titling. Exit from the informal equilibrium suggests that titling is an attractive option in contexts where the benefits of formalization outweigh those of social institutions.

## 2 Social Institutions and Land Formalization

Formalization efforts are implemented against the backdrop of existing social institutions—socially embedded rules and roles that govern social relationships and structure activities within a community (Harris and Honig, 2023; Lust, 2022; Lust and Rakner, 2018). To guide our analysis, we distinguish between two types of social institutions: horizontal and vertical, depending on whether citizens hold obligations *vis-à-vis* individuals of similar or higher social standing

(Lust and Rakner, 2018; Harris and Honig, 2023). While these institutions display wide variation, they share two characteristics. First, they help provide collective goods and informal insurance, as documented in diverse contexts such as Nigeria (Akinola, 2008; Udry, 1990), Tanzania (De Weerd and Dercon, 2006), India (Townsend, 1994), the Philippines (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), and China (Tsai, 2007; Xu and Yao, 2015). Second, social institutions are costly, often requiring fiscal and in-kind obligations from citizens: they involve *social extraction* (Lust and Rakner, 2018; Olken and Singhal, 2011).

Social institutions are often singled out as a critical factor behind variation in preferences for formal titling and frictions in the implementation of titling programs (Boone et al., 2021). Some argue that such institutions, together with communal land rights, provide sufficient tenure security (Deininger and Feder, 2001; Easterly, 2007; Honig, 2022).<sup>6</sup> According to this view, social institutions and formal land titles are substitutes. Furthermore, introducing formal titling might decrease the insurance pool, causing potential titleholders to avoid acquiring titles to maintain membership benefits and avoid sanctions (Harris and Honig, 2023). Empirically, the substitution argument implies that citizens who participate more in social institutions will have weaker incentives to formalize their land. Guided by the theoretical purchase of this argument, we pre-registered this hypothesis in our analysis plan. Yet, informed by our fieldwork and a richer conception of social institutions, we argue that the substitution argument is inadequate. On the one hand, formal land titles could complement the insurance provided by social institutions. On a more fundamental level, the substitution argument overlooks the costly nature of social institutions. These costs are monetary—fines, payments—but also psychological, since social institutions create ties of social dependence (Lust and Rakner, 2018; Migdal, 1988; Platteau, 2012).

Acknowledging that social institutions are costly implies that citizens face trade-offs when

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<sup>6</sup>Deininger and Feder (2001, p.314) write that “formal documentation (i.e. titling) is not crucial where customary tenure systems provide sufficient security.”



presented with the option to formalize. Specifically, citizens' decisions will depend on *how they weigh the benefits of informal insurance against the costs of social extraction*. In what follows, we inform this proposition by introducing the logic of horizontal and vertical institutions and by describing their operation in our setting.

## 2.1 Horizontal Social Institutions

Networks and groups outside of formal state structures play a vital role in public life in Africa (Chazan et al., 1999; Gulliver, 1971; Hyden and Williams, 1994). Horizontal social institutions facilitate risk sharing, provide social insurance, and support collective action (Akinola, 2008; Kpessa-Whyte, 2018; MacLean, 2010; Ostrom, 1990). Access to scarce resources, chiefly land, is determined by membership and status within these institutions (Berry, 1989, 1993).<sup>7</sup> Cooperation in these institutions is founded on reciprocity (Kpessa-Whyte, 2018; MacLean, 2010), creating ties of mutual dependence (Harris and Honig, 2023), and exerting distributive pressures. To enjoy the gains from cooperation, citizens must comply with institutional rules. Participation in informal institutions typically requires monetary obligations and is enforced through social and economic sanctions and control (Barkan and Holmquist, 1989; Dercon et al., 2006; Lust and Rakner, 2018; Migdal, 1988). Furthermore, some of these institutions encode egalitarian norms that penalize investment (Kennedy, 1988; Platteau, 2012), and citizens often resort to coping strategies, such as concealing assets, migrating, or changing religious denominations to mitigate these pressures (Platteau, 2009, 2012).

## 2.2 Vertical Social Institutions

In sub-Saharan Africa, traditional and urban chiefs play an important role in local governance (Baldwin and Raffler, 2019; Baldwin and Holzinger, 2019; Logan, 2009), contributing to public

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<sup>7</sup>Scholars have documented a variety of institutional arrangements to manage land (Boone, 2014; Bromley, 1989; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Le Rossignol, Montero and Lowes, 2022; Ostrom, 1990).

goods provision (Baldwin, 2016), participating in the administration of justice (Sheely, 2013), and exerting control over land (Baldwin, 2014; Boone, 2014; Honig, 2017, 2022). Urban chiefs, a common institution in Francophone Africa, frequently play complementary roles *vis-à-vis* the formal state (Henn, 2022), are endowed with authority stemming from customary legitimacy—the institution was modeled on the village chieftaincy—and enjoy high levels of trust (Logan and Katenda, 2021).

In the context of land titling, two characteristics of chiefs are worth highlighting: (i) their connections with citizens and (ii) their connections with politicians and political alignment. Comparative evidence indicates that chiefs selectively provide protection and tenure security (Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Honig, 2017, 2022) in exchange for rents and state recognition of their neo-customary status (Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014; Boone, 2014). Others have emphasized chiefs' role as development brokers with the capacity to deliver collective goods (Baldwin, 2013). However, informal protection afforded by chiefs comes at a cost: it is provisional and contingent on chiefs' incentives and, therefore, may be used to build clientelistic relationships that foster citizens' dependence (Janvry et al., 2014; Mattingly, 2016; Larreguy, Marshall and Trucco, 2018).

Therefore, while connections to chiefs may lower demand for titles—substitution—they could also boost willingness to formalize if the cost of informal protection is too high relative to the benefits of formal titling. Whether chiefs ultimately favor or hinder titling depends on their incentives. There is evidence that chiefs embedded in customary institutions would oppose titling programs that threaten to erode their power (Honig, 2022). By contrast, in urban areas chiefs' incentives are likely driven by politics rather than customary status. Chiefs affiliated with the ruling party might use their connections to the provincial government to speed up the titling process; alternatively, they might try to block or delay titling, fearing retaliation by government officials or seeking to maintain clientelistic ties.

## 2.3 Spatial Heterogeneity

Spatial variation in political economy features affects land titling (Boone et al., 2021). There are reasons to expect that social institutions affect the decision to formalize differently in urban and more peripheral areas. First, the market value of land is higher in urban areas (Lall, Henderson and Venables, 2017).<sup>8</sup> Second, in such areas the insurance benefits of horizontal institutions are likely lower and customary institutions are less prominent (Honig, 2022), depressing the status of chiefs and thus also the benefits to citizens of maintaining social links to them. Therefore, incentives to formalize land and exit informal institutions should be stronger in urban areas. Instead, we expect areas that more closely resemble rural ones—the urban periphery or those under the control of customary leaders—to follow a pattern consistent with the substitution logic. We explore the scope conditions of our argument by leveraging rich variation within the same city.

## 2.4 Theoretical Expectations

The previous discussion suggests that, if social institutions were costless, citizens could enjoy the benefits of both formal and informal institutions (complementarity) or remain in the informal equilibrium (substitution). Specifically, the substitution argument predicts that higher participation in informal institutions leads to lower demand for formal land titles (Table 1). Perfect substitution creates an observational problem: if it takes place, the effect of titling on social institutions cannot be observed. In turn, if formal and informal institutions are complements, then higher participation in the latter predicts higher demand for land titles—without crowding

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<sup>8</sup>In our sample, properties of eligible respondents located inside the borders of the former colonial city of Luluabourg have an average value of \$5,902 whereas those located outside have an average value of \$2,597. Estimates of property values come from machine learning and computer vision algorithms as described in Section 6.1.

out participation in social institutions.

We argue that, in settings where the cost of social extraction imposed by social institutions is higher than their insurance benefits, social institutions are *imperfect substitutes* for formal land property rights. In the absence of alternatives—for example, when the cost of formal titling is prohibitive—citizens may benefit from participating in social institutions. However, given their cost and weaker insurance benefits relative to formal titles, citizens will prefer to formalize when offered the chance. Upon formalization, the informal insurance afforded by social institutions is no longer needed and, to avoid their cost, citizens will seek to exit the informal equilibrium. This argument entails two empirical implications:

- **Heterogeneous take-up:** Citizens who participate more in social institutions are more likely to demand formal land titles.
- **Crowding-out:** Citizens’ adoption of formal land titles crowds out participation in social institutions.

Because we observe both take-up and treatment effects of the land titling program, our experimental design provides a unique setting to adjudicate between these competing theoretical accounts. Specifically, unless social institutions are perfect substitutes for formal titles, exogenous variation in incentives to formalize should induce take-up, allowing us to observe the effect of titling on social institutions. If our argument is correct, we should observe a crowding-out effect on social institutions, rather than the reinforcement of formal and informal institutions that should obtain under complementarity.

**Table 1:** Theoretical expectations

	Complementarity	Substitution	Imperfect substitution
Effect of social institutions on land formalization	+	–	+
Effect of land formalization on social institutions	Reinforcement	∅	Crowding-out

*Notes:* This figure displays the theoretical expectations about the relationship between land formalization and social institutions. + and – denote, respectively, positive and negative effects. ∅ means that the relationship is not observed.

## 3 Land and Social Institutions in Kananga, D.R. Congo

### 3.1 Land Formalization and Tenure Regime

The D.R. Congo is the fourth most populous country in Africa and one of the poorest. It is considered a low-capacity “fragile state,” with tax-GDP ratio ranking 188 of 200 countries. Less than 1 percent of the land is formally registered (Huggins et al., 2004). Kananga, the capital of the Kasai Central Province and the setting for this study, is a city with roughly 1.6 million inhabitants—the fourth largest in D.R. Congo—and an average monthly household income of \$106 (PPP\$168). Because of its size and urban form, Kananga can be considered a typical city in Francophone Africa, with an administrative center built around the colonial city of LuLuabourg, and an expanding patchwork-like periphery (Baruah, Henderson and Peng, 2021). Located in this periphery are four customary areas (*chefferies*), where chiefs have more power and state presence is weaker.

Citizens of Kananga are well aware of the legal benefits of land titles. Titles are highly valued, and some citizens undertake great efforts to obtain one, sometimes paying high legal fees.<sup>9</sup> However, very few citizens—only 16 percent, according to our baseline data—have a formal land title.<sup>10</sup> This low rate of formalization reflects the fact that the current procedure

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<sup>9</sup>Language is reflective of this high subjective valuation. During our focus group interviews, citizens would usually mention that the land title that carries the highest legal weight, known as *Certificat d’Enregistrement*, is “unattackable”—as it is officially described in Congolese law. See Peyton (2020) for qualitative evidence on the demand for titles in D.R. Congo. Ferree et al. (2022) show that citizens in Malawi value land titles regardless of the authority granting them.

<sup>10</sup>Across sub-Saharan Africa, only 2 to 10 percent of land is privately held. Comprehensive land registries and legal markers of land ownership are extremely rare (Boone, 2014; Deininger, 2005).

for obtaining title is difficult and costly.<sup>11</sup> Citizens seeking to obtain a land title face byzantine administrative procedures and a range of informal fees. There are at least six distinct steps in the titling production process, each of which represents a potential bottleneck. During focus group interviews some citizens reported hiring a lawyer to help them with the process. To keep the process moving, citizens must pay a range of “administrative fees” for tasks such as measuring the plot, producing an array of intermediate documents, and installing cornerstones. Some citizens report paying up to \$1,000 for a land title, when the official price is around \$100.<sup>12</sup>

The absence of formal land ownership creates a wide range of problems for citizens and the government. On the government’s side, the dearth of property ownership information inhibits tax collection and public goods provision (Weigel, 2020). In turn, citizens face the risk of expropriation—over 25 percent of respondents in our sample reported experiencing at least one property dispute and over 60 percent knew at least one person who did. Lastly, while banks in Kananga accept land titles as collateral for loans, the great majority of the population is effectively barred from the formal financial sector given the scarcity of official land titles.

### **3.2 Horizontal Social Institutions**

Citizens of Kananga participate in several overlapping sets of horizontal social institutions. In urban areas, churches and burial societies serve as a nexus for risk sharing (Auriol et al., 2020; Dehejia, DeLeire and Luttmer, 2007; Dercon et al., 2008). Like elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, religious institutions of several denominations feature prominently in Kananga. Church attendance is high: 64.5 percent of citizens in our sample report attending every day and 24 per-

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<sup>11</sup>See SI Section B for more details on the history of land titling in DRC.

<sup>12</sup>Land values have been increasing in Congolese cities. In our sample, among respondents eligible for the land titling campaign the average property value is \$5,700.

cent report attending multiple times per week.<sup>13</sup> Citizens also participate in mutual aid societies and rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). Other horizontal obligations include monetary contributions to community events such as weddings and funerals. Citizens typically make monetary or in-kind payments towards horizontal institutions. Payments to churches, weddings and funerals, and an informal labor tax known as *salongo* amount to roughly 11.5 percent of citizens' monthly income (Supplementary Information [SI] Figure D.1).<sup>14</sup>

Notably, horizontal social institutions in Kananga do not appear to provide an effective substitute for secure land rights, since citizens frequently experience tenure insecurity. Moreover, there is no correlation between participation in such institutions and a range of indicators including tenure security, experiencing hunger, access to health care, education, or having a retirement fund (SI Table E.3).<sup>15</sup>

### 3.3 Vertical Social Institutions: City Chiefs

Like in many urban areas of Francophone African countries, in Kananga local elites known as city chiefs are a distinctive institution. It was formally created in 1972 after a national law abolished traditional authority, seeking to integrate chiefs to the state apparatus (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1975). Although they share many characteristics with customary chiefs—including land dispute mediation, informal labor tax administration, and long-lasting, sometimes heritable tenure—city chiefs are best thought of as intermediaries between citizens and the provincial

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<sup>13</sup>There is some evidence that citizens obtain insurance by participating in religious institutions (Kapepula, Konshi and Weigel, 2022).

<sup>14</sup>These are conservative estimates obtained by winsorizing each measure of expenditure and income by trimming the highest and lowest 5th percentile. For comparison, the fraction of monthly income spent in transportation—one of the main expenditures of citizens in Kananga—amounts to about 11.4 percent.

<sup>15</sup>Considering the full sample, participation in social institutions is positively correlated with some such outcomes, but predicts *higher* frequency of land disputes.

government. These chiefs are local notables whose main responsibilities include: (i) mediating local disputes, especially over property, and (ii) helping maintain local infrastructure through *salongo*, during which citizens help repair roads, bridges, and other local public goods. Chiefs are nominated by elders in the neighborhood—typically for being longstanding and respected residents—and then rubberstamped by the government. Chiefs have indefinite and often lifelong tenure, which at times passes through families, and deposition is very rare.<sup>16</sup> Chiefs do not receive regular salaries, and most hold other remunerative positions, e.g., as teachers or pastors. The main benefit of being chief is the status it confers.

## 4 Intervention Description

### 4.1 Formal Land Titles

In collaboration with the provincial government of Kasai Central, we subsidized the three main land titles in the DRC: *Certificat d’Enregistrement* (CE), *Contrat de Location* (CL), and *Acte de Vente Notarié* (AVN). These are listed in decreasing legal weight. All three titles grant higher tenure security. The program randomly offered households the opportunity to obtain one of these three formal titles for the prices listed in Table 2 below.<sup>17</sup> The reduced prices imply a substantial subsidy. Given that citizens pay up to \$1,000 for the CE, the title with the highest legal value, an average subsidized price of \$75 implies a 92.5% price decrease.

**1. *Certificat d’Enregistrement*.** The CE represents the government’s formal recognition of a property owner’s rights to their plot of land. The acquisition of a CE requires that the land is sufficiently put to use—10 percent of the plot must contain buildings made of solid materials.

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<sup>16</sup>The average city chief in Kananga had worked in the position for 10 years, and 19 percent of chiefs inherited the position from a family member.

<sup>17</sup>For each treated respondent, we also randomized the magnitude of the subsidy, creating three price levels for each land title. This paper does not exploit the variation induced by the random subsidies.



Having a CE implies that the property owner faces no legal challenges to their property rights.

**2. *Contrat de Location.*** A CL also entails the government’s recognition of the owner’s right to the land. However, the CL is a contract with the government whereby the property owner is expected to make annual payments over the course of three years. At the end of this period, if the land is sufficiently put to use, the government will grant the owner a CE.

**3. *Acte de Vente Notarié.*** An AVN constitutes proof of the acquisition of a plot but does not offer legal protection. The notarization of an AVN renders it a legal document, which can prove useful if the owner plans to sell the plot, and may have more legal weight in case of a land dispute.

**Table 2:** Average subsidized price of each formal land title

<b>DOCUMENT</b>	<b>AVERAGE PRICE</b>
Certificat d’Enregistrment	75 USD
Contrat de Location	40 USD
Acte de Vente Notarié	20 USD

*Notes:* This figure displays the average price levels for each land title concerned by the program.

## 4.2 Randomization

Randomization was implemented at the household level. Units are households located in polygons (or neighborhoods). Each polygon was defined using a satellite to approximate the finest administrative unit, the *localité*, using boundaries such as roads, ravines, and other natural features easily identifiable from the ground (SI Figure I.1). There are 364 neighborhoods in Kananga. The randomization achieved balance: only 1 of 17 variables in Table 3 (years of education) is imbalanced, as one would expect under random assignment.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>See SI Section I for more details on the randomization protocol.

**Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Randomization Balance**

	Control			Treatment			Difference in Means
	Observations	Mean	SD	Observations	Mean	SD	
Age	228	54.43	15.91	254	55.65	15.00	1.215
Female	229	0.26	0.44	254	0.20	0.40	-0.053
Years of Education	229	10.72	3.54	254	11.45	3.62	0.724**
Household Size	228	6.33	4.08	254	6.78	4.52	0.447
Years Residing in Kananga	194	45.75	19.77	234	46.98	17.85	1.231
On Electrical Grid	229	0.03	0.16	254	0.05	0.21	0.021
House Near Ravine	227	0.20	0.40	254	0.19	0.39	-0.014
Predicted Property Value (USD)	219	2630.96	3872.13	244	3144.73	3707.23	513.776
Montly Income (USD)	227	3.94	1.34	254	4.09	1.40	0.150
Recent Expenditure (USD)	228	3.99	19.85	254	3.37	5.90	-0.616
Business Owner	229	0.22	0.41	254	0.19	0.39	-0.029
Trust in Provincial Government	215	2.56	1.24	241	2.44	1.27	-0.118
Political Party Member	229	0.30	0.46	254	0.33	0.47	0.025
Frequency of Land Disputes	229	0.95	6.04	254	0.66	1.46	-0.286
Helps with Community Security	229	2.22	9.55	254	1.28	3.47	-0.943
Ever Paid Property Tax	229	0.37	0.48	254	0.44	0.50	0.066
Affected by Kamuina Nsapu	227	0.35	0.48	253	0.41	0.49	0.055

*Notes:* This table shows averages at baseline for the treatment and control groups. The last column is the coefficient of a bivariate regression of treatment assignment each variable measured at baseline.

### 4.3 Title Production Process

The production of the land titles issued during the program comprised the following steps:

**1. Technical visit.** Respondents assigned to the treatment group were invited to sign up for a technical visit by agents of each division involved in the program: the provincial cadastral and land titling offices. Agents were accompanied by an enumerator to ensure compliance with the randomization protocol. During this visit, cadastral agents would measure the plot, draw a sketch, and determine the number of required cornerstones. Cadastral agents would then produce a set of official intermediate documents describing the technical and legal aspects of the plot and containing information on the full list of previous owners, the materials used to build the compound, etc. This step was an important source of attrition. In many cases, properties were determined to be ineligible for an official land title for technical reasons.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup>This happened for a variety of reasons, including proximity to a ravine, indirect street access, insufficient area, or insufficient construction on the plot.

Other respondents dropped out even before the first visit due to a loss of interest or long waiting times.

**2. Cadastral office.** A typist at the cadastral office was responsible for producing an official document—*procès verbal*—on the basis of the reports created during the technical visit and writing a transmission letter describing the title requested, the contents of the file, the respondent's personal details, and reproductions of the plot sketches. The cadastral agent would review and sign the document, verifying that it reflected their observations during the visit. The head of the cadastral office would then examine the file and determine the eligibility of the respondent for the requested title. If no problems were detected, the cadastral office would transfer a copy to the titling office. This step was also a source of attrition and delays. By the time the files would reach the titling office, many respondents had moved, sold their plot, or simply lost interest.

**3. Land titling office.** Each file was sent for legal review to the land titling office, the government office in charge of matters related to land law, which would determine if the plot satisfied the technical requirements to be eligible for the title selected by the respondent. This step was a significant source of discretion by titling officials, who would study the full history a plot's ownership and verify the authenticity of signatures contained in extant documents. Files were often rejected due to issues with these documents—the most common reason was insufficient proof of ownership by the former occupant.

**4. Title payment and official signature.** The land titling office would then produce a document detailing the amount to be paid to the provincial tax ministry. Respondents would take this document to the bank, pay the fee and, in return, obtain a receipt to be taken to the land titling office and attached to the their file. The head of the land titling office would then sign the official copies of the titles, which would be delivered to the respondent by an enumerator. Finally, a cadastral agent would visit the plot to install the cornerstones.

## 5 Data

Our data come from the following sources:

**1. Respondent baseline survey.** We administered surveys at baseline to 4,343 randomly selected households—12 per neighborhood—between July and December 2017. Independent enumerators randomly sampled compounds following skip patterns while walking down each avenue in a neighborhood: e.g. visit every  $X$ th property in the neighborhood, where  $X$  was determined by the estimated number of properties and a target of 12 per neighborhood. The survey instrument covered a range of topics, including, but not limited to, demographics, property characteristics, governance, public goods, experience with taxation and other payments to the state, city chiefs, political beliefs, and participation in social institutions. Following a change in the eligibility criteria decided by the government, we restricted our sample based on baseline characteristics.<sup>20</sup> The new sample included 483 households. Although this eligibility restriction was costly in terms of sample size, it did not hurt balance (Table 3) and homed in on the population relevant for understanding the demand for land titling in urban Africa.

**2. Respondent endline surveys.** Two surveys were conducted after the titling program. Round 1 was implemented in March-September 2019 and round 2 was implemented between December 2019 and February 2020. These surveys contained questions about tax compliance, use of formal and informal sectors, property disputes and tenure security, saving and investment behavior, participation in social institutions, and views on and engagement with the government and city chiefs.

**3. Chief survey.** We administered surveys to over 1,000 city chiefs, measuring a set of characteristics including, but not limited to, level of education, official duties, relationship with city authorities, knowledge of citizens in their jurisdiction, power over land allocation, past ex-

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<sup>20</sup>These changes are described in SI Section J.

perience collecting taxes, preferences for redistribution and public goods, and the organization of *salongo*. We exactly match chiefs to citizens based on who citizens reported to be their chief during endline and unique identifiers.

**4. Administrative data on land titling.** We employ administrative data from the cadastral and land titling offices of the Provincial Government of Kasai Central. The data contain information on all landowners who opened a file, irrespective of whether they finished the process and received a title. We define two variables:

- **Initiation of titling process.** An indicator of whether households initiated the land titling process during the study period. Importantly, this was a costly step individuals needed to undertake by (i) scheduling a technical visit from government land surveyors to their house and (ii) being present during this visit such that the government agents could open a file for the household. For the control group this variable was measured by bringing a list of all control respondents to the titling office and verifying whether they had any record of starting a file.
- **Receipt of land title.** An indicator of whether households received a land title during the study period. We merged the government’s administrative data on recently finalized titles with our household surveys. We also coded this variable as a 1 if a respondent—in treatment or control—reported getting a new title at endline since the start of the land titling program and was able to show the title to an enumerator.

## 6 Results

### 6.1 First Stage: Effects of the Titling Program on Land Formalization


We first study the effect of assignment to the land titling program on the probability that citizens formalize their property. As noted, we examine whether citizens initiated the titling process

and whether they ultimately received a title in the time window considered. We estimate the following equation:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Program_i + u_i \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_i$  denotes our two measures of take-up,  $i$  denotes households and  $Program_i$  is an indicator denoting citizens randomly assigned to the program. We report robust standard errors throughout, since randomization was conducted at the household level.

**Figure 1:** Treatment effects of the land titling program on initiation of the titling process and receipt of land titles



*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 1. Thicker and thinner lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively.  $N = 483$ .

Assignment to the land titling program caused a 44 pp increase in citizens' efforts to initiate the titling process (Figure 1). Citizens assigned to the program were 13.7 pp more likely to obtain a title during the time period considered (from July 2017 to July 2019). Very few individ-

uals in the control group tried to open a file in the titling office.<sup>21</sup> By contrast, when selected by the door-to-door titling program, nearly half of citizens initiated the titling process by scheduling a visit from government land surveyors. This stark difference suggests that the monetary and transaction costs of obtaining a title were binding constraints on land formalization before the program.<sup>22</sup>

Next, we study whether the demand for and adoption of formal land titles depends on socioeconomic factors. The estimates in Figure 2 confirm that socioeconomic factors—income, education and property value—have a large and positive effect on the likelihood of formalization, consistent with economic models of land property rights (Alston, Libecap and Schneider, 1996; Miceli, Sirmans and Kieyah, 2001).<sup>23</sup> Notably, for every significant coefficient in this figure—property value, income, and education—there is a gap between demand and actual completion of the formalization process, which likely reflects the bureaucratic obstacles mentioned in Section 4. The analysis also reveals that migrants are marginally less likely to demand a land title, possibly because they participate less in—and are thus less dependent on—social institutions.


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<sup>21</sup>Two individuals in the control group initiated the titling process (0.87 percent), and one individual in the control group obtained a land title during the study period (0.44 percent). Thus, the treatment effects represent, respectively, a 5,000 percent and a 3,100 percent increase.

<sup>22</sup>SI Figure H.1 shows the distribution of titles delivered by the program.

<sup>23</sup>Estimates of property values come from machine learning and computer vision algorithms based on a training set of nearly randomly selected 2,000 properties evaluated by the top expert in the cadastral office of the provincial government (Bergeron et al., 2020).

**Figure 2:** Heterogeneous treatment effects of the land titling program on initiation of the titling process and receipt of land titles, by socioeconomic characteristics



*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 2. Point estimates represent the interaction term between assignment to the program and dichotomous measures of respondents’ and households’ characteristics. Thicker and thinner lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively. See SI Table C.2 for more details on variables and sample size.

## 6.2 Heterogeneous Adoption of Titling: Land Formalization Depends on Social Institutions

In this section, we test the first empirical implication of our argument by studying what type of citizens were more responsive to an exogenous offer to formalize their property. We estimate heterogeneous effects of treatment assignment on our two measures of take-up—initiation and completion of the land formalization process—using the following equation:



$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Program}_i + (\text{Program}_i \times \mathbf{Z}_i) \beta_2 + \mathbf{Z}_i \beta_3 + u_i \quad (2)$$

where  $Y_i$  denotes our two measures of take-up,  $\mathbf{Z}_i$  is a vector of individual or household characteristics.<sup>24</sup>

### 6.2.1 Horizontal Social Institutions

We now study how formalization is affected by citizens' participation in horizontal social institutions. We consider four of the most important such institutions in Kananga—participation in ROSCAs, participation in mutual aid societies, and contributions to churches, as well as to weddings and funerals. Participation in all but one of these institutions is highly predictive of demand for titles—but none predict completion of the formalization process (Figure 3). This is consistent with the idea that these institutions entail a cost for citizens, such that more participation in these institution induces a higher demand for formalization.


The fact that participation in social institutions are predictive of demand but not of completion does not support a social capital interpretation, where such networks would help citizens to navigate the titling process and also to obtain a title. We similarly rule out an information channel whereby social networks help diffuse information about the program, since participation in social institutions predicts interest in the titling campaign before its onset (SI Section G.1).<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Since the elements of  $\mathbf{Z}_i$  are not randomly assigned, each characteristic is interacted with the treatment indicator.

<sup>25</sup>We also explore the role of social preferences, since these could be predictive both of institutional participation and the demand for formalization, but coefficients are noisy (SI Section G.2).

**Figure 3:** Heterogeneous effects of treatment assignment on initiation of the titling process and receipt of land titles, by participation in horizontal social institutions.



*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 2. Point estimates are the interaction term between assignment to the program and dichotomous measures of respondents' participation in ROSCAs, mutual aid societies, contributions to church, and contributions to weddings and funerals. All specifications are estimated using OLS and interactively control for income, gender, and education. Thicker and thinner lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively. See SI Table C.3 for more details on variables and sample size.


### 6.2.2 Vertical Social Institutions

**Connections to chiefs.** We now study the heterogeneity of the treatment effect along measures of citizens' connections with chiefs by exactly matching each respondent to the person they report to be their chief based on unique identifiers. Connections to chiefs are generally predictive of demand for titles, but not of land formalization (Figure 4, left panel). Treated citizens who know their chief's name are more likely to initiate the titling process. Likewise, the coefficient on knowing a chief's phone number is positive but noisy. The same is true for citizens

whose chief has enjoyed long tenure in the neighborhood—more than ten years—which makes them well-known to citizens. Notably, trust in chiefs does not predict demand for or acquisition of land titles (SI Table G.3). Thus, in contrast to the substitution view, which predicts that citizens-chief connections would lead to lower demand for titles, these results lend support to the idea that citizens may view chiefs as brokers who may be well-positioned to deliver benefits (Baldwin, 2013).

**Chiefs’ political connections and power.** Chiefs’ political connections and power may also affect the demand and success of formalization. Notably, none of these characteristics are predictive of demand, but they affect whether citizens in fact obtained a land title (Figure 4, right panel). Chiefs who are party members decrease the likelihood of citizens obtaining a land title—the effect is more pronounced for those affiliated with the ruling party, the PPRD. Moreover, citizens whose chiefs more active in the organization of *salongo*—a proxy for chiefs’ social power—are less likely to succeed in obtaining a land title. While citizens may think that chiefs can help them obtain a title, the fact that politically connected and more powerful chiefs stifle titling suggests a divergence between citizens’ and chiefs’ incentives, consistent with the idea that chiefs may be offering protection in the context of clientelistic relationships (Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014; Janvry et al., 2014; Peyton, 2020).

**Figure 4:** Heterogeneous effects of treatment assignment on initiation of the titling process and receipt of land titles, by citizens' connections to chiefs and chiefs' political connections and power.



*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 2. Point estimates are the interaction term between assignment to the program and dichotomous measures of citizens' or chiefs' characteristics. All specifications are estimated using OLS and interactively control for income, gender, and education. Thicker and thinner lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively. See SI Table C.4 and Table C.5 for more details on variables and sample size.

### 6.3 Spatial Heterogeneity: Customary and Former Colonial Areas

To explore the scope conditions of our argument, we leverage spatial variation in Kananga. First, we examine peripheral areas with customary chiefs. As noted, there are four customary areas in Kananga located in peripheral parts of the city, where state presence is lower and customary institutions are stronger. Second, we examine patterns of titling inside the footprint of the former colonial city of Luluabourg, where land values are higher and social institutions deliver lower benefits.


In customary areas, consistent with the substitution argument, citizens display lower demand for titling, but the coefficient is noisily estimated (Figure 5). Actual land formalization was significantly lower in these areas: not a single title was delivered to a customary area during the study period.<sup>26</sup> We explore the correlates of living in customary areas and find that citizens are less likely to seek help from the provincial government in case of a land dispute (SI Table

<sup>26</sup>Considering the full sample, two land titles were issued for citizens in such areas.

F.2). Interestingly, they do not experience lower frequency of land disputes. Chiefs in these areas are deemed to be more responsive, trustworthy, and active—as measured by the frequency of *salongo* and land reallocation—and are significantly less likely to perform state-like functions such as taxation. Chiefs themselves are less aware of other chiefs being fired—indicating that they are less accountable. This is consistent with chiefs in these areas having more power within customary institutions, likely reflecting an alternate “neocustomary” equilibrium (Boone, 2014). As argued by Honig (2022), chiefs in such areas may block titling, seeking to preserve their customary. Indeed, customary chiefs posed obstacles to the land titling program by requiring a document—*acte de reconnaissance*—authorizing the land titling program to proceed in their jurisdiction. These patterns are consistent with work documenting a substitution logic in rural Africa (Honig, 2017, 2022).

By contrast, the results for areas of Kananga within the footprint of the colonial city of Luluabourg reveal the opposite pattern—a marked increase in land formalization. Consistent with our theory, this may indicate that citizens living in such areas have the highest incentive to formalize due to higher land values and the higher costs of social extraction. Overall, these results reveal a stark contrast between the patterns of titling in urban and peripheral areas, and support the notion that spatial variation—even within the same city—shapes land formalization (Boone et al., 2021).

**Figure 5:** Heterogeneous effects of treatment assignment on initiation of the titling process and receipt of land titles, by customary area status.



*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 2. Point estimates are the interaction term of assignment to the program and dichotomous measures of whether the household is located inside the boundaries of the footprint of the colonial city of Luluabourg and whether the household is located in customary land areas (*chefferies*). All specifications are estimated using OLS and interactively control for income, gender, education, and machine-learning estimates of property value. Thicker and thinner lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively. See SI Table F.1 for more details on variables and sample size.

## 6.4 Reduced-Form Effects of the Titling Program on Social Institutions

This section tests the second implication of our theory: that the titling program will crowd-out—rather than reinforce—participation in social institution. We present reduced-form effects of the program on participation in horizontal and vertical social institutions using Equation 1 ( $Y_i$  denotes outcomes of the titling program). We measure outcomes at two points in time. The first endline survey (round 1) was conducted from May 2019 to August 2019, immediately after the

delivery of most land titles. A second endline survey (round 2) was conducted from December 2019 to February 2020, an average of 6-8 months after delivery of titles.

The estimates in Figure 6 show that the program had a negative impact on participation in and evaluation of horizontal and vertical social institutions—the latter becomes marginally significant in round 2. The two top coefficients show the reduced-form effect of the program on an index comprising participation in mutual aid societies, ROSCAs, contribution to churches, and contributions to weddings and funerals. The bottom coefficient corresponds to an index of views on chiefs, which were only measured during round 1, and participation in *salongo* and views about its fairness.<sup>27</sup> As can be seen in Figure 7 (left panel), the crowding-out effects are concentrated in participation in mutual aid, ROSCAs, and contributions to church. For example, the program caused a 6 pp decrease in the probability that an individual takes part in a mutual aid society—a 24 percent decrease. Treated citizens also view chiefs as less responsive, less important, less trustworthy, and worse overall—they also participate less in *salongo* and deem it less fair (Figure 7, right panel). Interestingly, these sizable effects are manifested despite the relatively short the time elapsed between title delivery and outcome measurement.<sup>28</sup> Notably, the program did not alter citizens’ evaluation of provincial government, although they deem it less responsive, and made citizens’ more willing to appear legible to the state (SI Table E.1).

These crowding-out results are, to our knowledge, the first evidence of social effects of land


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<sup>27</sup>SI Tables C.7 and C.8 show treatment effects for each index component.

<sup>28</sup>This time frame is shorter than the one used in most studies of land titling. Indeed, investments are unlikely to materialize in a short time period. For example, Field (2005) measures investment outcomes one to four years after a titling intervention in Peru, whereas Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) measure human and physical capital investment between nine and eighteen years after the natural experiment they study. Table E.2 shows the effect of the program on additional pre-registered social outcomes. The program had no effect on different forms of civic and political participation, did not make citizens shift from informal to formal mechanisms of conflict resolution, or increase the likelihood that citizens obtain other formal documents.

titling: formalization erodes participation in local social institutions. By contrast, the program shows no effects on trust in formal and informal institutions (SI Table G.3), civic participation, or beliefs (SI Table E.2). Instead, it affected participation in those institutions that are thought to provide informal insurance and protection. Overall, these results challenge the idea that land titling and formal land titling and social institutions are complements. Instead, they suggest that citizens prefer formalization over social institutions, consistent with the idea that treated citizens exit the informal equilibrium.


**Figure 6:** Reduced-form effects of the program on indexes of participation in social institutions and views of chiefs



*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 1. The two top rows display estimates of a regression of a standardized index of participation in social institutions. The bottom row displays estimates of a regression of a standardized index of citizens' views of chiefs and citizens' participation in and evaluation of *salongo*. All specifications are estimated using OLS and control for income, gender, and education, as well as for baseline measures of the outcome when available. Thicker and thinner lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively. Views on chiefs were measured at endline 1 only. See SI Table C.6 for more details on the variables and sample size.



**Figure 7:** Reduced-form effects of the program on participation in social institutions and views of chiefs



*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 1. Point estimates are standardized coefficients. All specifications are estimated using OLS and interactively control for income, gender, and education. Thicker and thinner lines are 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals, respectively. Views on chiefs were measured at endline 1 only. See SI Table C.7 and Table C.8 for more details on variables and sample size.

## 7 Conclusion

Studying a randomized land titling program in a large Congolese city, this paper argued that social institutions are an imperfect substitute for formal land rights in urban Africa. Citizens who participate more in horizontal social institutions and who are more closely connected to city chiefs were more, not less, likely to demand formalization. We also showed evidence that more powerful and politically connected chiefs stifle land titling. The program was most effective in the urban core, but completely ineffective in peripheral customary areas with stronger and more legitimate customary authorities. Our results reveal a distinctive logic of land formalization in urban areas, where the costs of social extraction exceed the benefits provided by social institutions. In doing so, they complement and expand on recent work on titling in rural areas (Honig, 2022) and give credence to the idea that spatial variation in land tenure regimes within the same city critically affects the success of formalization initiatives (Boone et al., 2021). Thus, when urban dwellers are offered the opportunity to formalize their land, they seek to exit the informal equilibrium. Indeed, we document negative causal effects of the land titling program on partic-

ipation in social institutions: treated citizens engage less with horizontal social insurance and view their chiefs more negatively.

As urbanization proceeds at a sweeping pace in sub-Saharan Africa, cities face formalization bottlenecks. From a policy perspective, the marked increase in take-up induced by the program indicates that carefully designed reforms aimed at simplifying the land titling process and reducing bureaucratic discretion can expand formalization significantly. Our findings suggest that the costly nature of social institutions in urban areas may be an asset for land formalization. Policymakers could therefore benefit from factoring this heterogeneity when designing land formalization programs.

Lastly, while we study a formalization program in a specific city, land titling remains a significant challenge in Africa and elsewhere, and the social institutions we study are present across the developing world (Bouman, 1983; Baldwin and Holzinger, 2019; Lust, 2022). Therefore, our findings add to an expanding agenda on how formalization interventions interact with social institutions, thereby conceptualizing state-building as a relational process (Migdal, 1988; Wang, 2021).

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
# Supplementary Information

## Property Rights and Social Institutions: How Informal Institutions and Chiefs Shape Land Formalization in Urban Africa

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## A Intervention Timeline



## B More Details on Land Tenure in the DRC

The Congo Free State had a dual system of land rights, whereby “vacant” land belonged to the state and land occupied by native population was allowed to be ruled according to customary rules. During the subsequent Belgian Congo era, only Europeans were allowed to hold formal land titles. The process involved the surveying and registration of land in land records. During this period there was a single official document, the *Livret de Logeur*. The indigenous population was only allowed to hold temporary occupation rights in urban areas (Leisz, 1998). Upon independence, indigenous Congolese were allowed to own land and owners of colonial titles were asked to prove that land was being put to productive use. During Mobutu’s presidency, law 73-021 of 1973 declared that all land belonged to the state, while granting temporal or perpetual rights of use. New land documents were created, including the *Droit de Concession Perpetuelle*, currently known as *Certificat d’Enregistrement*. Land owners who already possessed a *Livret de Logeur* were allowed to obtain the *Certificat d’Enregistrement* by requesting a conversion at the city council. However, many citizens failed to complete the conversion due to financial constraints and, as a result, now have outdated documents devoid of any legal value. Citizens who did not have any legal documents could still request a *Contrat de Location*. This document has less legal weight than the *Certificat d’Enregistrement* and is a contract between the owner and the government, as explained in Section 4.

## C Full results

### C.1 Program Take-up

**Table C.1:** Treatment effects of the land titling program on initiation of the titling process and receipt of land titles

	Titling Initiation (1)	Titling Completion (2)
Treatment	0.137*** (0.022)	0.440*** (0.032)
Observations	483	483
$R^2$	0.07	0.26
Control Mean	0.00	0.01

*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 1. Estimates of a regression of initiation of the land titling process (column 1) and acquisition of a land title (column 2) on assignment to the land titling program. All specifications are estimated using OLS. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

## C.2 Heterogeneous Take-up of Titling

**Table C.2:** Socioeconomic predictors of land formalization

<b>Panel A. Initiation of Titling Process</b>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.090*	0.247***	0.201***	0.464***
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.050)
× Income		0.270***		
		(0.064)		
× Education			0.258***	
			(0.075)	
× Property value	0.420***			
	(0.062)			
× Migrant				-0.085
				(0.065)
Migrant				0.007
				(0.021)
Income	0.100***	-0.030	0.093***	0.104***
	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Education	0.082**	0.072*	-0.033*	0.095**
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.040)
Property value	-0.031	0.142***	0.141***	0.139***
	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Gender	-0.018	-0.002	-0.011	-0.020
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Observations	462	462	462	462
$R^2$	0.36	0.34	0.33	0.32
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<b>Panel B. Receipt of Land Title</b>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.027	0.030	0.033	0.108***
	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.032)
× Income		0.149***		
		(0.038)		
× Education			0.108***	
			(0.035)	
× Property value	0.123***			
	(0.036)			
× Migrant				0.020
				(0.045)
Migrant				0.012
				(0.011)
Income	0.072***	-0.001	0.069***	0.074***
	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Education	0.030*	0.023	-0.019*	0.027
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.017)
Property value	-0.007	0.044***	0.043***	0.044***
	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Gender	-0.023	-0.015	-0.020	-0.022
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Observations	462	462	462	462
$R^2$	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.10
Control Mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 2. Panels A and B report, respectively, the heterogeneous effects of assignment to the land titling program on initiation and completion of the titling process. Columns display coefficients of the interaction term between program assignment and dichotomous measures of respondents' property value (column 1), income (column 2), education (column 3), and migrant status (column 4). All specifications are estimated using OLS and control for income, gender, and education. Sample size is lower because of missingness in estimated property value. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

**Table C.3:** Heterogeneous effects of treatment assignment on initiation of the titling process and receipt of land titles, by participation in horizontal social institutions

<b>Panel A. Initiation of Titling Process</b>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.146*	0.139*	-0.003	0.048
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.075)
× ROSCA	0.025			
	(0.031)			
× Mutual aid society		0.059**		
		(0.028)		
× Church			0.155**	
			(0.072)	
× Weddings and funerals				0.197***
				(0.065)
ROSCA				
Mutual aid society		0.005		
		(0.009)		
Church			-0.032	
			(0.022)	
Weddings and funerals				0.000
				(0.014)
× Income	0.209***	0.210***	0.218***	0.225***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.069)
× Education	0.184**	0.185**	0.220***	0.156*
	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.082)
× Gender	0.016	0.013	-0.012	0.027
	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.085)	(0.075)
Income	-0.004	-0.006	-0.000	-0.005
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Education	0.010	0.010	0.021	0.012
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.010)
Gender	-0.010	-0.009	-0.014	-0.011
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Observations	481	481	402	443
$R^2$	0.33	0.34	0.35	0.36
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<b>Panel B. Receipt of Land Title</b>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.017	0.005	-0.050	-0.039
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.029)
× ROSCA	0.045*			
	(0.025)			
× Mutual aid society		-0.003		
		(0.019)		
× Church			0.054	
			(0.049)	
× Weddings and funerals				0.049
				(0.046)
ROSCA	-0.004			
	(0.004)			
Mutual aid society		-0.003		
		(0.003)		
Church			-0.018	
			(0.018)	
Weddings and funerals				0.010
				(0.010)
× Income	0.123***	0.140***	0.144***	0.160***
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.036)
× Education	0.052	0.055*	0.063**	0.058**
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.023)
× Gender	-0.019	-0.020	-0.020	-0.015
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.046)
Income	0.009	0.008	0.012	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Education	0.004	0.003	0.008	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.002)
Gender	-0.005	-0.006	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Observations	481	481	402	443
$R^2$	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.14
Control Mean	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00

*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 2. Panels A and B report, respectively, the heterogeneous effects of assignment to the land titling program on initiation and completion of the titling process. Columns display coefficients of the interaction term between assignment to the program and dichotomous measures of respondents' participation in ROSCAs (column 1), mutual aid societies (column 2), contributions to church (column 3), and contributions to weddings and funerals (column 4). All specifications are estimated using OLS and interactively control for income, gender, and education. Sample size is lower in some columns because of missingness in some of the participation variables. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

**Table C.4:** Heterogeneous effects of treatment assignment on initiation of the titling process and receipt of land titles, by citizens' connections with city chiefs

Panel A. Initiation of Titling Process			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	-0.077 (0.091)	0.086 (0.066)	0.094 (0.074)
× Know Chief Name	0.186** (0.080)		
× Know Chief Number		0.141 (0.107)	
× Long Tenure			0.118* (0.061)
Know Chief Name	0.006 (0.006)		
Know Chief Number		0.042 (0.042)	
Long Tenure			-0.016 (0.011)
× Income	0.145* (0.075)	0.141* (0.075)	0.228*** (0.068)
× Education	0.283*** (0.077)	0.246*** (0.077)	0.178** (0.081)
× Gender	0.017 (0.039)	0.025 (0.039)	0.006 (0.036)
Gender	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)
Income	0.009 (0.009)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.014)
Education	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.010 (0.008)
Observations	350	352	481
R <sup>2</sup>	0.30	0.31	0.33
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01
Panel B. Receipt of Land Title			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	-0.095** (0.048)	0.008 (0.037)	-0.017 (0.035)
× Know Chief Name	0.111*** (0.038)		
× Know Chief Number		-0.004 (0.083)	
× Long Tenure			0.034 (0.044)
Know Chief Name	0.006 (0.006)		
Know Chief Number		0.042 (0.042)	
Long Tenure			-0.007 (0.007)
× Income	0.090** (0.043)	0.089** (0.043)	0.143*** (0.037)
× Education	0.067* (0.040)	0.050 (0.040)	0.053* (0.032)
× Gender	0.019 (0.026)	0.012 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.022)
Gender	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Income	0.009 (0.009)	0.008 (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)
Education	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	350	352	481
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.08	0.12
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.00

Notes: Estimates from Equation 2. Panels A and B report, respectively, the heterogeneous effects of assignment to the land titling program on initiation and completion of the titling process. Columns display coefficients of the interaction term between assignment to the program and dichotomous measures of whether respondents know their chiefs name (column 1), whether respondents know their chief's phone number (column 2), and whether the chief was appointed more than 10 years ago (column 3). All specifications are estimated using OLS and interactively control for income, gender, and education. Sample size is lower in some columns because of missingness in some of the variables about chiefs. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$



**Table C.5:** Heterogeneous effects of treatment assignment on initiation of the titling process and receipt of land titles, by the political connections of city chiefs

<b>Panel A. Initiation of Titling Process</b>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	0.146** (0.070)	0.153** (0.071)	0.146** (0.071)
× Political party member	-0.015 (0.031)		
× Ruling party member		-0.034 (0.030)	
× Salongo frequency			0.008 (0.043)
Political party member	0.002 (0.006)		
Ruling party member		0.006 (0.008)	
Salongo frequency			-0.002 (0.002)
× Income	0.220*** (0.068)	0.224*** (0.068)	0.218*** (0.068)
× Gender	0.007 (0.036)	0.004 (0.036)	0.007 (0.036)
× Education	0.184** (0.081)	0.175** (0.082)	0.186** (0.081)
Income	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.014)
Gender	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)
Education	0.010 (0.008)	0.009 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)
Observations	481	481	481
$R^2$	0.33	0.33	0.33
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01
<b>Panel B. Receipt of Land Title</b>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment	0.002 (0.028)	0.017 (0.030)	-0.008 (0.029)
× Political party member	-0.050** (0.020)		
× Ruling party member		-0.072*** (0.016)	
× Salongo frequency			-0.036*** (0.009)
Political party member	0.005 (0.005)		
Ruling party member		0.008 (0.008)	
Salongo frequency			-0.002 (0.002)
× Income	0.145*** (0.037)	0.151*** (0.038)	0.141*** (0.038)
× Gender	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.021)
× Education	0.049 (0.032)	0.030 (0.033)	0.058* (0.032)
Income	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.008 (0.008)
Gender	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
Education	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	481	481	481
$R^2$	0.13	0.15	0.13
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01

*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 2. Panels A and B report, respectively, the heterogeneous effects of assignment to the land titling program on initiation and completion of the titling process. Columns display coefficients of the interaction term between assignment to the program and dichotomous measures of whether the chief is a member of a political party (column 1), whether the chief is a member of the ruling party (column 2), and frequency of *salongo* organization (column 3).  $N = 481$ . \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

### C.3 Reduced-Form Effects of the Titling Program

**Table C.6:** Crowding out horizontal and vertical institutions (indexes)

	Social Institutions(R1) (1)	Social Institutions(R2) (2)	Views on Chiefs (3)
Treatment	-0.175** (0.080)	-0.158* (0.090)	-0.255** (0.104)
Horizontal Institutions (baseline)	0.367*** (0.040)	0.288*** (0.046)	
Views on Chiefs (baseline)			0.166*** (0.054)
Income	0.118*** (0.033)	0.133*** (0.037)	0.013 (0.033)
Gender	0.043 (0.097)	0.127 (0.107)	-0.135 (0.136)
Education	0.183*** (0.055)	0.239*** (0.060)	-0.038 (0.075)
Observations	481	418	478
$R^2$	0.24	0.20	0.04
Control Mean	0.04	0.03	0.11

*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 1. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the ITT effect of assignment to the land titling program on a standardized index of citizens' participation in and contributions to horizontal social institutions. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the ITT effect of assignment to the land titling program on a standardized index of citizens' participation in and contributions to horizontal social institutions comprising: (1) participation in ROSCAs, (2) contributions to church, and (3) contributions to weddings and funerals on assignment to the land titling program and the same index measured at baseline. Participation in mutual aid societies is excluded as it was measured only in endline round 1. Column 3 estimates the effect of assignment to the program on a standardized index of respondents' views on chiefs comprising (1) citizens' overall evaluation of chiefs, (2) whether citizens think that chiefs are important or responsive, (3) citizens' level of trust of avenue chiefs, (4) citizens' level of trust in neighborhood chiefs, (5) whether citizens think that chiefs are corrupt, and (6) an index of citizens' participation in and evaluation of *salongo*. All specifications are estimated using OLS and control for income, gender, and education, as well as for baseline measures of the outcome indexes. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

**Table C.7:** Reduced-form effects of the titling program on citizen participation in horizontal social institutions

	Mutual Aid (1)	ROSCA(R1) (2)	ROSCA(R2) (3)	Church(R1) (4)	Church(R2) (5)	Wed/Fun(R1) (6)	Wed/Fun(R2) (7)
Treatment	-0.062 (0.039)	-0.054 (0.040)	-0.076* (0.042)	-0.071* (0.042)	-0.086* (0.047)	-0.008 (0.045)	0.015 (0.046)
Mutual aid (baseline)	0.319*** (0.053)						
ROSCA (baseline)		0.370*** (0.048)	0.323*** (0.051)				
Church (baseline)				0.244*** (0.045)	0.189*** (0.050)		
Wed/Fun (baseline)						0.183*** (0.046)	0.207*** (0.047)
Income	0.030** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.015)	0.027* (0.016)	0.042** (0.017)	0.056*** (0.018)	0.045*** (0.016)	0.048*** (0.017)
Gender	-0.061 (0.043)	0.032 (0.048)	0.095* (0.052)	0.051 (0.053)	0.034 (0.058)	-0.055 (0.055)	-0.021 (0.057)
Education	-0.011 (0.027)	0.054** (0.026)	0.094*** (0.026)	0.137*** (0.031)	0.086** (0.034)	0.001 (0.030)	0.049 (0.030)
Observations	481	481	418	481	418	480	418
$R^2$	0.11	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.11	0.06	0.09
Control Mean	0.30	0.37	0.32	0.52	0.55	0.46	0.38

*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 1. Each column displays the ITT effect of assignment to the land titling program on respondents' participation in social institutions: participation in mutual aid societies (column 1), membership in ROSCAs (columns 2-3), contributions to church (columns 4-5), and contributions to weddings and funerals (5-6). Sample size is lower in some columns because of missingness in some of the participation variables in round 2. All specifications are estimated using OLS and control for income, gender, and education, as well as for baseline measures of the outcomes. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$


**Table C.8:** Reduced-form effects of the titling program on citizens’ evaluation of chiefs and *salongo*

	Evaluation (1)	Important (2)	Responsive (3)	Trust Neig. Chief (4)	Trust Ave. Chief (5)	Corrupt (6)	Salongo Eval. and Partic. (7)
Treatment	-0.161** (0.065)	-0.077* (0.046)	-0.191*** (0.059)	-0.088** (0.042)	0.015 (0.038)	-0.074 (0.053)	-0.089** (0.039)
Responsive (baseline)			0.075 (0.066)				
Evaluation (baseline)	0.070 (0.067)						
Trust Ave. Chief (baseline)					0.137*** (0.039)		
Income	-0.048* (0.025)	0.001 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.024)	0.001 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.020)	0.010 (0.015)
Gender	-0.007 (0.080)	-0.036 (0.059)	0.026 (0.074)	0.049 (0.051)	-0.147*** (0.052)	0.138** (0.063)	-0.112** (0.052)
Education	0.016 (0.046)	-0.047 (0.031)	0.026 (0.041)	-0.089*** (0.030)	-0.053* (0.030)	-0.015 (0.035)	0.041 (0.028)
Observations	233	370	272	418	478	353	481
R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.03
Control Mean	0.67	0.77	0.71	0.79	0.75	0.61	0.79

Notes: Estimates from Equation 1. Each column displays the ITT effect of assignment to the land titling program on respondents’ views on chiefs: citizens’ overall evaluation of chiefs (column 1), whether citizens think that chiefs are important (column 2) or responsive (column 3), citizens’ level of trust of avenue chiefs (column 4) and neighborhood chiefs (column 5), whether citizens think that chiefs are corrupt (column 6), and an index of citizens’ participation in and evaluation of *salongo* (column 7). All specifications are estimated using OLS and control for income, gender, and education, as well as baseline measures of the outcome when available. Sample size is lower in some columns because of missingness in some of the chief evaluation variables. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

## D Payments to Social Institutions

**Figure D.1:** Payments to social institutions as a percentage of citizen’s monthly income



Notes: Each column represents the expenditures in each category as a fraction of monthly income. All measures of expenditure and income are winsorized by trimming the top and bottom 5th percentile of observations.

## E Additional Results

### E.1 Effect of the Titling Program on Views of the Provincial Government

**Table E.1:** Effect of the program on views of the provincial government

	Gov. Performance (1)	Gov. Responsiveness (2)	Gov. Corruption (3)	Erased Tax Code (4)
Treatment	-0.020 (0.034)	-0.097** (0.043)	-0.036 (0.048)	-0.068* (0.038)
Gov. Performance (baseline)	0.067 (0.041)			
Income	-0.013 (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.050*** (0.018)	-0.028* (0.016)
Gender	-0.020 (0.042)	-0.008 (0.054)	-0.105* (0.060)	0.152*** (0.051)
Education	-0.075*** (0.026)	-0.050* (0.030)	0.045 (0.034)	0.023 (0.027)
Observations	440	481	418	481
$R^2$	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.04
Control Mean	0.17	0.37	0.49	0.49

*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 1. Each column displays the ITT effect of assignment to the land titling program on respondents' views of the provincial government: government performance (column 1), government responsiveness (column 2), corruption (column 3), and an indicator of whether respondents erased a tax code written with chalk for the purpose of a tax collection campaign. All specifications are estimated using OLS and control for income, gender, and education, as well as baseline levels of the outcome when available. Sample size is lower in some columns because of missing values in some of the outcome variables. See Appendix K for variables' definitions. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

### E.2 Additional Reduced-Form Effects of Land Formalization

**Table E.2:** Effects of the land titling program on additional outcomes

	Participation(R1) (1)	Participation(R2) (2)	Authorities(R1) (3)	Authorities(R2) (4)	Spillovers(R1) (5)	Spillovers(R2) (6)	Beliefs(R1) (7)	Beliefs(R2) (8)
Treatment	-0.075* (0.044)	-0.056 (0.048)	-0.033 (0.026)	-0.044 (0.049)	0.004 (0.043)	-0.001 (0.043)	-0.081* (0.046)	0.091* (0.049)
Income	0.032* (0.017)	-0.020 (0.018)	0.016** (0.007)	0.010 (0.019)	0.080*** (0.014)	0.071*** (0.016)	0.021 (0.018)	0.005 (0.019)
Gender	-0.084 (0.056)	-0.159*** (0.061)	-0.027 (0.031)	-0.045 (0.061)	0.005 (0.052)	-0.033 (0.050)	-0.006 (0.057)	0.002 (0.062)
Education	0.035 (0.030)	0.072** (0.032)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.033)	0.083*** (0.026)	0.117*** (0.028)	0.020 (0.032)	-0.051 (0.033)
Observations	481	418	481	418	481	418	481	418
$R^2$	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.09	0.12	0.01	0.01
Control Mean	0.65	0.57	0.10	0.62	0.37	0.28	0.52	0.80

*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 1. Each column displays the ITT effect of assignment to the land titling program on political participation (columns 1-2), likelihood of contacting formal authorities over informal authorities for conflict resolution (column 3-4), spillovers on other types of formalization (column 5-6), and traditional beliefs (column 7-8). All specifications are estimated using OLS and control for income, gender, and education. Sample size is lower in some columns because of missing values in some of the outcome variables in endline round 2. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

### E.3 Horizontal Social Institutions and Tenure Security

**Table E.3:** Correlates of horizontal institutions

	Land Disputes (1)	Hunger (2)	Well-Being (3)	Health Access (4)	Educ. Access (5)	Pension (6)	Affected by Conflict (7)
<b>Panel A. Titling program sample</b>							
Social Institutions	-0.011 (0.044)	-0.013 (0.048)	0.109 (0.086)	-0.025 (0.074)	0.089 (0.075)	0.016 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.047)
Income	0.020 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)	0.044 (0.030)	-0.011 (0.028)	-0.043* (0.024)	0.001 (0.004)	0.018 (0.017)
Gender	0.139** (0.054)	-0.100* (0.057)	0.029 (0.106)	-0.030 (0.089)	0.048 (0.089)	-0.024* (0.013)	-0.031 (0.054)
Education	0.035 (0.027)	-0.119*** (0.033)	0.184*** (0.054)	0.101** (0.048)	-0.014 (0.046)	0.014 (0.013)	0.020 (0.030)
Observations	481	481	141	188	189	189	478
$R^2$	0.02	0.03	0.14	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01
Control Mean	0.29	0.45	0.40	0.39	0.61	0.01	0.35
<b>Panel B. Full sample</b>							
Social Institutions	0.082*** (0.014)	-0.082*** (0.016)	0.095*** (0.016)	0.025 (0.025)	0.074*** (0.026)	0.004 (0.006)	0.061*** (0.015)
Income	0.004 (0.005)	-0.029*** (0.007)	0.046*** (0.006)	0.019** (0.009)	0.011 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.006 (0.006)
Gender	0.052*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.018)	0.086*** (0.017)	-0.018 (0.027)	0.027 (0.028)	-0.011* (0.006)	0.009 (0.016)
Education	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.091*** (0.011)	0.100*** (0.010)	0.027* (0.016)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.005 (0.010)
Observations	4274	3829	3341	1596	1598	1595	4232
$R^2$	0.01	0.04	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00
Control Mean	0.29	0.53	0.29	0.33	0.54	0.01	0.37
<b>Panel C. Full sample, central vs. peripheral areas</b>							
Social Institutions × Colonial Footprint	-0.092* (0.049)	-0.019 (0.053)	0.020 (0.056)	-0.006 (0.109)	0.067 (0.105)	0.050* (0.030)	0.005 (0.051)
Social Institutions	0.090*** (0.015)	-0.077*** (0.017)	0.089*** (0.016)	0.024 (0.025)	0.067** (0.027)	0.001 (0.007)	0.063*** (0.016)
Colonial Footprint	0.030 (0.038)	-0.118*** (0.041)	0.129*** (0.042)	0.081 (0.085)	0.079 (0.086)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.079** (0.038)
Income	0.004 (0.006)	-0.027*** (0.007)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.018* (0.009)	0.010 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.007 (0.006)
Gender	0.053*** (0.015)	-0.054*** (0.017)	0.078*** (0.017)	-0.020 (0.027)	0.023 (0.028)	-0.012** (0.006)	0.012 (0.016)
Education	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.087*** (0.011)	0.095*** (0.010)	0.025 (0.016)	0.050*** (0.016)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.003 (0.010)
Observations	4274	3829	3341	1596	1598	1595	4232
$R^2$	0.01	0.05	0.09	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Control Mean	0.29	0.53	0.29	0.33	0.54	0.01	0.37

*Notes:* Each column displays the coefficient of the regression of a specific outcome on a standardized index of participation in horizontal institutions. Panel A: Program eligible sample. Panel B: full sample. Panel C: full sample, interaction with an indicator of whether the respondent lives within the boundaries of the former colonial city. All specifications are estimated using OLS and control for income, gender, and education. Sample size is lower in some columns because of missing values in some of the outcome variables. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

## F Customary areas

**Table F.1:** Heterogeneous effects of treatment assignment on initiation and completion of land titling, by colonial footprint and customary land areas

	Initiation of Titling Process		Receipt of Land Title	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.107 (0.081)	-0.084 (0.089)	-0.075* (0.040)	-0.046 (0.038)
× Colonial Footprint	0.045 (0.107)		0.206** (0.089)	
× Customary Land		-0.104 (0.108)		-0.078** (0.034)
Colonial Footprint	0.031 (0.038)		-0.008 (0.008)	
Customary Land		-0.016 (0.014)		-0.003 (0.003)
× Income	0.085*** (0.030)	0.086*** (0.030)	0.049*** (0.016)	0.054*** (0.017)
× Education	0.064 (0.039)	0.066* (0.039)	0.026 (0.017)	0.023 (0.016)
× Gender	0.005 (0.027)	0.006 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.016)
× Property Value	0.163*** (0.029)	0.155*** (0.031)	0.037** (0.016)	0.036** (0.016)
Income	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)
Gender	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Education	0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Property Value	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
Observations	462	462	462	462
$R^2$	0.38	0.38	0.16	0.13
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00

*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 2. Columns display the heterogeneous effects of assignment to the land titling program on initiation (columns 1-2) and completion (columns 3-4) of the titling process. Coefficients are the interaction term of assignment to the program and dichotomous measures of whether the household is located inside the boundaries of the footprint of the colonial city of Luluabourg and whether the household is located in customary land areas (*chefferies*). All specifications are estimated using OLS and interactively control for income, gender, education, and machine-learning estimates of property value. The drop in sample size is because of missing values in the estimated property value variable. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

**Table F.2:** Tenure security, views of the government, and views of chiefs in customary areas

	Land Dispute (1)	Trust Prov. Gov (2)	Help Gov (3)	Chief Land (4)	Salongo (5)	Trust Chief (6)	Chief Responsive (7)	Chief Taxes (8)	Chief Fired (9)
<b>Panel A. Titling program sample</b>									
Customary Area	-0.029 (0.081)	0.111 (0.079)	-0.496** (0.230)	0.067 (0.051)	0.158** (0.077)	0.031 (0.080)	0.216** (0.104)	-0.439*** (0.028)	-0.189** (0.082)
Income	0.024 (0.021)	-0.000 (0.022)	0.005 (0.053)	-0.019* (0.010)	0.028 (0.025)	-0.063*** (0.022)	0.006 (0.015)	0.008 (0.022)	0.003 (0.008)
Gender	0.065** (0.026)	0.016 (0.026)	-0.049 (0.084)	0.012 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.028)	-0.018 (0.026)	-0.032* (0.017)	-0.093*** (0.024)	-0.010 (0.013)
Education	0.027 (0.022)	0.026 (0.025)	0.039 (0.081)	0.013 (0.008)	0.006 (0.027)	-0.107*** (0.023)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.055** (0.024)	0.007 (0.013)
Observations	481	455	189	481	352	478	335	481	476
$R^2$	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.04
Control Mean	0.29	0.71	-0.11	0.02	0.75	0.50	0.14	0.38	0.95
<b>Panel B. Full sample</b>									
Customary Area	0.019 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.162*** (0.061)	0.135*** (0.015)	0.052** (0.021)	0.064*** (0.022)	0.048** (0.020)	-0.362*** (0.014)	-0.153*** (0.019)
Income	0.012* (0.007)	0.027*** (0.008)	0.038 (0.026)	-0.005* (0.003)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.028*** (0.008)	0.013** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.005 (0.004)
Gender	0.024*** (0.007)	-0.015* (0.008)	0.002 (0.027)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.035*** (0.008)	-0.018*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.008)	0.005 (0.004)
Education	0.003 (0.007)	0.042*** (0.008)	0.013 (0.028)	0.005** (0.003)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.087*** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.018** (0.008)	0.008** (0.004)
Observations	4274	4090	1592	4244	3378	4255	3205	4244	4171
$R^2$	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.04
Control Mean	0.29	0.69	0.04	0.03	0.74	0.53	0.13	0.39	0.93

*Notes:* Coefficients display the results of a regression of a range of outcomes on a binary indicator of whether respondents live in one of the customary areas in Kananga. Coefficients are correlations between customary land area and frequency of land disputes (column 1), trust in the provincial government (column 2), getting help from the government in the case of a land dispute (column 3), whether the chief reallocated land in the past 12 months (column 4), frequency of *salongo* (column 5), trust in city chiefs (column 6), chief responsiveness (column 7), and whether chiefs collected taxes in the past (column 8), and whether chiefs think that chiefs can be fired (column 9). Panel A: Program eligible sample. Panel B: Full sample. Sample size is lower in some columns because of missing values in some of the outcome variables. All specifications are estimated using OLS and control for income, gender, and education. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

## G Alternative Explanations

### G.1 Information-sharing

Here, we consider the possibility that participation in horizontal social institutions might affect the demand for land titles through information-sharing. Indeed, citizens usually learn about welfare programs through social networks. Even if only citizens assigned to treatment received information about the program, this information could potentially have spilled over onto citizens in the control group. Note that, if true, this would be inconsistent with the heterogeneous treatment effects reported in the main paper. A second possibility is that citizens in the treatment group who participate in these institutions could have discussed the program and coordinated more among themselves, increasing the probability of formalization. We address this possibility by regressing a pre-randomization baseline measure of respondents' interest in an upcoming land titling government program on our measures of participation in social institutions. Note that this analysis employs the full sample, as interest in the program was elicited before the restriction of eligibility criteria discussed in Section J. Estimates show that citizens who participate more in horizontal social institutions display a higher interest in the program, before being assigned to the treatment group. This suggests that higher likelihood of formalization among

citizens in the treatment group who take part in these institutions is unlikely to be the result of information-sharing and coordination.

**Table G.1:** Correlation between participation in social institutions and interest in participating in the land titling program

	Interest in Land Titling Program				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ROSCA	0.045*** (0.012)				
Mutual Aid		0.013 (0.015)			
Church Contributions			0.024** (0.012)		
Weddings/Funerals				0.024** (0.012)	
Social Institutions (Index)					0.084*** (0.023)
Income	0.002 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Education	-0.074*** (0.014)	-0.073*** (0.014)	-0.074*** (0.014)	-0.074*** (0.014)	-0.073*** (0.014)
Gender	0.004 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)
Observations	3735	3735	3731	3735	3735
$R^2$	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Control Mean	2.68	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99

*Notes:* Coefficients show the correlation between dichotomous measures of participation in and contributions to horizontal social institutions and a pre-treatment measure of interest in participating in the land titling program. All specifications are estimated using OLS and interactively control for income, gender, and education. This estimation uses the full sample since the outcome variable was measured before defining the sample of respondents eligible for the titling program. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

## G.2 Social preferences

Social preferences could be predictive both of institutional participation and the demand for formalization. We explore the role of three social preferences—envy, altruism, and reciprocity—measured at baseline. Table G.2 reports negative but generally noisy effects of individuals’ social preferences on the demand for land titles.



**Table G.2:** Heterogeneous effects of treatment assignment on initiation of the titling process and receipt of land titles, by social preferences

	Initiation of Titling Process			Receipt of Land Title		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.144*	0.135*	0.160**	0.007	0.002	0.010
	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)
× Envy	-0.043			-0.011		
	(0.031)			(0.023)		
× Altruism		-0.031			-0.009	
		(0.031)			(0.022)	
× Reciprocity			-0.062**			-0.016
			(0.029)			(0.024)
Envy	-0.001			-0.005		
	(0.006)			(0.005)		
Altruism		0.002			-0.003	
		(0.006)			(0.003)	
Reciprocity			0.004			0.002
			(0.003)			(0.002)
× Income	0.095***	0.098***	0.090***	0.061***	0.062***	0.060***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)
× Education	0.091**	0.091**	0.081**	0.027*	0.027*	0.024
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
× Gender	0.007	0.003	0.007	-0.007	-0.008	-0.007
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.004	0.003	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Gender	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	481	480	481	481	480	481
R <sup>2</sup>	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.12	0.12	0.12
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

*Notes:* Estimates from Equation 2. Columns display the heterogeneous effects of assignment to the land titling program on initiation (columns 1-3) and completion (columns 4-6) of the titling process. Coefficients are the interaction term between assignment to the program and measures of respondents' social preferences: envy, altruism, and reciprocity. All specifications are estimated using OLS and interactively control for income, gender, and education. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

### G.3 Trust in formal and informal institutions

Trust in formal and informal institutions might also be a factor driving formalization decisions. In weak states distrust of these institutions may be a major reason why people would rationally choose to remain informal. Alternatively, high trust could obviate the need for formalization. However, trust generally has no effect on formalization (Table G.3). While trust in NGOs and foreign research organizations does not predict greater likelihood of starting the titling process, the latter does predict higher probability of receiving a land title. Citizens with above-median trust in foreign research organizations at baseline were significantly more likely to obtain a land title. A possible interpretation is that these citizens did not lose faith in the program despite the long delays due to trust in the implementation team.


**Table G.3:** Reduced-form effects of the titling program on citizens' trust in formal and informal institutions

	Initiation of Titling Process					Receipt of Land Title				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment	0.111 (0.089)	0.133 (0.085)	0.163* (0.089)	0.077 (0.091)	0.071 (0.089)	-0.021 (0.046)	-0.019 (0.042)	0.012 (0.038)	-0.029 (0.043)	-0.061 (0.044)
× Trust Prov. Gov.	0.047 (0.065)					0.034 (0.045)				
× Trust Nat. Gov.		0.018 (0.063)					0.034 (0.045)			
× Trust Chiefs			-0.031 (0.065)					-0.009 (0.044)		
× Trust NGOs				0.090 (0.068)					0.039 (0.042)	
× Trust FROs					0.107 (0.069)					0.111*** (0.040)
Trust Prov. Gov.	0.013 (0.009)					0.006 (0.006)				
Trust Nat. Gov.		-0.002 (0.014)					-0.011 (0.011)			
Trust Chiefs			-0.018 (0.013)					-0.008 (0.008)		
Trust NGOs				0.014 (0.010)					0.006 (0.006)	
Trust FROs					-0.005 (0.015)					-0.013 (0.013)
× Income	0.090*** (0.031)	0.088*** (0.031)	0.091*** (0.031)	0.098*** (0.030)	0.087*** (0.031)	0.060*** (0.017)	0.059*** (0.017)	0.060*** (0.016)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.051*** (0.016)
× Education	0.094** (0.039)	0.093** (0.039)	0.089** (0.039)	0.082** (0.040)	0.089** (0.040)	0.028* (0.016)	0.028* (0.016)	0.026* (0.015)	0.022 (0.015)	0.026 (0.016)
× Gender	0.005 (0.028)	0.006 (0.028)	0.006 (0.027)	0.012 (0.027)	0.011 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.016)	0.000 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.016)
Income	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Gender	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Education	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Observations	455	453	478	474	453	455	453	478	474	453
R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.31	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.13
Control Mean	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Estimates from Equation 2. Coefficients display the results of an interaction term between assignment to the titling program and measures of respondents' trust in the provincial and national governments (columns 1-2), chiefs (column 3), NGOs (column 4), and foreign research organizations (column 5). All specifications are estimated using OLS and interactively control for income, gender, and education. Sample size is lower in some columns because of missing values in some of the outcome variables. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

## H Types of Titles Delivered

**Figure H.1:** Number of land titles by type




*Notes:* This figure shows the distribution of titles delivered by the program. Left panel: full sample. Right pane: restricted sample. This is discussed in Section 6.

## I Randomization Details

The randomization procedure was implemented in two different ways. First, for respondents sampled for the first time at baseline, we collected survey data and, after surveying was completed in a polygon, we randomly assigned treatment within that polygon, ensuring an equal proportion of respondents within a polygon were assigned to treatment and control.

**Figure I.1:** Neighborhoods of Kananga




*Notes:* This figure displays a sample of neighborhood divisions in Kananga, as discussed in Section 4.


Survey teams then revisited households selected for treatment to invite them to participate in the titling program. During those visits, respondents were given flyers with information about each formal document offered during the program (Figure I.2). Second, due to government demands to increase the speed at which we registered participants, we adopted an alternative approach, embedding the randomization procedure directly into the baseline survey. Treatment assignment occurred at the start of the survey and only the relevant sections of the titling offer would appear to those assigned to treatment. The only difference between this randomization process and the initial method is that, because of the real-time nature of randomization, it was not possible to randomize within polygons. However, the probability of being assigned to treatment remained 0.5.

Importantly, we first screened out individuals who were either ineligible or uninterested in learning more about the land titling program. Initially, the basic eligibility requirement was that a citizen already had any kind of document showing proof of land ownership, including expired land titles from the Mobutu period. The sample size resulting from the original criteria was 2,966, with 1,416 respondents in the treatment group. However, as the program progressed, the land titling office changed its definition of household eligibility. With these stricter criteria, the total number of eligible respondents dropped to 483, 268 of which had been originally assigned to treatment. In total, 2,347 respondents were excluded from the study due to the stricter criteria. See Section J for a more detailed description of these changes.

**Figure I.2:** Information flyer (intermediate price level). Flyers were delivered in French and Tshiluba (the local indigenous language in Kananga)



**PROFITEZ DE L'OCCASION: CAMPAGNE SUR LES TITRES DE PROPRIETE**



- Le gouvernement provincial lance une campagne pour encourager l'obtention des titres de propriété à Kananga. Dans le cadre de ses recherches scientifiques, Harvard-RDC voudrait faire la sensibilisation et l'évaluation de la campagne.
- Vous pouvez obtenir un document officiel à un prix promotionnel (une réduction jusqu' à 86% du prix normal).
- Un agent viendra chez vous pour faciliter les démarches, vous accompagnera au bâtiment administratif, et vous remettra le document en main propre.
- Vous gagnerez donc en temps et en argent.
- Vous avez été sélectionné(e) pour cette campagne. Cette offre est personnelle.

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**ACTE DE VENTE NOTARIE**

- L'acte de vente notarié vous permet de rendre votre acte de vente officiel.
- Il a plus de valeur légale que l'acte de vente non-notarié en cas de conflit concernant la propriété de votre parcelle ou la vente de celle-ci.

<b>PRIX PROMOTIONNEL</b> : 20 dollars (Prix fixe. Offre limitée à notre campagne de trois mois.) <i>Commencez à épargner !</i>	<b>PRIX NORMAL</b> : 145 dollars
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**CONTRAT DE LOCATION**

- Le contrat de location est un titre de propriété valable 3 ans et renouvelable.
- Il a plus de valeur légale que l'acte de vente notarié ou non-notarié en cas de conflit concernant la propriété de votre parcelle, ses limites, et aussi la vente de celle-ci.
- Nous proposons la réduction du prix du contrat de location et nous offrons un montant fixe au lieu du montant actuel, proportionnel à la taille de votre parcelle.


<b>PRIX PROMOTIONNEL</b> : 52 dollars (Prix fixe. Incluant 4 bornes. Offre limitée à notre campagne de trois mois.) <i>Commencez à épargner !</i>	<b>PRIX NORMAL</b> : prix proportionnel. Exemple : entre 200 dollars et 500 dollars (selon la grandeur de la parcelle.)
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**CERTIFICAT D'ENREGISTREMENT**

- Le certificat d'enregistrement est le titre de propriété par excellence.
- Il est inattaquable (après deux ans) en cas de conflit concernant la propriété ou les limites de votre parcelle, ou si vous désirez vendre celle-ci.
- Il a plus de valeur légale que le contrat de location ou l'acte de vente notarié ou non-notarié.
- L'obtention d'un certificat d'enregistrement est conditionnée à la mise en valeur (bâti d'au moins 10% de la parcelle en matériel durable).
- Le prix promotionnel remplace l'ancien prix proportionnel.

<b>PRIX PROMOTIONNEL</b> : 87 dollars (Prix fixe. Incluant 4 bornes. Offre limitée à notre campagne de trois mois.) <i>Commencez à épargner !</i>	<b>PRIX NORMAL</b> : prix proportionnel. Exemple : entre 300 dollars et 700 dollars (selon la grandeur de la parcelle.)
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Scellé par Titres Immobiliers

*Notes:* This figure displays the information flyers containing information on each land title concerned by the campaign, as discussed in Section 4.2.

## J Eligibility Criteria and Changes in Sample Size

At the beginning of the program, eligibility was determined using the following questions from the baseline survey: (i) “Do you have any titles concerning the ownership of the compound? If so, which ones?”, (ii) “I am gonna mention a list of documents. Please tell me if you or a family member have any of the following documents for this compound”, and (iii) “Would you

be interested in receiving a visit from this program?”.


Some changes in the eligibility criteria had to be made once the program was rolling. At the beginning of the titling program in June 2017, the Provincial Government declared that individuals having at least one of the titles below were eligible for any of the three titles offered: (i) *Certificat d’Enregistrement*, (ii) *Contrat de Location*, (iii) *Acte de Vente* (notarized or not), (iv) *Fiche Parcellaire*, (v) *Livret de Logeur*, (vi) *Autorisation d’Occupation*, (vii) *Certificat d’Occupation / Contrat de Concession*. As the program rolled out, we faced a set of political and legal hurdles.

1. Some respondents were deemed ineligible for the CE since their plot lacked sufficient built area.
2. Some respondents wanting to obtain a CE were declared ineligible if there already was a CE concerning the same plot. For example, if the previous owner already had a CE, the new owner would have to pay a fee equal to 3 percent of the property value in case he wanted to update the name on the original document.
3. Official documents (the *procès verbal*) needed to be signed by an official surveyor from the cadastral office Office. The surveyor insisted on revisiting households, distrusting the agents’ work during the first visit.
4. The land titling office decided to enact stricter eligibility criteria: (i) Respondents needed to have original version of all the previous land titles concerning their plot; (ii) Respondents needed to have an additional official document other than the *Acte de Vente*; (iii) A narrower set of extant titles was considered valid for eligibility: (a) *Certificat d’Enregistrement*, (b) *Contrat de Location*, (c) *Fiche Parcellaire*, (d) *Livret de Logeur*, and (e) *Autorisation d’Occupation*.

Then, using the pre-treatment characteristics measured at baseline, we restricted our sample to match the government’s new eligibility criteria in order to estimate the effect of the program on those who are ultimately able to benefit from it. To do so, we used the pre-treatment characteristics, both in the treatment and control group, to assess which respondents were truly eligible accordingly to the new criteria.

The sample size resulting from the original criteria was 3,078, with 1,486 respondents in the treatment group. Among those respondents eligible for a title, only 489 showed interested in receiving a visit from the cadastral and titling agents. However, with the stricter eligibility criteria, the total number of eligible respondents dropped to 483, among which 254 been originally assigned to treatment. In total, 2,595 respondents were excluded from the study due to the stricter criteria.

**Figure J.1:** Change in eligibility criteria.



*Notes:* This figure displays changes in sample size due to restrictions in the eligibility criteria implemented by the titling office, as discussed in Section J.

## **K Variable Descriptions and Index Construction**

- **Chief Evaluation:** This variable equals 1 if respondents think their chief has an above-median evaluation of the performance of their chief. The exact question from endline is: “Overall, how would you rate the performance of the chief?”
- **Chief Important:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median evaluation of the importance of their chief. The exact question from endline is: “To what degree do you think the work done by chief is important for the development of your *quartier* and Kananga in general?”
- **Responsive Chief:** This variable equals 1 if respondents think their chief has an above-median level of responsiveness. The exact survey question from baseline is: “To what degree does the avenue chief respond to the needs of your avenue’s inhabitants?”
- **Trust Neighborhood Chief:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median level of trust in the neighborhood chief. The exact question from endline is: “I am going to name a number of people or organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [Neighborhood chief]”
- **Trust Avenue Chief:** This variable equals 1 if respondents think their chief has an above-median level of trust in the avenue chief. The exact question from endline is: “I am going to name a number of people or organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [Avenue chief]”

- **Chief Corruption:** This variable equals 1 if respondents think the chief government would steal an above-median amount of money for an infrastructure project. The exact question from endline is: “Imagine that the chief is in charge of doing a public infrastructure project on your avenue. He receives \$1000. How much of this money will they put in their pockets?”
- **Salongo Evaluation and Participation:** An indicator that equals 1 if respondents report an above-median level in an index comprising the following variables: (1) respondents’ participation in *salongo* (at endline 1 and 2) and (2) respondents’ sense of whether *salongo* is fair. The exact survey questions are: “Did someone from your household participate in *salongo* in the past 30 days?” and “In your opinion, how fair is it that households in your neighborhood must contribute to *salongo*?”
- **ROSCA:** This variable equals 1 if respondents participates in a ROSCA. The exact survey question from baseline is: “Do any of the members of your household participate in a ROSCA?”
- **Participation in Mutual Aid:** This variable equals 1 if respondents participates in a mutual aid society. The exact survey question from baseline is: “Is anyone from your house a member of your mutualité?”
- **Contributions to Church:** This variable equals 1 if respondents give money to the church above the sample median. The exact survey question from baseline/endline is: “In the past thirty days how much money have you given to your church?”
- **Contributions to Weddings/Funerals:** This variable equals 1 if respondents give an above-median sum of money to weddings and funerals. The exact survey question from baseline/endline is: “In the past six months how much did your household give to others for weddings and funerals?”
- **Participation in Social Institutions:** A standardized index comprising the following variables: (1) participation in ROSCAs, (2) participation in mutual aid societies, (3) contributions to church, (4) contributions to weddings/funerals.
- **View on Chiefs:** A standardized index comprising the following variables: (1) chief evaluation, (2) chief responsive, (3) chief important, (4) chief corrupt, (5) trust in neighborhood chief, and (6) trust in avenue chief.
- **Crowd-out Informal Institutions:** A standardized index comprising the following indicators: (1) whether the respondent belongs to a rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA), whether the respondent belongs to a mutual aid society, (3) whether the respondent donated money to her church in the last 30 days, (4) whether the respondent donated money for weddings or funerals in the past six months, and (5) whether the respondent or someone in her household contributed to *salongo* in the last 30 days.
- **Property Value:** Predicted property value of each property in the sample (in Congolese Francs). See [Bergeron et al. \(2020\)](#).



- **Income:** Respondents' income in Congolese Francs. The exact baseline survey question is "What was the household's total earnings this past month?"
- **Education:** Respondents' years of education. The exact baseline survey question is "What is the highest level of school you have reached?"
- **Migrant:** An indicator of whether the respondent was born in Kananga or is a migrant. The exact baseline survey question is "Have you always lived in Kananga?"
- **Gender:** This variable equals 1 if the respondent declared their gender to be Female.
- **Chief Name:** This variable equals 1 if respondents know the full name of their chief or part of their name. The exact survey question from baseline is: "What is the name of your chief?"
- **Chief Number:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have the phone number of their chief. The exact survey question from baseline is: "Do you have the phone number of the chief?"
- **Established Chief:** This variable equals 1 if the chief had been appointed more than ten years ago at the time of the survey.
- **Political Party Member:** This variable equals 1 if the answers to the question "Have you ever been a member of a political party?" are "Yes-I am currently a member" or "Yes-I used to be a member, but am not."
- **Ruling Party Member:** This variable equals 1 if the chief reports being affiliated with the ruling party (PPRD).
- **Salongo Frequency:** This variable equals 1 if the chief organizes *salongo* above the median frequency. The exact survey question from the chief survey is: "How many times per month do you typically organize *salongo*?"
- **Government Performance:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median opinion of the provincial government's performance. The exact question from endline is: "How would you rate the performance of the provincial government in Kananga?"
- **Government Corruption:** This variable equals 1 if respondents think the provincial government would steal an above-median amount of tax revenues. The exact question from endline is: "Now I would like to ask you what you think the provincial government will do with the money it receives thanks to taxes. Imagine that the provincial government of Kasai Central receives \$1000. How much of this money will be used on the well being of the population? [Diversion of funds and waste]"
- **Government Responsiveness:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median opinion of the provincial government's responsiveness. The exact question from endline is: "To what degree does the provincial government respond to the needs of your avenue's inhabitants?"

- **Erased Tax Code:** This variable equals 1 if respondents erased a tax code written with chalk for the purpose of a tax collection campaign described in [Weigel \(2020\)](#).
- **Political Participation:** An index comprising the following binary indicators capturing whether in the last year the respondent: (1) attended a political party meeting, (2) attended a community meeting, (3) joined or participated in the meetings of a civic association, such as a club, a union or a NGO, (4) voted in the 2018 national election, (5) met with a politician, and (6) met with a bureaucrat.
- **Contact Formal vs. Informal Authorities:** This variable captures the difference between the following two indexes. Contact Formal Authorities: An index comprising the following items: (1) whether the respondent would be willing to get help from the government in case of a land dispute, (2) frequency with which the respondent reaches out to the a city offer (*bourgmestre*), (3) frequency with which the respondent reached out to the police or court in case of a land dispute, and (3) frequency with which the respondent reached out to a deputy in case of a land dispute. Contact Informal Authorities: An index comprising the following items: (1) frequency with which the respondent reaches out to a priest in case of a land dispute, (2) frequency with which the respondent reaches out to the thunderman in case of a land dispute, and (3) frequency with which the respondent reaches out to the avenue chief in case of a land dispute, and (4) frequency with which the respondent reaches out to a neighbor in case of a land dispute.
- **Formalization Spillovers:** An index comprising the following binary indicators: whether the respondent obtained (1) a drivers' license, (2) a work permit, (3) a business permit, and (4) a birth certificate.
- **Beliefs:** An index comprising the following indicators: (1) level of envy of a hypothetical neighbor towards someone who holds a title, (2) level of envy by family members towards someone who hypothetically holds a title, (3) level of belief by a hypothetical titleholder that his neighbors or family will practice witchcraft against her, (4) belief that business success is due to supernatural as opposed to natural causes.
- **Land disputes:** This variable equals 1 for above-median values of an index comprising two variables: (1) the frequency of disputes about household ownership and (2) whether the respondent wrote an inscription on the compound walls to secure it. The exact questions from endline are: "How many times has a member of your household had a dispute about the ownership of this compound?" and "Did you ever write on the walls of this compound to prevent your compound being sold?"
- **Hunger:** This variable equals 1 if respondents report experiencing hunger due to liquidity constraints. The exact question from endline is: "In the past 30 days, has your household had to go to bed feeling hungry because you haven't had enough money on hand?"
- **Subjective Well-Being:** This variable equals 1 if respondents feel an above-median level of subjective-well being. The exact question from endline is: "Imagine 5 steps, where on

the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people on the avenue, and on the highest step, the fifth stand the richest people on the avenue.”

- **Health Access:** This variable equals 1 if respondents report having access access to health services.
- **Education Access:** This variable equals 1 if respondents report having access access to schools.
- **Pension:** This variable equals 1 if respondents report having access access to a retirement fund or pension.
- **Affected by Conflict:** This variable equals 1 if respondents give a positive answer to the question “Has anyone living on your street been hurt or killed because of the conflict in Kasa i.”
- **Colonial Footprint:** An indicator that equals 1 if a respondent’s household is located within the boundaries of colonial Kananga (Luluabourg).
- **Customary Land:** An indicator that equals 1 if a respondent’s household is located in one of the four customary areas in Kananga.
- **Trust Provincial Government:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median level of trust in the Provincial Government .The exact question from baseline is: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [the provincial government]”
- **Help from Government:** This variable equals 1 if respondents report above-median likelihood of getting help from the government in case of a property dispute. The exact question from baseline is: “Imagine your neighbors do not have any property title. Do you think they will be fear the following things [Get help from the government in the case of a property dispute].”
- **Trust Chief:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median level of trust in city chiefs .The exact question from baseline is: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [the avenue chief]”
- **Chief Taxes:** This variable equals 1 if the chief gives a positive answer to the question “Have you ever collected taxes in Kananga?”
- **Chief Taxes:** This variable equals 1 if the chief gives a positive answer to the question “Do chiefs ever get replaced/fired by the government?”

- **Envy:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median level of envy. The exact survey question from baseline is: “Imagine a man possesses an official land document/title. How much envious of his situation will his neighbors be?”
- **Altruism:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median level of altruism. The exact question from baseline is: “Imagine a man named Kabeya receives 20,000 CF from an NGO. How much do you think Kabeya should share with others?”
- **Reciprocity:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median level of reciprocity. The exact question from baseline is: “Imagine a man named Badibanga asks his neighbor Tshimbalanga for \$20 to help pay for his child’s school fees. Shortly thereafter Badibanga repays the debt. Later Tshimbalanga comes to Badibanga and asks to borrow \$30 to buy a ticket to return to the family village. Badibanga has the money but he refuses. How acceptable is Badibanga’s decision?”
- **Trust National Government:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median level of trust in the Provincial Government .The exact question from baseline is: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [the national government (in Kinshasa)]”
- **Trust NGOs:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median level of trust in NGOs .The exact question from baseline is: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [NGOs]”
- **Trust FROs:** This variable equals 1 if respondents have an above-median level of trust in foreign research organizations .The exact question from baseline is: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [foreign research organizations]”

## L Ethical Considerations

The design of this study involved careful consideration of the potential risks to participants. In the following sections, we provide details on these risks and how we endeavored to minimize them, as well as the ethics review process we undertook.

**IRB Approval.** We obtained approval from our institution’s IRB, before commencing field research. Our submission outlined the experimental design and included all survey instruments, consent forms, and other material needed to judge the potential risks and benefits to research participants. Although the D.R. Congo does not have a national ethics board, we sought out local ethical approval from the oldest and most highly regarded university in Kananga, the University of Notre-Dame du Kasai. We submitted the same set of materials and our IRB

protocol to the academic dean of the university, who wrote a letter stating that “the project does not hurt the local culture nor its sensitivity” and will “help to understand the importance of private property and that of having in an easy way the title of it”. We received a formal approval letter in 2017.

**Compensation.** Randomly sampled participants in the surveys we administered received compensation to thank them for their time. They were informed of the compensation during the consent, and then received the compensation at the end of the survey. Participants received approximately USD\$2 per hour of survey. Thus, the baseline survey took roughly 1 hour, and individuals received USD\$2. The endline survey took 90–120 minutes, and individuals received USD\$4. We have used a similar survey respondent compensation amount in Kananga since 2013. We chose this amount based on how other international organizations had compensated survey respondents in the city in the past.

**Risks and benefits.** The land titling campaign concerned 483 eligible households—a small cross-section of a population of about 1.6 million. It therefore did not eliminate the possibility of getting a title outside of the program via the status quo procedure during or after the campaign. On an individual level, our focus groups revealed that land titles are highly valued, as reflected by the high demand elicited by the program. While we do not detect effects on perceptions of tenure security, the results we report are short-run, and formal titles do in fact enhance tenure security in the case of land disputes. At the government level, the program helped increase revenue despite lower fees, as in the status quo very few citizens obtain formal land titles. The proceeds coming from land titles are shared between the national and provincial governments according to a formula unknown to the research team. We also conducted technical trainings with the personnel of the Land Titling and Cadastral offices who worked on the titling campaign, which should prove useful should the government decide to expand the campaign and continue to facilitate the titling process. We view these trainings as important investments in the technical capacity of the provincial government. None of this involvement relates to the experimental variation we study in the research. Lastly, in 2017 the national government issued an official note outlining guidelines to facilitate the process along lines similar to our campaign, by capping prices and simplifying the process. The findings coming from our study could thus inform the implementation of larger-scale titling programs.

## **M Note on Pre-Registration**

The Pre-Analysis Plan was pre-registered on the AEA RCT Registry (RCT ID: redacted for peer review) and EGAP. Below we note the parallels between the hypotheses in these paper and the hypotheses in the original PAP, as well as departures from the PAP.

- **Empirical Implication 1** on the heterogeneous effects of vertical and social institutions on formalization corresponds to **H23** and **H24** in the PAP. However, those hypotheses contained the opposite prediction: that citizens more embedded in networks of formal insurance, those with closer connections to the avenue chief, and those with more active chiefs (in terms of the organization of *salongo*) would have lower demand for land ti-

ties. After learning more about the institutional environment during fieldwork, it became clear that the working of informal institutions was more nuanced, and that the opposite predictions could also be justified theoretically.

- **Empirical Implication 2** on the crowding-out of informal institutions corresponds to **H8** in the PAP. The PAP also contains hypothesis about crowding-out mechanisms of conflict resolution (**H7**) and traditional beliefs (**H12**), spillovers onto other types of formalization (**H9**), political participation (**H11**), all of which are tested in this paper.
- The PAP also pre-specifies heterogeneous take-up by individual socioeconomic status (**H18**) and neighborhood levels of state capacity (**H21** and **H28**).