

# Policy Deliberation and Voter Persuasion: Experimental Evidence from an Election in the Philippines

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## Abstract

In a randomized experiment in cooperation with two national parties competing in a congressional election in the Philippines, we estimate the causal effect on voting behavior of a town-hall style campaign in which candidates discuss their campaign platform with small groups of citizens. Keeping the parties' platform fixed, we find that town-hall meetings have a positive effect on parties' vote shares compared to the status quo, in which voters play a passive role. Consistent with the parties' advocacy for underprivileged groups, we observe heterogeneous effects by income, education and gender. Deliberative campaigns increase voters' awareness on the issues parties campaign on, affecting the vote of the direct beneficiaries of the parties' platform.

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# 1 Introduction

Normative proponents of a participatory approach to political decision-making suggest that deliberation can lead to revelatory discussion and the resolution of political conflicts (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Habermas 1996; Macedo 2010). On purely instrumental grounds, deliberation may be an avenue through which individuals can share private information prior to collective decision-making, helping voters to implement more informed choices. (Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006; Coughlan 2000; Meirowitz 2006). Moreover, the opportunity to discuss relevant issues might provide citizens the motivation to actively become more informed about policy and act on this information (Esterling, Neblo and Lazer [2011]). In fact, laboratory and observational evidence has shown that policy choices can be more effective in changing attitudes, eliciting information and encouraging cooperation when they are chosen through deliberative settings (Ban, Jha and Rao 2012; Barabas 2004; Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman 2010; Goeree and Yariv 2011; Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014).

In principle, if deliberative forums can increase citizens' incentives to become more informed and affect their political behavior, it might be in the interest of politicians to use them as an electoral strategy to persuade voters of the merits of a desired alternative, offering a bridge between the practice of deliberative democracy and the domain of electoral politics.

Empirically, assessing the potential benefits of implementing deliberative forums on a politician's electoral prospects is challenging, as these could be confounded with other factors that might affect both the behaviors of politicians and citizens. In general, the effect that any political strategy might have on voting behavior is a function of the platform message, the communication strategy, the intrinsic traits of the politician, and the audience characteristics. Therefore, being able to disentangle whether and to what extent deliberation affects voting behavior requires manipulating the communication strategy of the campaign, while keeping fixed any other relevant variable that might affect voting

behavior. In this study, we implement such an experimental design by randomizing the assignment of town-hall meetings to different areas, while keeping campaign platforms fixed.

The implementation of the experiment involved the cooperation of two national party-lists competing for representation in the legislative election of May, 2013 in the Philippines. Importantly, the two party-lists with which we collaborated claimed to represent and advocate for distinct societal groups—namely women in one platform and the urban poor in another —emphasizing distinct legislative policies favorable to each of these groups in their campaign platforms. This allows us to measure the impact of town-hall meetings on the subset of voters that are more susceptible to the information contained in the campaign messages. Moreover, the Filipino party-list contest is ideal to assess the effect of deliberative forums on electoral returns, as it permit us to focus on a type of party that distinguishes itself programatically from the mainstream political organizations that compete in other legislative, presidential and local mayoral elections, where clientelistic practices, corruption, and vote buying have been widespread in the recent past (e.g., [Hicken et al. \[2014\]](#)).<sup>1</sup>

The treatment we implement manipulates the communication strategy for each party-list platform. First, we design a deliberative campaign in which the party-list message was communicated in town-hall meetings, where voters and party representatives discussed and debated the party-list platform and its potential implementation. The communication strategy in control villages was the “business-as-usual” campaign that parties implemented elsewhere. The same policy platform discussed in town-hall meetings was

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<sup>1</sup>According to law, 20 percent of congressional seats are reserved for minority groups. To fill these seats, voters do not choose candidates to represent their electoral districts, as in the first-past-the-post race that apportions the remainder 80 percent of Congress, but for “party-lists” in a closed-list (CL), proportional representation (PR) system. In other words, voters on Election Day cast two different votes for legislative representation, one for their candidate in their district and one for their preferred party-list at the national level.

also delivered through “one-way” communication technologies, such as the distribution of party propaganda and speeches in party rallies, with no direct participation of voters or debate between party representatives and citizens.

In the control group, we explicitly did not introduce any restriction on the communication strategy of party-lists except that town-hall meetings were not to be implemented.<sup>2</sup> In this way, we ensure that our results are not driven by an artificial condition imposed on politicians that could differ greatly from the way they would usually campaign.

Second, party-lists were randomly assigned to different areas and a treatment subset of these areas set up two or three town-hall meetings with around 40 participants each. This random assignment allowed us to control for the effect that intrinsic party characteristics might have had on voting behavior. We do this by focusing only on the electoral prospects of a given party-list in treatment versus control areas.

Given the random assignment of a deliberative campaign strategy, we examine whether the presence of town-hall meetings, in which citizens are encouraged to deliberate with candidates about policy, affects voters’ attitudes and political behavior differently than the “business-as-usual” campaign.

We argue that the favorable conditions to engage with both politicians and other citizens in town-hall meetings can improve voters’ knowledge about the private benefits and externalities of programmatic policies advocated by different candidates. This information in turn, might generate a benchmark or focal point with which to evaluate politicians. The increase in voters’ awareness about the candidate’s policies and its consequences on different societal groups might translate into an increase in votes from those citizens whose most-preferred policy is closer to the party’s platform.

Our main results show that town-hall meetings have a positive effect on both official

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<sup>2</sup>It is important to note here that deliberative campaigns, as the ones we designed for this experiment, were not part of the campaign strategy of any of the involved party-lists, either in past elections or prior to their agreement to cooperate with the experiment.

and self-reported measures of electoral support. Conditioning on casting a vote, party-lists increased their official vote shares around 46 percent with respect to the control group in those areas assigned to the deliberative campaign. In this context, we do not find that holding town-hall meetings increases turnout, as other campaign strategies, such as face-to-face voter mobilization, appear to do (Gerber and Green 2000; Green, Gerber and Nickerson 2003). This is not surprising, however, as we measure turnout as casting a valid vote in the party-list election, which occurs concurrently with the election to other offices (e.g., House, senatorial, mayoral and provincial elections). To the extent these other races are the main forces driving voters to the polls, no effects on party-list turnout would be expected.

When we analyze potential heterogeneous effects of town-hall meetings by party-list and socio-demographic characteristics using a post-election survey, we find positive and significant electoral returns of town-hall meetings only for women when the party-list that is campaigning is the one running a feminist platform (i.e., Akbayan party). Similarly, we find a positive and significant effect of the implementation of town-hall meetings only on poor and less educated voters when the party-list that is campaigning is the one running the pro-poor platform (i.e., Umalab Ka party).

Along with the impact on voting behavior, we find a widespread attitudinal change on the issues at the center of the party-list platforms when they are delivered via deliberation. On the one hand, voters exposed to the pro-feminist platform in town-hall meetings increased their disagreement with gender discrimination and sexism by 0.43 standard deviation units with respect to the control group. On the other hand, voters exposed to the pro-poor platform were 0.13 standard deviation units more concerned about poverty-related issues when town-hall meetings were in place compared to “business-as-usual” campaigns.

These results confirm that deliberative campaigns are indeed an effective way of delivering a campaign message and affect voters’ attitudes towards relevant policy issues.

More importantly, the heightened knowledge and awareness of policy proposals in town-hall meetings has relevant consequences on citizen's voting behavior, specifically persuading those voters who would directly benefit from the party's platform to cast a vote in their favor.

Our analysis follows a burgeoning empirical literature implementing randomized field experiments in actual campaigns with the collaboration of politicians. Our paper is closely related to [Fujiwara and Wantchekon \[2013\]](#), who find that programmatic platforms delivered through a deliberative campaign reduce the perception of clientelism and increase electoral returns. Although this paper makes a contribution on the relevance of platform transparency, it is unable to isolate the effect of deliberation from that of the platform content itself, as the latter also changes by treatment status.<sup>3</sup> In contrast, our experiment focuses on an electoral race where parties can only implement legislation in Congress and do not hold discretionary power to offer any type of particularistic spending. Thus, the legislative platform offered by parties' representatives remains fixed in both treatment and control areas, allowing us to isolate the effect of deliberative campaigns.

In the context of U.S. congressional elections, [Esterling, Neblo and Lazer \[2011\]](#) use a deliberative field experiment to assess whether debating with incumbent representatives increases participants' knowledge about policy issues. The authors find that participating in a deliberating session with the politician motivate constituents to become more informed about policy-relevant issues. In Nigeria, [Collier and Vicente \[2014\]](#) show experimental evidence that the implementation of a campaign against electoral violence through the holding of town meetings and popular theatre was able to decrease violence perception in local elections, improve citizen empowerment, and increase voter turnout.

[Casey, Glennester and Bidwell \[2015\]](#) measure the impact of voters' exposure to can-

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<sup>3</sup>Under deliberation, candidates and voters debated about a universalistic platform that emphasized the national benefits of policies, whereas under the "business-as-usual" campaign, candidates offered a mix of clientelistic goods (cash distribution, patronage, and discretionary spending), as well as universalistic policies.

didates' debates on voting behavior, campaign spending, and politicians' performance using a field experiment in Sierra Leone. The authors find that exposure to debates results in a higher number of votes cast. Unlike our treatment that facilitates deliberation between parties' representatives and voters, they focus on the interaction between candidates from different parties and the subsequent exposure of these debates to voters.

Finally, our paper is related to the works of [Kendall, Nannicini and Trebbi \[2015\]](#) and [Dewan, Humphreys and Rubenson \[2014\]](#) that experimentally assess the effects of different informational campaign treatments on voting behavior. Unlike our paper, their messages did not involve a deliberative setting. Instead, they manipulated the content of the messages themselves, making them either about the candidate's valence or ideology.

## 2 Party List Electoral System

Since the reinstatement of electoral democracy in 1986, the Philippines' political system has been formally composed of a presidential executive and a bicameral legislative body. The Senate is composed of 24 members elected every six years, whereas the House of Representatives is composed of 292 members elected every three years. A new constitution was drafted in 1987 that reapportioned congressional districts, reduced the term lengths for members of the House of Representatives, and introduced term limits for all elected officials. In addition, and with the intention of strengthening the party system, advancing programmatic-based parties, and reducing the elite monopoly of political power, the 1987 Constitution mandated that 20 percent of the lower House should be composed of representatives of marginalized societal groups such as "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals, and other such sectors as may be provided by law, except

the religious sector" (Article VI; Section 5.2).<sup>4</sup> However, it was not until 1995 that this mandate was implemented via the Party-List System Act, which stated that "the State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system. . . which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. . . to become members of the House of Representatives" (Sec. 2). In practice, Party-List seats in Congress are allocated via a closed-list proportional representation election at the national level. The Philippines' Commission of Elections (COMELEC) is in charge of certifying whether a political organization that seeks Party-List status is organized along one of the abovementioned sectoral groups. As a prerequisite, a political organization needs to submit an ordered list of at least five candidates, who need to be registered voters older than 25 years, and *bona fide* members of the organization nominating them. Party-list candidates cannot be nominated by more than one party, nor run for other elective offices in the same election. In addition, those candidates who lost a race in the immediate preceding election cannot run under the party-list system. Beyond these requirements, there are no formal quotas by category of disadvantaged group and any legislative seat allocated to the Party-list system can be occupied by any of these political organizations.

For the Party-List election, a voter chooses one party via closed list and each party that receives 2 percent of the party-list vote at the national level is entitled to one seat and an additional seat for every 2 percent thereafter, for a maximum of three seats per party-list. Therefore, every three years at each election, voters cast two votes for the House of Representatives, one for their district representative via plurality rule and one for a national party-list.

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<sup>4</sup>The remaining 80% of seats are allocated by simple majority from single-member districts apportioned among the Philippines' provinces and cities.



### 3 Experimental Design

The campaign experiment we analyze here focuses on the party-list election that took place on May 13, 2013. In this election, 58 out of 289 congress seats were allocated for party-list representatives among more than 130 registered parties. Two party-lists collaborated in the campaign field experiment: Akbayan, Citizens' Action Party and Umalab Ka.

Akbayan is one of the most prominent party-lists nationwide and the more established of the two participants in the experiment. It has consistently won at least one seat since its founding in 1998, and has been one of the five most successful party-lists, of the more than 100 registered at the national level.

Founded as a left pluralist national party, Akbayan is a multi-sectoral party comprised of labor, peasants, urban poor, women, LGBT, and youth organizations. In the 2013 campaign, however, Akbayan's message focused heavily on women. This was because Akbayan wanted to capitalize on a recent high-profile legislative victory concerning reproductive rights, as well as on its candidate for Senator, a well-known feminist activist.<sup>5</sup> In the May 2013 election, Akbayan was able to secure around 2.9 percent of the popular vote at the national level, which translated into two seats in the House of Representatives.

In contrast, Umalab Ka, although formally founded in 2003, did not participate in a party-list election until 2013. This party-list is composed mainly of urban poor organizations and informal sector workers (i.e., drivers, street vendors, and house servants). As a political organization, Umalab Ka has dealt in the past with issues such as the demolition of informal settlers' dwellings, discussions with government agencies about the plight of the urban poor and other peripheral issues that directly affect the lives of informal workers and other marginalized sectors in society. The primary legislative agenda of Umalab Ka includes the creation of a Magna Carta to protect workers in the informal sector.<sup>6</sup> In

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<sup>5</sup>The platform and constitution of the Akbayan party-list can be found at [www.akbayan.org.ph](http://www.akbayan.org.ph).

<sup>6</sup>The entire legislative agenda of the Umalab Ka party-list can be found at [www.facebook.com/notes/](https://www.facebook.com/notes/)

the 2013 election, Umalab Ka won around 0.16 percent of the national vote and therefore was not able to secure any representatives in Congress.

### 3.1 Sample Selection

The implementation of the experiment took place in two densely populated regions in the Philippines: the National Capital Region (NCR), which comprises Manila City and its suburbs, and the neighboring Calabarzon region. The evaluation of the campaign experiment focuses on electoral returns and self-reported voting behavior from 39 randomly selected barangays out of 13 municipalities following a two-stage cluster sampling. Electoral *barangays* are subdivisions of municipalities equivalent to U.S. wards and headed by barangay captains. As shown in Figure A.1 in Appendix A, we randomly selected 7 out of 17 municipalities from the NCR and 6 out of 90 municipalities from Calabarzon.<sup>7</sup> For each municipality selected in its respective region (i.e., either NCR or Calabarzon), we randomly chose three barangays and assign one of these to the treatment group and the remaining two to the control group. At this second stage, and to avoid the risk of contamination between treatment and control groups, we replaced a selected barangay and resampled another from the universe of barangays at each municipality whenever the distance between any two selected barangays was less than 1.5 kilometers. This procedure is repeated until no proximate barangays are selected. Finally, we randomly assigned the selected municipalities to each of the two party-lists involved in the experiment.

The local non-governmental organization, the Center for Popular Empowerment (CPE) was in charge of implementing the field experiment. It is important to note that, from the initial random selection of municipalities and barangays, the research team of CPE made some adjustments in the sample selection due to logistic difficulties encountered in the

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umalab-ka-partylist.

<sup>7</sup>On average, there are 58 and 25 barangays per municipality in NCR and Calabarzon, respectively. NCR accounts for 49.54 percent of the population of both regions, while Calabarzon accounts for 51.46 percent.

field while implementing the town-hall meetings. First, in the selected municipalities of Marikina and Valenzuela, the town-hall meeting organizers switched the originally selected control barangay for the treatment barangay.<sup>8</sup> The reason behind this decision was that the incumbent officials associated with another party-list ("Alay Buhay") were hostile to the CPE research team and blocked the implementation of town-hall meetings in the originally selected treatment units. This issue made it impossible to organize and announce scheduled meetings before the election at other randomized selected barangays. In these cases, both party-lists used their presence at the originally selected controls to organize the series of town-hall meetings. Second, in the municipality of Luisiana, the original treatment barangay, San Roque, could not be reached by the party-list Umalab Ka given the difficulties posed by the local authorities to implement the meetings. Instead, meetings were held in the barangays of San Diego and San Antonio, chosen by the party-list representatives themselves. Given these compliance issues, all of our analyses aimed at assessing the effectiveness of deliberative campaigns estimates both intention-to-treat effects (ITT), using assigned treatment rather than implemented treatment, and complier average causal effects (CACE), instrumenting treatment status with the original random assignment.

Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A present the sample of selected barangays for each municipality and the treatment status for each participating party-list.

### **3.2 Treatment Barangays**

In advance of the implementation of town-hall meetings, one representative from CPE conducted a series of meetings with the party-list representatives to instruct them on the specifications of the protocol they had to follow in treatment barangays.

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<sup>8</sup>In Marikina, town-hall meetings were implemented in the originally control unit, Barangka, instead of the selected treatment barangay Concepcion Dos. In Valenzuela, town-hall meetings were implemented in Punturin instead of the originally selected treatment barangay Isla.

A team of one organizer from CPE along with party-list members (mainly nominees and leading officers) implemented two or three town-hall meetings, each with around 40 participants, during the period between April 21 and May 9 of election year.<sup>9</sup> A staff of approximately four CPE staff members, along with party-list representatives, deployed teams a week in advance of the scheduled meetings to inform potential voters door-to-door and in public areas about the location, date, and time of the town-hall meetings. At the time of the implementation, every citizen who wished to attend a meeting was offered a place in the town-hall. On average, the town-hall meetings lasted between 90–120 minutes, and were divided in three stages: Introduction (10–15 minutes); deliberation (70–95 minutes); and resolution and commitment (10 minutes).

At the introduction stage, the CPE representative gave a brief explanation of the purpose of the party-list electoral system. In general, the audience was informed of the value of electing a party-list representative as differentiated from a district representative, mainly in that its objective is to give political representation to marginalized societal sectors.

Second, the party-list representative gave an introductory speech containing its platform and programmatic statement, following as a guideline a homogenous statement previously designed by the party-list officials and transmitted to its nominees. Akbayan's representative explained the services that the party provides to its members and its legislative accomplishments. The party-list representative highlighted Akbayan's role in passing the Responsible Parenthood Law, explaining how the law would help marginalized women. At this stage, Umalab Ka representatives stated that, if elected, they would push for the creation of laws aimed at protecting the urban poor, such as legislation to address price stabilizations on basic commodities during natural disasters and laws to

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<sup>9</sup>In the case of Akbayan, the National Secretary General Conrad Castillo coordinated the town-hall meeting implementation with CPE and instructed the party's nominees about the protocols to follow. In the case of Umalab Ka, National Secretary General Rosel Vargas coordinated the town-hall meeting implementation with CPE, but also personally led all the town-hall meetings.

give job security to informal workers.

The deliberation stage usually consisted of several rounds of questions/comments, in which participants were encouraged to suggest amendments to the original policies presented by the party-lists and to give new proposals that could potentially be included in the party-list platform. town-hall meeting participants had no restrictions to debate the policy proposals among themselves and with the candidates. For example, at a meeting conducted by Akbayan in the barangay of San Diego in the city of Luisiana, a young participant raised the concern that it was common for parties to make a lot of promises, but he wanted to know exactly what, if elected, Akbayan would do. The party representative clarified that, as members of Congress, they would be involved in crafting meaningful policies and would be involved in the drafting of the budget process, as it is determined by Congress at the national level. At another meeting conducted by Umalab Ka in the barangay Santo Rosario-Silangan, a woman raised the issue of land property that affected many households in that barangay. She shared her fear that her home would be demolished, as she did not have a property title. The Umalab Ka representative emphasized that one of their main objectives, if elected, was to reform the Urban Development and Housing Act to better regulate informal settling and help women like her.

At the resolution and commitment stage, the CPE representative summarized the main proposals of the party-list and the main issues raised during deliberation. At this stage, the party-list representative made a commitment to the participants to transmit the summary report of the meeting to the party-list leaders and candidates with their suggestions and proposals.

It is worth emphasizing that in each of the town-hall meetings implemented in the treatment barangays, there was no cash or any other type of valuable gift distributed to the meeting attendees. Both party-lists only distributed flyers and attached posters and banners at the meeting locations.

### 3.3 Control Barangays

In those barangays assigned to the control group, there were no instructions to party-list representatives on what campaign strategy to follow. The only restriction was that town-hall meetings were not to be implemented. In fact, both party-lists followed the “business-as-usual” strategy, which they have followed elsewhere to mobilize voters.

The only relevant distinction between control “barangays” and those not selected in the randomization protocol is that in the latter, we were able to monitor the presence and campaign efforts of both party-lists involved in the experiment.<sup>10</sup> CPE engaged 4 field researchers to monitor the campaign strategy of party-lists at each control barangay. The reports from the field indicate that both parties deployed mobile propaganda teams using a sound system roving within the barangays asking people for their vote. In addition, party-lists followed a door-to-door campaign, in which party-list volunteers distributed flyers to households.

Finally, party-lists organized around one public event in each control barangay to mobilize voters. These events took the form of rallies attended mainly by party members. The average size of these rallies usually exceeded 100 participants, notably higher than any of the town-hall meetings implemented in treatment barangays. In terms of the interaction between candidate and voters, party rallies are what we call “one-way communication” campaigns, in which only party-list leaders engaged the audience with a message containing the party’s policy platform, without the possibility that attendees speak directly to the candidate.

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<sup>10</sup>In addition, COMELEC does not disclose the electoral returns of the party-list election at the barangay level. In order to obtain this official information for treatment and control barangays we had to collect the electoral results from each polling precinct the weeks after the election. This data would have been unfeasible to collect for all the untreated barangays at each municipality.

## 4 Data


We use two types of data for the evaluation of the field experiment. To quantify the treatment effect of the presence of town-hall meetings on voting behavior, we use official data reported by COMELEC at the precinct level, a lower level electoral unit than the barangay. We aggregate this data to construct barangay-level measures of electoral returns (i.e., turnout and vote shares). Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A present the official information on turnout and vote shares at the general and at the party-list elections for the barangays assigned to Akbayan and Umalab Ka, respectively. On average, turnout for the general election was around 75 percent of registered voters, whereas the turnout for the party-list election was around 60 percent.<sup>11</sup>

Figure 1 presents the number of potential voters who attended at least one town-hall meeting in treatment barangays as a proportion of both the number of registered voters and the party-list voters for the 2013 election. On average, meeting attendees accounted for 5 percent of potential voters and 8 percent of party-list voters. There is, however, a huge amount of variation in the proportion of meeting attendees across barangays. On highly populated barangays such as Payatas and Ususan, meetings attendees accounted for barely 0.5 percent of party-list voters, whereas in barangays with a smaller number of voters like Barangay 738 or Lalakay, meeting attendees accounted for more than 25 percent of the electorate. In our analysis of official electoral returns, we address the variation in meeting attendance at the barangay level. First, we show the differential impact of town-hall meetings by the size of the electorate and then we present the heterogeneous

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<sup>11</sup>Even though party-list elections are concurrent to legislative district elections, low turnout has been a concern since the implementation of the Party-List system. For instance, in the first Party-List election in 1998, only 33% of voters cast a valid vote for a party-list. This has been attributed to a lack of awareness from the Philippines electorate and an inefficient campaign of dissemination and information from the government regarding the Party-List system. In our survey of individual voters, 17% of respondents said to be unaware of the existence of the Party-List system.

effect of town-hall meetings as a function of the proportion of attendees.



**Figure 1: Proportion of Town-Hall Meetings’ Attendees.** Number of meeting attendees is obtained from the attendance sheets CPE collected at every town-hall meeting. The number of registered voters is obtained from the COMELEC official statistics of the 2010 legislative election. The number of party-list voters is also obtained from COMELEC, for the 2013 election. The red dashed lines depict the mean attendance proportion across barangays.

In order to estimate differential effects of town hall meetings by voters’ characteristics, as well as potential mechanisms, we analyze individual-level data for a subset of treatment and control barangays using a post-electoral survey that CPE implemented two weeks after the election.<sup>12</sup> This survey covers standard demographic characteristics, self-reported voting behavior, town-hall meeting attendance, and political attitudes for a total of 1314 Filipino citizens of voting age.<sup>13</sup>

For this survey, CPE followed a “random walk” and quota sampling procedure, with an intended quota of 40 respondents per barangay. In control and treatment barangays,

<sup>12</sup>The municipalities that were excluded from the survey analysis because CPE did not sample respondents in both treatment and control barangays are Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria.

<sup>13</sup>The effective sample that we use in the analysis is of 1082 citizens, which excludes those respondents who did not give a valid response for the turnout question. The main individual results are qualitatively similar when we replicate them using a balanced survey data via multiple imputation (King et al. [2001]) as can be seen in Appendix E.



enumerators sampled households following a “random walk” starting from the barangay’s town-hall in control areas and from the location of the town-hall meetings in treatment barangays.<sup>14</sup>

Given its non-representative sampling procedure, the post-electoral survey does not reflect the sociodemographic characteristics of potential voters at the barangay-level. The presence of sampling biases, along with the lack of census data at the barangay level, prevents us from directly comparing the aggregate electoral returns to the individual-level survey responses. Nevertheless, the post-electoral survey is a valuable source of voters’ characteristics and attitudes to assess under what conditions deliberative campaigns were more effective for delivering a political platform to voters.

## 5 Barangay Level Results

We evaluate the effect of town-hall meetings (i.e., treatment) on aggregate voting behavior at the barangay-level on two main electoral outcomes: party-list turnout (as a proportion of registered voters) and vote shares (as a proportion of total party-list votes), both obtained from official results provided by COMELEC.

The random assignment process of the campaign treatment makes identification of the ITT of town-hall meetings on aggregate electoral returns straightforward using the following regression of the observed electoral return  $Y_{j,k}$  in barangay  $j = 1, \dots, J$ , within municipality  $k = 1, \dots, K$ , on an assignment dummy,  $Z_{j,k}$ , that equals 1 if either party  $p \in \{\text{Akabayan, Umalab Ka}\}$  was randomly assigned to implement a deliberative campaign in barangay  $j$  and zero, otherwise:

$$Y_{j,k} = \delta_k + \beta Z_{j,k} + \epsilon_{j,k}, \tag{1}$$

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<sup>14</sup>First, the household nearest to the starting point was the first included and then the enumerators flipped a coin to decide the direction to move next. Following the chosen road or path, the protocol dictated to include every fifth household until the quota was completed.

where  $\beta$  is our coefficient of interest, as it captures the ITT. The parameter  $\delta_k$  captures municipality fixed effects and  $\epsilon_{j,k}$  is an idiosyncratic error term.

The ITT computes the average change in electoral returns from the assignment of town-hall meetings irrespective of whether the deliberative campaigns were implemented on a small or large proportion of barangays. Beyond capturing the average effectiveness of deliberative campaigns, we are also interested on computing the CACE, which captures the effect of the implementation of town-hall meetings on voting behavior for the subpopulation of “complier” barangays. These are defined as those that were assigned to the treatment group and were actually treated. This subpopulation of interest exclude the barangays of Concepcion Dos, Isla and San Roque, in which town-hall meetings could not be implemented as originally assigned. The CACE is estimated via instrumental variable estimation of the following equation:

$$Y_{jk} = \lambda_k + \alpha_{jk}T_{j,k} + v_{jk} \quad , \quad (2)$$

where we instrument the implementation of town-hall meetings,  $T_{j,k}$  with assignment  $Z_{j,k}$ . The coefficient  $\alpha_{jk}$  captures the CACE,  $\lambda_k$  capture municipality fixed effects, and  $v_{jk}$  is the error term.

To conduct inference, we present uncertainty estimates of the ITT and CACE under a non-parametric permutation test (Efron and Tibshirani 1994). We focus on the statistical inference under randomization or permutation resampling, as it does not rely on random sampling from a known population or on any distributional assumption of the quantity of interest, making it less sensitive to the small number of sampled barangays. We compute the distribution for the null hypothesis of no effect from the assignment of town-hall meetings for all barangays and calculate a  $p$ -value for any within-municipality permutation of the treatment assignment that we might have observed in the experiment.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>To compute the sampling distribution under the sharp null of no effect, we draw a binary treatment assignment from the empirical distribution of the original assigned barangays without replacement. Then,

Appendix B shows evidence that that the randomization of town-hall meetings successfully achieved balance across treatment and control barangays given available pre-treatment official statistics.

## 5.1 Effect of Town-Hall Meetings on Electoral Returns

We present the estimates of the ITT and CACE for turnout and vote shares across barangays in Table 1.<sup>16</sup> First, looking at the results on party-list turnout, we can see that the presence of town-hall meetings does not have a significant effect on voter turnout in the party-list race. However, conditional on casting a ballot, the presence of town-hall meetings has a positive and statistically significant effect ( $p$ -value  $< 0.05$ ) on aggregate vote shares when we pool both party-lists together. These results suggest that the vote shares in barangays assigned to deliberative campaigns increase 1.1 percent with respect to the baseline of 2.4 percent obtained by “one-way” communication campaigns. This result translates into an overall electoral return of the assignment of deliberative campaigns of approximately 46 percent. Given the estimated CACE, we find that the effect of implementation of town-hall meetings on vote shares among “complier” barangays is 1.43 percent or 60 percent in terms of electoral returns with respect to the control group.

When we split the sample by treatment party-list, we find that both treatment effects are positive, but the ITT is statistically significant only for Akbayan ( $p$ -value  $< 0.1$ ). In particular, Akbayan was rewarded, on average, with a 1.96 percent higher vote share in treatment barangays. Umalab Ka, in turn, obtained an increase of 0.36 percent vote share in those barangays where town-hall meetings were implemented, which represents

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we compute the difference-in-means between treated and untreated barangays. We repeat this procedure on 1000 samples, randomly shuffling the treatment status within each municipality. In this way, we can estimate the fraction of simulated difference-in-means that exceeds the observed difference-in-means (i.e., permutation  $p$ -values).

<sup>16</sup>Figure C.1 in Appendix C presents these results graphically with respect to their empirical null distribution.

approximately 1.4 times their vote in control barangays. These results are not only considerable in magnitude with respect to baseline scenarios, but also politically meaningful. In the case of Akbayan, this estimated return, if extrapolated at the national level, would directly translate into an additional seat in Congress, which Akbayan failed to secure in the 2013 election. Moreover, the CACE by party-list represents electoral returns with respect to “business-as-usual” campaigns of 53 and 181 percent, for Akbayan and Umalabka, respectively. These estimated effects imply that town-hall meeting attendees are, on average, 13.7 percentage points more likely to vote for the party-list than non-attendees.<sup>17</sup> This is not saying that this increase in voting probability is causal, given non-random selection of voters into meeting attendance, but still, it is another measure of the effectiveness associated with deliberative campaigns.<sup>18</sup>

**Table 1: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Barangay Level**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Turnout (1)	Vote (Overall) (2)	Vote (Akbayan) (3)	Vote (Umalab Ka) (4)
ITT	-4.544	1.096	1.955	0.360
CACE	-5.908	1.425	2.606	0.459
	p = 0.404	p = 0.049	p = 0.086	p = 0.142
Control	65.040	2.397	4.897	0.253
	p = 0.000	p = 0.005	p = 0.0003	p = 0.248
<b>City FE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	39	39	18	21
R <sup>2</sup>	0.408	0.859	0.748	0.642


*Note: Inference for the ITT and CACE under randomization of the treatment. Permutation p-values for ITT and CACE.*

The previous average estimates, albeit informative of the aggregate effect of town-hall meetings on electoral returns, do not allow us to account for the observed variation

<sup>17</sup>This is estimated from the ratio of the estimated ITT (i.e., 1.1 percent for aggregate vote shares) to the proportion of town-hall meeting attendees (i.e. 8 percent of party-list voters).

<sup>18</sup>We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.

in treatment intensity. As we have shown in Figure 1, there is significant differences across barangays in the proportion of voters who were exposed to the presence of town-hall meetings, which affects the impact of deliberative campaigns on voting behavior. To address this issue, we estimate heterogeneous effects of town-hall meetings by the size of the electorate, as observed in our sample of barangays.<sup>19</sup> The left panel of Figure 2 shows these marginal ITT on vote shares (pooling both party-lists together). As can be seen, the largest effect of deliberative campaigns is estimated on the smallest barangays (by the number of registered voters), in which the exposure to town-hall meetings is potentially the largest. For instance, the effect of town-hall meetings on a small barangay such as Tungkod. with less than 1000 registered voters, is approximately 2.2 percent. This effect represents twice the estimated ITT across barangays. Moreover, once a barangay exceeds 7500 voters, the ITT is not statistically different from zero.



**Figure 2: Heterogeneous Effects of Town-Hall Meetings by Size of the Electorate and Proportion of Meeting Attendees.**

The right panel Figure 2 shows the change in aggregate vote shares as a function of the proportion of treated voters (after controlling for municipality fixed effects). As can

<sup>19</sup>We estimate a linear interaction between treatment assignment and the number of registered voters, while controlling for municipality fixed effects.

be seen, electoral returns significantly increase with the proportion of town-hall meeting attendees. Pooling both party-lists together, we find that an increase of 5 percent of meeting attendees, equivalent to a standard deviation in the data, is related to an increase of 0.74 percentage in vote share. For instance, while there is no significant effect of the presence of town-hall meetings when the proportion of voters treated does not exceed 5 percent of the electorate, vote shares are 2.76 percent higher in treatment barangays when the proportion of voters treated reaches 19 percent (the largest attendance in the data as a proportion of registered voters).

The evidence that town-hall meetings are more effective as the proportion of voters treated increases is reassuring and allows us to capture more subtle effects of deliberative campaigns across parties. In the case of Akbayan, the effect of town-hall meetings is statistically similar to the average ITT only for barangays with an attendance larger than 5 percent of registered voters. For Umalabka, while the average ITT across barangays is not statistically different from zero, an increase in attendance of 2.6 percent (the standard deviation in the data) is associated with a significant increase in vote share of 0.31 percent. For example, the estimated ITT in the municipality of Los Banos, in which 7.6 percent of the electorate attended at least one town-hall meeting, is 1 percent, three times the average ITT across municipalities.<sup>20</sup>

## 6 Individual-Level Results

The estimates obtained from the previous analysis at the aggregate level indicate that the presence of deliberative campaigns, here in the form of town-hall meetings, is indeed an effective way to appeal to voters on Election Day, as it provides political parties with larger electoral returns than traditional “business-as-usual” strategies, in which voters

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<sup>20</sup>In Appendix C, Figure C.2 shows heterogeneous effects by party-list returns and Table C.1 shows ITT by municipality.

are mere observers of the politician’s behavior during the campaign. However, these results do not give us an understanding of the type of voters who are most persuaded by the implementation of town-hall meetings, nor of the specific channels that drive these voters to support parties that implement “deliberative” campaigns.

In order to estimate heterogeneity in causal effects across different subsets of respondents and provide some evidence on the causal mechanisms behind aggregate voting behavior, we use the post-electoral survey that contains turnout and vote declarations, political and socio-demographic characteristics in treatment and control barangays.<sup>21</sup> In Appendix B we test for the presence of pre-treatment covariate imbalance with a matching estimation of respondents from barangays assigned to treatment and respondents from barangays assigned to control. In addition, Appendix D shows that the individual-level results are qualitatively similar when we adjust for any remaining imbalance by controlling for the set of pre-treatment covariates contained in the individual survey.

## 6.1 Effect of Town-Hall Meetings on Individual Behavior

In principle, the randomization of the campaign strategy makes treatment assignment independent of any pre-treatment voter characteristics. However, meeting attendance is not randomly assigned and could be affected by both observed and unobserved characteristics not accounted in the randomization protocol. For example, it seems reasonable to imagine a voter in a treatment barangay whose unobserved interest in the political campaigns might influence both her decision to attend a town hall meeting and her propensity to cast a vote for one of the treatment parties. For this subset of voters, attendance does not give us a measure of the effect of town-hall meetings as a deliberative institution. Even with respect to observed characteristics in our survey, meeting attendees are significantly different than other voters, particularly to non-attendees in treatment barangays and to attendees to rallies in the control group. In Appendix G we show that, compared

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<sup>21</sup>The survey questions used to generate all the individual-level outcomes can be found in Appendix H.

to non-attendees, voters who attended at least one town-hall meeting are, on average, richer and younger. The probability that attendees are married and belong to the Tagalog linguistic group is significantly higher than that for non-attendees. Moreover, a larger proportion of attendees declared obtaining their political news outside of their family circle, compared to both non-attendees and respondents who attended a rally organized by a party-list in control barangays.

Given the self selection of meeting attendees, we use the post-electoral survey to estimate the identified ITT and CACE as well as heterogeneous effects by respondents' characteristics.

Let  $i = 1, \dots, N$  denote a voter in barangay  $j$  within municipality  $k$ . Analogous to equation (1) for the aggregate effect, the ITT effect with individual data can be identified with the following regression:

$$Y_{i,j,k} = \delta_k^{survey} + \beta^{survey} Z_{j,k} + \epsilon_{i,j,k}^{survey}, \quad (3)$$

where  $\beta^{survey}$  captures the individual-level ITT,  $\delta_k^{survey}$  captures municipality fixed-effects and  $\epsilon_{i,j,k}^{survey}$  is the error term clustered at the barangay level, which is the level of treatment assignment. Similarly, we can estimate the effect of town-hall meeting implementation on those barangays that implemented the assigned treatment with an IV regression analogous to equation (2):

$$Y_{i,j,k} = \lambda_k^{survey} + \alpha_{jk}^{survey} T_{j,k} + v_{i,j,k}^{survey}, \quad (4)$$

where  $\alpha^{survey}$  captures the individual-level CACE and  $Z_{j,k}$  instruments for  $T_{j,k}$ .

All of the individual effects adjust for the over-sampling of meeting attendees via inverse probability weighting, where the adjustment in treatment barangays is given by the proportion of (self-reported) survey attendees to actual barangay attendees, obtained from town-hall meetings' attendance sheets. As a robustness check, Appendix F presents



the unadjusted individual results, which over-represent self-reported attendees. As with aggregate data, inference of the unweighted results is done under a non-parametric permutation test that uses the two-stage cluster randomization design to estimate empirical  $p$ -values for the ITT effects.


Figure 3 presents the ITT and CACE with the individual level data.<sup>22</sup> Although absolute magnitudes of treatment effects are not comparable between official and survey data, we can see that, consistent with the aggregate results, the individual propensity to turn out to vote is not significantly affected by the presence of deliberative campaigns. In contrast, the presence of town-hall meetings affects overall vote choice positively, increasing the probability of voting for the party under the deliberative campaign approximately 13.5 percent with respect to the control group. When we split the results by party, we find, as with the aggregate data, that the average electoral returns of town-hall meetings are statistically significant only for Akbayan. The probability of voting for this party in treatment barangays is approximately 16.7 percent higher than in the control group. In the survey, the propensity to vote for Umalab Ka increases in 6.6 percent in barangays where parties implemented town-hall meetings with respect to “one-way” communication campaigns (although the ITT does not reach statistical significance). In contrast, the CACE on the probability of voting for both participating parties is statistically significant and similar in magnitude, with an effect of town-hall meeting implementation on voting probability of approximately 17.5 percent.

## 6.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Income, Education, and Gender.

By fixing the platform’s content that parties delivered in treatment and control barangays, we are able to assess the effectiveness of deliberation conditional on a particular campaign message. This feature of the experiment allows us to test differential effects of town-hall meetings for the subset of voters at whom the campaign platforms is aimed at.

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<sup>22</sup>Table F.1 in Appendix C shows these point estimates with their associated  $p$ -values.



**Figure 3: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are based on a linear probability model with city fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the barangay level.**

First, we assess whether there is a differential effect of town-hall meetings on informal sector workers and the urban poor, for which Umalab Ka’s platform was designed. Although the post-electoral survey did not ask respondents to provide information on their employment status, we use their self-reported level of income and education as a crude proxy for informality.<sup>23</sup>

Second, we condition the effect of town-hall meetings on respondents’ gender to test whether the effect of the deliberative strategy is different for women, who are the primary focus of Akbayan’s platform, as it primarily emphasized women’s rights in the labor market.

To obtain a differential ITT effect of town-hall meetings, we estimate an interaction

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<sup>23</sup>For this, we rely on the labor economics literature, which has consistently found that in developing countries, such as the Philippines, workers employed in the untaxed, unregulated sector, tend to have lower income and less education than their counterparts in the formal sector (Amaral and Quintin 2006; Maloney 1999).

model of the form:

$$Y_{i,j,k} = \gamma_k^{survey} + \beta_1^{survey} Z_{j,k} + \beta_2^{survey} X_{i,j,k} + \beta_3^{survey} (Z_{j,k} \times X_{i,j,k}) + \zeta_{i,j,k}, \quad (5)$$

where  $X_{i,j,k}$  denotes the pre-treatment conditioning variable (either income, education or gender).<sup>24</sup> The parameter  $\gamma_k^{survey}$  captures municipality fixed effects and  $\zeta_{i,j,k}$  is an idiosyncratic error term clustered at the barangay level.

We also estimate a differential CACE, with a similar specification to equation (5), but instrumenting treatment status with treatment assignment at the barangay level.

Figure 4 graphically depicts the marginal effects of town-hall meetings conditioned by income, education and gender, along with 95% confidence intervals. In the upper panel we present the differential effects on Akbayan returns. Consistent with Akbayan’s policy platform, the positive impact of deliberative campaigns on electoral returns is driven exclusively by women, as both the ITT and CACE are positive only among female voters. On average, women are 24 percent more likely to vote for Akbayan when their platform is delivered in town-hall meetings than through “one-way” communication campaigns. We find no statistically significant differences by income on the effect of town-hall meetings on electoral returns. Nonetheless, less educated voters in our sample seem to be 9 percent more likely to vote for Akbayan’s platform under a deliberative campaign, although this effect is only statistically significant at  $p\text{-value} < 0.05$  when we control for pre-treatment covariates (see Figure D.2 in Appendix D)

The lower panel of Figure 4 shows the differential impact of town-hall meetings on Umalab Ka electoral returns. As with the estimated average effects shown in Figure 3, differences by voter characteristics are not statistically significant when we focus on treatment assignment (i.e., ITT). However, when we estimate the CACE, we find heterogeneous effects by income and education consistent with the policy platform of Umalab


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<sup>24</sup>Appendix D shows that estimates of equation 5 are robust to adding additional pre-treatment covariates.


Ka, which focused on the demands of the urban poor. In particular, town-hall meetings implemented by Umalab Ka increased the probability of voting for that party by 18.5 percent among low income voters, whereas this effect is not statistically different from zero for survey respondents with an income larger than 10,000 pesos. Similarly, the effect of the presence of town-hall meetings on the probability of voting for Umalabka is 19.5 percent for respondents with as much as primary education, whereas the presence of town-hall meetings does not have a statistically significant effect on the propensity to vote for Umalabka among respondents with a high-school diploma or more. Finally, we find no differential treatment effect by gender on Umalab Ka electoral returns.

Overall, the conditional effects of town-hall meetings are consistent with the fact that the main recipients of the proposed policies contained in the party-list platforms, namely women and the urban poor, directly rewarded the party-lists to a larger extent when these platforms were delivered through a deliberative campaign. As the platform content is the same across treatment conditions, these results imply that the consequences of programmatic policies are better understood when voters debate with candidates compared to the scenario in which voters just listen passively to the politician's message. More importantly, voters respond to this information and change their vote according to their own policy priorities.

## Vote for Akbayan



## Vote for Umalab Ka



Effect by Gender

Effect by Income

Effect by Education

Figure 4: Marginal effect of town-hall meetings on outcomes by income, gender and education.

### 6.3 Causal Mechanisms: The Effect of Town-Hall Meetings on Attitudes about Gender Discrimination and Poverty

Having found differential effects of deliberative campaigns on voting behavior for the main beneficiaries of party-lists' platforms, we turn to explore whether town-hall meetings are more effective in changing voters' attitudes regarding the core policies emphasized by both party-lists in the experiment. For Akbayan, we compute attitudinal differences on issues related to gender discrimination and sexism. In this way, we assess whether Akbayan's message induces a higher awareness of gender inequality and gender discrimination when platforms are transmitted in town-hall meetings *versus* "one-way" communication devices. In the case of Umalab Ka, we compute the ITT and CACE on

voters' attitudes about poverty and income inequality, which were the main priorities of its policy platform.

Voters' attitudes on gender discrimination and sexism are constructed from all six survey questions in which respondents were asked to show their degree of agreement or disagreement with respect to statements involving gender differences in the quality of House Representatives (Female Rep.), female representation in politics (Female Pol.), gender equality (Equality), gender discrimination in the labor market (Discrimination), and sexual harassment towards women (Harassment).<sup>25</sup>

To measure voters' attitudes on issues emphasized by Umalab Ka in their platform, we use all four survey questions that ask voters about the relevance of issues such as poverty (Poverty), the income gap between the rich and poor (GAP), a poverty-reducing policy (CCT), and corruption and graft (Corruption). For poverty, income gap, and corruption and graft, the survey captures how intensely voters agree with the statement that each of these issues is one of the Philippines' most important problems. For the poverty-reducing policy, the survey asks to rank the policy they would like to be implemented the most among a conditional cash transfer program, an anti-corruption policy or an increase in public investment.<sup>26</sup>

Causal effects are estimated following Anderson [2008]. First, we orient each individual outcome, so that the positive direction implies more agreement. Next, we demean all outcomes and standardize them with respect to the control group mean and standard deviation to use a comparable scale. Since we have multiple measures for each issue, we construct summary indices in the form of standardized inverse-covariance-weighted averages of the outcomes. These indices estimate an optimal linear combination of the individual measures to reflect a common latent factor. By pooling several measures of an issue into a single index, these indices are robust to overtesting; they also test for


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<sup>25</sup>The six statements used to generate gender-related attitudinal variables can be found in Appendix H.


<sup>26</sup>Appendix H shows the questions used to extract the poverty-related attitudinal variables.

whether an issue has a “general effect”; and finally, they have more statistical power than individual-level tests.

### Vote for Akbayan



### Vote for Umalab Ka



### Gender Discrimination

### Poverty and Income Inequality

**Figure 5: ITT Effects and CACE of Attitudes on Gender Discrimination and Poverty.** Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are based on a linear probability model with municipality fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the barangay level. Index refer to the standard weighted averages across components.

Figure 5 present the results regarding the effects of town-hall meetings on voters at-

titudes split by party-list and policy issue. We present both ITT and CACE estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals. The upper panel presents the results for Akbayan municipalities. Consistent with the party's platform, we show significant effects of town-hall meetings on voters' attitudes toward gender discrimination and sexism. Based on the evidence of the summary index, the presence of town-hall meetings increases awareness on gender-related issues by 0.43 standard deviation (s.d.) units. This attitudinal change on gender-related issues is mainly driven by a positive and significant increment in two individual components: female representation in politics (by 0.47 s.d. units) and discrimination toward women (by 0.78 s.d. units). The effect of town-hall meeting implementation on gender discrimination issues are significantly larger, with a CACE on the summary index of 0.63 s.d. units.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, voters' disagreement towards poverty-related issues also increases significantly when Akbayan implements town-hall meetings compared to control areas, as can be seen in the upper-right panel of Figure 5. This significant effect is present even when the policy platform of Akbayan relegated poverty to a second-order issue, and instead, stressed women empowerment and gender equality as their main messages.

In the lower panel of Figure 5 we show the results for Umalab Ka municipalities. We find a small, but significant ITT of town-hall meetings on the general index of poverty-related attitudes (0.13 s.d. units), which is driven mainly by voters' preferences over a CCT program (0.24 s.d. units). The CACE of the general index and its components are positive, but statistically insignificant. Hence, in contrast to the robust attitudinal change caused by the deliberative campaign implemented by Akbayan, the evidence in favor of an effect of town-hall meetings on poverty-related attitudes, although positive, is weaker. When we look at differential gender attitudes by treatment status, we cannot reject a null effect of town hall meetings on the summary index.

The significant effect of town-hall meetings on attitudes related to gender discrimina-

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<sup>27</sup>Table D.3 presents the point estimates and *p*-values for the overall index and each of its components.



tion, and to a smaller extent poverty, provides evidence that deliberative campaigns can be a more effective communication strategy in improving voters' knowledge and changing voters' beliefs on issues central to the party's platform. Moreover, these attitudinal effects are present for men and women and for low and high-income voters. In both cases we cannot reject that the ITT or CACE for both subset of voters is the same. These attitudinal effects, however, increase the votes only of women who represent the direct beneficiaries of the party-list' platform.

## 7 Conclusion

In this paper we present deliberative campaigns as a communication strategy that can be both electorally effective for self-interested politicians and succesful in increasing voters' knowledge regarding relevant policy issues. The creation of deliberative spaces where citizens and political elites participate in meaningful conversations with real policy consequences is central to strengthen the quality of weak democracies such as the Philippines (Curato [2015]; Dressel [2011]; Querubin [2012]). Hence, the impact of deliberative forums, such as the one presented in this paper, adds to the existing arguments in favor of institutions that encourage the active engagement of citizens in the decision-making process.

The positive electoral returns of deliberative campaigns found in this paper are estimated conditional on the observed strategies of the remaining parties that did not participate in the experiment. The general equilibrium effects allowing other parties to respond to this strategy are outside of the scope of this paper. However, even if other parties were to opimally adopt town-hall meetings, potentially diminishing their positive electoral benefits, their presence would still be a more effective strategy to deliver a policy platform to voters with respect to "one-way" communication strategies, generating a more informed political environment. Moreover, in weak democratic contexts, such as the one

studied in this paper, in which “business-as-usual” campaigns involve the distribution of cash and other clientelistic goods, as well as a multi-arm campaign requiring canvassers and rally organizers, town-hall meetings appear to be a cost-effective campaign alternative.

A future avenue of fruitful research would be to disentangle the effects of town-hall meetings on attendees from the spillover effects to untreated voters. This would require carefully tracing meeting attendees’ social networks and the channels through which information is shared across voters.

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# Supplemental Appendix (For Online Publication)

## A Sample Selection


**Table A.1: Turnout for the National and Party-List Elections (Umalab Ka Barangays)**

Muni	Barangay	Status	Turnout (National)	Turnout (Party-list)	Vote Share (Treatment)
Baras	Concepcion	Control	80.3	62.5	1.70
Baras	San Juan	Treated	76.1	54.8	0.78
Baras	Santiago	Control	80.0	58.8	0.00
Imus	Anabu II-F	Treated	62.3	52.8	0.13
Imus	Alapan II-A	Control	77.2	42.8	0.00
Imus	Mariano Espeleta II	Control	55.9	47.9	0.00
Los Banos	Lalakay	Treated	81.3	66.2	1.00
Los Banos	Putho	Control	83.9	68.5	0.00
Los Banos	Bayog	Control	83.6	66.9	0.00
Paranaque	Baclaran	Treated	68.0	58.8	0.15
Paranaque	San Dionisio	Control	72.8	62.3	0.05
Paranaque	B.F Homes	Control	72.8	58.5	0.18
Pasay	Barangay 191	Control	78.1	64.1	0.00
Pasay	Barangay 183	Control	72.1	92.0	0.00
Pasay	Barangay 178	Treated	73.9	59.8	0.00
Pateros	San Pedro	Control	76.7	128.4	0.09
Pateros	San Roque	Control	77.3	62.9	0.07
Pateros	San Rosario-Silangan	Treated	73.8	59.6	2.25
Valenzuela	Karuhatan	Control	77.8	68.1	0.09
Valenzuela	Isla	Control	57.9	74.6	0.00
Valenzuela	Punturin	Treated	79.6	68.8	1.36
Mean			74.36	65.68	0.37
S.D.			7.68	17.48	0.65

**Table A.2: Turnout for the National and Party-List Elections (Akbayan Barangays)**

Muni	Barangay	Status	Turnout (National)	Turnout (Party-list)	Vote Share (Treatment)
Luisiana	Barangay Zone VI	Control	-	65.0	11.57
Luisiana	San Salvador	Control	78.2	55.3	1.59
Luisiana	S.D./S.A.	Treated	82.5	29.3	12.22
Luisiana	San Roque	Control	-	-	9.52
Malate	Barangay 738	Treated	76.6	67.8	6.83
Malate	Barangay 190	Control	72.4	60.8	3.51
Malate	Barangay 609	Control	75.8	63.3	3.45
Marikina	Parang	Control	74.3	75.7	4.46
Marikina	Barangka	Treated	73.6	76.7	3.66
Marikina	Concepcion Dos	Control	73.8	55.2	5.13
Quezon City	Escopa 4	Control	82.2	66.9	10.56
Quezon City	Tatalon	Control	69.8	60.7	8.41
Quezon City	Payatas	Treated	72.8	60.0	4.44
Sta Maria	Cabooan	Control	-	55.2	2.68
Sta Maria	Tungkod	Treated	79.6	54.9	5.91
Sta Maria	Masinao	Control	83.9	53.3	1.47
Taguig	Hagonoy	Control	-	55.3	4.28
Taguig	Upper Bicutan	Control	56.0	50.0	3.13
Taguig	Ususan	Treated	60.4	92.7	6.59
Mean			74.13	61.01	5.76
S.D.			7.7	13.12	3.29

Note: No available general election figures for the barangays of Cabooan, Zone VI and Hagonoy.



**Figure A.1: Experiment's Design. Sample Selection of Cities and Barangays.**

## B Balance in Aggregate and Individual Data

### B.1 Balance at the Barangay Level

We show evidence that the randomization of town-hall meetings successfully achieved balance across treatment and control barangays given available pre-treatment official statistics, including barangays' registered voters, the proportion of female voters, as well as to whether the barangay is classified as urban or rural.<sup>28</sup> First, we run a regression of the assigned treatment on all of the covariates and calculate the joint  $F$ -statistic. We calculate the  $p$ -value of the  $F$ -statistic via randomization inference under the null that no covariates have any effect on the assigned treatment. Figure B.1 shows a large  $p$ -value for the  $F$ -statistic with respect to the null distribution ( $p$ -value= 0.89), indicating that pre-treatment covariates cannot explain assignment to deliberative campaigns. Table B.1 shows additional evidence of balance, by providing evidence of small and statistically insignificant ITT estimates of town-hall meetings on each pre-treatment covariate.<sup>29</sup>

### B.2 Balance at the Individual Level

We implement a matching estimation of respondents from barangays assigned to treatment and respondents from barangays assigned to control. We include all sociodemographic characteristics included in the survey questionnaire, such as *gender*, *income*, *education*, *age*, *religion*, *marital status*, and *linguistic group*. In particular, *gender* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is female. *income* is a dummy variable that

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
<sup>28</sup>Registered voters is in thousands. Female voters is estimated as a proportion of barangay population. *urban* is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 2010 Philippines Census denotes the barangay as urban and zero as rural.

<sup>29</sup>Although ideally we would like to show balance on a broader set of pre-treatment covariates, such as previous turnout and vote shares, the COMELEC does not have publicly available electoral data at the barangay level for past party-list elections. Similarly, census data besides population is not available for lower units of disaggregation than municipalities.



takes a value of 1 if the monthly income is above 10K pesos, and zero otherwise. *education* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if education is above a high school diploma, and zero otherwise. *age* is a categorical variable with 4 brackets, [18-29 years old], [30-39 years old], [40-49 years old], [50 years old and older]. *religion* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is Roman Catholic. *status* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is married. *linguistic* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is from the Tagalog linguistic group.

As a summary measure of potential imbalances, we compute the density of a propensity score of the treatment assignment conditional on pre-treatment covariates. We match individuals in treatment and control barangays using a “nearest-neighbor” matching technique with replacement and a probit model for the probability of assignment conditional on covariates. This technique is helpful because if treatment and control groups have identical propensity score distributions, the pre-treatment covariates will be balanced between the two groups (Ho et al. 2007). Table B.2 shows summary statistics for the propensity score and all the pre-treatment covariates by treatment assignment. The left panel of Figure B.2 plots the estimated propensity scores by assigned treatment, while the right panel shows a scatterplot of the propensity scores’ quantiles for treatment and control observations. Overall, the propensity score densities of control and treatment groups look very similar to each other. If anything, there is a slight discrepancy in the low end of the quantile range.




**Figure B.1: Joint Pre-treatment Balance Test.** The dashed red line depicts the F-statistic of a regression of the assigned treatment on all pre-treatment covariates. The distribution of the F-statistic is obtained through randomization inference with 1000 within-municipality resamples of the assigned treatment.

**Table B.1: Pre-treatment Balance Test at the Barangay Level**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Registered Voters	Female Proportion	Urban
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ITT	0.158	-0.014	-0.038
	p = 0.947	p = 0.658	p = 0.321
Control	1.552	0.317	0.269
	p = 0.738	p = 0.00001	p = 0.006
Observations	39	39	39
R <sup>2</sup>	0.652	0.375	0.916

Inference for the ITT under randomization of the treatment.  
Permutation  $p$ -values for the ITT.

## Assigned Units



**Figure B.2: Kernel Density and Q-Q Plot of the Survey Sample.** On the left panel, the red line depicts the density of the propensity score for individuals from barangays assigned to the control group, whereas the blue line depicts the density of the propensity score for individuals from barangays assigned to the treatment group. On the right panel, the red dots represent empirical Q-Q estimates for the survey sample. The 45-degree line indicates identical distribution and the dotted lines indicate the width of the propensity score range.

**Table B.2: Balanced Statistics of Pre-Treatment Covariates to Predict Treatment and Assignment to Treatment at the Individual Level**

	<i>Assignment</i>				
	Means Assigned	Means Control	SD Control	Mean Diff	eQQ Med
distance	0.35	0.34	0.06	0.01	0.01
gender	0.59	0.59	0.49	-0.00	0.00
income	0.07	0.10	0.30	-0.03	0.00
age	2.56	2.68	1.12	-0.12	0.00
religion	0.91	0.89	0.32	0.02	0.00
status	0.62	0.68	0.47	-0.06	0.00
linguistic	0.92	0.87	0.34	0.05	0.00
education	0.30	0.30	0.46	-0.00	0.00

*Note: The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included. The variables gender, religion, status, and linguistic are matched exactly.*

## C Additional Tables and Figures

**Table C.1: ITT on Electoral Returns by Municipality**

Municipality	Control	Treatment	ITT
Aklayan			
Luisiana	6.58	12.22	5.64
Malate	3.48	6.83	3.35
Marikina	4.06	5.13	1.07
Quezon City	9.48	4.44	-5.04
Sta Maria	2.08	5.91	3.83
Taguig	3.71	6.59	2.89
Mean	4.90	6.85	1.95
Umalab Ka			
Baras	0.85	0.78	-0.07
Imus	0.00	0.13	0.13
Los Banos	0.00	1.00	1.00
Paranaque	0.12	0.15	0.03
Pasay	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pateros	0.08	2.25	2.17
Valenzuela	0.73	0.00	-0.73
Mean	0.25	0.61	0.36

*Note: Inference for the within-city effect assuming normally distributed effects.*

**Table C.2: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Turnout (1)	Vote (Overall) (2)	Vote (Akbyan) (3)	Vote (Umalab-Ka) (4)
ITT	-0.870 p = 0.824	13.480 p = 0.00002	16.678 p = 0.00001	6.659 p = 0.203
CACE	-1.152 p = 0.820	17.722 p = 0.00001	17.746 p = 0.00003	17.596 p = 0.029
Control	80.917 p = 0.000	10.900 p = 0.034	18.773 p = 0.023	0.989 p = 0.215
<b>Municipality FE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Pre-treatment Vars.</b>	No	No	No	No
Observations	1,082	892	477	415
R <sup>2</sup>	0.063	0.265	0.220	0.051

*Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors  
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.*

**Table C.3: Intention to Treat Effect on Attitudes on Poverty**

<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
Akbayan Treatment:					
	Index	Poverty	CCT	Gap	Corruption
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ITT	0.472	0.619	0.389	0.526	0.341
	p = 0.020	p = 0.001	p = 0.067	p = 0.091	p = 0.134
CACE	0.573	0.851	0.583	0.662	0.473
	p = 0.089	p = 0.065	p = 0.124	p = 0.195	p = 0.195
Control	-0.341	-0.157	-0.548	-0.289	-0.193
	p = 0.186	p = 0.536	p = 0.00001	p = 0.441	p = 0.517
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-treatment Vars.	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	640	664	682	651	665
R <sup>2</sup>	0.246	0.156	0.067	0.184	0.156


<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
Umalab Ka Treatment:					
	Index	Poverty	CCT	Gap	Corruption
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ITT	0.132	0.091	0.236	0.055	0.031
	p = 0.044	p = 0.571	p = 0.00002	p = 0.651	p = 0.617
CACE	0.395	0.274	0.704	0.167	0.093
	p = 0.371	p = 0.676	p = 0.130	p = 0.722	p = 0.722
Control	0.109	0.167	0.233	-0.244	-0.022
	p = 0.0002	p = 0.058	p = 0.00004	p = 0.000	p = 0.748
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-treatment Vars.	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	568	576	575	578	578
R <sup>2</sup>	0.094	0.051	0.073	0.050	0.033

*Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors  
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.*

**Table C.4: ITT Effect and CACE on Attitudes on Gender**

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
		Index	Female Rep.	Female Pol.	Equality	Discrimination	Harassment
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		<i>Akbayan Treatment:</i>					
ITT		0.425	0.469	0.247	0.351	0.783	0.285
		p = 0.042	p = 0.000	p = 0.081	p = 0.439	p = 0.0003	p = 0.440
CACE		0.626	0.706	0.368	0.526	1.184	0.425
		p = 0.0003	p = 0.000	p = 0.183	p = 0.341	p = 0.000	p = 0.341
Control		-0.037	-0.176	-0.204	0.168	-0.135	0.078
		p = 0.512	p = 0.196	p = 0.247	p = 0.336	p = 0.019	p = 0.621
<b>Municipality FE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Pre-treatment Vars.</b>	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations		643	674	673	675	672	663
R <sup>2</sup>		0.245	0.137	0.175	0.090	0.140	0.070
		<i>Umalab Ka Treatment:</i>					
ITT		0.107	-0.305	-0.703	0.688	0.306	0.510
		p = 0.058	p = 0.179	p = 0.004	p = 0.009	p = 0.145	p = 0.050
CACE		0.296	-0.840	-1.938	1.933	0.864	1.435
		p = 0.384	p = 0.463	p = 0.310	p = 0.327	p = 0.447	p = 0.383
Control		-0.019	0.121	0.193	-0.204	-0.037	-0.138
		p = 0.469	p = 0.219	p = 0.043	p = 0.084	p = 0.637	p = 0.251
<b>Municipality FE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Pre-treatment Vars.</b>	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations		543	572	570	559	577	572
R <sup>2</sup>		0.031	0.055	0.132	0.085	0.097	0.045


Note: *p*-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors  
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.




**Figure C.1: Permutation Distribution for the ITT Effect.** The dashed red line indicate the observed ITT. The distribution is constructed from 1000 within-municipality resamples from the observed outcomes.



Vote (Akbayan)



Vote (Umalabka)



Registered Voters

Meeting Attendance

Figure C.2: Heterogenous Effects by Registered Voters and Attendance

## D ITT Effects with Pre-treatment Covariates

Table D.1: Intention to Treat Effect on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (with Covariates)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Turnout (1)	Vote (Overall) (2)	Vote (Akbyan) (3)	Vote (Umalab-Ka) (4)
ITT	4.109 p = 0.367	11.721 p = 0.000	18.353 p = 0.000	6.403 p = 0.190
CACE	5.929 p = 0.445	16.984 p = 0.000	20.525 p = 0.00004	15.356 p = 0.030
Control	80.917 p = 0.000	10.900 p = 0.034	18.773 p = 0.023	0.989 p = 0.215
income	-1.571 p = 0.790	-2.125 p = 0.423	-4.946 p = 0.166	-0.216 p = 0.785
education	4.374 p = 0.124	3.101 p = 0.108	6.034 p = 0.034	-0.777 p = 0.382
religion	1.943 p = 0.765	1.903 p = 0.535	2.468 p = 0.689	2.423 p = 0.311
age	-0.610 p = 0.737	-1.400 p = 0.247	-2.846 p = 0.184	0.404 p = 0.332
status	3.378 p = 0.451	5.042 p = 0.228	9.279 p = 0.163	0.369 p = 0.672
linguistic	-9.327 p = 0.034	1.664 p = 0.671	12.699 p = 0.057	-2.008 p = 0.153
<b>Municipality FE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	850	698	334	364
R <sup>2</sup>	0.063	0.306	0.251	0.068

*Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors  
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.*

**Table D.2: Intention to Treat Effect on Attitudes on Poverty**

<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
Akabayan Treatment:					
	Index	Poverty	CCT	Gap	Corruption
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ITT	0.436	0.646	0.182	0.812	0.283
	p = 0.054	p = 0.004	p = 0.061	p = 0.004	p = 0.295
CACE	0.572	0.967	0.292	1.112	0.427
	p = 0.183	p = 0.112	p = 0.230	p = 0.089	p = 0.089
Control	-0.341	-0.157	-0.548	-0.289	-0.193
	p = 0.186	p = 0.536	p = 0.00001	p = 0.441	p = 0.517
gender	-0.080	-0.093	0.005	-0.167	-0.147
	p = 0.053	p = 0.100	p = 0.963	p = 0.002	p = 0.100
income	0.030	0.161	-0.091	-0.141	0.096
	p = 0.877	p = 0.591	p = 0.747	p = 0.046	p = 0.616
education	-0.074	-0.171	-0.099	0.029	-0.010
	p = 0.150	p = 0.002	p = 0.338	p = 0.732	p = 0.916
religion	0.172	-0.021	0.348	0.100	0.120
	p = 0.012	p = 0.876	p = 0.019	p = 0.372	p = 0.293
age	0.005	-0.073	0.103	-0.078	-0.064
	p = 0.787	p = 0.128	p = 0.014	p = 0.024	p = 0.051
status	-0.118	-0.116	-0.181	-0.023	-0.016
	p = 0.008	p = 0.168	p = 0.026	p = 0.801	p = 0.874
linguistic	-0.145	-0.031	-0.252	-0.104	-0.097
	p = 0.0002	p = 0.607	p = 0.031	p = 0.381	p = 0.151
<b>City FE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Pre-treatment Vars.</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	447	469	484	457	470
R <sup>2</sup>	0.209	0.126	0.085	0.205	0.106

<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
Umalab Ka Treatment:					
	Index	Poverty	CCT	Gap	Corruption
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ITT	0.116	0.061	0.242	0.005	-0.009
	p = 0.085	p = 0.713	p = 0.00001	p = 0.964	p = 0.785
CACE	0.313	0.164	0.653	0.014	-0.026
	p = 0.386	p = 0.762	p = 0.148	p = 0.965	p = 0.965
Control	0.109	0.167	0.233	-0.244	-0.022
	p = 0.0002	p = 0.058	p = 0.00004	p = 0.000	p = 0.748
gender	-0.080	-0.093	0.005	-0.167	-0.147
	p = 0.053	p = 0.100	p = 0.963	p = 0.002	p = 0.100
income	0.030	0.161	-0.091	-0.141	0.096
	p = 0.877	p = 0.591	p = 0.747	p = 0.046	p = 0.616
education	-0.074	-0.171	-0.099	0.029	-0.010
	p = 0.150	p = 0.002	p = 0.338	p = 0.732	p = 0.916
religion	0.172	-0.021	0.348	0.100	0.120
	p = 0.012	p = 0.876	p = 0.019	p = 0.372	p = 0.293
age	0.005	-0.073	0.103	-0.078	-0.064
	p = 0.787	p = 0.128	p = 0.014	p = 0.024	p = 0.051
status	-0.118	-0.116	-0.181	-0.023	-0.016
	p = 0.008	p = 0.168	p = 0.026	p = 0.801	p = 0.874
linguistic	-0.145	-0.031	-0.252	-0.104	-0.097
	p = 0.0002	p = 0.607	p = 0.031	p = 0.381	p = 0.151
<b>City FE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Pre-treatment Vars.</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	506	511	512	514	513
R <sup>2</sup>	0.132	0.084	0.111	0.090	0.056

Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors  
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.


**Table D.3: Intention to Treat Effect on Attitudes on Gender**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Akabayon Treatment:					
	Index (1)	Equality (2)	Discrimination (3)	Harassment (4)	Female Rep. (5)	Female Pol. (6)
ITT	0.277	0.370	0.450	0.043	0.624	-0.008
	p = 0.149	p = 0.034	p = 0.00002	p = 0.877	p = 0.003	p = 0.975
CACE	0.443	0.593	0.718	0.068	1.018	-0.012
	p = 0.019	p = 0.0001	p = 0.0002	p = 0.871	p = 0.00005	p = 0.975
Control	-0.037	-0.176	-0.204	0.168	-0.135	0.078
	p = 0.512	p = 0.196	p = 0.247	p = 0.336	p = 0.019	p = 0.621
income	0.205	0.366	0.006	0.271	0.273	0.141
	p = 0.0005	p = 0.0002	p = 0.963	p = 0.173	p = 0.121	p = 0.382
education	-0.018	-0.150	-0.054	0.115	-0.153	-0.056
	p = 0.422	p = 0.112	p = 0.651	p = 0.316	p = 0.024	p = 0.398
religion	-0.128	-0.067	-0.194	-0.147	-0.031	-0.158
	p = 0.024	p = 0.743	p = 0.401	p = 0.286	p = 0.835	p = 0.116
age	0.067	0.021	0.090	0.093	0.013	0.026
	p = 0.0003	p = 0.761	p = 0.141	p = 0.163	p = 0.692	p = 0.580
status	0.039	0.027	0.005	-0.036	0.250	0.102
	p = 0.143	p = 0.648	p = 0.937	p = 0.702	p = 0.008	p = 0.017
linguistic	-0.030	0.075	0.229	-0.101	-0.312	0.100
	p = 0.709	p = 0.765	p = 0.325	p = 0.639	p = 0.082	p = 0.741
<b>Municipality FE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	463	483	482	485	481	476
R <sup>2</sup>	0.370	0.188	0.198	0.188	0.263	0.063




	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Umalab Ka Treatment:					
	Index (1)	Equality (2)	Discrimination (3)	Harassment (4)	Female Rep. (5)	Female Pol. (6)
ITT	0.083	-0.263	-0.682	0.600	0.312	0.466
	p = 0.179	p = 0.226	p = 0.006	p = 0.012	p = 0.184	p = 0.126
CACE	0.204	-0.646	-1.680	1.503	0.788	1.177
	p = 0.438	p = 0.476	p = 0.294	p = 0.312	p = 0.453	p = 0.419
Control	-0.019	0.121	0.193	-0.204	-0.037	-0.138
	p = 0.469	p = 0.219	p = 0.043	p = 0.084	p = 0.637	p = 0.251
income	-0.086	-0.133	-0.356	0.049	0.033	-0.178
	p = 0.233	p = 0.336	p = 0.028	p = 0.749	p = 0.798	p = 0.252
education	0.006	0.254	0.225	-0.277	-0.033	-0.078
	p = 0.916	p = 0.122	p = 0.046	p = 0.003	p = 0.754	p = 0.529
religion	-0.017	0.255	0.077	-0.141	-0.182	0.202
	p = 0.718	p = 0.264	p = 0.692	p = 0.579	p = 0.392	p = 0.008
age	0.026	0.078	0.075	-0.010	0.016	-0.026
	p = 0.350	p = 0.259	p = 0.256	p = 0.846	p = 0.740	p = 0.681
status	-0.021	0.093	-0.154	-0.039	0.012	-0.026
	p = 0.627	p = 0.433	p = 0.044	p = 0.662	p = 0.941	p = 0.740
linguistic	0.076	0.031	0.025	0.136	0.014	-0.013
	p = 0.012	p = 0.829	p = 0.867	p = 0.330	p = 0.875	p = 0.900
<b>Municipality FE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	481	507	506	495	512	508
R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	0.081	0.167	0.106	0.110	0.046

Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors  
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.






**Figure D.1: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (with Covariates). Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are based on a linear probability model with city fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the barangay level.**

## Vote for Akbayan



## Vote for Umalab Ka





Effect by Gender

Effect by Income



Effect by Education

Figure D.2: Marginal effect of town-hall meetings on outcomes by income, gender and education (With Covariates).

### Vote for Akbayan



### Vote for Umalab Ka



### Gender Discrimination

### Poverty and Income Inequality

**Figure D.3: ITT Effects and CACE of Attitudes on Poverty and Gender (with Covariates). Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are based on a linear probability model with city fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the barangay level.**


## E ITT Effects with Balanced Panel

Table E.1: Intention to Treat Effect on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (with Balanced Panel)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Turnout (1)	Vote (Overall) (2)	Vote (Akbyan) (3)	Vote (Umalab-Ka) (4)
ITT	1.452 p = 0.688	16.673 p = 0.0001	21.659 p = 0.0005	6.251 p = 0.176
CACE	2.622 p = 0.706	29.715 p = 0.016	32.460 p = 0.047	20.362 p = 0.083
Control	80.538 p = 0.000	11.908 p = 0.081	19.195 p = 0.054	1.626 p = 0.530
gender	-2.312 p = 0.470	-0.265 p = 0.932	0.838 p = 0.857	-1.184 p = 0.531
income	-2.676 p = 0.590	-2.812 p = 0.427	-3.762 p = 0.476	-0.973 p = 0.611
education	3.348 p = 0.208	3.004 p = 0.316	5.903 p = 0.131	-0.885 p = 0.530
religion	1.006 p = 0.834	1.408 p = 0.626	0.601 p = 0.892	1.823 p = 0.571
age	-0.499 p = 0.761	-1.068 p = 0.305	-1.919 p = 0.171	0.350 p = 0.620
status	4.247 p = 0.318	4.813 p = 0.162	5.421 p = 0.271	0.423 p = 0.804
linguistic	-8.980 p = 0.012	3.493 p = 0.353	11.900 p = 0.092	-2.900 p = 0.302
<b>Municipality FE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,314	1,078	593	485
R <sup>2</sup>	0.057	0.211	0.177	0.048

*Note: p-value for the ITT and CACE under clustered standard errors  
The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.*





**Figure E.1: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (with Balanced Panel). Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are based on a linear probability model with city fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the barangay level.**

## **F ITT Effects (Unweighted Results)**

**Table F.1: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (Un-weighted Results)**


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Turnout (1)	Vote (Overall) (2)	Vote (Akbyan) (3)	Vote (Umalab-Ka) (4)
ITT	2.406	23.292	31.864	13.994
CACE	2.950	28.844	33.860	21.118
Control	p = 0.309 83.747	p = 0.0003 12.171	p = 0.005 19.242	p = 0.044 3.019
<b>Municipality FE</b>	p = 0.000 Yes	p = 0.011 Yes	p = 0.011 Yes	p = 0.160 Yes
<b>Pre-treatment Vars.</b>	No	No	No	No
Observations	1,040	871	477	394
R <sup>2</sup>	0.047	0.300	0.284	0.159

Note: \*  $p < 0.05$ .

*Inference for the ITT under randomization of the treatment.*


*Permutation p-values.*

*The cities of Imus, Pateros and Santa Maria were not included.*




**Figure F.1: ITT Effect and CACE on Electoral Returns at the Individual Level (Un-weighted Results). Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All estimates are based on a linear probability model with city fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the barangay level.**

# G Correlates of Attendance



Attendance in Treatment Barangays



Attendance to Town-Halls vs Rallies

**Figure G.1: Correlates of Attendance.** This plot graphs the change in attendance probability in treatment barangays as a function of a change in each covariate from the 1st to it 99th percentile.

# H Survey Questions Used in the Individual-level Analysis

## H.1 Demographics

The enumerator will ask the respondent and circle the corresponding choice number.

- (Income) What is your monthly household income in pesos?
  1. Below 10K
  2. Up to 60K
  3. Up to 100K
  4. Over 100K
- (Female) Indicate your gender
  1. Male
  2. Female
- (Age) What is your age?
  1. 18-29
  2. 30-39
  3. 40-49
  4. 50 and up
- (Religion) Do you belong to any particular religion?
  1. Roman Catholic
  2. Protestant
  3. Islam
  4. Others
- (Status) What is your marital status?
  1. Married
  2. Single
  3. Widowed
  4. Separated
  5. Other
- (Linguistic) What is the ethnic or linguistic group you identify with?

1. Tagalog
  2. Cebuano
  3. Hiligaynon
  4. Waray
  5. Bikol
  6. Ilokano
  7. Kapampangan
  8. Pangasinense
  9. Others
- (Education) What is your highest level of education?
    1. None
    2. Elementary
    3. High School
    4. College
    5. Post-Graduate

## **H.2 Turnout and Vote Choices**

- (Turnout) We would like to ask you about the last national elections that happened on May 13. Did you go to a polling station?
  1. Yes
  2. No
  - (Vote) If yes, which party-list did you vote for in the election of party-list representatives? (Open Answer).

## **H.3 Town-Hall Meeting Attendance**

For the enumerator in treatment barangays, please ask the next question:

- (Attendance) During the campaign, did you attend town-hall meetings enabled for you by the party-list (PL NAME) in favor of its candidates?
  1. Yes
  2. No

## H.4 Gender Attitudes

- (Female Rep.) Who would do a better job in the House of Representatives? A representative who is Male, a representative who is Female, or would they do an equally good or bad job?
  1. Male
  2. Female
  3. Both
  
- (Female Pol.) Would you say that women have too much influence in Philippines politics, just about the right amount of influence in Philippines politics, or too little influence in Philippines politics?
  1. Too much
  2. Too little
  3. Just the right amount
  
- I am going to read several statements. After each one, I would like you to tell me how strongly you agree or disagree
  - (Equality) “When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors”. Do you:
    1. Agree strongly
    2. Agree somewhat
    3. Neither agree nor disagree
    4. Disagree somewhat or
    5. Disagree Stronglywith this statement?
  
  - (Discrimination) “Women often miss out of good jobs because of discrimination”. Do you:
    1. Agree strongly
    2. Agree somewhat
    3. Neither agree nor disagree
    4. Disagree somewhat or
    5. Disagree Stronglywith this statement?
  
  - (Harassment) “Women who complain about sexual harassment cause more problems than they solve”. Do you:
    1. Agree strongly
    2. Agree somewhat

3. Neither agree nor disagree
  4. Disagree somewhat or
  5. Disagree Strongly
- with this statement?

## H.5 Poverty Attitudes

- For each of the following issues, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree that it is one of the Philippines' main problems:
  - Poverty.
  - Wide income gap between rich and poor.
  - Corruption and graft.
  1. Agree strongly
  2. Agree somewhat
  3. Neither agree nor disagree
  4. Disagree somewhat or
  5. Disagree Strongly
- (CCT) Please read the following three options of government policies in the Philippines.
  1. Conditional Cash Transfers or CCT (like the Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program)
  2. Anti-Corruption Drive
  3. Increased Investments (including Public-Private Partnership, or PPP)

Which of these options would you most like to see implemented?