

Childcare, labor supply, and business development: Experimental evidence from Uganda*

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Abstract

Mothers of three-to-five-year-old children in Uganda were randomly offered a childcare subsidy, an equivalent cash grant, or both. Childcare improved household income and child development, but its impact on female labor varied by household composition. For single mothers, childcare increased labor supply and earnings from self-employment; among couples, it increased fathers' income from wage-employment. Cash grants had a similar effect on household income, driven by mothers' labor supply and earnings. Our findings suggest that in a low-income context, childcare can reduce household poverty and improve child development, but access to capital is more effective in increasing female labor supply.

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1 Introduction

Social norms, market imperfections and the structure of the labor market may limit women's labor market opportunities in low-income contexts. Women are often responsible to do the bulk of household chores and caregiving (Jayachandran, 2021), regularly combine work with childcare (Delecourt and Fitzpatrick, 2021) and are more likely to be involved in self-employment than in wage-employment (Bonnet et al., 2019). While access to childcare has been critical for mothers' labor supply in many high-income countries (Baker et al., 2008; Gelbach, 2002; Goldin, 2021), it remains an open question whether it can improve maternal labor market outcomes in low-income settings and how it affects other household members.

This paper reports from a field experiment in Uganda designed to understand the effects of offering subsidized childcare on income and child development. We hypothesize that childcare will allow household members to increase their labor supply by freeing up their time. As in other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, the labor market in Uganda is gender-segmented: Women are more likely to be involved in self-employment, and men in wage-employment, and men receive higher wages than women in general. In order to encourage maternal labor supply, we therefore primarily focus on business development, but we also document the impact on wage labor and for other household members, such as the fathers. This is an important contribution to the literature, because we have very limited evidence on the effects of childcare on household members besides mothers and children in low-income countries (Evans et al., 2021).

Capital and labor are two key inputs of production in a business. Entrepreneurs may be unable to invest in capital due to credit constraints, while their labor supply may be constrained by domestic duties. There may also be important complementarities between them.¹ Similar arguments apply to wage labor, where domestic duties can restrict labor supply and credit constraints the investment in (costly) job search.

To study these mechanisms, we randomly assigned mothers of 3–5 year old children in our sample to one of four groups. The first group was offered free childcare for one year. While private childcare services exist in urban and peri-urban regions of Uganda, these are typically not accessible to the poor, or are limited to a program that runs only in the morning. The childcare treatment offered to enroll one child of three to five years of age in a nearby childcare center of choice with all costs covered.² The second group was of-

¹For instance, lacking access to capital may severely limit the returns to childcare, as the marginal product of labor can be very low. Similarly, the returns to an increase in capital may be contingent on having access to childcare, allowing the entrepreneur to work more hours, and more productive hours, in the business.

²Note that most of the childcare centers in our sample were pre-school nurseries with lessons during the morning hours and (supervised) play or rest time in the afternoon. As such, our childcare intervention can be interpreted as providing subsidized access to pre-school education.

ferred an unconditional cash grant equal to the cost of the childcare treatment. The cash grants were unconditional but labeled as a business grant and transferred directly to the women. The third group was offered both free childcare and the cash grant. A final group of women served as a control. This design allows us to assess the relative importance of time and credit constraints for labor supply and business development, as well as the cost-effectiveness of subsidized childcare. We surveyed the participants at baseline and approximately one year later to measure their labor supply and earnings and that of the other household members. We also collect information on family well-being and on child development indicators for the “target child”, i.e. the child who is eligible for the childcare treatment.

The childcare subsidy leads to a large increase in full-day enrollment of target children. In terms of labor market outcomes, we find that childcare significantly increases the mothers’ revenues from self-employment, without increasing their average labor supply, productive assets or number of employees. The childcare treatment also increases the fathers’ labor supply and earnings from wage labor. These results highlight the importance of the household composition in determining the effects of a childcare subsidy. At baseline, about a third of the women are single mothers. While the freed-up time from childcare is likely to increase the labor supply of single mothers, the prediction is less clear for mothers who live with a partner, as labor market returns are typically higher for men than for women in Uganda. Indeed, we do not find an impact on labor supply or income for women who live with a partner. In those households, the evidence suggests that fathers use the freed-up time to take on additional wage labor, leaving more domestic chores to the mothers. Single mothers, on the other hand, increase their labor supply in self-employment, which is associated with a substantial increase in their business income.

The cash treatments have a similar effect as the childcare subsidy on the mothers’ revenues from self-employment. Contrary to the childcare subsidy though, the average women’s labor supply increases as well. In line with the hypothesis of binding capital constraints, the treatments lead to the creation of new businesses, and investments in productive assets and makes it more likely she hires an employee. The cash treatments do not affect the father’s labor supply, income, business assets or number of employees.

In a final set of results, we discuss the treatment effects on family well-being. We find that childcare has the additional benefit of significantly improving children’s development, early literacy and motor skills in particular. Cash grants, on the contrary, do not have a significant effect on early childhood development after one year of treatment. Both childcare and the cash grants increase the mothers’ reported levels of happiness and life satisfaction, along with household consumption and food security. In terms of domestic violence, offering childcare does not have a significant impact, while we cannot exclude that the cash grants increase the reported prevalence of physical violence between partners.

Our study contributes to the research on the effects of access to childcare on labor supply and income. Evidence from middle- and high-income countries show that childcare has positive effects on mothers' employment in general,³ with some evidence that the effects can be particularly important for single mothers (e.g. Gelbach, 2002). A number of recent studies from India (Nandi et al., 2020) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Ajayi et al., 2022; Donald and Vaillant, 2023; Martinez et al., 2017) study the effects of introducing new, community-based childcare facilities in a low-income context. They generally find positive effects on mothers' labor supply as well. We contribute by studying the effects of subsidizing access to existing pre-school facilities. Some articles look at the impact on fathers as well. The impact is limited in high-income countries, as fathers are likely to work full-time already (e.g. Brewer et al., 2022; Eckhoff Andresen and Havnes, 2019). The results may differ in low-income contexts though, due to the interplay of gender-segmented labor markets and household composition. The focus on other household members and the family as a whole – on which there is currently little evidence in low-income contexts (Evans et al., 2021) – is a key contribution of our work.⁴ Another major contribution is the inclusion of cash transfers as a separate treatment arm, at a cost equivalent to the childcare subsidy. This allows us to assess the relative importance of access to childcare versus capital on labor market outcomes and the cost-effectiveness of subsidizing access to existing childcare services.

Our factorial design also allows us to speak to the literature on the effectiveness of interventions to promote small and medium enterprises. Previous work has shown that male-owned enterprises benefit more from financial support and training programs than female-owned enterprises (Berge et al., 2015; Bernhardt et al., 2019; de Mel et al., 2008; Delecourt and Fitzpatrick, 2021; Fafchamps et al., 2014; Fiala, 2018). One potential explanation is that women face more severe time-constraints, arising from domestic work and care obligations.⁵ Our design allows us to test separately for the importance of *time* and *credit* constraints in explaining the development of women-led businesses. Our evidence points to credit constraints being binding for the average women, while time constraints are important for particular subgroups such as single mothers.

Finally, the paper complements the growing evidence on the role of childcare services in promoting child development. Most of this evidence is from high-income countries, and in general shows that the impact is particularly strong for children in low socio-economic

³See Baker et al. (2008); Bauernschuster et al. (2016); Berger and Black (1992); Berlinski and Galiani (2007); Berlinski et al. (2009); Bettendorf et al. (2015); Bick (2016); Clark et al. (2019); Eckhoff Andresen and Havnes (2019); Gelbach (2002); Givord and Marbot (2015); Havnes and Mogstad (2011a); Hojman and López Bóo (2019); Jain (2016); Martínez A. and Perticará (2017); Nollenberger and Rodríguez-Planas (2015); Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017); Paes de Barros et al. (2011); Rosero and Oosterbeek (2011), among others.

⁴To the best of our knowledge, the only exception is Donald and Vaillant (2023), who find positive effects of childcare on fathers' commercial activities in rural areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

⁵Women's preference for working closer to home is also documented in high-income countries, see Le Barbanchon et al. (2021).

status families (Baker et al., 2008; Cascio, 2009; Cornelissen et al., 2018; Duncan et al., 2022; Felfe and Lalive, 2018; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011b, 2015; van Huizen and Plantenga, 2018). The more limited evidence in low- and middle-income countries shows that effects are not always positive and highlights the quality of childcare and the recipient’s economic status as important mediators (Ajayi et al., 2022; Andrew et al., 2019; Behrman et al., 2004; Berlinski et al., 2009; Bernal and Fernández, 2013; Bietenbeck et al., 2019; Bouguen et al., 2018; Dean and Jayachandran, 2020; Donald and Vaillant, 2023; Dowd et al., 2016; Engle et al., 2011; Mwaura et al., 2008). Given the existing evidence, it is not trivial that access to childcare will benefit children. Furthermore, given the cost of childcare, it is plausible that a better outcome could be achieved through simple cash transfers. We contribute to this literature in two ways: by providing experimental evidence on the effects of receiving full-time childcare on child development in Uganda, and by comparing the effect of childcare with that of an equivalent cash grant.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, baseline characteristics, estimation strategy and take-up of the treatment. Section 3 presents treatment effects for mothers and fathers, and discusses the underlying mechanisms. Section 4 summarizes the impact at the household level, for the child and for family well-being more broadly. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2 Empirical Design and Data

2.1 Experimental design

Our experiment is designed to understand the effects of childcare and cash transfers on labor supply and income generation. As in many low-income countries, both the labor market and domestic work are highly gender-segmented in Uganda. In the labor market, women are more likely to be involved in self-employment, and men in wage-employment.⁶ Therefore, in order to improve women’s labor market outcomes, we primarily focus on business development. Ugandan women are more involved in domestic work than men, but men contribute substantially as well. According to a recent national time-use survey, women spend about seven hours per day doing unpaid care work, compared to an average of five hours per day for men (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2019). We, therefore, also document the treatment effects on other household members, such as the mother’s partner and for other income sources, such as wage labor.

Capital and labor are two key inputs of production in any business. Nonetheless, entrepreneurs may be unable to invest in capital due to credit constraints, while their labor

⁶See, for instance, the 2018/19 wave of the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS). For households living in our study districts, 12 percent of women (of the same age range as the participants in our sample) were in wage-employment and 21 percent were self-employed. For males, the corresponding rates were 32 percent for wage labor and 25 percent for self-employment.

supply may be constrained by domestic duties. In the context of Uganda, Delecourt and Fitzpatrick (2021) document that it is common for female business owners to take their children to work and that this is associated with lower profitability than other female-owned businesses where a child is not present. Hence, the labor supply constraint may have both a quantity dimension (affecting the number of hours at work) and a quality dimension (affecting productivity at work). In line with this, Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008) show theoretically that limited attention (e.g. due to the presence of children) can reduce productivity. Moreover, there may be important complementarities between capital and labor. For instance, a lack of access to capital may severely limit the returns to childcare, as the marginal product of labor may be low. Similarly, the returns to an increase in capital may be contingent on the entrepreneur having access to childcare, allowing her to work more (productive) hours in the business.

Similar arguments may apply to wage labor, which childcare may impact by alleviating a time constraint, and cash transfers by facilitating increased investments in a (costly) job search. For example, Abebe et al. (2020) show that providing a transport subsidy to job seekers in Ethiopia can lead to large positive effects on the likelihood of finding a job.

As we mentioned above, labor markets are highly gender-segmented and men are more likely to be engaged in wage-employment and earn higher wages.⁷ Therefore, the composition of the household is likely to matter for women's income generating activities and their responses to free childcare and cash support. At baseline, about a third of the women in our sample are single mothers. They may face very different constraints compared to women living with a partner, and their responses to childcare may differ accordingly. For instance, while the freed up time from childcare is likely to increase the labor supply of single mothers, the prediction is less clear when she lives with a partner, as the labor market returns are typically higher for men than for women.

To shed light on these mechanisms, we designed and implemented a randomized controlled trial with four treatment arms: A childcare treatment that primarily targets the time constraint; a cash treatment that primarily targets the capital constraint; and a combined treatment, offering both childcare and cash, which explores any potential complementarity between the treatments:

T1 One year of free, full-time childcare.

T2 Cash grant that equals the average cost of childcare.

T3 The childcare and cash grants combined.

C Control group (no intervention).

⁷During the study period, the median monthly earnings in wage labor were UGX 240 thousand for men and 150 thousand for women (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2019a).

The childcare intervention offered free, full-day childcare for a year. While private childcare services exist in urban and peri-urban regions of Uganda, these are typically not accessible to the poor, or are limited to a program that runs only in the morning. Given that more than 40 percent of Ugandan households have a three-to-five year-old child (authors' calculations using the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey, 2016), there is a potentially large unmet demand for better access to childcare services.

The childcare treatment offered to enroll one child aged three–five in a nearby childcare center of choice. Most of these centers were pre-school nurseries with lessons during the morning hours and (supervised) play or rest time in the afternoon. As such, the treatment effects can be interpreted as the effect of providing access to free pre-school education. We covered the tuition for full-day attendance, breakfast and lunch. The total cost was on average UGX 411,752 (equivalent to USD 111.2) per year. We assisted with the enrollment of children and paid the centers directly at the start of each trimester (in line with their requirements).

The cash grant was delivered to the mothers in the form of mobile money and labeled as a business grant. The cash transfers were made at the same time as the childcare fees were paid to the childcare centers (three installments, one each trimester), the value of the transfers being equal to the average cost of childcare within the district. The total cost of the cash transfer was on average UGX 424,322 (USD 114.6) per year.


The sample for the study was selected from three districts in Western Uganda (Kasese, Kyenjojo and Kabarole), three districts in central Uganda (Mukono, Masaka and Mityana) and three districts in Eastern Uganda (Mbale, Iganga and Jinja). In these districts, we identified 454 communities containing at least one childcare center. To identify eligible households, we conducted a census of each of these communities. Households had to satisfy three criteria to be part of the study: (i) the household should have one (and only one) child in the age range three to five (we refer to this child as the “target child”), (ii) the female caregiver should be present within the household (mother or grandmother) and (iii) the target child should not already be attending full-time childcare (but we allowed for children attending part-time childcare).⁸ We also wanted to have a sufficiently large group of households without a younger child (less than three years old). To that end, we restricted the study sample to communities that have at least three households that satisfy the additional criteria of not having a younger child (and one household that does not satisfy this).⁹ From the list of eligible communities and households, we randomly selected 1,496 households across 389 communities to participate in the baseline survey.

⁸In the census sample, 49 percent of the households have a child aged three–five, and 39 percent of the households have exactly one child in that age range (note this is close to our calculations using the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey, 2016). Of those, the mother was absent in three percent of the households, and 23.5 percent of the target children were already enrolled in full-time daycare.

⁹To obtain this, we had to drop an additional 2.5 percent of the census households.

We collaborated with BRAC Uganda on collecting the data and with Dyadic Research Impact (DRI) on implementing the interventions. The baseline surveys were conducted in November and December 2018. We then randomized the sample into the four treatment arms. Randomization was conducted at the individual level and blocked by (i) district, (ii) whether the target child had younger siblings or not, (iii) whether the target child attended any (part-time) childcare or not, (iv) the female caregiver’s main occupation (self-employed, wage-employed or unemployed), and (v) whether the female caregiver was the child’s mother (versus grandmother).¹⁰ The interventions covered the 2019 school year, which began in February and ended in late November. A short-term follow-up survey was conducted in July–August 2019, and a long-term follow-up survey in November–December 2019 for children and in February 2020 for households. Figure 1 summarizes the timeline of the project.

FIGURE 1: PROJECT TIMELINE



Notes: The numbers below the tick marks indicate the month of the year. We indicate the three household surveys (Baseline, Short-Term and Long-Term), the two child development surveys (Child), and the timing of the cash transfers (\$).

The household surveys were answered by the primary female caregiver of the target child. At baseline and at the long-term follow-up, we collected information on the labor supply and business activities of the respondent and other household members, the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of all the household members, and on the respondent’s well-being. During the short-term follow-up, we collected information on only a subset of indicators in order to track some potential short-run changes.

The child survey was based on the International Development and Early Learning Assessment (IDELA), as developed by Save the Children. The tool consists of a set of questions and tests aimed at measuring the level of competency that children possess across four domains: motor skills, early literacy, early numeracy and socio-emotional skills. We chose IDELA because that tool is tailored to the age of the children targeted by our study, covers the most important domains of child development and has been tested in and translated for use in Uganda (Halpin et al., 2019; Pisani et al., 2018).

We registered a pre-analysis plan with the American Economic Association’s registry for

¹⁰Of the 1,496 households that took part in the baseline survey, 363 were randomly allocated to T1, 364 to T2, 357 to T3 and 412 to C. These are not symmetric groupings because the number of observations differed across strata and it was not always divisible by four.

randomized control trials (Bjorvatn et al., 2019). It details the power calculations, sampling, research design, baseline balance checks, outcome variables, heterogeneity, and correction for attrition.

2.2 Baseline characteristics

Table A.1 in Appendix A presents key background characteristics of the participants from the baseline survey. We observe that in 87 percent of households, the respondent is the target child's mother (as opposed to the grandmother). For brevity, we will refer to the female respondent as the *mother* in the remainder of the paper. The average mother was 35 years old and lived in a household with five members.¹¹ Her partner (i.e. the father or stepfather of the target child) was listed as being part of the household for 68 percent of the families. As for the *mother*, we will refer to the partner of the mother as the *father* in what follows. In terms of religion, about a third of the women are Muslim and the remainder Christian. The average child was 3.6 years old at baseline and almost half of them are boys. In about three quarters of the households, the target child was the youngest child in the household, and the average target child had two elder siblings: one male and one female. The enrollment rate of the target children in half-day childcare was 38 percent, and – by design – none attended full-day childcare.

Total household income is measured in two ways, by summing revenues from self-employment and income from wage labor, and by summing profits from self-employment and income from wage labor. The average household generated UGX 109 (243) thousand in monthly income measured through profits (revenues). Table A.2 shows details for mothers and fathers separately. Self-employment constitutes the larger share of the mother's labor hours and earnings than wage-employment, whereas the opposite holds for fathers.¹² This confirms the gender-segmented nature of the labor market in Uganda that we discussed in Section 2.1.

Tables A.1 and A.2 also provide balance tests, comparing the sample of non-attriters (i.e. households still in the sample at the time of the follow-up survey) by treatment status. Columns 2–4 present the standard difference between the control and the three treatment arms, while columns 5–7 report the normalized differences (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Fewer than five percent of the pairwise mean comparisons are statistically significantly different, which could have occurred through random chance. Moreover, all the normalized differences are smaller than one fourth of the combined sample variation. Hence, we conclude that the randomization was successful in achieving baseline balancing in key observable characteristics and that the control group therefore constitutes a valid

¹¹Summary statistics from the nationally representative Demographic and Health Survey (2016) provide similar numbers: On average, adult Ugandan women are 37 years old on and live in households of 4.7 members.

¹²The father's labor market outcomes are coded as zero if the respondent does not have a partner.

counterfactual for the treatment groups.

2.3 Estimation strategy

We estimate the treatment effects using the following model:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^3 \beta^k T_i^k + \lambda y_{i0} + \Gamma_{i0} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where y_{it} is the outcome of interest for respondent i at follow-up ($t=1$), y_{i0} is the baseline level of the outcome,¹³ $T_i^k = 1$ if the respondent is in the following treatment group: (i) childcare only ($k=1$), (ii) cash only ($k=2$), (iii) childcare & cash ($k=3$); Γ_{i0} are indicators for the five variables on which we stratified our randomization. In this specification, the β^k correspond to intention to treat (ITT) estimates. Under the assumption that the control observations constitute a valid counterfactual for each treatment group, β^k identifies the causal effect of the offer of childcare (β^1), cash (β^2), or both (β^3). Throughout the paper, monetary values are expressed in 1,000 UGX and are winsorized at the 99th percentile.

The treatments are randomized at the individual level. Hence, we do not cluster the standard errors but they are robust to heteroscedasticity.¹⁴ We group outcomes that test the same hypothesis in families and correct the p -values to account for multiple hypotheses testing using the procedure proposed by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). This allows us to control the *false discovery rate* within families of outcome variables. We correct the p -values by treatment arm and group the outcomes into families as specified in the table notes.

We test for differential attrition in Table A.3. For the household survey, the attrition rate was eight percent among the control group and four–five percent among the three treatment arms. The difference in attrition between the childcare and the childcare & cash arms relative to the control group is statistically significant, but not for the cash only versus control arm. There is no differential attrition across the three treatment arms, as can be seen from the p -values in the bottom panel of the table. For the child survey, the attrition rate was ten percent among the control group and this was lower by four ppt for the childcare arm and by three ppt for the cash and combined arms. Due to the differential attrition rate in the control group relative to the treatment groups, we assess the sensitivity of our findings with respect to attrition throughout the analysis. To do so, as pre-specified in our pre-analysis plan, we follow Kling et al. (2007) and Fairlie et al. (2015) and calculate the lower and upper bound estimates that adjust for differential non-response rates in the treatment groups relative to the control. We calculate the upper bounds by imputing the mean among the treated plus 0.1 (or 0.2) standard deviations (SD) to the non-responders in

¹³If information on the baseline level of the outcome is missing (due to non-response for a specific question), we impute the missing value at baseline with the sample mean and we control for this using an indicator variable equal to one if the observation has been imputed.

¹⁴Appendix D, shows that our results are robust to clustering the standard errors at the community level.

the treatment group. For the control group, we impute using the mean among the control minus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD. To calculate the lower bounds, we follow the opposite procedure. For the treatment group, we take the mean minus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD and for the control we take the mean plus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD. We then re-estimate the treatment effects. We report the results in Appendix C. Overall, the attrition bounds show that our main findings are unlikely to be driven by differential attrition.

2.4 Take-up

Before presenting the treatment impacts of our interventions, we confirm that the childcare treatment actually led to an increase in the enrollment of the target child in childcare. Table 1, column 1 indicates a 15 (14) ppt increase in the likelihood that the target child is enrolled in any childcare among the childcare (childcare & cash) treatment groups. This corresponds to an increase of around 18 percent relative to the control group.¹⁵ The cash transfer also increases enrollment in any childcare by seven ppt — this effect is significantly smaller than the effects in the treatment arms that include childcare (p -value $< .01$). Column 2 shows the treatment effects on enrollment in full-day childcare. In the control group, 34 percent of the children are enrolled for the full day. This proportion is approximately 50 ppt larger in the childcare treatments. This corresponds to a nearly 150 percent increase relative to the control. In contrast, the cash treatment leads to only a seven ppt (21 percent) increase and this is significantly smaller than the effects of the childcare treatments (p -value $< .01$). Column 3 shows that the mothers report fewer days of missed childcare in all the treatment groups during the third trimester: Compared to 21 days on average in the control group, children in the childcare arms miss 15 fewer days while those in the cash-only transfer arm miss nine fewer days. The treatment effects in the childcare treatments are significantly higher than in the cash-only treatment (p -value $< .01$).

¹⁵We see similar enrollment rates among children of this age range in other data from this region. For example, in Figure A.1 we compare the school enrollment rates of the children in our control group with children residing in the same districts using the 2018/19 wave of the Uganda LSMS. Among our control group, enrollment rates in any type of school are 79 percent and 83 percent among children aged three or four at baseline, while in the LSMS sample the corresponding rates are 69 percent and 82 percent respectively. Among the children aged five years at baseline, enrollment rates are above 90 percent in both samples.

TABLE 1: EFFECTS ON CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT AND ATTENDANCE

	Enrollment		Attendance
	Any childcare	Full-day childcare	Days missed
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Childcare	.15*** (.02)	.48*** (.03)	-15.21*** (1.9)
Cash	.07*** (.02)	.07** (.03)	-8.58*** (2.23)
Childcare & cash	.14*** (.02)	.5*** (.03)	-14.53*** (1.96)
p-value (equal treatment effects):			
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.463	0.571	0.597
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000	0.001
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.003	0.254	0.000
Mean Control	.82	.34	20.71
Obs.	1428	1428	1414

Notes: In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variables are dummies indicating the child is enrolled in any childcare, or in full-day childcare respectively; and in column (3) it measures the number of childcare days missed during the last trimester. All regressions control for the baseline level of the outcome variable and the randomization strata: district indicators, an indicator for whether the target child has younger siblings, whether the target child was already attending childcare at baseline, an indicator for whether the respondent was self-employed at baseline and the corresponding indicator for being wage-employed, and whether the respondent was the birth mother of the target child. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group all three outcomes as one family.

Overall, the findings in Table 1 demonstrate that all treatments increase enrollment and attendance rates in childcare among the targeted children, but the increase is significantly greater in the groups assigned to the childcare subsidy in comparison to those assigned to the cash transfer.¹⁶ One important finding from the research on childcare interventions is that full-time programs generally have stronger effects than part-time programs (Brewer et al., 2022; van Huizen and Plantenga, 2018) and it is therefore important to note the strong effects on full-day enrollment. Nevertheless, we observe that the recipients of cash grants increase their child’s enrollment in childcare to some extent, primarily in half-day

¹⁶We assess the robustness of these findings with respect to differential attrition in Table C.1 and Table C.2. Overall, the magnitudes of the lower and upper bounds are similar to those reported in Table 1 and this holds for all the alternative assumptions about the attriters. As such, we conclude that the effects on childcare enrollment are unlikely to be caused by differential attrition.

programs. This is also confirmed by additional evidence from the long-term survey. When we presented an open question “What did you use the cash transfer for?”, 65 percent of the respondents in the cash group said they used it at least partly to cover childcare expenditures. This could reflect a latent demand for childcare that may be subject to liquidity constraints. It could also be that the cash grant increases the opportunity cost of time, by increasing labor productivity, and thereby the attractiveness of childcare services.

We also estimate the treatment effects on older siblings’ school enrollment and attendance (children aged 7–18 years). As we show in Appendix Table A.4, there are no significant effects on enrollment rates, but there are significant effects on attendance. In particular, the childcare & cash treatment decreases the number of days missed by older siblings during the last school term by four days, corresponding to a 38 percent decrease relative to the control mean of ten days. The effect is driven by both sisters (three days) and brothers (two days). The other two treatments, childcare alone and cash alone, do not significantly impact the school attendance of older siblings compared to the control group. We conclude that the increased enrollment and attendance by the target children caused by the childcare treatment(s) did not come at the expense of the enrollment and attendance of their siblings. This reinforces our confidence that these treatments freed up the parents’ time.

3 Results

Our key research questions are whether subsidizing childcare increases labor supply and income, and how this compares to a similar-sized cash grant. The hypothesis is that childcare increases labor supply and income by alleviating a time constraint while the cash grant reduces a credit constraint on business development. We start by presenting evidence for the mother, then move on to the father, and, acknowledging the potential importance of the household composition, show evidence separately for mothers with and without a partner.

3.1 Mothers

Table 2 provides the treatment effects for mothers. We discuss the impact on income, and on the drivers of income changes, namely labor supply, investments in business assets, and the recruitment of employees. In each case, we begin by analyzing the effect of childcare and then move to cash and its comparison with childcare only, and finally the potential complementarities between the two treatments. The results are based on the long-term survey which was conducted approximately one year after the interventions started.

We measure income from self-employment as revenues and profits over the past month from all businesses owned by the mother (columns 1–2), and wages as the total wages received by the mother over the same time period (column 3).¹⁷ Total income is measured

¹⁷We focus on income from self-employment and wage labor, as they are the most important sources of

in two ways, by summing wages and revenues from self-employment (column 4), and by summing wages and profits from self-employment (column 5).¹⁸

We observe that childcare leads to a significant increase in the mother's revenues from self-employment (UGX 42 thousand compared to a control group mean of UGX 90 thousand). The point estimate on her business profits is also positive (UGX seven thousand compared to a control group mean of UGX 24 thousand). The increase in the mother's business revenues from childcare comes without any average increase in her labor supply, productive assets or number of employees.¹⁹ This suggests that, for the average woman in our sample, childcare does not lead to more work hours, but increases productivity.

The cash transfer has a similar effect as the childcare subsidy on the mother's revenues from self-employment. The effect is large and carries through to total revenues, which are UGX 43 thousand higher than in the control group. The total effect is driven by an increase in income from self-employment (UGX 49 thousand), but partly crowded out by a reduction in income from wages (UGX seven thousand). Mothers receiving cash are 13 ppt more likely to be employed (compared to a control group average of 47 percent) and work 31 hours longer per month (compared to 112 hours in the control group). They are also seven ppt more likely to buy business assets, and the value of these assets is about UGX five thousand higher, amounting to more than a doubling compared to the control group mean. There are no differences regarding employees.²⁰

A similar pattern as for the cash transfer arm emerges from the combined treatment. The mother's revenues (profits) from self-employment increase by UGX 63 (16) thousand. Again, these results also hold for total revenues. Mothers also increase their time spent in the business, but it is now accompanied by a significant reduction in the time spent on wage work. In total, mothers are nine ppt more likely to have employment, driven by a 16 ppt increase in self-employment and a five ppt reduction in wage employment. On the intensive margin, mothers increase their monthly labor supply by 20 hours in total which

income generation. Few households in our sample have income from farming (18 percent in the control group) or from livestock rearing (16 percent in the control group). As these are household activities, we cannot attribute those to the mother or the father.

¹⁸In case the respondent was unsure about the level of revenues or profits, we asked them to estimate these using intervals. In particular, they were asked if the revenues/profits were higher than X where X = median level of revenues/profits at baseline; if they said "Yes" ("No") they were then asked if the level was higher than X where X = 75th (25th) percentile of revenues/profits at baseline; followed by the 62.5th or 12.5th percentiles from the baseline. We impute missing values using the mid-point of the relevant interval in which they finished.

¹⁹In addition, we do not find childcare effects on the creation of new or the closure of old businesses (Table A.5). This suggests that mothers stayed in the same occupations. Consistent with this, we do not find effects on the operating time of the business nor on the travel time to the business (Table A.6).

²⁰Our finding that cash grants have a positive impact on mothers' business revenues is in line with Blattman et al. (2014), who study a government program in Uganda that invited youth to form groups and submit grant proposals for business start-ups. Although the grants were labeled as being for business, they were not supervised. As such, they were similar to the cash grants we study which were labeled as being for business development. Blattman et al. (2014) find that four years after baseline, the treated groups had more business assets, longer work hours and higher earnings. These effects did not differ by gender.

is due to a 36 hours increase in self-employment and a 16 hours decrease in wage labor. We observe an increase of eight ppt in the likelihood of owning newly purchased business assets and of UGX seven thousand in the value of these assets. Mothers are seven ppt more likely to employ at least one worker, which is a robust ten percent increase compared to the control group. Throughout the paper, we check for any complementarities between the childcare and the cash transfer treatments by testing if the treatment effect of the childcare & cash arm is equal to the sum of the treatment effects of the single-arm treatments. We find no evidence of any complementarities for mothers.²¹

²¹Tables C.3 and C.4 provide the lower and upper attrition bounds for the findings in Table 2 and these suggest that the treatment effects are unlikely to be driven by differential attrition.

TABLE 2: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nb.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Childcare	41.51** (21.04)	6.65 (4.74)	-3.83 (3.41)	37.72* (21.13)	3.37 (6.04)	.02 (.03)	2.61 (10.31)	-.02 (.03)	-6.83 (5.58)	.01 (.04)	-4.24 (10.93)	.03 (.02)	1.71 (2.22)	.01 (.02)	-.06 (.09)
Cash	49.47** (19.68)	9** (4.56)	-7.26** (3.3)	43.34* (19.72)	2.51 (5.86)	.19*** (.03)	39.73*** (10.98)	-.04 (.03)	-10.51* (5.54)	.13*** (.04)	31.31*** (11.44)	.07** (.02)	4.79* (2.5)	.06** (.03)	.05 (.1)
Childcare & cash	63.17*** (20.56)	16.06*** (4.91)	-9.67*** (3.11)	55.43*** (20.78)	7.65 (6.15)	.16*** (.03)	36.1*** (11.03)	-.05** (.02)	-16.28*** (5.08)	.09** (.04)	20.39* (11.42)	.08*** (.02)	7.41** (2.78)	.07*** (.02)	.02 (.09)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.741	0.640	0.311	0.816	0.891	0.000	0.001	0.540	0.503	0.001	0.003	0.078	0.288	0.065	0.056
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.380	0.083	0.071	0.476	0.520	0.000	0.003	0.219	0.059	0.017	0.036	0.032	0.066	0.028	0.100
Cash = childcare & cash	0.559	0.176	0.433	0.608	0.421	0.389	0.762	0.546	0.245	0.370	0.373	0.690	0.433	0.759	0.641
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.376	0.954	0.757	0.417	0.842	0.253	0.693	0.797	0.888	0.424	0.684	0.632	0.819	0.926	0.757
Mean Control	89.92	24.27	19.34	110.35	45.1	.31	81.76	.17	30.58	.47	112.34	.07	4.25	.1	.25
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues (1) and profits (2) earned through self-employment; income earned through wage labor (3) and the sum of wages and revenues (4) or wages and profits (5); labor supply in wage labor, and in self-employment, and in total at the extensive (6, 8 and 10) and at the intensive (7, 9 and 11) margins; whether the household purchase any business asset during the last 12 months (12) and the value of these assets (13); whether it has any employee in its businesses (14) and the number of employees (15). All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

3.2 Fathers

Turning to the treatment effects on fathers, Table 3 shows that childcare leads to a significant and robust increase in the father's total income by UGX 38 thousand, a 36 percent increase relative to the control group mean. While the coefficients on income from self-employment and wage labor are both positive, only the latter is statistically significant. Fathers receive UGX 18 thousand more in wages than those in the control group, an increase of approximately one third. The increased income from wage employment is mirrored by a significant increase in labor supply. At the extensive margin, the father's likelihood to be in wage employment increases by nine ppt (from a mean of 27 percent in the control group) and at the intensive margin by 21 hours (compared to 70 hours in the control group). The effect on total labor supply is attenuated by a slight decrease in labor supply for self-employment, but it is still clearly positive. Consistent with the increase in the father's income being driven by changes in wage employment, we do not observe a change in his business assets or employees.²²

The cash grant does not affect the father's income and labor supply, nor the other inputs to his business: assets and employees. All the coefficients are small and insignificant.

The combined treatment is associated with a positive increase in total revenues, which is not statistically different from that observed for the childcare only treatment. The effect is now mainly driven by an increase in revenues from self-employment, as the impact on wage labor is close to zero. The additional number of hours worked by fathers is similar in size to those of childcare only but less precisely estimated. While these hours were mainly allocated to wage labor in the childcare only arm, they are now more equally divided between self-employment and wage labor.^{23 24}

²²Note that only 15 percent of the fathers owned a business at baseline.

²³Fathers may help in the women's businesses. As such, this result is consistent with the increase in employees observed in women's businesses in Table 2, column 14.

²⁴Tables C.5 and C.6 provide the lower and upper attrition bounds for the findings in Table 3. The results show that the treatment effects are unlikely to be driven by differential attrition.

TABLE 3: EFFECTS ON FATHERS

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nr.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Childcare	14.37 (14.96)	2.61 (4.03)	18.1** (9.12)	38.12** (17.46)	24.56** (10.16)	-.02 (.03)	-3.38 (8.21)	.09*** (.03)	20.5** (9.55)	.07** (.04)	18.29 (11.68)	0 (.01)	.98 (1.13)	0 (.01)	.03 (.05)
Cash	-7.2 (13.01)	-5.49 (3.56)	8.02 (8.97)	6.02 (15.62)	5.08 (9.88)	-.01 (.03)	-4 (8.54)	.05 (.03)	8.06 (9.09)	.02 (.04)	8.41 (11.68)	0 (.01)	1.97 (1.31)	0 (.01)	.03 (.04)
Childcare & cash	30.77* (15.81)	1.87 (3.84)	.92 (8.82)	40.65** (18.35)	5.04 (9.94)	.03 (.03)	10.43 (8.76)	.03 (.03)	7.56 (9.33)	.04 (.04)	16.27 (11.79)	0 (.01)	.47 (1.02)	.01 (.02)	.06 (.07)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.154	0.042	0.290	0.073	0.069	0.767	0.737	0.187	0.198	0.123	0.419	0.914	0.522	0.974	0.997
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.358	0.863	0.069	0.901	0.070	0.121	0.129	0.065	0.191	0.280	0.870	0.705	0.698	0.513	0.618
Cash = childcare & cash	0.019	0.054	0.441	0.066	0.997	0.212	0.248	0.633	0.958	0.644	0.524	0.785	0.306	0.527	0.608
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.288	0.397	0.053	0.892	0.095	0.171	0.255	0.016	0.119	0.258	0.540	0.735	0.178	0.641	0.912
Mean Control	52.39	17.09	54.11	106.9	71.99	.15	40.64	.27	70.34	.4	110.14	.03	1.53	.04	.09
Obs.	1414	1414	1412	1412	1412	1414	1413	1414	1411	1414	1410	1414	1414	1413	1413

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues (1) and profits (2) earned through self-employment; income earned through wage labor (3) and the sum of wages and revenues (4) or wages and profits (5); labor supply in wage labor, and in self-employment, and in total at the extensive (6, 8 and 10) and at the intensive (7, 9 and 11) margins; whether the household purchased any business asset during the last 12 months (12) and the value of these assets (13); whether it has any employee in its businesses (14) and the number of employees (15). All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

The impact of the childcare subsidy on the fathers' wage labor and income can be driven by two potential mechanisms. First, childcare may free up some of the father's time, either directly, by relieving time he would otherwise have spent with the child, or indirectly, by the mother taking over some of his domestic work. A recent national time-use survey shows that Ugandan men spend about five hours per day doing unpaid care work (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2019). This is less than the seven hours women spend on such tasks, but it is still substantial.²⁵ The childcare treatment relieves the household from part of the domestic work required, resulting in the reallocation of the parents' time to other tasks, such as income-generating activities. If there are capital constraints, the main income-generating option is wage labor. Given the importance of the gender gap in the labor market in Uganda (see Section 2.1), the most lucrative option from the household's point of view is to increase the father's wage labor, with the mother potentially taking over some of his domestic chores. In addition, the division of labor may also be guided by the traditional role of the woman as the main responsible for household chores (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2019). The time channel, therefore, provides a plausible explanation.

Second, the childcare subsidy may free up resources (as some households would have sent their child to childcare anyhow), allowing the fathers to invest more in costly job search.²⁶ Given that the cash transfer does not significantly impact the fathers' labor supply, it is unlikely that this resource channel drives the results. Offering childcare does increase his labor supply though. To better understand which households are more likely to free up resources (as they would have paid for childcare without the subsidy), we assess the correlates of full-day childcare enrollment in the control group using baseline covariates. Appendix Table A.7 shows that the mother's occupation (wage-employment) and education level, as well as the target child's age and gender are among the significant correlates of childcare enrollment among the control group. Using these covariates, we then predict the target child's likelihood to be in full-day childcare. We use this predicted likelihood to split the sample into households where it is highly likely that the target child will attend childcare or not. Table A.8 shows the heterogeneity of the father's labor supply and income with respect to this dimension. Overall, we do not find evidence that the effects are driven by households that are more likely to send the target child to childcare. This suggests that the effect of the childcare subsidy on the father's labor supply is unlikely to be driven by an income effect among the "always takers" of childcare.²⁷

²⁵According to Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2019), cooking, shopping, childcare and care for dependent adults take up most of this time (5.3 hours for women and 3 hours for men). Men spend more time on other domestic tasks, such as home maintenance, transporting goods or family members, and unpaid work in support of other households (2.7 hours versus 1.4 for women).

²⁶Abebe et al. (2020) show that providing a transport subsidy to job seekers in Ethiopia can lead to large positive effects on the likelihood of finding a job.

²⁷We also analyzed effects on other household members' (besides the mother and the father of the target child) labor supply and earnings, but did not find any significant effects – results available upon request.

3.3 Impact of Childcare by Family Composition

The childcare treatment increases labor supply for the average father, but not for the average mother. This suggests that the household composition may be an important aspect to look at to understand the impact of the childcare subsidy: While it may be more profitable for a couple to allocate the freed-up time to the partner, this is not an option for single mothers, who comprise 32% of our sample.

Figure 2 graphically summarizes the impact of the childcare subsidy on mothers who live with a partner (left panel) versus single mothers (right panel). The left axis indicates income (in UGX 1,000) and labor supply at the intensive margin (in hours per month), and the right axis labor supply at the extensive margin (percent of working mothers). While the childcare subsidy does not impact the labor supply and income of mothers in a couple, the effects are large for single mothers.

FIGURE 2: THE IMPACT OF CHILDCARE BY FAMILY COMPOSITION.




Table 4 reports the estimates for this heterogeneous effect. There is no impact of childcare on the mother’s labor supply or income when a partner is present, but the interaction effects between the childcare treatment and the mother being single are positive and significant. Single mothers use the extra time to increase their labor supply in self-employment, and this is associated with a substantial increase in both their revenues and profits. The proportion of self-employed increases by 13 ppt (from 30 to 43 percent), business revenues by UGX 157 thousand per month (compared to a control mean of UGX 88 thousand) and business profits by UGX 23 thousand per month (compared to a control mean of UGX 24 thousand). The effect carries through to total revenues and profits, though the latter is less

precisely estimated.²⁸

This evidence is consistent with the interpretations made so far. When a father is present, the household uses the additional time to increase the father's labor supply and income from wage work. For single mothers, such a reallocation is not possible, leading them to increase their own time in self-employment.²⁹ Furthermore, the magnitude of the effects suggests that single mothers became more productive in their businesses. In the control group, the average single mother works 75 hours and earns UGX 88 thousand, so her average hourly earnings equal UGX 1.17 thousand. When provided childcare, the average single mother works $75+35=110$ hours and earns UGX 156 thousand, which corresponds to hourly earnings of UGX 1.41 thousand. Assuming a concave production function with diminishing marginal productivity of labor, the higher hourly earnings for single mothers in the treatment group relative to single mothers in the control group (i.e. $1.41 > 1.17$) indicates that single mothers become more productive when they receive a childcare subsidy.

²⁸Note this is one of the dimensions that we pre-specified for a heterogeneity analysis. The Tables A.9, A.10 and A.11 show the heterogeneous effects for the other pre-specified dimensions: the presence of a younger child, the child's age and the child's gender. The point estimates of the interaction effects are sizable for some of these dimensions, but they are not significant when accounting for multiple hypothesis testing.

²⁹The evidence could have also been consistent with a scenario in which single mothers are less credit constrained than mothers living with a partner. Our data does not support this. We asked all mothers at baseline if they would be able to borrow UGX 300 thousand for the next six months: 65 percent of single mothers said no, while only 57 percent of mothers who live with their partner said no. The difference is statistically significant ($p = 0.004$).

TABLE 4: EFFECTS ON SINGLE MOTHERS

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nr.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Childcare	-1.57 (21.1)	.34 (5.35)	-4.73 (4.05)	-5.24 (21.37)	-3.17 (6.9)	-.02 (.04)	-10.25 (11.99)	-.02 (.03)	-1.28 (5.86)	-.04 (.04)	-11.6 (12.66)	.02 (.02)	1.78 (2.66)	-.01 (.03)	-.17 (.13)
Cash	64.04** (27.19)	11.14* (5.97)	-7.38** (3.57)	60.44** (27.19)	5.78 (7.42)	.19*** (.04)	33.4** (13.63)	-.04 (.03)	-4.28 (5.64)	.12*** (.04)	29.22** (14.01)	.09*** (.03)	6.31* (3.3)	.03 (.03)	-.06 (.13)
Childcare & cash	63.51** (25.93)	14.28** (5.82)	-8.43** (3.79)	59.13** (26.32)	8.08 (7.38)	.18*** (.04)	40.19*** (13.54)	-.06** (.03)	-9.83* (5.22)	.11** (.04)	30.03* (13.84)	.1*** (.03)	8.92** (3.55)	.07** (.03)	-.01 (.13)
Single mother	-29.72 (24.96)	-6.24 (6.44)	1.85 (5.42)	-25.11 (25.25)	-1.36 (8.93)	-.03 (.05)	-14.93 (15.23)	.06 (.04)	23.48** (10.21)	.03 (.05)	10.79 (16.63)	.02 (.03)	1.22 (2.7)	-.07** (.03)	-.29* (.15)
Childcare × single mother	158.17*** (57.05)	22.74** (11.55)	3.89 (7.27)	158.88*** (56.7)	24.84* (13.99)	.15** (.07)	45.93* (23.68)	.01 (.06)	-15.8 (13.2)	.17** (.08)	30.84 (24.84)	.02 (.05)	.06 (5.03)	.07 (.05)	.34** (.17)
Cash × single mother	-41.7 (35.77)	-6.03 (9.1)	.28 (7.67)	-49.38 (35.86)	-9.62 (12.3)	.01 (.07)	19.49 (23.17)	0 (.06)	-19.3 (13.36)	.02 (.08)	5.75 (24.38)	-.05 (.05)	-4.58 (4.96)	.08 (.05)	.35** (.16)
Childcare & cash × single mother	.4 (40.31)	5.55 (10.73)	-3.77 (6.68)	-9.76 (40.62)	-1.27 (13.34)	-.06 (.07)	-11.46 (23.47)	.02 (.06)	-20.23* (12.22)	-.05 (.08)	-29.25 (24.68)	-.06 (.05)	-4.54 (5.62)	-.02 (.05)	.1 (.15)
Impact for single mothers at baseline															
Childcare	156.6*** (53.06)	23.08** (10.18)	-.83 (6.07)	153.64*** (52.56)	21.67* (12.13)	.13** (.06)	35.68* (20.38)	-.01 (.05)	-17.08 (11.93)	.14** (.06)	19.24 (21.36)	.04 (.04)	1.83 (4.21)	.06 (.04)	.17* (.09)
Cash	22.35 (23.16)	5.1 (6.81)	-7.1 (6.81)	11.06 (23.36)	-3.84 (9.71)	.2*** (.06)	52.9*** (18.67)	-.04 (.05)	-23.58* (12.17)	.14** (.06)	34.97* (19.95)	.03 (.04)	1.73 (3.67)	.12*** (.04)	.29*** (.1)
Childcare & cash	63.91** (31.81)	19.83** (9.04)	-12.2** (5.5)	49.37 (31.88)	6.81 (11.14)	.12** (.06)	28.72 (19.11)	-.04 (.05)	-30.06*** (11.1)	.06 (.06)	.78 (20.39)	.04 (.04)	4.39 (4.36)	.06 (.04)	.1 (.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects)															
Childcare = cash	.009	.064	.341	.005	.023	.29	.416	.665	.545	.933	.463	.862	.984	.231	.376
Childcare = childcare & cash	.095	.776	.03	.057	.237	.875	.748	.607	.174	.22	.4	.98	.631	.969	.439
Cash = childcare & cash	.14	.086	.391	.173	.296	.2	.231	.945	.508	.17	.098	.874	.592	.216	.073
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.055	.532	.616	.053	.489	.018	.038	.889	.493	.013	.073	.582	.899	.065	.009
Mean Control	88	24	22	113	49	.3	75	.22	48	.49	123	.1	6	.07	.1
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues (1) and profits (2) earned through self-employment; income earned through wage labor (3) and the sum of wages and revenues (4) or wages and profits (5); labor supply in wage labor, and in self-employment, and in total at the extensive margins (6, 8 and 10) and at the intensive (7, 9 and 11) margins; whether the household purchased any business asset during the last 12 months (12) and the value of these assets (13); whether it has any employee in its businesses (14) and the number of employees (15). All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. The interaction term is a dummy indicating the mother was single at baseline. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

4 Effects on Household Well-being

We now turn to the impact on a broader range of outcomes related to family welfare. We first discuss the treatment effects on household income, consumption and food security, before ruling out the possibility that childcare negatively impacts child development.

Table 5 reports the treatment effects on total income, the average consumption per day and food insecurity. Total household income is measured in two ways, by summing wages and revenues from self-employment (column 1), and by summing wages and profits from self-employment (column 2). The households assigned to childcare see a large increase in revenues by UGX 86 thousand, and profits by UGX 31 thousand compared to the control group averages of UGX 250 thousand and UGX 137 thousand respectively. Turning to the cash treatment, we note that the impact on total revenues is economically important, but not significant once we correct for multiple hypothesis testing. The effects on profits are small and insignificant. The households assigned to the combined treatment of childcare & cash obtain an increase in revenues by UGX 107 thousand. The impact on profits is again positive but not statistically significant.

To measure consumption, we asked about the expenditures over the past month for infrequent purchases, and the value of consumption over the past week for drinks, food and tobacco. The measure, therefore, does not only include expenditures, but also the consumption of goods produced by the household (from farming and livestock) and received from others. All treatments increase total household consumption. This effect is mainly driven by an increase in non-food consumption by 16 percent (childcare only), 18 percent (cash only) and 26 percent (childcare and cash). Despite the higher increase in the combined treatment arm, there are no significant complementarities between childcare and cash. The coefficients on food consumption are positive for all treatment arms, yet insignificant. The effect on the consumption of temptation goods is negative and close to zero in all cases.

Finally, food security measures the experienced food insecurity during the past seven days.³⁰ Food insecurity is common in the region we study. In the control group, 87 percent of the households reduced the variety of products consumed due to a lack of money, and 60 percent reported they had to skip at least one meal. This declines for those receiving the cash transfer (column 7).³¹

³⁰Food insecurity is measured by taking the principal component of four questions: (1) Was there a time when you ate only a few kinds of foods because of a lack of money or other resources?, (2) Was there a time when you had to skip a meal because there was not enough money or other resources to get food?, (3) Was there a time when your household ran out of food because of a lack of money or other resources? (4) Was there a time when you were hungry but did not eat because there was not enough money or other resources for food?

³¹Tables C.7 and C.8 provide the lower and upper attrition bounds for the findings in Table 5. The results show that the treatment effects are unlikely to be driven by differential attrition.

TABLE 5: EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME, CONSUMPTION AND FOOD SECURITY

	Total Income		Consumption per day				Food
	Revenues (1)	profits (2)	Total (3)	Food (4)	Non-food (5)	Temptation (6)	insecurity (7)
Childcare	85.73** (33.85)	31.03** (13.29)	.93* (.52)	.09 (.27)	.85** (.36)	-.03 (.05)	-.11 (.1)
Cash	56.2* (30.66)	5.76 (12.68)	1.29** (.53)	.33 (.27)	.97*** (.36)	-.06 (.05)	-.19* (.1)
Childcare & cash	107.05*** (34.32)	9.12 (12.95)	1.63*** (.57)	.22 (.28)	1.39*** (.39)	-.04 (.05)	-.23** (.1)
p-value (equal treatment effects):							
Childcare = cash	0.437	0.083	0.524	0.353	0.771	0.430	0.424
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.605	0.141	0.234	0.612	0.200	0.771	0.252
Cash = childcare & cash	0.184	0.816	0.563	0.711	0.322	0.608	0.718
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.496	0.159	0.454	0.624	0.442	0.480	0.625
Mean Control	250.51	137.15	11.44	5.9	5.33	.18	.39
Obs.	1410	1410	1393	1413	1400	1403	1414

Notes: In column (1) and (2) the dependent variables are total income measured through revenues and profits, respectively. In column (3), the dependent variable measures total household expenditures per day, comprising expenditures on food in column (4), and non-food in column (5). The final column is a measure of food insecurity, which is the first principal component of the four questions on experiencing food insecurity in the past seven days. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: (1) to (2) and (3) to (7).

Table 6 presents the treatment effects on the target child’s development, as measured by the IDELA instrument. The tool, as previously mentioned, was developed by Save the Children and has been extensively used to evaluate children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills across the world (Halpin et al., 2019). Column 1 presents the impact on the standardized aggregate IDELA score, while columns 2–5 show the effects on each of its four dimensions: emergent literacy, emergent numeracy, socio-emotional skills and motor development.

We find that childcare –alone or when combined with cash– has positive and significant effects of about 0.15 SD on the aggregate score, driven by significant improvements in emergent literacy and motor development. The effects on emergent numeracy and socio-emotional skills are also positive (0.1 SD and 0.04 SD, respectively), but not statistically significant.³²

Turning to the cash treatment, the impact on the aggregate score and on its components are positive, but not statistically significant.³³

³²We do not have a direct measure of the quality of childcare. Presuming the cost reflects its quality, and under the caveat that households in the control and in the cash only arm self-select into paying for childcare, there is no evidence that children attend different types of schools. The average cost per trimester for full-time daycare is UGX 152,040 in the control arm, UGX 155,390 in the childcare arms, and 144,040 in the cash only arm.

³³The Tables C.9 and C.10 provide the lower and upper attrition bounds for the findings in Table 6. The results show that the treatment effects are unlikely to be driven by differential attrition.

TABLE 6: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT

	Breakdown into components				
	IDELA score (1)	Emergent literacy (2)	Emergent numeracy (3)	Socio-emotional (4)	Motor development (5)
Childcare	.16 ^{***} (.06)	.12 ^{**} (.06)	.11 [*] (.06)	.04 (.07)	.23 ^{***} (.06)
Cash	.09 (.06)	.06 (.06)	.08 (.06)	.01 (.07)	.11 [*] (.06)
Childcare & cash	.15 ^{***} (.06)	.16 ^{***} (.06)	.1 (.06)	.04 (.07)	.19 ^{***} (.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.234	0.334	0.674	0.562	0.056
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.956	0.491	0.969	0.950	0.523
Cash = childcare & cash	0.268	0.100	0.706	0.613	0.207
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.258	0.786	0.379	0.921	0.080
Mean Control	0	0	0	0	0
Obs.	1366	1366	1366	1366	1366

Notes: In column 1, the dependent variable is the standardized aggregate IDELA score, and in the columns 2-5 the standardized components of the score: emergent literacy, emergent numeracy, socio-emotional skills and motor development. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group the outcomes together in two families: the overall score (1) and the components of the score (2, 3, 4 and 5).

Finally, we collected information on mothers' own assessment of their well-being and domestic violence. We report the results on these outcome in the Online Appendix. Table B.1 documents that all three treatments lead to improvements in the mother's subjective well-being, measured through self-reported happiness, life satisfaction and perceived stress. In table B.2, we investigate potential treatment effects on violence against mothers, against children by members of the household, and against children by outsiders. For each block, we look separately at psychological violence, physical violence, and the combination of both. The treatments did not significantly affect violence against children. However, it cannot be entirely excluded that the cash treatments increase domestic violence.

5 Conclusion

We reported findings from a randomized control trial that offered women who have a child aged three–five access to (i) free childcare, (ii) a cash grant, or (iii) both a cash grant and free childcare. A fourth group of women remained as the control group. We find that access to free childcare improves household income, by allowing single mothers to work more or more effectively in self-employment, and fathers to take up new wage jobs. The cash grant of similar value and timing triggers an occupational shift from wage labor to self-employment, and increases business profits and total income. We do not find important complementarities between these treatments.

In terms of other outcomes, we find that childcare has large and positive effects on child development and does not cause any increase in violence against the child or the mother. Moreover, it has a positive effect on household consumption. The evidence from the cash transfer effects on well-being is more mixed. The impact on consumption is positive, but we cannot exclude an increase in domestic violence against the mother and it does not have any significant effect on child development over the observation period.

Our findings indicate that subsidizing childcare can be a cost-effective way to improve household income and child development. The positive effect of childcare on household income and child development is at least as large as that of a cash grant of equivalent cost. However, in a context where the labor market is gender-segmented (women are more likely to be involved in self-employment, and men in wage-employment), our evidence also highlights how inequality in the labor market shapes the effects of the policy. Our findings suggest that access to capital is more effective in increasing female labor supply.

Our findings also help understand why families do not use childcare services more despite the large returns. The immediate returns in income are lower than the cost of formal childcare and the substantial effects on child development can only bring long-term benefits. Credit constrained households may therefore not have the possibility to use childcare services as much as they would like. The fact that 65 percent of the households receiving the cash transfers used it partly to pay for childcare is consistent with the hypothesis of binding liquidity constraints. However, the enrollment rates in full-day childcare among the cash transfer recipients still fall short of the levels obtained through the subsidy. This may be driven by the labeling of cash grants for business activities, by households who underestimate the potential impact of childcare on household income and child development, or simply by their preference for less uncertain and immediate income gains over long-term investments in children. All of these potential explanations are worthy of further research.

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
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A Appendix Figures and Tables

FIGURE A.1: ENROLLMENT RATE AMONG CHILDREN, BY AGE AT BASELINE



Notes: The figure shows the enrollment rates in any type of school (half-day or full-day) among the target children in our control group and children of a similar age, who reside in the same districts, in the LSMS data. The age on the X-axis refers to the age of the target child at baseline (the actual age of the child is +1 year older at the follow-up survey and in the LSMS).

TABLE A.1: BASELINE DESCRIPTIVES AND BALANCE

	Control	Basic Difference			Normalized Difference		
	Mean (SD)	T1 v.s. C	T2 v.s. C	T3 v.s. C	T1 v.s. C	T2 v.s. C	T3 v.s. C
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
A: Descriptives							
Respondent is target child's mother	0.873 (0.333)	0.030 (0.023)	0.025 (0.024)	0.034 (0.023)	0.066	0.056	0.076
Mother's age	34.540 (10.381)	-0.253 (0.781)	-0.415 (0.755)	-0.875 (0.754)	-0.017	-0.029	-0.061
Mother's education (years)	8.190 (3.946)	-0.532 (0.285)*	-0.065 (0.297)	-0.211 (0.293)	-0.098	-0.012	-0.038
Household size	5.362 (2.172)	-0.079 (0.154)	-0.069 (0.155)	-0.036 (0.159)	-0.027	-0.023	-0.012
Father is in the household	0.677 (0.468)	0.062 (0.034)*	-0.014 (0.035)	-0.013 (0.035)	0.097	-0.022	-0.019
Target child has younger sibling	0.286 (0.452)	-0.014 (0.033)	-0.018 (0.033)	-0.012 (0.034)	-0.021	-0.029	-0.018
Nb of elder male siblings	0.952 (1.072)	-0.076 (0.078)	-0.025 (0.077)	-0.092 (0.076)	-0.051	-0.017	-0.064
Nb of elder female siblings	0.889 (1.050)	0.097 (0.083)	0.006 (0.078)	0.038 (0.078)	0.062	0.004	0.026
Mother's religion is Islam	0.270 (0.444)	0.017 (0.033)	0.009 (0.033)	-0.031 (0.032)	0.026	0.015	-0.050
Household owns any land	0.367 (0.483)	-0.062 (0.036)*	0.018 (0.038)	0.023 (0.038)	-0.093	0.026	0.033
Target child is a boy	0.503 (0.501)	0.011 (0.038)	-0.033 (0.038)	0.029 (0.038)	0.015	-0.047	0.041
Target child's age in years	3.612 (0.710)	-0.055 (0.053)	-0.012 (0.052)	-0.066 (0.054)	-0.055	-0.012	-0.066
Target child attends childcare	0.384 (0.487)	-0.034 (0.036)	-0.035 (0.036)	-0.026 (0.036)	-0.050	-0.051	-0.037
Child development (IDELA) score	0.005 (0.993)	-0.137 (0.076)*	-0.117 (0.076)	-0.105 (0.074)	-0.101	-0.085	-0.079
B: Household-level outcomes							
Household total income (profits)	109.160 (216.897)	-20.770 (16.760)	1.581 (18.720)	17.996 (28.005)	-0.067	0.024	0.045
Household total income (revenues)	243.153 (748.054)	-5.431 (61.951)	-18.795 (54.157)	12.148 (60.640)	-0.001	-0.013	0.019

Notes: Column (1) gives the mean and the standard deviation of observations in the control group; columns (2), (3) and (4) report the differences between the control group and the childcare only, cash only, and combined arms respectively. These differences are obtained by regressing each variable on the treatment indicators, and the tests of significance are based on the regression estimates (* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$). Columns (5), (6) and (7) report the normalized difference between the control and the three different treatments, computed as the difference in means in the relevant treatment and control observations divided by the square root of the sum of the variances. All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile.

TABLE A.2: BASELINE DESCRIPTIVES AND BALANCE (CONTINUED)

	Control	Basic Difference			Normalized Difference		
	Mean (SD)	T1 v.s. C	T2 v.s. C	T3 v.s. C	T1 v.s. C	T2 v.s. C	T3 v.s. C
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
A: Mothers' labor market outcomes and well-being							
Mother's total income (profits)	39.706 (90.737)	-6.116 (6.273)	3.598 (8.712)	-4.221 (6.562)	-0.053	0.023	-0.035
Mother's total income (revenues)	102.325 (293.533)	-5.460 (20.102)	4.241 (23.182)	7.184 (26.529)	-0.015	0.010	0.015
Mother's income from wage-employment	12.003 (49.585)	0.448 (3.733)	4.432 (3.980)	0.371 (3.477)	0.006	0.059	0.006
Mother's profits from self-employment	26.957 (78.883)	-6.816 (5.134)	0.190 (7.947)	-4.491 (5.722)	-0.072	0.001	-0.043
Mother's revenues from self-employment	89.729 (292.319)	-5.857 (19.971)	0.881 (23.068)	6.959 (26.491)	-0.016	0.002	0.014
Mother is employed	0.429 (0.496)	-0.010 (0.037)	0.022 (0.037)	-0.009 (0.037)	-0.015	0.031	-0.012
Mother's hours in employment	91.175 (136.693)	-4.338 (9.985)	9.721 (10.504)	1.222 (10.442)	-0.023	0.049	0.006
Mother is wage-employed	0.116 (0.321)	0.010 (0.024)	0.035 (0.025)	0.012 (0.024)	0.021	0.072	0.026
Mother's hours in wage-employment	17.542 (61.120)	-0.262 (4.348)	11.167 (5.501)**	2.781 (4.854)	-0.003	0.108	0.030
Mother is self-employed	0.325 (0.469)	-0.025 (0.034)	-0.009 (0.035)	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.037	-0.013	-0.029
Mother's hours in self-employment	73.743 (128.325)	-4.238 (9.540)	-1.121 (9.559)	-1.408 (9.620)	-0.023	-0.006	-0.008
Happiness (0-10)	4.979 (2.454)	0.196 (0.182)	-0.081 (0.179)	0.199 (0.185)	0.057	-0.024	0.057
Life satisfaction (0-10)	4.156 (2.093)	-0.001 (0.153)	-0.284 (0.151)*	0.001 (0.158)	-0.000	-0.099	0.000
Stress (Cohen scale)	21.249 (5.889)	0.107 (0.431)	0.519 (0.431)	-0.144 (0.426)	0.013	0.063	-0.018
B: Fathers' labor market outcomes							
Father's total income (profits)	57.404 (164.201)	-9.426 (11.968)	12.940 (14.645)	29.892 (24.981)	-0.045	0.051	0.071
Father's total income (revenues)	122.220 (625.610)	3.450 (51.520)	-3.904 (43.368)	9.475 (47.577)	0.004	-0.005	0.011
Father's income from wage-employment	35.576 (101.181)	-1.763 (7.955)	14.744 (10.940)	28.128 (20.549)	-0.012	0.075	0.075
Father's profits from self-employment	16.628 (123.223)	-7.870 (7.602)	-3.485 (7.818)	-3.843 (7.892)	-0.057	-0.024	-0.027
Father's revenues from self-employment	75.831 (589.986)	4.883 (46.684)	-18.485 (38.285)	-20.117 (38.635)	0.006	-0.026	-0.029
Father is employed	0.407 (0.492)	-0.006 (0.036)	-0.021 (0.036)	-0.034 (0.036)	-0.009	-0.030	-0.050
Father's hours in employment	106.205 (153.988)	-2.089 (11.382)	4.177 (11.770)	-3.880 (11.492)	-0.010	0.019	-0.018
Father is wage-employed	0.262 (0.440)	-0.010 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.032)	-0.061 (0.031)*	-0.016	-0.043	-0.102
Father's hours in wage-employment	58.817 (118.585)	0.566 (8.823)	0.719 (9.097)	-5.777 (8.996)	0.003	0.004	-0.034
Father is self-employed	0.159 (0.366)	0.002 (0.027)	0.004 (0.027)	0.013 (0.028)	0.003	0.008	0.025
Father's hours in self-employment	47.766 (119.649)	-3.461 (8.751)	2.932 (9.133)	1.363 (8.858)	-0.021	0.017	0.008

Notes: See Table A.1.

TABLE A.3: ATTRITION

	Household survey (1)	Child survey (2)
Childcare	-0.04*** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Cash	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)
Childcare & cash	-0.04*** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)
Observations	1496	1496
Mean in control	0.08	0.10
Daycare = Cash	0.274	0.917
Daycare = Daycare and cash	0.941	0.941
Cash = Daycare and cash	0.310	0.976

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value one if the respondent (column 1) or the target child (column 2) could not be surveyed in the follow-up survey. All regressions control for the randomization strata: district indicators, an indicator for whether the target child has younger siblings, whether the target child was already attending (half-day) childcare at baseline, an indicator for whether the respondent was self-employed at baseline and the corresponding indicator for being wage-employed, and whether the respondent was the birth mother of the target child. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis (* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$).

TABLE A.4: EFFECTS ON ELDER SIBLINGS' ENROLLMENT AND ATTENDANCE

	Enrollment			Days missed		
	All (1)	Females (2)	Males (3)	All (4)	Females (5)	Males (6)
Childcare	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.32 (1.74)	.73 (1.63)	-1.38 (1.43)
Cash	-.01 (.02)	0 (.03)	0 (.03)	-1.71 (1.47)	-1.7 (1.33)	-1.1 (1.36)
Childcare & cash	.01 (.02)	.02 (.03)	.01 (.03)	-3.76 ^{***} (1.31)	-2.92 ^{***} (1.12)	-2.34 [*] (1.27)
p-value (equal treatment effects):						
Childcare = cash	0.684	0.546	0.871	0.389	0.118	0.836
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.170	0.208	0.512	0.022	0.010	0.421
Cash = childcare & cash	0.350	0.522	0.620	0.072	0.202	0.268
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.200	0.363	0.612	0.408	0.308	0.939
Mean Control	.85	.85	.85	9.8	6.39	6.87
Obs.	1150	872	848	1150	872	848

Notes: In columns (1) until (3) the dependent variables measure the share of the target child's elder siblings, sisters and brothers who are enrolled in school; and in columns (4) until (6) the average number of days of school they missed in the last trimester. The sample is restricted to households where the target child has any elder sibling (columns 1 and 4), an elder sister (columns 2 and 5), or an elder brother (columns 3 and 6). All regressions control for the baseline level of the outcome variable and the randomization strata listed in Table A.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group all the outcomes together in one family.

TABLE A.5: BUSINESS CREATION AND SURVIVAL

	Household	Mothers	
	New business (1)	New business (2)	Closed business (3)
Childcare	0 (.03)	.02 (.03)	.01 (.03)
Cash	.19*** (.03)	.17*** (.03)	.03 (.03)
Childcare & cash	.15*** (.03)	.15*** (.03)	.03 (.03)
p-value (equal treatment effects):			
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000	0.375
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.000	0.000	0.477
Cash = childcare & cash	0.362	0.605	0.859
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.496	0.390	0.754
Mean Control	.24	.15	.17
Obs.	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure whether a new business was created at the household level (column 1) or by the mother (column 2). Column (3) measures whether at least one of the mother's baseline businesses closed down. All regressions control for the randomization strata listed in Table A.3. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group all the outcomes together in one family.

TABLE A.6: TRAVEL TIME TO THE BUSINESS AND OPERATING HOURS (MOTHER)

	Travel time			Operating time (total)		
	Any business	New business	Old business	Any business	New business	Old business
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Childcare	.99 (.73)	.36 (.53)	.63 (.49)	8.44 (9.04)	3.9 (7.49)	4.9 (6.1)
Cash	2.35*** (.75)	1.89*** (.63)	.46 (.41)	45.68*** (10.28)	36.57*** (8.44)	9.2 (6.45)
Childcare & cash	1.65** (.72)	1.21* (.59)	.45 (.42)	42.73*** (10.09)	36.73*** (8.7)	6.33 (5.97)
p-value (equal treatment effects):						
Childcare = cash	0.114	0.022	0.751	0.001	0.000	0.505
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.428	0.181	0.744	0.001	0.000	0.813
Cash = childcare & cash	0.407	0.336	0.982	0.801	0.987	0.651
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.130	0.239	0.351	0.442	0.765	0.379
Mean Control	2.33	1.35	.99	78.43	32.52	45.91
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables are the operating time (total hours per month over all businesses) and the time needed to travel to a business (minutes per day, over all businesses). This is provided for any business (columns 1 and 4), newly created businesses (columns 2 and 5) and businesses that were in existence at the time of the baseline (columns 3 and 6). We control for the randomization strata listed in Table A.3. In columns 4 to 6, we also control for the baseline level of the outcome variable. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group the outcomes in two families: (1) to (3) and (4) to (6).

TABLE A.7: CORRELATES OF FULL-DAY CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT IN CONTROL GROUP

	Full-day childcare (1)
Mother self-employed	0.06 (0.05)
Mother wage-employed	0.13* (0.07)
Child's age : 4	0.01 (0.05)
Child's age : 5	0.26*** (0.09)
Child's gender: boy	0.09* (0.05)
Mother of the child is the respondent	0.08 (0.11)
Child in half-day childcare (at baseline)	0.06 (0.06)
Mother's age	0.00 (0.00)
Mother's education (years)	0.02*** (0.01)
Household size	-0.00 (0.02)
Father is in the household	0.00 (0.06)
Other caregiver, besides mother or father	-0.01 (0.07)
Nb of elder male siblings	-0.01 (0.03)
Nb of elder female siblings	0.01 (0.03)
Mother's religion is Islam	0.03 (0.06)
Household owns any land	-0.05 (0.06)
Household income	0.01 (0.01)
Observations	383
R-squared	0.14
Mean of outcome	0.33

Notes: The sample includes the control group. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value one if the child is enrolled in full-day childcare at the long-term follow-up survey. All the right-hand side variables are defined at baseline. In addition, we also control for district fixed effects and a dummy taking value one if the household's income was missing and therefore imputed to the sample mean. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A.8: EFFECTS ON FATHERS BY TARGET CHILD'S LIKELIHOOD TO BE IN CHILDCARE

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nr.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Childcare	34.85 (23.97)	6.86 (6.33)	20.97 (13.47)	56.56** (26.89)	34.3*** (15.16)	0 (.04)	.86 (12.34)	.11** (.05)	21.46 (14.08)	.12** (.05)	23.4 (16.94)	0 (.02)	-.88 (1.41)	.03 (.02)	.08 (.08)
Cash	-8.87 (18.15)	-6.99 (4.99)	6.9 (12.04)	1.04 (20.73)	2.27 (12.99)	-.01 (.04)	-8.87 (11.15)	.08* (.05)	16.29 (13.94)	.05 (.05)	10.41 (16.45)	0 (.02)	.93 (1.83)	.02 (.02)	0 (.05)
Childcare & cash	48.17** (23.49)	4.77 (5.77)	1.93 (12.88)	61.59** (27.45)	9 (14.42)	.05 (.04)	15.01 (12.35)	.04 (.04)	5.33 (13.83)	.07 (.05)	20.87 (16.86)	.01 (.02)	-.57 (1.37)	.03 (.02)	.16 (.13)
Childcare × t. c. likely to be in school	-46.66 (29.58)	-9.45 (8.02)	-6.32 (18.33)	-44.54 (34.49)	-23.21 (20.21)	-.04 (.05)	-8.77 (16.68)	-.03 (.06)	.22 (19.18)	-.08 (.07)	-9.04 (23.45)	0 (.03)	3.65 (2.33)	-.06* (.03)	-.09 (.1)
Cash × t. c. likely to be in school	2.33 (25.57)	1.4 (6.97)	2.95 (17.95)	8.88 (31.08)	4.44 (19.73)	0 (.05)	14.05 (16.93)	-.06 (.06)	-15.57 (18.34)	-.07 (.07)	-5.08 (23.36)	-.01 (.02)	1.4 (2.46)	-.03 (.03)	.06 (.09)
Childcare & cash × t. c. likely to be in school	-32.3 (32.46)	-4.7 (7.89)	-.1 (17.79)	-38.02 (37.14)	-5.48 (20.26)	-.05 (.06)	-8.45 (17.85)	0 (.06)	6.79 (18.57)	-.06 (.07)	-6.11 (23.78)	-.02 (.03)	2.21 (2.11)	-.03 (.03)	-.2 (.14)
Impact when target child likely in school															
Childcare	-11.81 (17.37)	-2.59 (4.95)	14.64 (12.4)	12.03 (21.69)	11.09 (13.32)	-.04 (.04)	-7.91 (11.18)	.08** (.04)	21.68* (12.97)	.03 (.05)	14.36 (16.25)	0 (.02)	2.77 (1.8)	-.03 (.02)	-.02 (.06)
Cash	-6.54 (18.4)	-5.59 (4.85)	9.84 (13.38)	9.92 (23.3)	6.7 (14.85)	-.01 (.04)	5.18 (12.79)	.01 (.04)	.72 (11.9)	-.02 (.05)	5.33 (16.63)	0 (.02)	2.33 (1.71)	-.01 (.02)	.05 (.08)
Childcare & cash	15.87 (21.98)	.07 (5.22)	1.83 (12.25)	23.57 (24.86)	3.52 (14.07)	0 (.04)	6.55 (12.77)	.04 (.04)	12.13 (12.46)	.01 (.05)	14.76 (16.72)	-.01 (.02)	1.64 (1.6)	0 (.02)	-.04 (.04)
p-value (equal treatment effects)															
Childcare = cash	.776	.539	.726	.93	.77	.445	.306	.13	.12	.329	.61	.663	.853	.516	.375
Childcare = childcare & cash	.204	.616	.308	.648	.592	.285	.25	.305	.494	.654	.982	.461	.614	.248	.697
Cash = childcare & cash	.32	.261	.555	.609	.84	.742	.923	.623	.379	.619	.601	.751	.755	.637	.181
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.225	.245	.217	.962	.488	.313	.604	.321	.576	.922	.839	.693	.214	.185	.401
Mean Control	59	18	49	109	69	.15	42	.25	65	.4	106	.04	1	.05	.1
Obs.	1402	1402	1400	1400	1400	1402	1401	1402	1399	1402	1398	1402	1402	1401	1401

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues (1) and profits (2) earned through self-employment; income earned through wage labor (3) and the sum of wages and revenues (4) or wages and profits (5); labor supply in wage labor, and in self-employment, and in total at the extensive margins (6, 8 and 10) and at the intensive (7, 9 and 11) margins; whether the household purchased any business asset during the last 12 months (12) and the value of these assets (13); whether it has any employee in its businesses (14) and the number of employees (15). All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. The interaction term is a dummy indicating it is likely that the target child would have attended full day childcare in absence of our subsidies. All regressions control for the baseline level of the outcome variable and the randomization strata listed in Table A.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

TABLE A.9: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS BY PRESENCE OF YOUNGER CHILDREN AT BASELINE

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nr.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Childcare	69.57** (27.19)	10.58* (5.94)	-2.46 (4.03)	66.58** (27.26)	8.25 (7.38)	.04 (.04)	7.22 (12.45)	-.04 (.03)	-11.78* (6.77)	.01 (.04)	-4.23 (13.16)	.03 (.03)	3.64 (2.35)	.04 (.03)	-.04 (.13)
Cash	55.95** (23.27)	7.89 (5.31)	-7.21* (3.81)	49.77** (23.35)	1.69 (6.89)	.2*** (.04)	49.7*** (13.17)	-.06* (.03)	-12.52* (7.03)	.13*** (.04)	39.53*** (13.81)	.07*** (.03)	8.79*** (3.09)	.07** (.03)	.03 (.13)
Childcare & cash	69.38*** (23.9)	19.49*** (6.12)	-9.42*** (3.62)	61.89** (24.18)	11.39 (7.57)	.15*** (.04)	38.2*** (13.13)	-.07** (.03)	-21.4*** (6.28)	.07* (.04)	18.06 (13.6)	.04 (.03)	4.75** (2.39)	.07** (.03)	-.02 (.12)
Younger children	18.9 (25.83)	.79 (6.2)	-.69 (5.54)	14.44 (25.98)	-1.13 (8.62)	0 (.05)	8.09 (15.38)	-.04 (.04)	-15.21** (7.62)	-.03 (.05)	-7.13 (16.04)	-.01 (.03)	5.97 (3.93)	.03 (.03)	-.08 (.14)
Childcare × younger children	-101.3*** (37.88)	-14.23 (9.25)	-4.94 (7.44)	-104.21*** (38.41)	-17.63 (12.46)	-.06 (.07)	-16.16 (21.74)	.05 (.06)	17.73 (11.82)	0 (.08)	.29 (23.35)	-.02 (.04)	-6.89 (5.61)	-.09** (.05)	-.08 (.14)
Cash × younger children	-21.82 (43.84)	4.52 (10.42)	-.12 (7.42)	-21.59 (43.93)	3.49 (13.14)	-.02 (.08)	-36.33 (23.47)	.06 (.06)	6.77 (10.72)	0 (.08)	-30.38 (24.24)	-.01 (.05)	-14.77*** (4.91)	-.03 (.06)	.08 (.17)
Childcare & cash × younger children	-21.12 (46.24)	-12.24 (9.88)	-.86 (7.04)	-21.95 (46.67)	-13.31 (12.64)	.05 (.08)	-7.02 (24.12)	.04 (.06)	18.28* (10.4)	.07 (.08)	8.81 (25.01)	.15*** (.06)	9.87 (8.15)	0 (.06)	.14 (.16)
Impact with younger children at baseline															
Childcare	-31.73 (26.33)	-3.65 (7.12)	-7.4 (6.3)	-37.63 (26.93)	-9.38 (10.08)	-.02 (.06)	-8.94 (17.91)	.01 (.05)	5.94 (9.69)	0 (.07)	-3.94 (19.36)	.01 (.04)	-3.26 (5.09)	-.06 (.04)	-.12** (.06)
Cash	34.13 (37.05)	12.41 (8.95)	-7.33 (6.42)	28.17 (37.08)	5.18 (11.19)	.18*** (.07)	13.37 (19.48)	0 (.05)	-5.75 (8.06)	.13* (.07)	9.15 (19.97)	.06 (.04)	-5.98 (3.8)	.04 (.05)	.11 (.1)
Childcare & cash	48.27 (39.75)	7.24 (7.76)	-10.27* (6.06)	39.94 (40.1)	-1.92 (10.12)	.2*** (.07)	31.18 (20.27)	-.02 (.05)	-3.13 (8.29)	.15** (.07)	26.87 (21)	.19 (.05)	14.62 (7.79)	.07 (.05)	.13 (.09)
p-value (equal treatment effects)															
Childcare = cash	.048	.073	.989	.052	.192	.004	.246	.829	.22	.076	.524	.259	.435	.027	.016
Childcare = childcare & cash	.03	.164	.597	.039	.461	.001	.046	.482	.349	.045	.153	.001	.019	.006	.004
Cash = childcare & cash	.752	.584	.592	.794	.525	.766	.407	.617	.75	.83	.423	.017	.003	.546	.918
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.38	.898	.596	.349	.88	.668	.339	.603	.793	.906	.461	.071	.005	.18	.332
Mean Control	89	21	19	108	40	.31	84	.15	20	.44	103	.06	8	.11	.18
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues (1) and profits (2) earned through self-employment; income earned through wage labor (3) and the sum of wages and revenues (4) or wages and profits (5); labor supply in wage labor, and in self-employment, and in total at the extensive margins (6, 8 and 10) and at the intensive (7, 9 and 11) margins; whether the household purchased any business asset during the last 12 months (12) and the value of these assets (13); whether it has any employee in its businesses (14) and the number of employees (15). All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. The interaction term is a dummy indicating the target child has a younger sibling at baseline. All regressions control for the baseline level of the outcome variable and the randomization strata listed in Table A.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

TABLE A.10: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS BY AGE OF TARGET CHILD

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nr.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Childcare	54.42*	12.75*	-3.48	52.03*	10.64	.02	-.37	-.01	-5.01	.02	-5.95	.01	-1.49	.02	-.13
	(30.46)	(7.23)	(5.29)	(30.62)	(9.31)	(.05)	(15.38)	(.04)	(7.97)	(.05)	(16.2)	(.03)	(3.26)	(.03)	(.17)
Cash	64.01**	9.36	-7.44	57.1*	3.37	.15***	29.36*	-.03	-5.74	.1*	25.69	.02	.41	.03	-.1
	(32.39)	(6.89)	(4.62)	(32.23)	(8.74)	(.05)	(16.49)	(.04)	(8.45)	(.05)	(17.37)	(.03)	(4.04)	(.04)	(.18)
Childcare & cash	78.73**	20.92**	-7.27	74.71**	14.56	.16***	32.73**	-.05	-14.04*	.11**	17.99	.06	4.46	.08**	-.05
	(31.11)	(7.14)	(4.82)	(31.6)	(9.35)	(.05)	(16.06)	(.03)	(7.45)	(.05)	(16.59)	(.04)	(4.5)	(.04)	(.17)
4-5 yo	-18.71	-3.68	-.6	-20.63	-5.17	-.04	-16.08	.03	.37	0	-16.33	-.07**	-7.02**	-.03	-.18
	(22.57)	(5.83)	(4.79)	(22.8)	(7.82)	(.05)	(14.33)	(.04)	(7.99)	(.05)	(15.16)	(.03)	(2.75)	(.03)	(.19)
Childcare × 4-5 yo	-28.19	-12.82	-.76	-31.2	-15.33	0	4.8	-.03	-3.72	-.03	2.15	.02	6	-.02	.13
	(41.9)	(9.62)	(7.01)	(42.12)	(12.39)	(.06)	(20.76)	(.05)	(11.17)	(.07)	(22.03)	(.04)	(4.29)	(.04)	(.19)
Cash × 4-5 yo	-28.9	-.77	.32	-27.4	-1.8	.08	19.77	-.03	-9.32	.06	10.48	.09*	8.32	.05	.3
	(40.98)	(9.39)	(6.66)	(41.11)	(12.15)	(.07)	(22.28)	(.05)	(11.17)	(.07)	(23.23)	(.05)	(5.22)	(.05)	(.2)
Childcare & cash × 4-5 yo	-33.14	-10.2	-4.91	-40.81	-14.48	0	5.65	-.01	-4.56	-.02	3.63	.04	5.47	-.02	.13
	(39.92)	(9.89)	(6.34)	(40.37)	(12.42)	(.07)	(22.07)	(.05)	(10.29)	(.07)	(22.93)	(.05)	(5.67)	(.05)	(.19)
Impact when target child is 4/5 yo															
Childcare	26.23	-.07	-4.24	20.83	-4.69	.02	4.43	-.04	-8.73	-.01	-3.8	.03	4.5	0	-.01
	(28.76)	(6.15)	(4.48)	(28.87)	(7.87)	(.04)	(13.88)	(.04)	(7.86)	(.05)	(14.85)	(.02)	(2.98)	(.03)	(.07)
Cash	35.11	8.59	-7.11	29.69	1.58	.23***	49.13***	-.05	-15.05**	.16***	36.17**	.11	8.74	.08**	.2**
	(23.95)	(6.19)	(4.77)	(24.33)	(8.15)	(.05)	(14.81)	(.03)	(7.29)	(.05)	(15.23)	(.03)	(3.18)	(.04)	(.1)
Childcare & cash	45.59*	10.72	-12.19***	33.9	.08	.16***	38.38**	-.06*	-18.6***	.08	21.62	.1	9.93	.06*	.08
	(25.77)	(6.77)	(4.05)	(25.86)	(8.06)	(.05)	(15.19)	(.03)	(7.03)	(.05)	(15.82)	(.03)	(3.41)	(.03)	(.08)
p-value (equal treatment effects)															
Childcare = cash	.757	.143	.549	.76	.428	0	.004	.733	.405	.001	.013	.019	.326	.018	.024
Childcare = childcare & cash	.53	.107	.052	.672	.554	.008	.032	.604	.179	.078	.127	.059	.229	.083	.228
Cash = childcare & cash	.69	.75	.234	.874	.856	.172	.515	.854	.596	.161	.39	.702	.795	.5	.233
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.689	.811	.893	.676	.782	.164	.483	.499	.616	.369	.634	.285	.546	.601	.374
Mean Control	90	25	18	109	45	.31	79	.18	30	.48	109	.04	1	.1	.19
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues (1) and profits (2) earned through self-employment; income earned through wage labor (3) and the sum of wages and revenues (4) or wages and profits (5); labor supply in wage labor, and in self-employment, and in total at the extensive margins (6, 8 and 10) and at the intensive (7, 9 and 11) margins; whether the household purchased any business asset during the last 12 months (12) and the value of these assets (13); whether it has any employee in its businesses (14) and the number of employees (15). All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. The interaction term is a dummy indicating the target child is older (four-five years instead of three years). All regressions control for the baseline level of the outcome variable and the randomization strata listed in Table A.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

TABLE A.11: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS BY GENDER OF TARGET CHILD

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues (1)	Profits (2)		Revenues (4)	Profits (5)	>0 (6)	Hrs. (7)	>0 (8)	Hrs. (9)	>0 (10)	Hrs. (11)	>0 (12)	UGX 1000 (13)	>0 (14)	Nr. (15)
Childcare	40.18 (29.28)	8.21 (6.71)	-3.34 (4.91)	35.02 (29.17)	4.94 (8.52)	.01 (.05)	4.53 (14.26)	-.03 (.04)	-10.89 (8.74)	-.01 (.05)	-6.27 (15.47)	0 (.03)	2.13 (3.38)	.01 (.03)	-.14 (.18)
Cash	77.79*** (26.46)	17.2** (6.34)	-6.22 (4.59)	70.63*** (26.54)	10.76 (8.09)	.22*** (.05)	52.36*** (14.98)	-.05 (.04)	-18.38** (8.14)	.14*** (.05)	35.56** (15.93)	.06* (.03)	7.06* (4.01)	.06* (.04)	-.05 (.18)
Childcare & cash	64.74** (30.33)	17.78** (7.2)	-12.15*** (3.76)	50.45* (30.5)	4.35 (8.58)	.14*** (.05)	32.73** (15.05)	-.08** (.03)	-26.62*** (7.23)	.06 (.05)	5.04 (15.76)	.06* (.04)	9.67** (4.57)	.06* (.04)	-.09 (.17)
Boy	13.27 (23.5)	5.38 (5.99)	-1.4 (4.66)	9.83 (23.64)	1.81 (7.82)	.02 (.05)	19.38 (14.11)	-.04 (.04)	-13.22* (7.9)	-.02 (.05)	4.49 (14.97)	-.04 (.03)	-1.49 (2.61)	-.02 (.03)	-.21 (.17)
Childcare × boy	2.1 (42.66)	-3.18 (9.54)	-.86 (6.79)	4.87 (42.77)	-3.04 (12.08)	.03 (.07)	-4.49 (20.66)	.02 (.05)	8.36 (11.02)	.03 (.07)	3.71 (21.89)	.05 (.04)	-.72 (4.51)	0 (.05)	.15 (.19)
Cash × boy	-59.16 (39.6)	-17.05* (8.92)	-2.27 (6.53)	-57.17 (39.57)	-17.36 (11.35)	-.06 (.07)	-25.62 (21.98)	.01 (.05)	16.03 (11.11)	-.03 (.07)	-8.69 (22.91)	.02 (.05)	-4.9 (5.17)	0 (.05)	.2 (.2)
Childcare & cash × boy	-3.7 (40.92)	-3.54 (9.95)	4.77 (6.2)	8.84 (41.43)	6.13 (12.34)	.03 (.07)	5.17 (22.08)	.05 (.05)	20.31** (10.07)	.06 (.07)	28.66 (22.87)	.04 (.05)	-4.16 (5.71)	.01 (.05)	.23 (.19)
Impact when target child is a boy															
Childcare	42.27 (30.67)	5.03 (6.75)	-4.21 (4.75)	39.89 (30.95)	1.9 (8.58)	.04 (.05)	.03 (14.9)	-.01 (.03)	-2.53 (6.85)	.02 (.05)	-2.56 (15.48)	.05 (.03)	1.41 (2.96)	.01 (.03)	.01 (.05)
Cash	18.63 (29.29)	.15 (6.38)	-8.49* (4.68)	13.46 (29.24)	-6.6 (8.2)	.16*** (.05)	26.74* (16.08)	-.03 (.04)	-2.36 (7.55)	.11** (.05)	26.87 (16.49)	.08 (.03)	2.16 (3.06)	.06* (.04)	.15* (.08)
Childcare & cash	61.04** (27.92)	14.24** (6.82)	-7.38 (4.91)	59.29** (28.41)	10.48 (8.85)	.17*** (.05)	37.9** (16.08)	-.03 (.03)	-6.3 (6.99)	.12** (.05)	33.7** (16.47)	.1 (.03)	5.51 (3.38)	.07** (.03)	.14** (.07)
p-value (equal treatment effects)															
Childcare = cash	.48	.473	.321	.433	.317	.015	.099	.543	.982	.106	.082	.487	.828	.204	.09
Childcare = childcare & cash	.565	.205	.491	.56	.351	.005	.018	.588	.593	.044	.03	.175	.264	.079	.057
Cash = childcare & cash	.172	.041	.806	.144	.052	.799	.518	.938	.612	.763	.701	.534	.378	.698	.882
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.997	.35	.42	.893	.219	.737	.624	.758	.892	.913	.689	.501	.683	.955	.814
Mean Control	94	26	18	112	45	.31	86	.15	23	.45	109	.05	3	.09	.14
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues (1) and profits (2) earned through self-employment; income earned through wage labor (3) and the sum of wages and revenues (4) or wages and profits (5); labor supply in wage labor, and in self-employment, and in total at the extensive margins (6, 8 and 10) and at the intensive (7, 9 and 11) margins; whether the household purchased any business asset during the last 12 months (12) and the value of these assets (13); whether it has any employee in its businesses (14) and the number of employees (15). All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. The interaction term is a dummy indicating the target child a boy. All regressions control for the baseline level of the outcome variable and the randomization strata listed in Table A.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

B Other Effects: Well-Being

We first discuss the mother's psychological well-being, followed by domestic violence targeting the mother or child.

B.1 Mother's psychological well-being

We now analyze the treatment effects on the mother's subjective well-being. Table B.1 shows the impact on the mother's self-reported happiness, life satisfaction and stress. For happiness, we rely on the question "How happy are you with your life?", and for life satisfaction on the response to "In your opinion, where are you on the ladder of life at the moment?". Both are measured on a scale from zero to ten. The stress level is captured by the perceived stress scale (Cohen et al., 1983).

Relative to the control group, providing childcare increases happiness by ten percent and life satisfaction by eight percent. It also reduces stress by an insignificant 2.4 percent. Cash has a significant impact on all three outcome variables: Compared to the control, happiness and life satisfaction increase with 20 percent and 16 percent respectively, and the level of stress is reduced by five percent. The effects on happiness and life satisfaction are significantly higher than in the childcare only arm. For the combined arm, happiness with life and life satisfaction increase by 16 percent and 11 percent respectively, and stress goes down by three percent.

TABLE B.1: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS' SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING

	Happiness with life (0 to 10) (1)	Life satisfaction (0 to 10) (2)	Perceived stress scale (0-40) (3)
Childcare	.4*** (.15)	.31*** (.11)	-.58 (.38)
Cash	.81*** (.16)	.65*** (.12)	-1.15*** (.37)
Childcare & cash	.62*** (.16)	.42*** (.11)	-.78** (.39)
p-value (equal treatment effects):			
Childcare = cash	0.010	0.003	0.136
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.151	0.325	0.605
Cash = childcare & cash	0.256	0.063	0.348
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.009	0.001	0.083
Mean Control	4	4	24
Obs.	1414	1414	1414

Notes: In the columns (1) and (2), the dependent variables are the mother's happiness with life and position on the ladder of life, measured on a scale from zero to ten; and in column (3) it is the mother's stress level, captured by Cohen's perceived stress scale. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group the outcomes together in one family.

B.2 Domestic violence

In Table B.2, we investigate potential treatment effects on violence against mothers, against children by members of the household, and against children by outsiders. For each block, we look separately at psychological violence, physical violence, and the combination of both.

We first discuss the treatment effects on violence against mothers. This is particularly relevant in our context, given the recurrent finding that cash transfers may increase intimate partner violence (IPV) (Hidrobo and Fernald, 2013). Mothers who have a partner were asked in private about the occurrence of psychological and physical violence over the past month.³⁴ We report the extensive margin of domestic violence. The effects are not signif-

³⁴For violence against mothers, psychological violence includes three acts: (i) saying or doing something to humiliate the mother in front of others; (ii) threatening to hurt or harm the mother or someone she cares about; (iii) insulting the mother or make her feel bad about herself. Physical violence asks about seven acts: (i) push you, shake you, or throw something at you; (ii) slap you; (iii) twist your arm or pull your hair; (iv) punch you with his fist or with something that could hurt you; (v) kick you, drag you, or beat you up; (vi) try to choke you or burn you on purpose; (vii) threaten or attack you with a knife, gun or other weapon.

icant once we correct for multiple hypothesis testing. Nevertheless, the large point estimates imply that we cannot exclude that the cash transfers increased physical IPV. For the childcare only treatment, on the other hand, there is no impact on IPV as the coefficients are small and insignificant.

Columns (4) to (6) provide details on violence against children by household members, which is also a prevalent social problem in Uganda (Ministry of Gender and Development, 2015). We asked the mother whether she, or any other adult household member, committed violent acts against the target child in the past month and report the extensive margin results.³⁵ Notice that children are often subject to violence. In the control group, 78 percent report at least one episode of psychological violence and 75 percent report at least one episode of physical violence. The treatment effects are mostly positive, but small and statistically insignificant.

Finally, columns (7) to (9) discuss violence against children by others. We deemed this is important, as there is substantial use of violence in the education sector in Uganda (Devries et al., 2015). In this case, we asked mothers if they were aware of any other adult having performed the same acts as violence against children by household members. We do not find any evidence of increased violence against children outside the household.

³⁵For violence against children, psychological violence includes three acts: (i) shouting, yelling or screaming at the child; (ii) calling the child dumb, lazy etc.; (iii) taking away privileges. Physical violence includes six acts: (i) shaking the child; (ii) spanking, hitting or slapping the child on the bottom with bare hand; (iii) hitting the child on the bottom or elsewhere on the body with something like a belt, hairbrush, stick or other hard object; (iv) hitting or slapping the child on the face, head or ears; (v) hitting or slapping the child on the hand, arm, or leg; (vi) beating the child up, that is hit him/her over and over as hard as one could.

TABLE B.2: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

	Against partner			Against child (in hh)			Against child (out hh)		
	Psych. (1)	Phy. (2)	Any (3)	Psych. (4)	Phy. (5)	Any (6)	Psych. (7)	Phy. (8)	Any (9)
Childcare	.01 (.03)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.03)	.05* (.03)	-.03 (.03)	.03 (.02)	.03 (.04)	.04 (.03)	.04 (.04)
Cash	.04 (.03)	.06** (.03)	.06* (.03)	.04 (.03)	0 (.03)	.03 (.02)	-.02 (.04)	-.01 (.03)	-.02 (.04)
Childcare & cash	.02 (.03)	.05* (.03)	.04 (.03)	.05 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	.02 (.02)	.03 (.04)	.02 (.03)	.03 (.04)
p-value (equal treatment effects):									
Childcare = cash	0.410	0.049	0.145	0.687	0.499	0.874	0.111	0.170	0.098
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.638	0.134	0.362	0.930	0.568	0.666	0.993	0.644	0.920
Cash = childcare & cash	0.724	0.644	0.589	0.756	0.923	0.554	0.117	0.351	0.127
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.668	0.605	0.535	0.317	0.610	0.217	0.643	0.851	0.704
Mean Control	.23	.1	.24	.78	.75	.88	.47	.23	.51
Obs.	1287	1287	1282	1388	1388	1388	1388	1388	1388

Notes: The dependent variables measure the extensive margin of psychological, physical or any violence against women (column 1 to 3), against children by members of the household (column 4 to 6) and against children by others (column 7 to 9). We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in three families: (1) to (3), (4) to (6) and (7) to (9).

C Attrition Bounds

Given the differential attrition rate in the control relative to the treatment groups, we assess the sensitivity of our main findings with respect to attrition. As pre-specified, we follow Kling et al. (2007) and Fairlie et al. (2015) and calculate lower and upper bound estimates that adjust for differential non-response rates in the treatment groups relative to the control. We calculate the upper bounds by imputing the mean among the treated plus 0.1 (or 0.2) standard deviations (SD) to the non-responders in the treatment group. For the control group, we impute using the mean among the control minus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD. To calculate lower bounds, we follow the opposite procedure: For the treatment group, we take the mean minus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD and for the control we take the mean plus 0.1 (or 0.2) SD. We then re-estimate the treatment effects. We report the results in the following tables.

TABLE C.1: EFFECTS ON CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT AND ATTENDANCE – ATTRITION: TEN PERCENT IMPUTATION

	Enrollment		Attendance
	Any childcare	Full-day childcare	Days missed
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Lower bound			
Childcare	.14 ^{***} (.02)	.48 ^{***} (.03)	-15.81 ^{***} (1.77)
Cash	.07 ^{***} (.02)	.06 [*] (.03)	-9.1 ^{***} (2.07)
Childcare & cash	.13 ^{***} (.02)	.49 ^{***} (.03)	-15.02 ^{***} (1.82)
p-value (equal treatment effects):			
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.386	0.625	0.524
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.003	0.282	0.000
Mean Control	.83	.34	21
Obs.	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Upper bound			
Childcare	.15 ^{***} (.02)	.49 ^{***} (.03)	-15.12 ^{***} (1.77)
Cash	.08 ^{***} (.02)	.07 ^{**} (.03)	-8.23 ^{***} (2.07)
Childcare & cash	.14 ^{***} (.02)	.5 ^{***} (.03)	-14.32 ^{***} (1.82)
p-value (equal treatment effects):			
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.402	0.619	0.515
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.001	0.198	0.000
Mean Control	.82	.33	20.43
Obs.	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 1 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group all three outcomes together in one family.

TABLE C.2: EFFECTS ON CHILDCARE ENROLLMENT AND ATTENDANCE – ATTRITION: 20 PERCENT IMPUTATION

	Enrollment		Attendance
	Any childcare (1)	Full-day childcare (2)	Days missed (3)
Panel A: Lower bound			
Childcare	.14*** (.02)	.47*** (.03)	-16.15*** (1.77)
Cash	.07*** (.02)	.06* (.03)	-9.53*** (2.08)
Childcare & cash	.13*** (.02)	.49*** (.03)	-15.37*** (1.82)
p-value (equal treatment effects):			
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.379	0.627	0.529
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.004	0.333	0.000
Mean Control	.83	.34	21.28
Obs.	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Upper bound			
Childcare	.15*** (.02)	.49*** (.03)	-14.78*** (1.77)
Cash	.08*** (.02)	.07** (.03)	-7.8*** (2.07)
Childcare & cash	.14*** (.02)	.51*** (.03)	-13.97*** (1.82)
p-value (equal treatment effects):			
Childcare = cash	0.000	0.000	0.000
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.410	0.617	0.510
Cash = childcare & cash	0.001	0.000	0.000
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.001	0.164	0.000
Mean Control	.82	.33	20.15
Obs.	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 1 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group all three outcomes together in one family.

TABLE C.3: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS – ATTRITION: TEN PERCENT IMPUTATION

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nr.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Panel A: Lower bound															
Childcare	39.24*	6.74	-3.86	36.41*	3.87	.02	2.1	-.02	-6.62	0	-3.71	.03	1.84	.01	-.06
	(20.05)	(4.5)	(3.23)	(20.09)	(5.71)	(.03)	(9.73)	(.02)	(5.26)	(.03)	(10.32)	(.02)	(2.12)	(.02)	(.09)
Cash	49.04***	8.65**	-7.31**	43.71**	2.7	.19***	38.68***	-.04*	-10.46**	.12***	31.09***	.07**	4.63*	.06**	.05
	(18.68)	(4.34)	(3.08)	(18.69)	(5.52)	(.03)	(10.28)	(.02)	(5.19)	(.03)	(10.71)	(.02)	(2.37)	(.02)	(.1)
Childcare & cash	61.1***	15.03***	-10.11***	53.34***	6.67	.16***	35.75***	-.06**	-16.76***	.09**	20.5*	.08***	7.37***	.07**	.02
	(19.68)	(4.72)	(2.95)	(19.87)	(5.86)	(.03)	(10.46)	(.02)	(4.77)	(.03)	(10.82)	(.02)	(2.68)	(.02)	(.09)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.670	0.694	0.287	0.751	0.846	0.000	0.001	0.478	0.464	0.001	0.002	0.078	0.313	0.050	0.056
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.361	0.114	0.045	0.482	0.661	0.000	0.002	0.166	0.036	0.014	0.033	0.027	0.064	0.019	0.100
Cash = childcare & cash	0.592	0.205	0.340	0.671	0.520	0.400	0.798	0.503	0.185	0.345	0.366	0.637	0.391	0.717	0.641
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.368	0.957	0.807	0.378	0.991	0.299	0.737	0.797	0.964	0.440	0.659	0.677	0.813	0.938	0.757
Mean Control	91.95	24.78	19.8	112.38	45.79	.32	82.95	.18	31.28	.48	113.6	.08	4.46	.11	.25
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1414
Panel B: Upper bound															
Childcare	45.05**	8.16*	-2.57	42.15**	5.59	.03	5.68	-.02	-4.62	.02	.06	.03	2.52	.01	-.06
	(20.01)	(4.5)	(3.24)	(20.06)	(5.71)	(.03)	(9.74)	(.02)	(5.27)	(.03)	(10.33)	(.02)	(2.12)	(.02)	(.09)
Cash	55.39***	10.15**	-5.87*	49.99***	4.56	.2***	42.9***	-.03	-8.23	.14***	35.51***	.07***	5.5**	.06***	.05
	(18.69)	(4.33)	(3.09)	(18.71)	(5.52)	(.03)	(10.29)	(.02)	(5.2)	(.03)	(10.72)	(.02)	(2.37)	(.02)	(.1)
Childcare & cash	66.56***	16.51***	-8.9***	58.79***	8.49	.17***	39.47***	-.05**	-14.89***	.1***	24.38**	.08***	8.15***	.07**	.02
	(19.66)	(4.72)	(2.95)	(19.85)	(5.87)	(.03)	(10.47)	(.02)	(4.77)	(.03)	(10.83)	(.02)	(2.68)	(.02)	(.09)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.653	0.680	0.308	0.733	0.863	0.000	0.001	0.508	0.493	0.001	0.002	0.067	0.280	0.043	0.056
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.368	0.111	0.042	0.489	0.650	0.000	0.002	0.164	0.034	0.014	0.032	0.026	0.059	0.018	0.100
Cash = childcare & cash	0.619	0.205	0.303	0.697	0.522	0.374	0.764	0.467	0.161	0.323	0.342	0.667	0.407	0.750	0.641
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.262	0.791	0.918	0.272	0.844	0.188	0.543	0.960	0.774	0.291	0.473	0.509	0.973	0.860	0.757
Mean Control	87.9	23.76	18.88	108.31	44.4	.31	80.56	.17	29.88	.47	111.07	.07	4.05	.1	.25
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1414

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

TABLE C.4: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS – ATTRITION: 20 PERCENT IMPUTATION

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues (1)	Profits (2)		Revenues (4)	Profits (5)	>0 (6)	Hrs. (7)	>0 (8)	Hrs. (9)	>0 (10)	Hrs. (11)	>0 (12)	UGX 1000 (13)	>0 (14)	Nr. (15)
Panel A: Lower bound															
Childcare	36.33* (20.08)	6.03 (4.51)	-4.51 (3.23)	33.53* (20.13)	3 (5.71)	.01 (.03)	.3 (9.74)	-.03 (.02)	-7.61 (5.26)	0 (.03)	-5.59 (10.32)	.02 (.02)	1.51 (2.12)	0 (.02)	-.06 (.09)
Cash	45.86** (18.7)	7.89* (4.35)	-8.02*** (3.08)	40.56** (18.71)	1.77 (5.53)	.18*** (.03)	36.57*** (10.29)	-.05** (.02)	-11.58** (5.19)	.12*** (.03)	28.88*** (10.72)	.06** (.02)	4.19* (2.37)	.05** (.02)	.05 (.1)
Childcare & cash	58.36*** (19.71)	14.28*** (4.72)	-10.71*** (2.96)	50.6** (19.89)	5.75 (5.87)	.15*** (.03)	33.89*** (10.46)	-.06*** (.02)	-17.69*** (4.77)	.08** (.03)	18.56* (10.82)	.07*** (.02)	6.98** (2.68)	.06** (.02)	.02 (.09)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.679	0.701	0.277	0.760	0.838	0.000	0.001	0.464	0.451	0.001	0.002	0.084	0.330	0.055	0.056
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.358	0.116	0.046	0.479	0.667	0.000	0.002	0.168	0.037	0.014	0.033	0.028	0.067	0.019	0.100
Cash = childcare & cash	0.579	0.205	0.360	0.658	0.519	0.413	0.815	0.522	0.199	0.357	0.379	0.622	0.384	0.701	0.641
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.431	0.958	0.676	0.440	0.907	0.369	0.843	0.681	0.833	0.529	0.762	0.768	0.736	0.837	0.757
Mean Control	93.97	25.29	20.26	114.41	46.49	.32	84.15	.18	31.97	.48	114.87	.08	4.66	.11	.25
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1414
Panel B: Upper bound															
Childcare	47.94** (20.01)	8.87** (4.51)	-1.93 (3.25)	45.02** (20.06)	6.45 (5.71)	.04 (.03)	7.47 (9.75)	-.01 (.02)	-3.63 (5.28)	.02 (.03)	1.94 (10.35)	.04* (.02)	2.86 (2.12)	.02 (.02)	-.06 (.09)
Cash	58.55*** (18.72)	10.9** (4.33)	-5.16* (3.09)	53.13*** (18.75)	5.48 (5.52)	.21*** (.03)	45.01*** (10.3)	-.03 (.02)	-7.12 (5.21)	.14*** (.03)	37.71*** (10.74)	.08*** (.02)	5.94** (2.37)	.07*** (.02)	.05 (.1)
Childcare & cash	69.29*** (19.67)	17.26*** (4.73)	-8.29*** (2.96)	61.52*** (19.86)	9.4 (5.88)	.17*** (.03)	41.32*** (10.48)	-.04* (.02)	-13.96*** (4.78)	.11*** (.03)	26.32** (10.85)	.09*** (.02)	8.54*** (2.68)	.08*** (.02)	.02 (.09)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.644	0.674	0.320	0.724	0.872	0.000	0.001	0.523	0.508	0.000	0.002	0.062	0.264	0.040	0.056
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.372	0.109	0.041	0.493	0.644	0.000	0.002	0.163	0.033	0.014	0.032	0.025	0.057	0.017	0.100
Cash = childcare & cash	0.633	0.206	0.285	0.711	0.524	0.362	0.747	0.450	0.150	0.313	0.331	0.683	0.415	0.766	0.641
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.218	0.711	0.782	0.228	0.764	0.146	0.457	0.838	0.651	0.231	0.393	0.435	0.947	0.762	0.757
Mean Control	85.87	23.25	18.42	106.28	43.71	.31	79.36	.17	29.18	.47	109.8	.07	3.84	.1	.25
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1414

Notes: See Table 2 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

TABLE C.5: EFFECTS ON FATHERS – ATTRITION: TEN PERCENT IMPUTATION

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nr.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Panel A: Lower bound															
Childcare	18.36 (15.07)	4.57 (4.2)	19.24** (8.68)	42.74** (16.95)	28.47*** (9.77)	-.02 (.02)	-3.76 (7.74)	.09*** (.03)	21.83** (8.98)	.07** (.03)	18.07* (10.95)	0 (.01)	.96 (1.09)	0 (.01)	.03 (.05)
Cash	-4.86 (12.51)	-4.94 (3.51)	8.44 (8.54)	8.54 (14.94)	7.1 (9.5)	-.01 (.02)	-.96 (7.96)	.04 (.03)	7.31 (8.53)	.02 (.03)	7.68 (10.87)	0 (.01)	1.85 (1.23)	0 (.01)	.03 (.04)
Childcare & cash	36.81** (16.67)	4.3 (4.07)	-.23 (8.52)	40.64** (18.16)	7.72 (9.66)	.02 (.03)	10.11 (8.26)	.03 (.03)	7.66 (8.84)	.03 (.03)	16.11 (11.1)	0 (.01)	.42 (.98)	.01 (.01)	.06 (.07)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.127	0.020	0.239	0.050	0.040	0.779	0.740	0.110	0.116	0.094	0.371	0.865	0.552	1.000	0.997
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.326	0.954	0.033	0.918	0.050	0.106	0.112	0.029	0.136	0.256	0.869	0.680	0.667	0.453	0.618
Cash = childcare & cash	0.014	0.021	0.336	0.088	0.953	0.179	0.215	0.581	0.969	0.595	0.474	0.805	0.307	0.440	0.608
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.304	0.424	0.026	0.675	0.051	0.130	0.209	0.008	0.093	0.255	0.549	0.776	0.174	0.492	0.912
Mean Control	53.95	17.56	55.15	108.74	73.12	.15	41.53	.27	71.43	.41	111.43	.03	1.62	.05	.09
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1413
Panel B: Upper bound															
Childcare	21.29 (14.98)	5.58 (4.19)	21.81** (8.69)	44.88*** (16.82)	30.66*** (9.75)	-.01 (.02)	-1.02 (7.74)	.1*** (.03)	25.27*** (9.01)	.09** (.03)	22.25** (10.96)	.01 (.01)	1.29 (1.09)	0 (.01)	.03 (.05)
Cash	-1.1 (12.5)	-4.07 (3.49)	11.47 (8.55)	11.97 (14.87)	9.54 (9.48)	0 (.02)	2.16 (7.96)	.06** (.03)	11.04 (8.54)	.03 (.03)	12.2 (10.88)	0 (.01)	2.27* (1.23)	0 (.01)	.03 (.04)
Childcare & cash	40.45** (16.64)	5.23 (4.07)	2.16 (8.52)	43.3** (18.13)	8.99 (9.66)	.03 (.03)	12.89 (8.27)	.04 (.03)	10.95 (8.85)	.05 (.03)	20.04* (11.11)	0 (.01)	.73 (.98)	.01 (.01)	.06 (.07)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.139	0.018	0.259	0.058	0.042	0.741	0.706	0.121	0.124	0.104	0.387	0.899	0.506	0.961	0.997
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.306	0.940	0.031	0.938	0.040	0.103	0.111	0.028	0.132	0.256	0.852	0.675	0.658	0.448	0.618
Cash = childcare & cash	0.014	0.019	0.300	0.094	0.957	0.190	0.230	0.542	0.993	0.627	0.505	0.765	0.269	0.464	0.608
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.370	0.521	0.013	0.590	0.028	0.211	0.320	0.003	0.047	0.155	0.370	0.575	0.107	0.680	0.912
Mean Control	50.83	16.62	53.06	105.06	70.86	.14	39.74	.27	69.25	.4	108.84	.03	1.44	.04	.09
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1413

Notes: See Table 3 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

TABLE C.6: EFFECTS ON FATHERS – ATTRITION: 20 PERCENT IMPUTATION

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nr.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Panel A: Lower bound															
Childcare	16.78 (15.11)	4.04 (4.2)	17.96** (8.69)	41.46** (17.03)	27.31*** (9.8)	-.02 (.02)	-5.14 (7.74)	.09*** (.03)	20.11** (8.98)	.07** (.03)	15.97 (10.95)	0 (.01)	.8 (1.09)	0 (.01)	.03 (.05)
Cash	-6.84 (12.54)	-5.4 (3.53)	6.93 (8.55)	6.65 (15)	5.84 (9.54)	-.02 (.02)	-2.53 (7.97)	.04 (.03)	5.45 (8.54)	.01 (.03)	5.43 (10.88)	0 (.01)	1.63 (1.23)	-.01 (.01)	.03 (.04)
Childcare & cash	34.88* (16.69)	3.82 (4.08)	-1.41 (8.52)	39.13** (18.2)	7.02 (9.69)	.02 (.03)	8.72 (8.27)	.02 (.03)	6.02 (8.84)	.03 (.03)	14.15 (11.11)	-.01 (.01)	.27 (.98)	.01 (.01)	.06 (.07)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.122	0.021	0.229	0.047	0.039	0.799	0.757	0.105	0.113	0.089	0.364	0.849	0.575	0.980	0.997
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.337	0.961	0.034	0.909	0.056	0.108	0.113	0.029	0.138	0.255	0.878	0.682	0.671	0.456	0.618
Cash = childcare & cash	0.014	0.022	0.355	0.085	0.909	0.175	0.208	0.601	0.950	0.579	0.459	0.825	0.328	0.429	0.608
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.273	0.378	0.036	0.724	0.069	0.100	0.166	0.012	0.126	0.319	0.652	0.884	0.217	0.410	0.912
Mean Control	55.51	18.03	56.2	110.59	74.24	.15	42.42	.28	72.52	.41	112.73	.03	1.71	.05	.09
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1413
Panel B: Upper bound															
Childcare	22.66 (14.95)	6.07 (4.19)	23.1*** (8.71)	45.79*** (16.78)	31.71*** (9.75)	-.01 (.02)	.35 (7.75)	.11*** (.03)	26.99*** (9.03)	.09*** (.03)	24.35** (10.98)	.01 (.01)	1.45 (1.09)	.01 (.01)	.03 (.05)
Cash	.7 (12.51)	-3.65 (3.48)	12.98 (8.57)	13.55 (14.88)	10.72 (9.5)	0 (.02)	3.73 (7.97)	.06* (.03)	12.9 (8.55)	.04 (.03)	14.45 (10.9)	.01 (.01)	2.48** (1.23)	.01 (.01)	.03 (.04)
Childcare & cash	42.17** (16.63)	5.68 (4.07)	3.36 (8.54)	44.48** (18.14)	9.58 (9.69)	.04 (.03)	14.28* (8.28)	.04 (.03)	12.6 (8.86)	.05 (.03)	22.01** (11.13)	0 (.01)	.88 (.98)	.02 (.01)	.06 (.07)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.146	0.017	0.270	0.063	0.043	0.722	0.689	0.128	0.128	0.109	0.395	0.916	0.485	0.941	0.997
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.296	0.933	0.031	0.948	0.036	0.101	0.111	0.028	0.131	0.257	0.843	0.673	0.654	0.445	0.618
Cash = childcare & cash	0.014	0.019	0.284	0.097	0.912	0.196	0.238	0.524	0.974	0.644	0.521	0.746	0.252	0.476	0.608
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.404	0.572	0.009	0.555	0.021	0.263	0.389	0.002	0.033	0.119	0.297	0.485	0.083	0.784	0.912
Mean Control	49.27	16.16	52.02	103.22	69.73	.14	38.85	.26	68.16	.39	107.55	.03	1.35	.04	.09
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1413

Notes: See Table 3 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

TABLE C.7: EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME, CONSUMPTION AND FOOD SECURITY – ATTRITION: TEN PERCENT IMPUTATION

	Total Income		Consumption per day				Food
	Revenues (1)	profits (2)	Total (3)	Food (4)	Non-food (5)	Temptation (6)	insecurity (7)
Panel A: Lower bound							
Childcare	92.22*** (32.53)	35.91*** (12.72)	.96** (.48)	.04 (.25)	.89*** (.33)	-.04 (.05)	-.14 (.1)
Cash	59.85** (28.86)	8.26 (12.1)	1.27*** (.49)	.29 (.25)	.95*** (.34)	-.07* (.04)	-.21** (.09)
Childcare & cash	108.23*** (32.72)	12.33 (12.42)	1.62*** (.52)	.18 (.26)	1.41*** (.37)	-.05 (.05)	-.25*** (.1)
p-value (equal treatment effects):							
Childcare = cash	0.374	0.048	0.560	0.312	0.863	0.417	0.478
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.687	0.100	0.236	0.592	0.198	0.756	0.273
Cash = childcare & cash	0.188	0.768	0.525	0.678	0.263	0.607	0.681
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.374	0.091	0.415	0.674	0.407	0.330	0.471
Mean Control	253.67	138.54	11.51	5.94	5.38	.19	.41
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Upper bound							
Childcare	94.9*** (32.43)	37.65*** (12.65)	1.18** (.49)	.14 (.25)	1.03*** (.34)	-.02 (.05)	-.1 (.1)
Cash	65.36** (28.85)	10.54 (12.01)	1.52*** (.49)	.4 (.25)	1.12*** (.34)	-.05 (.04)	-.17* (.09)
Childcare & cash	112.27*** (32.86)	13.34 (12.36)	1.85*** (.52)	.28 (.26)	1.55*** (.37)	-.03 (.05)	-.22** (.1)
p-value (equal treatment effects):							
Childcare = cash	0.416	0.052	0.518	0.294	0.826	0.440	0.511
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.662	0.090	0.231	0.589	0.202	0.759	0.275
Cash = childcare & cash	0.201	0.839	0.556	0.654	0.287	0.633	0.648
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.328	0.063	0.253	0.481	0.253	0.518	0.671
Mean Control	247.35	135.77	11.37	5.87	5.29	.17	.38
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 5 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: (1) to (2) and (3) to (7).

TABLE C.8: EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME, CONSUMPTION AND FOOD SECURITY – ATTRITION: 20 PERCENT IMPUTATION

	Total Income		Consumption per day				Food
	Revenues (1)	profits (2)	Total (3)	Food (4)	Non-food (5)	Temptation (6)	insecurity (7)
Panel A: Lower bound							
Childcare	90.52*** (32.66)	34.96*** (12.8)	.85* (.48)	0 (.25)	.82** (.33)	-.05 (.05)	-.16* (.1)
Cash	56.78* (28.95)	7.06 (12.19)	1.14** (.49)	.24 (.25)	.87** (.34)	-.09* (.04)	-.23** (.09)
Childcare & cash	105.89*** (32.7)	11.75 (12.5)	1.51*** (.52)	.14 (.26)	1.34*** (.37)	-.06 (.05)	-.27*** (.1)
p-value (equal treatment effects):							
Childcare = cash	0.355	0.046	0.582	0.322	0.882	0.406	0.463
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.700	0.106	0.239	0.594	0.196	0.754	0.272
Cash = childcare & cash	0.182	0.734	0.510	0.690	0.252	0.595	0.699
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.403	0.109	0.515	0.781	0.502	0.256	0.386
Mean Control	256.83	139.93	11.59	5.97	5.42	.19	.42
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Upper bound							
Childcare	95.99*** (32.47)	38.47*** (12.66)	1.29** (.49)	.18 (.25)	1.1*** (.34)	-.01 (.05)	-.09 (.1)
Cash	67.89** (28.93)	11.66 (12.03)	1.64*** (.49)	.45* (.25)	1.2*** (.34)	-.04 (.04)	-.15 (.09)
Childcare & cash	114.07*** (32.99)	13.83 (12.41)	1.96*** (.52)	.33 (.26)	1.62*** (.37)	-.02 (.05)	-.2** (.1)
p-value (equal treatment effects):							
Childcare = cash	0.439	0.055	0.498	0.285	0.808	0.452	0.529
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.648	0.085	0.229	0.588	0.204	0.761	0.276
Cash = childcare & cash	0.208	0.875	0.572	0.643	0.300	0.646	0.631
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.309	0.053	0.191	0.397	0.194	0.629	0.781
Mean Control	244.18	134.38	11.29	5.84	5.24	.17	.37
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 5 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: (1) to (2) and (3) to (7).

TABLE C.9: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT – ATTRITION: TEN PERCENT IMPUTATION

	Breakdown into components				
	IDELA	Emergent	Emergent	Socio-	Motor
	score	literacy	numeracy	emotional	development
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Lower bound					
Childcare	.15*** (.05)	.1* (.05)	.09 (.06)	.04 (.06)	.21*** (.06)
Cash	.09* (.05)	.06 (.05)	.08 (.06)	0 (.06)	.11* (.06)
Childcare & cash	.15*** (.05)	.16*** (.05)	.11* (.06)	.02 (.06)	.19*** (.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.281	0.390	0.781	0.544	0.062
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.893	0.297	0.828	0.807	0.630
Cash = childcare & cash	0.232	0.058	0.626	0.723	0.166
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.290	0.995	0.464	0.857	0.093
Mean Control	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Upper bound					
Childcare	.16*** (.05)	.12** (.05)	.11* (.06)	.06 (.06)	.23*** (.05)
Cash	.11** (.05)	.08 (.05)	.1* (.06)	.03 (.06)	.13** (.06)
Childcare & cash	.17*** (.05)	.18*** (.05)	.12** (.06)	.05 (.06)	.21*** (.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.322	0.419	0.832	0.562	0.074
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.867	0.289	0.810	0.818	0.644
Cash = childcare & cash	0.254	0.062	0.656	0.732	0.186
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.195	0.807	0.329	0.631	0.048
Mean Control	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 6 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group the outcomes in two families: (1) and (2, 3, 4 and 5).

TABLE C.10: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT – ATTRITION: 20 PERCENT IMPUTATION

	Breakdown into components				
	IDELA	Emergent	Emergent	Socio-	Motor
	score	literacy	numeracy	emotional	development
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Lower bound					
Childcare	.14*** (.05)	.09* (.05)	.08 (.06)	.03 (.06)	.2*** (.06)
Cash	.08 (.05)	.05 (.05)	.06 (.06)	-.01 (.06)	.1 (.06)
Childcare & cash	.14*** (.05)	.15*** (.06)	.1 (.06)	.01 (.06)	.18*** (.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.262	0.378	0.756	0.536	0.057
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.906	0.302	0.837	0.802	0.624
Cash = childcare & cash	0.223	0.056	0.611	0.720	0.157
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.350	0.895	0.544	0.975	0.128
Mean Control	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496
Panel B: Upper bound					
Childcare	.17*** (.05)	.13** (.05)	.12** (.06)	.08 (.06)	.25*** (.05)
Cash	.12** (.05)	.09 (.05)	.11* (.06)	.04 (.06)	.15** (.06)
Childcare & cash	.18*** (.05)	.19*** (.05)	.13** (.06)	.06 (.06)	.22*** (.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.345	0.434	0.858	0.571	0.080
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.855	0.286	0.801	0.823	0.652
Cash = childcare & cash	0.267	0.065	0.671	0.737	0.197
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.158	0.712	0.273	0.530	0.034
Mean Control	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02
Obs.	1496	1496	1496	1496	1496

Notes: See Table 6 for a description of the dependent and control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group the outcomes in two families: (1) and (2, 3, 4 and 5).

D Clustered standard errors

The treatment is at the individual level, but it does not exclude that some of the outcomes may be correlated across households within communities. This section shows that our results are robust to clustering the standard errors at the community level.

TABLE D.1: EFFECTS ON MOTHERS – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nb.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Childcare	41.51*	6.65	-3.83	37.72*	3.37	.02	2.61	-.02	-6.83	.01	-4.24	.03	1.71	.01	-.06
	(22.41)	(4.99)	(3.85)	(22.3)	(6.2)	(.03)	(10)	(.03)	(5.87)	(.04)	(10.61)	(.02)	(2.23)	(.02)	(.09)
Cash	49.47**	9**	-7.26**	43.34*	2.51	.19***	39.73***	-.04	-10.51*	.13***	31.31***	.07**	4.79*	.06**	.05
	(19.72)	(4.44)	(3.38)	(19.57)	(5.55)	(.03)	(11.04)	(.03)	(5.73)	(.03)	(11.23)	(.02)	(2.57)	(.03)	(.1)
Childcare & cash	63.17***	16.06***	-9.67***	55.43**	7.65	.16***	36.1***	-.05**	-16.28***	.09**	20.39*	.08***	7.41**	.07*	.02
	(20.51)	(5.01)	(3.24)	(20.46)	(6.12)	(.03)	(10.82)	(.03)	(5.42)	(.03)	(11.29)	(.02)	(2.77)	(.03)	(.09)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.752	0.652	0.328	0.824	0.890	0.000	0.002	0.558	0.501	0.001	0.003	0.078	0.302	0.077	0.048
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.401	0.088	0.082	0.497	0.530	0.000	0.005	0.240	0.057	0.015	0.044	0.026	0.056	0.031	0.110
Cash = childcare & cash	0.561	0.180	0.436	0.608	0.404	0.389	0.761	0.563	0.264	0.359	0.365	0.679	0.425	0.776	0.646
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.392	0.954	0.772	0.431	0.841	0.245	0.693	0.805	0.891	0.403	0.678	0.629	0.812	0.929	0.760
Mean Control	89.92	24.27	19.34	110.35	45.1	.31	81.76	.17	30.58	.47	112.34	.07	4.25	.1	.25
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues (1) and profits (2) earned through self-employment; income earned through wage labor (3) and the sum of wages and revenues (4) or wages and profits (5); labor supply in wage labor, and in self-employment, and in total at the extensive (6, 8 and 10) and at the intensive (7, 9 and 11) margins; whether the household purchase any business asset during the last 12 months (12) and the value of these assets (13); whether it has any employee in its businesses (14) and the number of employees (15). All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

TABLE D.2: EFFECTS ON FATHERS – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nr.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Childcare	14.37 (15.95)	2.61 (4.15)	18.1* (9.5)	38.12** (18.69)	24.56** (10.63)	-.02 (.03)	-3.38 (8.46)	.09*** (.03)	20.5** (10.31)	.07** (.04)	18.29 (11.79)	0 (.01)	.98 (1.27)	0 (.02)	.03 (.05)
Cash	-7.2 (12.67)	-5.49 (3.44)	8.02 (9.39)	6.02 (16.16)	5.08 (10.4)	-.01 (.02)	-.4 (8.17)	.05 (.03)	8.06 (9.26)	.02 (.03)	8.41 (11.03)	0 (.01)	1.97 (1.3)	0 (.01)	.03 (.04)
Childcare & cash	30.77* (15.94)	1.87 (3.69)	.92 (8.8)	40.65** (19.2)	5.04 (9.83)	.03 (.03)	10.43 (8.89)	.03 (.03)	7.56 (9.68)	.04 (.04)	16.27 (11.36)	0 (.01)	.47 (1)	.01 (.02)	.06 (.07)
p-value (equal treatment effects):															
Childcare = cash	0.157	0.041	0.328	0.080	0.086	0.771	0.746	0.203	0.206	0.139	0.430	0.921	0.564	0.975	0.998
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.377	0.865	0.078	0.905	0.082	0.109	0.119	0.070	0.197	0.280	0.867	0.689	0.693	0.510	0.626
Cash = childcare & cash	0.017	0.035	0.451	0.059	0.997	0.206	0.250	0.636	0.958	0.643	0.502	0.788	0.311	0.509	0.606
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.302	0.394	0.060	0.895	0.109	0.162	0.232	0.018	0.133	0.252	0.517	0.717	0.164	0.629	0.914
Mean Control	52.39	17.09	54.11	106.9	71.99	.15	40.64	.27	70.34	.4	110.14	.03	1.53	.04	.09
Obs.	1414	1414	1412	1412	1412	1414	1413	1414	1411	1414	1410	1414	1414	1413	1413

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues (1) and profits (2) earned through self-employment; income earned through wage labor (3) and the sum of wages and revenues (4) or wages and profits (5); labor supply in wage labor, and in self-employment, and in total at the extensive (6, 8 and 10) and at the intensive (7, 9 and 11) margins; whether the household purchased any business asset during the last 12 months (12) and the value of these assets (13); whether it has any employee in its businesses (14) and the number of employees (15). All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

TABLE D.3: EFFECTS ON SINGLE MOTHERS – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

	Income					Labor supply						Assets & employees			
	Self-emp.		Wage	Total		Self-emp.		Wage		Total		Assets		Employees	
	Revenues	Profits		Revenues	Profits	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	Hrs.	>0	UGX 1000	>0	Nr.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Childcare	-1.57 (22.35)	.34 (5.84)	-4.73 (4.63)	-5.24 (22.51)	-3.17 (7.35)	-.02 (.04)	-10.25 (12.29)	-.02 (.03)	-1.28 (6.43)	-.04 (.04)	-11.6 (13.02)	.02 (.02)	1.78 (2.69)	-.01 (.03)	-.17 (.13)
Cash	64.04** (27.75)	11.14* (5.9)	-7.38* (3.76)	60.44** (27.48)	5.78 (7.23)	.19*** (.04)	33.4** (13.76)	-.04 (.03)	-4.28 (5.98)	.12*** (.04)	29.22** (14.01)	.09*** (.03)	6.31* (3.53)	.03 (.03)	-.06 (.13)
Childcare & cash	63.51** (26.4)	14.28** (5.66)	-8.43** (3.83)	59.13** (26.46)	8.08 (7.15)	.18*** (.04)	40.19*** (13.35)	-.06** (.03)	-9.83* (5.51)	.11*** (.04)	30.03** (13.5)	.1*** (.03)	8.92** (3.56)	.07** (.03)	-.01 (.13)
Single mother	-29.72 (24.25)	-6.24 (6.62)	1.85 (5.3)	-25.11 (24.72)	-1.36 (9.05)	-.03 (.05)	-14.93 (15.33)	.06 (.04)	23.48** (9.86)	.03 (.05)	10.79 (16.63)	.02 (.03)	1.22 (2.68)	-.07** (.03)	-.29* (.15)
Childcare × single mother	158.17** (62.71)	22.74* (12.21)	3.89 (7.38)	158.88** (62.39)	24.84* (14.82)	.15* (.08)	45.93* (24.84)	.01 (.06)	-15.8 (13.45)	.17** (.08)	30.84 (25.45)	.02 (.05)	.06 (5.02)	.07 (.05)	.34** (.17)
Cash × single mother	-41.7 (35.89)	-6.03 (9.18)	.28 (7.86)	-49.38 (35.85)	-9.62 (12.77)	.01 (.07)	19.49 (22.58)	0 (.06)	-19.3 (13.02)	.02 (.07)	5.75 (24.32)	-.05 (.05)	-4.58 (5.24)	.08* (.05)	.35** (.15)
Childcare & cash × single mother	.4 (40.35)	5.55 (9.87)	-3.77 (6.45)	-9.76 (40.54)	-1.27 (12.55)	-.06 (.07)	-11.46 (22.83)	.02 (.06)	-20.23* (11.93)	-.05 (.07)	-29.25 (23.75)	-.06 (.05)	-4.54 (5.51)	-.02 (.05)	.1 (.15)
Impact for single mothers at baseline															
Childcare	156.6*** (58.26)	23.08** (10.46)	-.83 (6.03)	153.64*** (57.62)	21.67* (12.42)	.13** (.06)	35.68* (20.32)	-.01 (.05)	-17.08 (11.96)	.14** (.06)	19.24 (20.72)	.04 (.04)	1.83 (4.18)	.06 (.04)	.17* (.09)
Cash	22.35 (22.12)	5.1 (6.78)	-7.1 (6.87)	11.06 (22.28)	-3.84 (9.85)	.2*** (.06)	52.9*** (18.15)	-.04 (.05)	-23.58** (11.8)	.14** (.06)	34.97* (19.56)	.03 (.04)	1.73 (3.64)	.12*** (.04)	.29*** (.09)
Childcare & cash	63.91** (30.92)	19.83** (8.74)	-12.2** (5.49)	49.37 (30.93)	6.81 (10.77)	.12** (.06)	28.72 (18.48)	-.04 (.05)	-30.06** (11.07)	.06 (.06)	.78 (19.89)	.04 (.04)	4.39 (4.23)	.06 (.04)	.1 (.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects)															
Childcare = cash	.018	.07	.349	.011	.026	.277	.404	.686	.528	.933	.466	.858	.983	.23	.371
Childcare = childcare & cash	.121	.774	.029	.081	.25	.87	.744	.643	.175	.228	.398	.979	.626	.971	.439
Cash = childcare & cash	.117	.078	.409	.142	.27	.188	.238	.949	.511	.17	.102	.874	.587	.217	.072
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	.07	.532	.62	.067	.497	.014	.04	.895	.497	.012	.07	.582	.899	.06	.007
Mean Control	88	24	22	113	49	.3	75	.22	48	.49	123	.1	6	.07	.1
Obs.	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414	1414

Notes: The dependent variables measure total revenues (1) and profits (2) earned through self-employment; income earned through wage labor (3) and the sum of wages and revenues (4) or wages and profits (5); labor supply in wage labor, and in self-employment, and in total at the extensive margins (6, 8 and 10) and at the intensive (7, 9 and 11) margins; whether the household purchased any business asset during the last 12 months (12) and the value of these assets (13); whether it has any employee in its businesses (14) and the number of employees (15). All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. The interaction term is a dummy indicating the mother was single at baseline. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in eight families: (1) and (2), (3), (4) and (5), (6) and (7), (8) and (9), (10) and (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15).

TABLE D.4: EFFECTS ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME, CONSUMPTION AND FOOD SECURITY – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

	Total Income		Consumption per day				Food
	Revenues	profits	Total	Food	Non-food	Temptation	insecurity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Childcare	85.73** (34.73)	31.03** (13.34)	.93* (.54)	.09 (.25)	.85** (.38)	-.03 (.05)	-.11 (.1)
Cash	56.2* (30.39)	5.76 (12.99)	1.29** (.51)	.33 (.25)	.97*** (.36)	-.06 (.04)	-.19* (.1)
Childcare & cash	107.05*** (34.58)	9.12 (12.58)	1.63*** (.57)	.22 (.27)	1.39*** (.41)	-.04 (.05)	-.23** (.09)
p-value (equal treatment effects):							
Childcare = cash	0.429	0.092	0.493	0.327	0.752	0.450	0.431
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.609	0.147	0.242	0.615	0.192	0.776	0.227
Cash = childcare & cash	0.173	0.816	0.542	0.689	0.301	0.577	0.709
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.499	0.167	0.459	0.607	0.443	0.415	0.609
Mean Control	250.51	137.15	11.44	5.9	5.33	.18	.39
Obs.	1410	1410	1393	1413	1400	1403	1414

Notes: In column (1) and (2) the dependent variables are total income measured through revenues and profits, respectively. In column (3), the dependent variable measures total household expenditures per day, comprising expenditures on food in column (4), and non-food in column (5). The final column is a measure of food insecurity, which is the first principal component of the four questions on experiencing food insecurity in the past seven days. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. All monetary values are in thousands of UGX and are winsorized at the top 99th percentile. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values for multiple hypothesis testing, we group the outcomes in two families: (1) to (2) and (3) to (7).

TABLE D.5: EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT – CLUSTERED STANDARD ERRORS

	Breakdown into components				
	IDELA score (1)	Emergent literacy (2)	Emergent numeracy (3)	Socio-emotional (4)	Motor development (5)
Childcare	.16*** (.05)	.12** (.06)	.11* (.06)	.04 (.06)	.23*** (.06)
Cash	.09 (.06)	.06 (.06)	.08 (.06)	.01 (.07)	.11* (.07)
Childcare & cash	.15*** (.06)	.16*** (.06)	.1 (.06)	.04 (.07)	.19*** (.06)
p-value (equal treatment effects):					
Childcare = cash	0.237	0.334	0.675	0.550	0.063
Childcare = childcare & cash	0.956	0.482	0.970	0.949	0.507
Cash = childcare & cash	0.255	0.091	0.712	0.605	0.204
Childcare & cash = childcare + cash	0.238	0.774	0.384	0.916	0.075
Mean Control	0	0	0	0	0
Obs.	1366	1366	1366	1366	1366

Notes: In column 1, the dependent variable is the standardized aggregate IDELA score, and in the columns 2-5 the standardized components of the score: emergent literacy, emergent numeracy, socio-emotional skills and motor development. We include the same control variables as in Table 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is indicated by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for unadjusted p -values and by * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ for p -values that are adjusted for multiple hypotheses testing. When correcting the p -values, we group the outcomes together in two families: the overall score (1) and the components of the score (2, 3, 4 and 5).